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Abstract
Developers are notorious for their dislike of writing in-
ternal documentation. It has few value to them because
its benefits are too far away in the future and distributed
on the whole team, while the efforts of documenting
are burdened on the individual himself. The resulting
phenomena have names like free riding or tragedy of the
commons.
Software is an accumulation of encoded knowledge
and a collecting pond for complexity. Its development
is more akin to research and evolution than to an agreed
path with an established goal. Multiple developers are
engaged in an intricate joint endeavor, building on dis-
covery, invention and decision making, flanked by sev-
eral stakeholders. A developer must constantly learn
and relearn the software to be able to adapt it to ever-
changing requirements. Instead of being “soft” and easy
to adapt, software is difficult to modify. If knowledge is
not preserved in source code, wiki articles, and other doc-
umentation, then software development becomes costly
even up to the point of a total economic loss.
This research presents CollabReview, which ad-
dresses the developers’ motivation to invest in internal
quality without strict regulation. It re-balances intrap-
ersonal cost-benefit considerations in favor of internal
quality using gamification. Personal reputation scores
for developers are calculated from ownership-based
responsibility and quality ratings for collaboratively
written software process artifacts. The scores are tied to
social games and rewards to make scores worthwhile to
achieve. The implemented prototype of the CollabRe-
view concept mines responsibility information from
revision histories, and combines it with manual and
automated assessments of artifact quality.
The CollabReview concept and prototype were eval-
uated in several studies including an analytical con-
cept evaluation, technical validations and field exper-
iments. The latter deployed the prototype in knowledge
management, agile, open source or distributed consor-
tium projects. It successfully amplified contributions to
knowledge management wikis, and improved the read-
ability of source code. The results show that CollabRe-
view leads to better internal documentation and quality
of the whole software. At the same time, it leaves devel-
opers their freedom to neglect quality when necessary,
does not burden them with unnecessary additional ef-
forts, and hence has particular value in self-organizing
project environments where code ownership is weak.
Zusammenfassung
Entwickler sind beru¨chtigt fu¨r ihre Abneigung gegen
das Schreiben von Dokumentation. Der perso¨nliche
Nutzen hiervon liegt zu weit in der Zukunft und wird
mit anderen geteilt, wa¨hrend der Schreibaufwand auf
dem Einzelnen lastet. Das Ergebnis sind Pha¨nomene
wie Trittbrettfahren oder die Tragik der Allmende.
Software ist eine Ansammlung kodierten Wissens
und ein Auffangbecken fu¨r Komplexita¨t. Ihr Entste-
hungsprozess gleicht eher Forschung und Evolution als
einem festen Weg mit klarem Ziel. Die gemeinsame Ar-
beit mehrerer Entwickler wird von unterschiedlichsten
Interessenten begleitet, und besteht aus Entdeckung,
Erfindung und Entscheidung. Um die Software an sich
laufend a¨ndernde Anforderungen anpassen zu ko¨nnen,
muss ein Entwickler ihr Inneres sta¨ndig (wieder) er-
lernen. Anstatt leicht anpassbar zu sein, ist Software
schwer zu a¨ndern; ihre Entwicklung ist daher teuer.
Wird das Wissen nicht in Quellcode, Wiki-Artikeln
oder anderer Dokumentation wohl bewahrt, droht ein
wirtschaftlicher Totalschaden.
Diese Arbeit pra¨sentiert CollabReview, das anstatt
strenge Regeln vorzugeben, die Motivation der Entwick-
ler anspricht, in interne Qualita¨t zu investieren. Es bee-
influsst intrapersonelle Kosten-Nutzen-U¨berlegungen
zu Gunsten interner Qualita¨t mittels Spielelementen.
Dazu werden perso¨nliche Reputationspunkte fu¨r En-
twickler aus Qualita¨ts- und Zusta¨ndigkeitsinformationen
von gemeinschaftlich entwickelten Software-Artefakten
berechnet. Um die Punkte erstrebenswert zu machen,
sind sie an soziale Spiele und Belohnungen gekoppelt.
Der CollabReview Prototyp gewinnt seine Informatio-
nen aus Entwicklungshistorien, und kombiniert sie mit
manuell und automatisch erzeugten Qualita¨tsreviews.
Das Konzept und der Prototyp von CollabReview wur-
den in Expertenanalysen, technischen Validierungen und
Feldversuchen evaluiert. Letztere brachten den Prototyp
in agilen, quelloffenen, verteilten Konsortial- und Wis-
sensverwaltungsprojekten zum Einsatz. Die Beitra¨ge
zur Wissensverwaltung konnten so erfolgreich gesteigert
und die Lesbarkeit von Quellcode verbessert werden.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass CollabReview zu besserer
interner Dokumentation und Qualita¨t der Software fu¨hrt.
Gleichzeitig la¨sst es Entwicklern die Freiheit, Qualita¨t
wenn no¨tig zu vernachla¨ssigen, belastet sie nicht mit
unno¨tigem Mehraufwand, und hat folglich besonderen
Wert in selbst-organisierenden Projekten mit schwacher
Quellcode-Eigentu¨merschaft.
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Introduction
Documentation is a love letter that you write to your future self.
— Damian Conway
THIS research deals with advancing the process ofsoftware development. The goal is to improve thequality of the software that is being developed. It
is achieved by focusing on internal quality. As opposed
to external quality which users see, internal quality is
that which the development team gets into contact with.
Software process artifacts like source code and docu-
mentation preserve the knowledge that was obtained and
applied while building the software system. How good
they are determines the internal quality of software. But
internal quality is often neglected in software projects
for various reasons like time pressure or management
ignorance. Another major reason is that developers have
a dislike for activities that improve internal quality be-
cause doing so often has few direct value for the individ-
ual himself. Writing down knowledge about the inner
workings of software, for example, costs a developer
his precious time but has few value for the developer
himself. Potential benefits pay off much later and are
shared with the team. Yet preservation of knowledge is
invaluable for the team. The economic analogy is that
of a public good. Everybody expects it to be there and
be in a good condition but there is few incentive to the
individual to pay for its maintenance.
The problem is highly relevant: Large software sys-
tems accumulate a huge mass of detailed knowledge
which is implemented in the behavior of software. How-
ever, its implemented functionality has to be accompa-
nied by high-quality documentation which further ex-
plains the software to users and, here, developers. Oth-
erwise the software gradually becomes more and more
difficult to modify, cannot keep up with always chang-
ing requirements, and ages quickly. In the end, valu-
able detail knowledge is lost because it is too difficult or
even impossible (e.g. requirements) to recover it from
the machine-readable instructions alone. Better internal
quality leads to better external quality and quality in
use, makes development itself more efficient, decreases
long-term software maintenance costs, and enables eas-
ier reuse of software components. Research projects
often generate large-scale software prototypes, i.e. pro-
totypes which are developed for being more than just a
quick design probe. If such prototypes cannot be reused
in later projects because they are too costly to under-
stand or modify, then it means that the implementation
can only be discarded. As a consequence, all the imple-
mentation knowledge and invested efforts are lost. The
project is a total economic loss.
The approach presented in this thesis brings micro-
scale economic market elements into the software
project to improve internal quality. The reasoning is
as follows: Ownership for a software process artifact
is gained by contributing to it. With ownership comes
responsibility for the software process artifacts, and for
the value that they have for the project. The development
history of collaboratively developed artifacts can be
mined in order to unearth ownership and responsibility.
Trivially, this works against the diffusion of responsi-
bility in collaboratively created artifacts, and privatizes
the common good. Developers now have a stake in the
value that their property has for the team. Furthermore,
it becomes possible to associate a perceivable direct
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value with the abstract value-for-the-team of their
property. Taking care of artifacts for the good of the
team becomes a game. Selfishness then motivates
individual developers to take pro-social care of internal
quality. The realization of this concept is supported by a
computer-implemented reputation system that computes
individual scores for developers. These scores are the
basis for reinforcing desired behavior.
The game makes it possible to appeal to the develop-
ers’ selfishness to bring forth the improvement of inter-
nal quality. Selfishness guides developers like Smith’s
invisible hand to do more of the activities that help
the team. The effect assists quality assurance by en-
abling the self-management of software process artifact
quality. The concept is especially interesting for dis-
tributed, consortium-based projects with flat hierarchies
(like European Union (EU) projects) because it does not
require enforcement and control based on established hi-
erarchical structures. And it still leaves developers their
flexibility without forcing them to comply. In the end,
improved internal quality reduces development costs and
makes industrial exploitation easier.
Chapter 2 elaborates the problem scope of this re-
search. On the basis of source code and other exam-
ples of software process artifacts, the chapter stresses
the importance of internal quality for collaboration. Al-
though good internal quality is known to be so important,
it is infamous for being fallen short of. This situation
causes unnecessary costs, delays, and exploitation prob-
lems. The reasons are attributed to the tragedy of the
commons, a sociological phenomenon that causes the
decay of valuable resources. The original context that
initiated the research process were EU projects. There
the problem reveals itself more clearly due to less pro-
nounced organizational maturity of consortia, which per-
haps makes them particularly susceptible to this phe-
nomenon as compared to other kinds of projects.
Chapter 3 presents a survey of related work. It de-
scribes relevant concepts and approaches in the domains
of software engineering, software quality management,
testing, mining software repositories, and in related areas
like collaboration, organization, management and moti-
vation, also including economics. Additionally, the lit-
erature review reveals that the above problems have not
yet been tackled satisfactorily and that a new approach
is required. But it also shows that current research is
trying similar approaches in other domains and software
development as well.
Chapter 4 therefore introduces such a new approach.
It is based on the claim that software process artifacts
can be internalized with a reputation-based software tool,
and can be used to encourage the individual developer
himself to care more for the quality of a project team’s
common property when combined with suitable rewards.
Pro-social behavior that helps the team, i.e. contributing
to internal quality, earns the developers a high reputation
score. Consequently, documentation has an immediate
value for the individual. This leads to steadily improving
software quality.
Chapter 5 explains how the concept was designed. It
starts out with the research process, presents the concep-
tual requirements that were gathered through the pro-
cess, explains the computational model behind reputa-
tion scores, shows how to obtain authorship information
from collaboratively written texts, and sketches possible
rewarding mechanisms.
Chapter 6 describes the CollabReview prototype,
which is the software system that implements the
concept and design. CollabReview is later used to
validate and evaluate the researched concept and design.
In this chapter, the focus is on software architecture,
and the interfaces and user interfaces provided by the
prototype.
Chapter 7 validates the prototype against defined re-
quirements, and evaluates its benefit. First, it specifies
the validation and evaluation procedure, the targeted user
group, and summarizes the different environments that
served as real-world contexts for field studies. Several
studies were conducted to test that previously formulated
requirements are met. It shows that the way how reputa-
tion is computed is consistent and valid, reports results
from analytical concept evaluations, and describes the
several field experiments and their results that were used
to trial the developed concept and prototype. Finally, the
chapter evaluates the merit, worth, and significance of
the concept by systematically reviewing and assessing
the results obtained in the studies.
Chapter 8 concludes the research by summarizing
on its contributions and presenting an outlook to future
work.
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Chapter 2
Problem Scope: On the Quality of
Software Process Artifacts
Junior programmers create simple solutions to simple problems. Se-
nior programmers create complex solutions to complex problems.
Great programmers find simple solutions to complex problems. The
code written by topnotch programmers may appear obvious, once it
is finished, but it is vastly more difficult to create.
— Charles H. Connell Jr.
POOR quality of software process artifacts means thatit is difficult for developers to learn what they needto know in order to change a software. Conse-
quently, most organizations that are involved in the de-
velopment of software have a high interest in good in-
ternal quality. However, they very often fail to achieve
that goal. I will be argued that the primary reason is that
developers do not like writing documentation, and that
it is therefore neglected.
2.1 Introduction to Software Pro-
cess Artifacts
Today’s software is not trivial to change. Instead, it
evolves by the hand of knowledgeable developers, who
must constantly learn and re-learn the inner workings of
the software. This section first defines software as en-
coded knowledge that comes to being through a research-
like evolution process, and investigates how this knowl-
edge is preserved.
2.1.1 Software as collection of knowledge
The term software was introduced to discriminate it from
its tangible counterpart hardware. Software “is a subset
of the set of things called information.” (Bersoff et al.,
1979). As its prefix “soft” implies, software is easy
to change (Bersoff et al., 1979). At least, it used to
be “an unspoken belief that, in some sense, software
is easy to change” (Bailin, 1997). But soon it became
clear that due to its complexity, software is extremely
difficult to change. Today, software serves as sink for
the ever-increasing complexity in things that man builds.
Software is knowledge and its encoding. Its development
is the process of discovery and invention (Cerri and
Fuggetta, 2007; Bailin, 1997).
Definition 1 – Software
Software is the immaterial counterpart of the tangible
hardware in a computer system (Brockhaus, 2005). It is
encoded knowledge.
2.1.1.1 Pyramid of data, information and knowl-
edge
Some confusion is often involved with the terms data,
information and especially knowledge, which is still a
matter of debate in the philosophical discipline of episte-
mology. This work pragmatically follows the definition
used in knowledge management disciplines:
13
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II — PROBLEM SCOPE: ON THE QUALITY OF SOFTWARE PROCESS ARTIFACTS
Definition 2 – Knowledge
“Knowledge is the combination of data and information,
to which is added expert opinion, skills and experience,
to result in a valuable asset which can be used to aid
decision making. Knowledge may be explicit and/or
tacit, individual and/or collective” (CWA Std. 14924-1,
2004).
Information is partial knowledge that lacks the seman-
tic integration into a knowledge context.
Definition 3 – Information
Information is a subset of knowledge that may be needed
by a certain person or group in a concrete situation to
solve a problem (Herget and Kuhlen, 1990).
Finally, data is information that does not carry mean-
ing. Data is obtained through observations, measure-
ments, statistical surveys and the like (Brockhaus, 2005).
Definition 4 – Data
Data are sequences of characters that represent informa-
tion so that they can be processed by a computer (Brock-
haus, 2005).
Data is on the lowest level of abstraction. All three
terms are often represented in a pyramid with the most
valuable, most complex and most difficult to obtain
knowledge at the top (see Figure 2.1).
2.1.1.2 Software as an industrial product
Software is a relatively new and unique technology. Pro-
cesses used in other industrial sectors can therefore not
be easily transferred to the production of software (Cerri
and Fuggetta, 2007). However, all kinds of production
have in common that blueprints are the major output
of any innovation phase. Engineers use them to give
work descriptions to craftsmen who then craft prototypes.
Engineers also communicate with each other through
blueprints, learn from them, and incrementally improve
a design. Only if blueprints are understandable to in-
dustrial engineers, then research results are repeatable
and actually usable. Consequently, these plans are the
baseline for later industrial production and continued
optimization efforts.
Pragmatics
integration
Semantics
context
Syntax
Mr. Mu¨ller lives
in Hamburg. He
is a potential cus-
tomer...
Mu¨ller is a last
name
Mu¨ller
’A’, ’b’,
’c’, ...
Knowledge
Information
Data
Characters
Figure 2.1: The pyramid of knowledge, information and
data (adapted from Bodendorf (2005))
Definition 5 – Blueprint
Originally, a form of paper-based reproduction, the term
blueprint here refers to any detailed, technical plan that
documents an architecture, design or construction. It
is not necessarily of graphical nature. Engineers use
blueprints to communicate with each other, and with
craftsmen who build prototypes according to them.
In the software domain, engineers use blueprints, too.
They are called source code here. The following defini-
tion largely borrows from the terminology given by the
IEEE International Working Conference on Source Code
Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM) (Harman, 2010),
but does not follow its view to include machine code,
i.e. instructions immediately executable by a Central
Processing Unit (CPU).
Definition 6 – Source code
Source code is any human-readable description that also
a compiler can read to build the fully executable soft-
ware. Source code is the blueprint of software. It is the
most precise description of software behavior.
Producing software from source code is by definition
an automatic process with little cost. If a compiler ac-
cepted source code once, then it will accept it over and
over again. As opposed to other industries, mass produc-
tion is a matter of a few Watts.
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II-1 — Introduction to Software Process Artifacts
2.1.2 Software development as costly
knowledge creation process
Software development is compared to Darwin’s bio-
logical evolution with increasing interest and efforts in
academia and industry (Nehaniv et al., 2006). Darwinian
evolution is the struggle for existence undergone by pop-
ulations of individuals. Individuals that fit better, are
more likely to survive and reproduce, also beyond the
lifespan of single individuals. A definitional requisite in
Darwinian evolution is the identification of individuals
in an evolving population. The role of an individual is
played by a fielded instance of the software, while its
source code plays the role of inheritable genetic infor-
mation (Nehaniv, 2011). It is this instance of software
that is trialed in the context of its target environment that
is called prototype (Naumann and Jenkins, 1982). Bio-
logical evolution is the creation of encoded knowledge
as in the case of software development.
2.1.2.1 Software evolution through purposeful ex-
perimentation
Software development is a non-algorithmic, experimen-
tal activity: Developers identify issues, experiment with
possible solutions, and come to decisions in a process
involving justifications, alternatives and trade-offs
(Bruegge and Dutoit, 2000).
Prototypes are trial versions of a system. Similar to
the early life, early prototypes are less complex and less
complete. They may be cheap and quick to build, per-
form only a subset of the product’s final functionality,
have bugs and look crude. But evolution of a prototype
continues through modification and expansion as long
as it is fit for its environment with each iteration adding
more functions and optimizing performance. Eventually
the prototype evolves into a production system or sup-
plements a larger prototype. But even then evolution
continues through adaptation to changing environments.
Only supplanting by a fitter prototype can end its evolu-
tion (Naumann and Jenkins, 1982; Lewis, 2005).
Definition 7 – Prototype
Prototypes are incomplete, cheap and light-weight ver-
sions of software that can later be extended into the full
product.
As opposed to the genome in the biological metaphor,
however, change in software does not come by accident.
It does not happen at random but is realized by develop-
ers and on purpose.
Definition 8 – Developer
A (software) developer is a contributor to the project
who alters and extends the project’s knowledge base,
focusing on its encoding in source code.
The changes that developers make lead to prototypes
that are often fitter in the Darwinian sense, i.e. better
adapted to their environment and their users. Yet the
developers’ effort has an operational cost. It determines
if and how fast a prototype will be able to improve its
fitness. In the world of software, the continuous change
of the environment represented through requirements is
as sure as death and taxes. Software that fails to catch
up with new requirements, ages by losing fitness and
eventually becomes useless. The easier developers per-
form changes, the higher the chance that a software will
cope with emerging requirements (e.g. Kanat-Alexander,
2012).
Definition 9 – Knowledge base
The project’s knowledge base consists of all human- or
machine-readable media storing pieces of information of
the project’s knowledge. It is consistent and minimal.
Above definition of knowledge base assumes the ideal
case: If the base is consistent, then it does not contradict
itself, and no piece of information contradicts another
one. If it is minimal, then it does not duplicate any piece
of information, and in particular, no piece of information
in it is automatically derivable from another piece of
information.
For example, certain functionality should only be im-
plemented (i.e. written into the knowledge base) once
and then be reused across the software. Its implementa-
tion may share the same software process artifact with
other pieces of information. The users’ wish to have a
certain feature is stored as a requirement artifact. While
implementation and requirement are related, they do not
serve the same purpose, store different information and
can therefore coexist in the knowledge base.
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In practice, however, the knowledge base rarely is
neither consistent nor minimal. Possibilities for testing
consistency and minimality are limited; media objects
may overlap and duplicate information, or get lost or
not cover all information. For example, a change in a
software module may modify its behavior in such a way
that it is no longer consistent with other modules it has
to work with. Some inconsistencies may be detected
automatically by tools like a compiler. A discrepancy
between behavior implemented in source code and be-
havior expressed in requirements is far more delicate to
detect. Furthermore, the knowledge base may contain
documentation that was automatically generated from
source code. But such knowledge base is not minimal
as it duplicates information that can be derived from it
automatically.
Knowledge base forking remark A knowledge base
may potentially be forked to serve a very similar but dif-
ferent software project. Two artifacts with contradicting
pieces of information may exist legally in different forks
of the same knowledge base.
Definition 10 – Fork
A different knowledge base that is very similar to the
original knowledge base it was forked from.
2.1.2.2 Software development as knowledge cre-
ation and learning
Above definition of developer is purposefully not re-
stricted to source code alone1 but includes any support-
ing material that conveys parts of the project’s knowl-
edge. Such supporting material can be, for example,
architecture designs to convey a broader picture of the
software, requirement descriptions to gain insights into
software needs, test cases that define expected behav-
ior, comments that supplement source code, or a change
history that preserves decision rationale.
If all that what multiple developers do while they
evolve software over months or years is to create knowl-
edge, then a single software project resembles science
more than engineering. The developers’ activities like
1As Bailin (1997) notes, a better term for that would then be pro-
grammer.
experimenting with models, adding layers of abstrac-
tions, and forming vocabularies, are more like a scien-
tific process than engineering discipline (Bailin, 1997).
Curtis et al. (1988) cite a developer’s words that “Some-
one had to spend a hundred million to put that knowl-
edge in my head. It didn’t come free.” Modern software
is too complex and too large for a single developer to
fully understand in detail. But developers need a certain
understanding for performing changes. For example,
Tryggeseth (1997) finds that even the best and most ex-
pensive maintainers that money can buy are worth no
more than any other maintainer, if they cannot get a hold
of the necessary knowledge. They cannot use their ad-
vanced skills, are no faster, and the changes they make
are no better.
Working on the development of software is a continu-
ous learning process. The developers’ learning materials
are process artifacts like source code, requirements, bug
history, etc.; their personal learning environments consist
of their individual selections of pieces of source code,
requirements, searchable bug records and so on, that are
delivered to them through tools like their Integrated De-
velopment Environment (IDE) or an issue tracker. The
software project with tools that grant views and sophisti-
cated access to the knowledge, the documentation con-
taining the information, and colleagues to exchange in-
formation with which become the developers’ personal
learning environments (Prause, 2011).
2.1.2.3 Constituents of a good personal learning en-
vironment
The better knowledge is preserved to be learned by de-
velopers who are in search of information, the better
they can employ their abilities to make changes to the
software. They do not need to reinvent the wheel over
and over again but can efficiently expand the software
project’s knowledge (Humphrey, 1997). But what con-
stitutes a good personal learning environment?
For a developer, there are two ways of acquiring
project knowledge: either through experimentation, i.e.
changing something and seeing how it affects the soft-
ware (and the happiness of its users), or through commu-
nication, i.e. exchange of existing knowledge between
developers. In the case of complex and abstract matters,
communication is usually preferable because it is faster
and of higher quality. A good personal learning envi-
ronment maximizes transfer of existing knowledge, and
eases the generation of new knowledge (Prause, 2011).
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A special form of communication is documentation.
It is for sure a constituent of a good personal learning
environment because it captures and preserves informa-
tion and knowledge. Without that kind of preservation,
knowledge would simply get lost. Documentation is a
part of the knowledge base with emphasis on didactic
value, i.e. its ability to confer information and knowl-
edge. Sender and receiver communicate asynchronously,
i.e. sender and receiver have to be available at the same
time. Its creation is event-driven, e.g. it gets written
when a task is completed and is received when in need
of information Bruegge and Dutoit (2000). And docu-
mentation is not a directed communication between a
known set of developers but broadcast preemptively to
whomever it may concern while later information needs
are not well known at the time of sending.
Definition 11 – Documentation
Documentation is the set of papers, forms, books, texts,
etc. provided as information about, evidence or proof
of something (Oxford Dictionary, 1994). It is asyn-
chronous, event-driven, and broadcast communication.
But documentation in the classical sense is not the
only constituent of a good personal learning environ-
ment. For example, emails as traces of communication
can also carry and preserve valuable information (cf.
Prause, 2006). The cost of creating and maintaining
classical documentation with a high didactic value has
to be traded off against other forms of communication.
Emphasizing direct and frequent communication be-
tween developers, e.g. pair programming, lets develop-
ers teach each other the knowledge of the project. The
role of an architect similarly unifies architectural knowl-
edge in one place, giving others a source of information
to turn to. Reducing complexity by keeping a loose cou-
pling and clean interfaces between subsystems limits
knowledge needs to a local part. Automated tests let de-
velopers play with software behavior and learn through
experimentation (Prause, 2011).
These aspects are just examples of what can help de-
velopers to learn the software. Chapter 3 will come back
to some more aspects in detail. For now it is important
to remember that knowledge is what enables develop-
ers to change software, and that knowledge often has
to be learned or relearned, especially as the number of
developers and the length of projects increases.
2.1.3 Software process artifacts document
created knowledge
A variety of different activities are carried out when a
software is developed. In accordance with IEEE Std.
1074 (2006), the formalization of activities to be carried
out during development is called the software process:
Definition 12 – Software process
The Software Process (short for software project life
cycle process) is the augmentation of (a) a chosen ex-
ecutable sequence of activities to be performed during
a project (b) with the resources that define an organiza-
tion’s software project environment. The software pro-
cess is the specific implementation of the development
approach followed by the project.
A software project usually spans dozens of different
activities. During each of these activities, software devel-
opers and their tools transform some form of input into
an output. The output is one or more software process
artifacts that contain pieces of information of the whole
knowledge in the project. For example, a developer re-
ceives input in form of an incoming change request be-
cause the software behaves in way that is not desired by
its users. The developer reacts with a change to a piece
of source code thereby updating the project knowledge
by replacing the information how the software should
behave. The new revision of the modified file is the
artifact that is output by the activity. Note that although
a file can be changed, an artifact cannot be. Instead, a
new artifact revision that supersedes its predecessor is
created.
Software process artifacts are unchangeable but can
be superseded. They are atomic in that they are either
part of the project knowledge base or not, are tangible in
that they exist in a human- or machine-readable medium,
are possibly intermediate meaning they are not neces-
sarily part of the final form of the software, and are not
necessarily planned outputs of the different activities of
the software process like bug reports.
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Definition 13 – Software process artifact
Software process artifacts are containers for the infor-
mation that builds the project knowledge base. They are
unchangeable, atomic, tangible, possibly intermediate,
and not necessarily planned. Software process artifacts
are either created manually by software developers (pri-
mary software process artifacts), or are secondary ones
derived automatically from primary ones by a tool. Sec-
ondary artifacts are also called views.
If not stated otherwise, this work deals with primary
software process artifacts only because all other arti-
facts are regarded as redundant. An example would be
the machine-executable software obtained from source
code through the process of compilation. The automatic
transformation of existing information does not add new
information to the knowledge base. In some cases, au-
tomatic transformation might make information more
easily consumable for humans. A tool that achieves this
would be considered as a viewer of the knowledge base,
but it still only creates secondary software process arti-
facts (views). For example, Doxygen2 extracts structure
and comments from object-oriented source code of ma-
jor programming languages to create documentation like
off-line reference manuals. It is a viewer.
Software process artifacts are documentation, with
each artifact being a document. According to ISO 9000,
this means that an artifact is information in its supporting
medium. An artifact is a piece of project knowledge,
stored in a supporting medium.
2.1.3.1 Types of Software Process Artifacts
IEEE Std. 1074 (2006) identifies a total of 69 distinct
activities in 17 activity groups that can be combined to
form the software process. The spectrum covers such
diverse activities like “Perform Estimations”, “Conduct
Feasibility Studies”, “Prioritize and Integrate Software
Requirements”, or “Validate the Training Program”.
Often one activity produces more than one kind of
software process artifact. The output of “Create Exe-
cutable Code”, for example, can be source code, exe-
cutable binaries and databases. And still even source
code can take various forms. Storing all source code in
a revision control system testifies professionalism and is
2See www.doxygen.org/
Figure 2.2: Volere requirement software process artifact
good practice (Richardson and Gwaltney, 2005). How-
ever, a source code fragment that is sent via email be-
tween two developers, is a software process artifact, too.
Coordination and communication activities continuously
create software process artifacts that contain valuable
pieces of information.
Given the manifoldness of software processes, their
different outputs, and the diversity of available media, it
is impossible to compile an exhaustive list of kinds of
software process artifacts. Instead, this section picks out
three major types of software process artifacts as exam-
ples that reappear throughout this work: requirements,
wiki articles, and source code. However, the focus of
research is more on the latter ones.
Requirements During the requirements process, ex-
pectations about a future software system are collected
(IEEE Std. 1074, 2006). Projects typically define a stan-
dardized way of how requirements are managed. The
Volere requirements template, for instance, is a standard
for documenting a requirement, its origin, and the ratio-
nale (i.e. a justification) that led to it (Robertson and
Robertson, 1999). Figure 2.2 depicts a Volere require-
ment captured on paper. It is a software process artifact
in a human-readable medium.
Wiki articles The major strength of wikis is as all-
round documentation tools for software projects. Ev-
ery developer can easily contribute to documentation
(Louridas, 2006). Wikis are also used for requirements
engineering (e.g. Decker et al., 2007). Other areas of
application include issue tracking, quality & process
management, software design, reference and setup in-
formation, configurations, specifications and installation
guidelines (Majchrzak et al., 2006). A single wiki page
or article is considered a software process artifact. When
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an article changes, its new revision is another software
process artifact. The wikis’ all-round applicability in
the software process qualify them as subject for further
investigation in this research.
Source code Source code is the blueprint of software.
Every software project will explicitly deal with source
code. Concepts are important, but they do not suffice
as input to compilers. Source code constitutes the most
fundamental software process artifacts of a software
project. Having said that, compilable source code alone
is not enough (Hruschka and Starke, 2011). The purpose
of source code is more than the communication between
man and machine. Source code is documentation.
2.1.3.2 Source code — two faces of the ultimate
software process artifact
The special role and dualism of source code justify a
closer look at these ultimate software process artifacts.
Inherent documentation of source code There is an
infinite number of ways of writing a same-purpose com-
puter program. And there are less, but still infinitely
many ways of writing source code that will compile
into the exactly same binary program3. Neither does it
matter for a computer what programming language one
uses, nor does a parser care how functions and methods
are named. The instructions that the computer needs
are intertwined with the human-readable lines of source
code. Functions, data types, objects, comments, macros,
etc. and their respective names are just abstractions that
make the design appear more clearly from source code
by masking unneeded implementation details (Spinellis,
2010). Programming languages help to model algorith-
mic solutions to problems without having to know too
much about their inner workings (Grier, 2010). This way
we humans — with our cognitive abilities being limited
to handling only a small amount of information at a time
— better understand what the computer will do.
Computer science has developed an incredible number
of programming languages: from imperative C to object-
oriented Java, functional languages like Haskell, hybrids
like Golog, or descriptive ones like Hyper Text Markup
Language (HTML); all exist just to make it easier for us
3As a proof, consider arbitrary comments added to the source code
that are ignored by the compiler when it builds the software.
humans to talk to computers. Even without embedded
comments or other syntactic sugar, source code seen in
an IDE is mostly documentation (Prause et al., 2010b).
Definition 14 – Syntactic sugar
Syntactic sugar is some notation (e.g. a comment, named
constants, etc.) that makes an expression in source code
more palatable and comprehensible (Landin, 1964).
Source code is written to be read by developers and
their fellows (Knuth, 1992). Telling a computer to add
two numbers takes two bytes (03 D8) in its own lan-
guage, a 10 byte string ADD BX, AX in Assembler
(Gumm and Sommer, 2000), or ten times that in a Java
program with standard formatting. Despite its length, it
is obvious what people prefer, especially when a soft-
ware grows larger. Source code — originally a medium
of communication between man and machine — has
become a medium of communication among humans
(Dubochet, 2009; Prause et al., 2010b).
There is a general desire in software development
that source code should be self-explanatory, i.e. not
requiring further documentation. Such source code is
called inherently documented (Didrich and Klein, 1996):
Definition 15 – Inherent documentation
Inherent documentation is part of the source code itself.
It documents source code by making good use of an
appropriate programming language’s inherent features
like syntactic sugar, variable names, clear structuring,
etc. in order to make it better understandable.
To say it upfront, it is possible to create source code
that does not need further documentation to make the
source code itself easily understandable. But writing
understandable source code is an art that requires hard
skills to implement functionality, soft skills to do it in an
understandable way, and motivation because understand-
ability of source code does not come for free. And still
the desire for completely self-explanatory source code
can only be partly fulfilled in reality (Raskin, 2005).
Inherent documentation is limited and insufficient
Source code and inherent documentation are limited be-
cause background, rationale and context information are
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missing. A study by Parnin (2010) about cognitive pro-
cesses of developers while they are programming details
the problem: Unfortunately, shortly after bringing source
code into being, the valuable information required for
making the change starts to fade from the developers
mind and will be permanently lost if not preserved: In-
terruptions4 of a few minutes can already cost the de-
veloper his ensemble of well-crafted thoughts (Graham,
2004, p. 229). After several days of interruption, details
(e.g. names of identifiers) have faded. Yet traces of
memories are still available to the developer that help
him in re-activating the mental representations that be-
came inactive but that are needed for a task. After weeks,
most representations have faded, too. Once the mental
representations have faded, reading them from source
code is hard to impossible. Also, source code is not a
sacred tome carved into stone and touched by no one
else, but a collection of organic and social documents.
So the above mental representations are not available to
developers in the first place if they have not made the
changes themselves.
Instead, such mental models need to be captured in
the project’s knowledge base promptly so that knowl-
edge does not get lost. Through further documentation,
a developer communicates (possibly to his future self)
background, context, trial-and-error and side-effect in-
formation while it is present in his mind. For example,
comments embedded in source code, or architecture de-
sign documents belong into this category. This infor-
mation is extremely valuable if ever the code has to be
modified (Raskin, 2005).
2.1.4 Source code and other documenta-
tion, and how to best make it
Source code is the precise description of a software
system. Its inherent documentation explains facts but no
rationale, it has details but not the big picture. In a small,
one-person, throw-away-prototype project, it may be
sufficient to write source code that will never need to be
understood by someone again. But any other project will
eventually need documentation (Raskin, 2005; Hruschka
and Starke, 2011; Tilley, 1993).
Documentation is often divided into external and in-
ternal documentation. External documentation primarily
4The time between the execution of tasks that build on top of each
other can be regarded as an interruption in one joint bigger task.
targets an audience outside of the developing organiza-
tion, i.e. the users. It is not relevant in this research.
Definition 16 – External documentation
External documentation — as opposed to internal docu-
mentation — is published for users of the software. It
supports them in learning how to use the software (Hunt
and Thomas, 2003).
Internal documentation, instead, targets developers of
the software. The definition given here has a slightly
different connotation from the common definition be-
cause of its relation to the term software process artifacts
that was defined earlier. All software process artifacts
can be considered as documentation because they carry
information in the project’s knowledge base. From an
information content point of view, both terms are more
or less equivalent. However, documentation emphasizes
didactic value. Internal documentation may prefer sec-
ondary software process artifacts whenever they have
a didactic advantage over others. And the term hints
at software process artifacts that were created for the
didactic goal only. In situations where the didactic value
is to be emphasized, the term internal documentation is
used instead of the more technical term software process
artifacts.
Definition 17 – Internal documentation
Internal documentation — as opposed to external docu-
mentation — is internal to the organization and project.
It encompasses all information that originated from the
development, and is bound for developers and maintain-
ers (Hunt and Thomas, 2003). It is largely equivalent to
the sum of all software process artifacts with didactic
relevance to developers and maintainers.
2.1.4.1 Internal documentation controversy
Currently, there is no agreement about how much or what
kind of documentation is useful. Software maintainers
feel source code is the most important thing to docu-
ment in a software project (de Souza et al., 2006). How-
ever, the Extreme Programming (XP) software devel-
opment methodology demands that source code should
not require other documentation so that more time can
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be spent on developing. Raskin (2005), instead, sees
internal documentation as a way to speeding implemen-
tation. Then again, Selic (2009) calls “documenting
software at the code level [...] foolish”, as it results in
a “nightmare of trying to keep duplicated information
consistent”. Fowler (1999) adds that comments are actu-
ally very useful but that they are often there to cover up
bad source code, which makes them undesirable. As op-
posed to this, Spinellis (2010) says that developers owe
their (future) colleagues brilliant source code documen-
tation. Stephens and Rosenberg (2003) strictly object
against the position of XP that documentation was un-
neccessary. They consider documentation as necessary
to keep development on track, and to reduce communi-
cation overhead; especially in distributed projects. Yet
Curtis et al. (1988) do not convey a reduction in required
communication because of documentation.
As evidenced by this, the experiences and opinions
regarding documentation are very different. There are
many different understandings of what documentation
is, and what it should look like. Therefore, there is
no commonly accepted way of how software should
be documented. Instead, it is in the discretion of each
organization or project to decide on how to document
software and manage their knowledge.
2.1.4.2 The optimal documentation method?
There is no universal documentation method, and, in-
deed, it seems that there cannot be the one and only way.
As the purpose of documentation is to impart knowledge
in its audience, it has to be judged based on this ability.
It may, for instance, be incomplete and still be appreci-
ated, as long as the necessary information is conveyed
to other developers and later maintainers (Forward and
Lethbridge, 2002).
As opposed to this, overly documentation standards
lead to unmaintainable amounts of documentation which
will eventually rather pollute the project; either because
of the high costs for keeping documentation up-to-date,
or because inaccurate, obsolete and wrong information
is contained in it, or because the needed piece of infor-
mation is too difficult to find. Therefore it is necessary
to document the right things in the right way (Papadi-
moulis, 2010).
This research does not want to proclaim or prescribe
how an organization should document its knowledge.
Instead, it investigates the problem of why knowledge is
not managed, and how the root cause can be addressed
in an agile way.
What matters is the difference between writing source
code quick and dirty and being nice to fellow developers
by making source code easier to understand: by invest-
ing in inherent documentation and by accompanying it
with appropriate documentation. But setting documenta-
tion standards may be the wrong way because they are
too rigid. When a developer makes a change, he already
has all important knowledge present in his mind. Doc-
umenting the software process artifacts, consequently,
costs him only little extra time. It would be much better
and efficient if developers would themselves look for
ways to optimize documentation. Not because there is a
prescription that forces them to do it, but because they
have a motivation to do it.
2.1.5 Summary of software development
as knowledge creation
The prefix soft implies that software is easy to change.
But it is not. Software is condensed encoded knowledge,
interlinked, and complex. It is a new technology that
has few in common with traditional industrial products.
Its cost lies in its development (and not its production)
which is more akin to scientific research than to engineer-
ing. Software comes to being through experimentation
with prototypes, very much like nature developed liv-
ing organisms and their genetic code through Darwinian
evolution. But changes required by evolution do not
come for free. They are made by developers, who con-
tinuously learn and relearn the knowledge of the project
while they expand that knowledge at the same time. The
knowledge that developers need for making changes is
taught to them using software process artifacts from the
project’s knowledge base. Typical software process ar-
tifacts are requirements, wiki articles or source code,
but there are many more. Among them, source code is
the ultimate software process artifact because it contains
the machine-readable commands sugared with inherent
documentation. However, inherent documentation alone
is insufficient. More documentation beyond source code
is needed. Yet there is no consensus about what and
what amount of internal documentation is needed and
good for the project. Perhaps this can never be decided
in an across-the-board fashion. And it is not what this
research aims solving at.
Instead, agile approaches to documentation need to
give developers a motivation to invest their own precious
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time into carefully editing documentation for their fellow
developers. The reason why documentation standards
still exist is that developers do not like to do documenta-
tion because of this discrepancy. This will be discussed
later in this chapter. Before that, the next section dis-
cusses what happens if software knowledge is not man-
aged.
2.2 The Case for Internal Quality
Source code contains a lot of detailed knowledge from
the project. It is perhaps the most valuable asset that a
software project generates. But source code is burdened
with maintenance costs. This reduces economic poten-
tial for organizations engaged in the development of soft-
ware. If maintenance costs are too much, the project may
even end in a total economic loss. This section discusses
why poor internal quality is a problem. Internal quality
makes software more reliable, simpler, easier to extend,
understand, maintain, and change5. The connection with
developer knowledge makes internal documentation the
most essential element of internal quality.
Definition 18 – Internal quality
The internal quality of software covers quality aspects
that are primarily visible to members of the develop-
ing organization, e.g. architects, developers and testers
(Plo¨sch et al., 2007).
2.2.1 Source code as the project’s most
valuable output
Source code encodes the project’s essential knowledge.
All that is needed to produce the software is its source
code. It is the most precise description of software be-
havior, and the most valuable output.
The difference between crafting and engineering is
that engineers take good care of their knowledge ac-
quired during the engineering process. Craftsmen and
laborers use the engineer’s blueprints to build products
according to their plans. At the same time, engineers do
5C2Wiki http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?
InternalSoftwareQuality, retrieved 2012-08-15
continuously refine a product after a successful proto-
type using the detailed documentation. In all engineer-
ing disciplines except software engineering, documenta-
tion has been accepted as — perhaps unloved — basic
necessity (Selic, 2009).
For example, Bruegge and Dutoit (2000) compare
software development to the engineering of a large pas-
senger aircraft. The first Boing 747 was rolled out in
1968 and was since in production for more than 40 years.
It underwent steady improvements of its design includ-
ing several major revisions. Such success is only pos-
sible with good management of construction plans and
decisions (Bruegge and Dutoit, 2000; Drommert, 2011).
Bruegge and Dutoit stress that the same holds true in
software development for software process artifacts like
requirements, designs documents, source code, and so
on. Similarly, blueprints and construction plans of the
prototype of the largest passenger airliner ever built (Air-
bus A380) were re-used in the later product. It is not
that a group of researchers first built the prototype, just
to show general feasibility, and then a different team
started from scratch to build the industrial version. The
detailed initial construction plans are refined and re-used.
In the biological metaphor, nature also continues devel-
opment from existing designs. The genetic code carried
by individuals representing their design must have value,
otherwise evolution would not work in the Darwinian
sense.
In other engineering disciplines, detailed construction
plans are only totally discarded, when a design com-
pletely failed. In software engineering, the detailed plans
(i.e. source code) are sometimes discarded although the
product is successful. Spolsky (2004) considers discard-
ing source code as one of the biggest mistakes an orga-
nization can make.
2.2.2 Protecting the value in source code,
and the cost of maintenance
A colleague of mine had once worked for an internet
software company that had an internal statistic that said
that redevelopment would happen when the third gen-
eration of developers took over development. Why is it
then that organizations still sometimes decide for rede-
velopment if it is such a bad decision?
Almost anything can be built with software. It is only
a virtual construct that rarely hits the limits of modern
hardware. But a large program is too complex for a
22
II
—
P
R
O
B
L
E
M
S
C
O
P
E
:
O
N
T
H
E
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
O
F
S
O
F
T
W
A
R
E
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
A
R
T
IF
A
C
T
S
II-2 — The Case for Internal Quality
single developer’s mind, and takes more time to build
than will be available to an original team; especially, if
this team is only contracted for the initial research phase.
Additionally, requirements change constantly, and so has
the software. Otherwise, it quickly ages and becomes
useless in the end. The software’s blueprints will have
to be continuously re-understood by engineers. And it
is harder to read source code than to write it (Spolsky,
2004). The reason why source code is still discarded so
often is maintenance cost.
2.2.2.1 A definition of software maintenance
ISO 14764 defines software maintenance as one of the
five primary life cycle processes that starts at the de-
livery of the software, and ends with its retirement. Its
objective is to modify an existing software product while
preserving its integrity. The process of maintenance is
the modification of the project knowledge base, includ-
ing source code. Maintenance is needed when an opera-
tional environment detects errors, or when it introduces
the need for unforeseen new or modified capability. Soft-
ware maintenance consists of corrective and enhancing
maintenance that further divides into its four major sub-
areas of
• corrective — to correct discovered problems,
• preventive — to detect and correct latent faults that
have not yet failed in operation,
• adaptive — to keep the software usable in a chang-
ing environment, and
• perfective — to implement enhancements of inter-
nal of external aspects
maintenance.
Maintenance is a considerable cost factor of software
projects. Kozlov et al. (2007) surveyed in literature
that in the 1970-1990’s the efforts spent on maintenance
ranged from 49% to 75% of the total software lifecycle
costs. Since then, costs devoted to system maintenance
and evolution can account for over 90% in some cases.
Most of the maintenance costs result from enhancements
in form of adaptive and perfective maintenance.
One reason for increased maintenance efforts is that
the demarcation between development and maintenance
phases may be bit fuzzy. Nowadays, development of
long-lived software goes on even after the first release
of the software. The increase in maintenance costs
also chronologically coincides with the rise of agile and
prototype-based development methodologies that are
gaining ground in comparison to classical development
methodologies. A functional prototype with reduced
functionality may be delivered although development is
not yet officially finished. These methodologies there-
fore further complicate the demarcation between de-
velopment and delivery. Maintenance is hence defined
broader in this work:
Definition 19 – Maintenance
Software maintenance is modification and extension of
an existing project knowledge base with further software
process artifacts while preserving integrity of the soft-
ware. Maintenance may already take place during devel-
opment iterations in agile development methodologies.
2.2.2.2 Technical debt can make redevelopment
necessary
Cunningham (1992) introduced the concept technical
debt as a way to speed development. In order to tem-
porarily improve development speed, developers can go
into debt by cutting down on development activities that
do not implement new functionality (for example, doing
documentation or creating unit tests). The original debt
term referred only to source code but has since been
extended to other areas of the software process. It is
the counterpart of internal quality. In dependence on
the proposal by Brown et al. (2010), technical debt is
defined:
Definition 20 – Technical debt
Technical debt characterizes the gap between the current
state of a software’s software process artifacts, and their
hypothetical ideal state of best internal quality. Technical
debt measures the cost for closing the gap between both
states.
Fowler (2009) identifies two dimensions of technical
debt (see Figure 2.3 for his illustration of the two dimen-
sions including examples):
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“We don’t have
time for design.”
“We must ship now
and deal with the
consequences.”
“What’s Layering?”
“Now we know
how we should
have done it.”
Deliberate
R
ec
kl
es
s
Inadvertent
Prudent
Figure 2.3: The four kinds of technical debt (Fowler,
2009)
• reckless vs. prudent — whether the debt was in-
curred because the developers did not know better,
and
• deliberate vs. inadvertent — whether the debt was
incurred intentionally.
Technical debt, however, leads to a danger when that
debt is not repaid promptly: All the time that is spent
because software process artifacts are not-quite-right, is
regarded as interest on the debt. If there is too much
technical debt in a project, it leads to extreme special-
ization of developers and brings entire development to a
stand-still. A developer describes the following situation:
“Conversely I have seen decades old code that was Bad,
but had been maintained, used, bug fixed, and fixed, and
fixed, and fixed, until the defect count was astonishingly
low. Just don’t try to add any new features though....”6
Definition 21 – Interest
Interest (on technical debt) is any effort that does not
change the amount of technical debt, and that would not
have had to be spent, if there was no technical debt.
Sometimes, however, redevelopment seems to be with-
out alternative to developers when technical debt and the
resulting interest payment is too high. If too much knowl-
edge is lost, important rationale and links are missing,
6C2Wiki http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?
InternalSoftwareQuality, retrieved 2012-08-15
then the remaining knowledge is unsalvageable. Martin
and McClure (1983) observed that it is consensus among
software professionals that “Inadequate documentation
is a major contributor to the high cost of software main-
tenance and to the distaste for software maintenance
work.” Indeed, research showed that even the best main-
tainers can only be effective when they have the neces-
sary knowledge available. Otherwise they are no better
than any others (Tryggeseth, 1997).
2.2.2.3 Redevelopment is a total economic loss of
source code
Once more back to the biological metaphor: External
quality of software is its fitness, i.e. its ability to survive,
being used by users. Internal quality is evolvability, e.g.
does software adapt to new user needs? Does it stay
liked? Without fitness, there is no evolution and no need
for evolvability. But given fitness, only evolvability can
ensure long-term fitness. The extinction of dinosaurs
is attributed to their failure to adapt to a changing en-
vironment. Their races showed only few diversifica-
tion and innovation in behavioral strategies. When their
world changed, only two species attempted an adapta-
tion to new foods (Lloyd et al., 2008). The dinosaurs’
seemingly unbreakable predominance abruptly ended,
making room for mammals that had waited in a niche.
Mammals instantly filled the gap, and diversified into a
plethora of species. Today, they emboss the planet’s face
as successful predators in most ecosystems. If dinosaurs
had not failed to adapt, they would have remained in-
vincible competitors for any other species. To avoid
extinction, software must evolve (Prause, 2011).
All the innovation and effort that nature put into di-
nosaurs is lost. Whoever wants to sell research and
software-encoded knowledge should be aware that no-
body7 wants to buy a dinosaur. They want to have a
mouse with a bright future, which is easy to evolve into
great products.
Spolsky (2004) calls it a delusion to think that rewrit-
ing the software from scratch would be any better than
redevelopment. The team working on the new version
has probably no advantage in experience, instead many
old mistakes will be repeated but enriched with new ones.
The detailed decisions and precise knowledge that went
into the first software are recorded only in the source
code, and are lost when the source code is discarded.
7except for John Hammond from Jurassic Park may be...
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II-2 — The Case for Internal Quality
This causes costs similar to the development costs of the
first version. Redevelopment is a total economic loss of
the knowledge and effort put in the earlier software; and
a huge loss of time to market.
2.2.3 Why and where internal quality mat-
ters
Sometimes prototypes will have to be discarded due
to insurmountable problems revealed by the prototype
(Lewis, 2005). If a novel design turns out not to work
as expected, parts of the design may have to revised or
dumped. Investments into the internal quality of these
parts are lost. Still, internal quality matters not only
as a precautionary measure against a total economic
loss. Already small amounts of technical debt negatively
affect the development process.
2.2.3.1 The effects of internal quality on cost, dura-
tion and quality
Poor internal quality or non-existence of software pro-
cess artifacts means that knowledge is not (adequately)
preserved. When it fades from the developers minds, it is
either lost forever, or has to be recovered in a costly pro-
cess. For example, if the software architecture needs to
be understood from source code, one may not to see the
wood for the trees (Hruschka and Starke, 2011). Other
knowledge like requirements, solutions to known prob-
lems, or failed designs have to be re-learned again and
again. These are interest payments on technical debt.
In fact, Griss (1993) considers re-use of existing arti-
facts as the best and cheapest way to produce quality
products. Consequently, enabling re-use of knowledge
through internal quality is the key to cost effectiveness,
development speed, and product quality.
Besides the cost benefit, reuse also reduces time
needed for development: The thorough use documen-
tation speeds implementation by avoiding interest
payments (Raskin, 2005). In the end, this reduces the
time to market, resulting in a competitive advantage or
not resulting in a competitive disadvantage respectively.
Finally, good maintainers can only use their skill and
make high quality changes if the necessary knowledge is
available to them. If it is not, then quality of the source
code will inevitably degrade (Tryggeseth, 1997). Every
degradation means that the valuable knowledge encoded
in source code is one step closer to total economic loss.
2.2.3.2 The effects of internal quality on the hand-
over of knowledge
Development teams are subject to fluctuation in person-
nel. Developers that leave take knowledge they have
with them, and new developers enter without knowledge
of the software. Even more problematic the situation
when a software system changes from development into
maintenance phase, or when the software was devel-
oped by a contractor and gets delivered. In this case, a
whole-new team that has none of the knowledge of the
original team, will take over the work of the original
team. Knowledge is handed down by word-of-mouth
and through documentation. Although the verbal pro-
cess has a higher bandwidth, the less time there is for
the hand-over, the more knowledge will be lost. But the
fewer documentation there is, the more extensive must
the verbal process be. Note that the verbal communica-
tion process does rarely reduce the amount of technical
debt as communication is not captured. So the receivers
end up with no less technical debt.
Additionally, in the case that software was devel-
oped on contract, the problem is that the customer never
knows what he is getting. He does have no effective
way to ensure that knowledge is actually transferred to
him (Bailin, 1997). Therefore, any contracting research
organization must plausibly assure to the customer that
he will be able to reuse the results he pays for. Internal
quality is indispensable to contract research.
2.2.3.3 The effects of internal quality on prototypes
in applied research
This case is a specialization of the above hand-over of
knowledge with all the same problems and some more.
Applied research organizations operate in an area be-
tween academic research and industry. On the one hand,
carrying out research, but on the other hand closely coop-
erating with industry to transform prototypes into prod-
ucts. Their core business is to transfer knowledge to
industry. Bullinger (2010) put it this way: “Sieger ist,
wer Ideen am schnellsten in Nutzen fu¨r Kunden umsetzt.”
[german: the winner is he who turns ideas into use for
his customers in the shortest time.] As opposed to funda-
mental research, much of the knowledge resulting from
applied research in the software domain is in form of
software prototypes, and recorded in software process
artifacts.
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It is a common misconception in research that inter-
nal quality has no place in the world of software proto-
types. In order to allow for further development itera-
tions, blueprints of prototypes must be reusable, extensi-
ble and improvable. For this to happen, the knowledge
must be preserved and be understandable to the later
engineers. Only then are they able to optimize the de-
sign incrementally, and to eventually build the product.
Having to re-create large portions of blueprints because
they are incomprehensible, wastes valuable resources
and time; both of which are important in today’s global
competition.
A prototype project generates a prototype (i.e. some-
thing tangible that actually works) and the knowledge
how to build it. The knowledge consists of requirements,
failed and successful designs, and precise construction
plans in form of source code. A research organization
that develops a new material for a customer is not only
supposed to show that such material exists but how to
make more of it. A customer of contracted development
not only wants to know that something works but how
to make it work. Knowledge that was generated during
the project but which is not preserved is something that
the customer paid for while not getting it delivered. If
understanding the source code is similarly expensive as
redoing the prototype project, then the original project is
a total economic loss. Due to the high probably of a loss
of knowledge through the hand-over, a total economic
loss for the customer can occur earlier.
The plan of building one prototype first to later throw
it away, is not a good idea in large-scale software de-
velopment because most of the knowledge built into the
source code would be lost. It is fine to write experi-
mental code and throw it away a week later. It is also
fine to refactor individual classes. These prototypes and
experiments are limited in time and scope. But throwing
away the whole program is dangerously foolish (Spolsky,
2004).
2.2.3.4 The effects of internal quality on dis-
tributed development projects
Poor internal quality negatively impacts collaboration in
distributed projects. So, technical debt becomes more
relevant here. In such projects, there are fewer commu-
nication opportunities, and the cost of communication
is higher. Vital informal communication between col-
leagues can even fully break down (Grinter et al., 1999).
Besides interpersonal problems, the exchange of infor-
mation (communication) is generally more complicated
(Carmel and Agarwal, 2001). The result is extraordinary
coordination problems (Herbsleb and Grinter, 1999a),
aggravated by distance-induced impairments of motiva-
tion and teamness (Casey and Richardson, 2009; Zopf,
2009; Kiel, 2003). This leads to the effect that distributed
work takes much longer (Herbsleb et al., 2001).
The purpose of documentation is to communicate in-
formation to individuals involved in development (For-
ward and Lethbridge, 2002). It facilitates the exchange
of information between developers by channelizing it
into standardized forms of communication. High qual-
ity software process artifacts preserve more information
from getting lost, and are easier to understand. Con-
sequently, fewer one-on-one communication is neces-
sary, strongly simplifying communication topologies
and overhead. While documentation is always a form of
communication among project members, (Curtis et al.,
1988) gaps in it are more costly to fill in distributed
settings due to the higher cost and lower richness of
communication (Liukkunen et al., 2010). Information
that is basically there, is fragmented to different sites,
making it difficult to reunite it into one place (Boden
et al., 2009).
Herbsleb and Moitra (2001) find that updating and
revising documentation are as important as writing it in
the first place. Written documentation, instead, lessens
the need to have co-located teams (Stephens and Rosen-
berg, 2003). Furthermore, Cataldo and Nambiar (2009)
showed that high software process maturity (which also
means to carefully manage artifacts) mitigates the neg-
ative effects of spatial distribution. So, in distributed
teams, the interest rate is higher than in co-located ones.
2.2.3.5 The effects of internal quality in EU re-
search
Asian states are putting a high pressure on western in-
dustry with their cheap products. The market crisis of
2008 only made this situation worse. China, for instance,
had an expected industrial growth of 8.5% even during
the crisis. At the moment their products are not com-
parable in quality to western counterparts. But Asian
engineers are working hard, which makes continuous in-
novation important for Europe. Research results must be
transferred to industry and be transformed into products
quickly (Bullinger, 2010).
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“Eine Gesellschaft kann nicht nur aus Geld Wissen
machen. Wir mu¨ssen aus Wissen auch wieder Geld
machen.”8 [german: A society may not only convert
money into knowledge. We must also again make money
from knowledge.] No matter the domain of science, in
order to achieve German and European competitiveness,
research must deliver results that are well-usable in the
next phase of the innovation cycle. Fundamental re-
search must deliver proven concepts. The role of applied
research is to create prototypes and run pilots to demon-
strate that a certain design is realizable and works as
expected. Prototypes thereby bridge the gap between
fundamental research and industrial engineering.
Research co-funded by the European Commission
(the executive of the European Union) (EC) under the
Framework Programmes is signified by the cooperation
of academic and industrial partners in distributed re-
search consortia. Subsequent exploitation of project re-
sults is wanted by the EC. A need for freedom lies in the
nature of research projects as well as a high risk of fail-
ure due to theoretical misconceptions. But Tolido (2009)
notes that if partial results are reusable, then a project
can adapt its direction to market changes. This flexibility
is very important for these comparatively long-lasting
research projects. Although the risk of failure is always
involved in research, large research projects rarely fail
as a whole. A cheaply reached medium level of quality
with a focus on internal quality is particularly important
for such projects. This grants flexibility in development
and permits re-use of engineering results like source
code, no matter if it be for further research projects or
for turning a research project into an industrial project.
Quality management has to be guided by this goal.
However, there are major problems: “Whilst Euro-
pean R&D in ICT and other key enabling technologies is
generally strong, the transition from ideas arising from
basic research to production and to markets is the weak-
est link in European value chains. To boost future pro-
ductivity and growth, it is critically important to generate
breakthrough technologies and to translate them into in-
novations (new products, processes and services) which
are taken up by the wider economy.” (ICT Work Pro-
gramme, 2012) Reasons are that academic and industrial
partners have different opinions regarding the secrecy
of inventions (including source code). The norms of
science urge researchers to publish their results with re-
wards of prestige, while private enterprises want to pro-
tect their intellectual property (Kogut and Metiu, 2001).
8Hans-Jo¨rg Bullinger in Horeis (2009)
Additionally, research focuses on novelty over excel-
lence of a design (Graham, 2004). This further adds to
the problems of distributed development.
2.2.4 Summary of the importance of inter-
nal quality
This section made the case for internal quality. It empha-
sized that source code is the primary value in software
projects but that its value can be burdened with technical
debt. In the extreme case, technical debt can lead to a
total economic loss. But even if this worst case does not
occur, internal quality still has its value. Software main-
tenance processes, in which technical debt matters most,
are today the main cost factor in the life of software.
Internal quality is therefore important in the competi-
tive economic market. While deliberate technical debt
has short-term advantages, the problem is interest: First,
interest increases development cost, leads to slower de-
velopment and degrades source code quality. Second,
knowledge that is not captured in software process ar-
tifacts is prone to get lost when the software is handed
over between developers, or from a contractor to the
customer. Third, a prototype is a feature-reduced, early
product, that one day may have to be transferred to a
whole new development team. Fourth, in distributed
settings, interest rates on technical debt are higher be-
cause communication is more complicated. Fifth, the
negative effects of poor software process artifact quality
are that research results cannot be reused economically.
This not only causes monetary costs but also delays the
date of a market launch, which can be critical in global
competition.
2.3 An As-is Analysis of Internal
Quality
Internal quality has long-term advantages, for the
project’s knowledge may be learned more easily by
developers. However, internal quality tends to be
problematic in many projects. This section looks for
evidence in computer science literature and popular
developer culture, reports on surveys with software
engineering experts and in EU projects of the the Sixth
Framework Programme for Research and Technological
Development (FP6), and concludes with a project case
study and personal experiences.
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2.3.1 The software crisis in literature
The software crisis is a term that describes the phe-
nomenon in software development to not deliver soft-
ware in time, on budget, or in the expected quality and
scope. While no single reason can be made solely re-
sponsible for the crisis, a major reason is the omnipresent
lack of communication and documentation in software
development (Kraut and Streeter, 1995). This section
analyzes the status quo of communication and internal
quality in literature. In fact, it seems that problems with
internal quality are so pervasive in software develop-
ment that the fact itself rarely requires scientific proof.
The analysis of literature finds that the two factors that
inhibit internal quality are developer personalities and
management lapses.
2.3.1.1 Empirical studies about documentation
problems
In a study covering almost 500 data processing organi-
zations, Lientz and Swanson (1981) find that poor docu-
mentation is considered as one of the biggest problems.
Dekleva (1992) lists the lack or quality of documentation
on rank three of major problems. Kajko-Mattsson (2001)
observes that documentation requirements are rather low
in companies, implying that without appropriate regu-
lations, documentation activities are carried out rarely.
Krogstie and Sølvberg (1994) repeat the results of sev-
eral earlier empirical studies on software maintenance,
and find that one of the biggest problems, which has
actually gotten worse, is the quality of documentation.
2.3.1.2 Individual statements about documenta-
tion problems
Research literature is full of opinions describing the
problem in different levels of detail: Raskin (2005) calls
internal documentation “one of the most overlooked
ways” to increase efficiency in development. Forward
and Lethbridge (2002) recognize that while internal doc-
umentation is abundant in large projects, its role and
maintenance is only poorly understood; moreover, in
medium and small projects, there is little to no documen-
tation. Laramee (2010) reports from his experience a
stages model coined “Bob’s Theory of Software Redevel-
opment”, culminating in the eighth “Slow Death” stage,
where generations of developers quit or restart develop-
ment anew. Foote and Yoder (1997) derived the Ball
of Mud pattern for the decay of source code due to not
cleaning up. Bertram et al. (2010) report of reluctance of
developers to contribute to bug databases although this
kind of documentation is considered pivotal in knowl-
edge management. Seibel (2009) conducted interviews
with several famous developers: Joe Armstrong is re-
ported to think that people who say “What does it do?
Read the code.” are unprofessional because source code
shows what it does, not what it is supposed to do; and
recites Edsger Dijkstra’s words that one who is no good
at English will never be a good programmer. Jamie Za-
winsky said that “I always wish people would comment
more”. And Douglas Crockford reports that when he
reads source code written by other developers he starts
by “cleaning it. I’ll throw it in a text editor and I’ll start
fixing it.”
Nordberg (2003) considers poor documentation as a
typical symptom in software development, when there
are no clear assignments of ownership. Pigoski and
April (2004) report that comprehension in text-oriented
representation is difficult, especially if e.g. source code
and its evolution is not properly documented, “which
is often the case”. Also, many projects do not take the
time to document the knowledge gained in the project
(Casey and Richardson, 2009). Martin and McClure
(1983) attribute the typical high cost of maintenance to
problems in documentation.
2.3.1.3 Reasons for documentation problems
Zopf (2009) made the observation that “engineering dis-
cipline is not yet basic knowledge in software devel-
opment organizations”. Singer and Schneider (2012a)
report anecdotally of industrial projects where develop-
ers omit writing test cases, or perform revision control
by emailing project directories. Casey and Richardson
(2009) argue that incentives that encourage staff to ex-
change knowledge are missing. But Boden et al. (2009)
also found that in distributed development, different de-
velopment teams sometimes do not honor or recognize
each others’ contributions to documentation but accuse
each other of not doing it. Particularly in distributed
projects, Kiel (2003) observed that not following stan-
dards can almost be like a point of pride. But the major
two reasons found in literature seem to be time pressure
and economic rationality of developers.
Time pressure as external source of documentation
problems Time pressure has a negative effect on docu-
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mentation, particularly if there are low standards (Kajko-
Mattsson, 2001). When management is short-sightedly
more concerned with deadlines than with the inside of
their software, then this can be one reason for poor doc-
umentation (Connell, 1999). Even while developers be-
lieve in the importance of documentation, often timing,
budget and scheduling constraints prevent them from
adequately documenting their work (Forward and Leth-
bridge, 2002). This vulnerability to project pressures is
also mentioned by Curtis et al. (1988).
Individual cost-benefit analysis as internal source
of documentation problems Hruschka and Starke
(2011) see one reason for insufficient documentation in
the stereotypical personality of “code heroes” that lets
them fight their way through implementation problems
without caring too much about their team. Selic (2009)
notices that software developers are famous for their
dislike of documentation, often trying to avoid doing
it altogether. To them, writing documentation has
few value. Wray (2009) asks “Why do we persist in
poor programming practices when we know they’re
poor?” and witnessed that from time to time, inexperi-
enced programmers but experts, too, do code-and-fix
programming, then leaving low-quality source code
behind when pressing on with other tasks. Curtis et al.
(1988) find that if “information created outside of the
software tools environment must be manually entered,
developers will find ways around using the tools, and
information will be lost.” Herbsleb and Moitra (2001)
ascertain that the “resistance to documentation among
developers is well known and needs no emphasis.” After
conducting interviews with developers, Lethbridge et al.
(2003) narrow down that it is true that developers put
less effort into updating documentation as timely and
completely as managers and software process personnel
advocate. Leonard-Barton (1987) bequeaths that better
maintenance is not a convincing argument because it
is a too long way down the road. Kimmerle and Cress
(2007) reason that information-exchange through “a
shared database induced costs and provided no benefit
for the individual”. It is only rational for individuals to
not contribute; especially if they lack the experience to
see the benefits for the whole team.
It is therefore not surprising to see that in particular
young developers tend to create documentation prob-
lems: Boehm (2002) calls not documenting the “cowboy
role model” of young developers. Humphrey (1997)
confirms this view of young professionals who do not
Figure 2.4: Problems of understanding source code from
http://abstrusegoose.com/432
know the value of documenting. Spinellis (2010) sees
it as an indicator of maturing and early professionalism,
when developers start to include helpful explanations
with their source code.
2.3.2 Evidence of the problems in popular
developer culture
Similar to the previous section, this section recites evi-
dence of documentation and internal quality problems
in less scientific developer culture on the Internet.
Oram (2007) compares (external) documentation to
government funding that nobody wants to contribute to
but that everybody wants to have when in need. Papadi-
moulis (2010) openly presumes that, “like most organi-
zations, your internal documentation is non-existent or
known to be inaccurate”.
Figure 2.4 broaches the issue of developers getting
lost in undocumented or poorly documented software. A
famous resource of developer culture is Geek and Poke
that featured cartoons of programmers’ bad habits since
years (see Figure 2.5).
2.3.3 Interviews with Software engineer-
ing experts
Prause and Durdik (2012) conducted structured inter-
views with software engineering experts to inquire on
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Figure 2.5: Excerpts of Geek and Poke cartoons (Widder, 2012)
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documentation problems. The percentages of experts
considering source code and documentation as problem-
atic are summarized in Table 2.1.
Source code Doc.
All 47% 74%
by work perspective
Academia 48% 68%
Industry 40% 100%
by area of interest in software development life cycle
Early SDLC 67% 70%
Late SDLC 47% 76%
Development 56% 74%
Management 57% 78%
Theory 17% 66%
by work experience
< 5 years 43% 88%
5− 10 years 60% 82%
10− 20 years 33% 71%
> 20 years 43% 40%
by agile process experience
Scrum 50% 65%
Open source dev. 56% 72%
Extreme Programming 50% 57%
Table 2.1: Percentage of experts seeing documentation
problems by background (Prause and Durdik, 2012)
The internal quality of source code is not seen as the
most pressing concern, but still recognized as problem-
atic. Experts from both industry and academia alike
noted problems with documentation in general.
Experts who are interested in the theory of software
engineering saw few problems with documentation, and
were even less concerned about the internal quality of
source code (17%). Problems with the source code were
mostly noted by experts interested in the early phases
of the software process like requirements, design, and
implementation. Yet there was broad awareness of prob-
lems with documentation. On the end of the spectrum
were experts interested in development and management.
They saw the most problems with documentation and
the internal quality of source code.
In open source software development, experts were
more sensitive to source code problems. The internal
quality of source code as a medium of communication
among distributed developers, might be more important
here. Similarly, developers following the XP develop-
ment methodology might experience less documenta-
tion problems because knowledge is spread by different
means, e.g. pair programming. XP is famous for putting
rapid implementation above architectural design, which
is clearly reflected in the experts’ opinions, which reveal
low sensitivity towards documentation problems. Break-
ing down the results based on experience, there was a
moderate (r = 0.34, significant at p < 0.05) correlation
between work experience and insensitivity to problems
with documentation problems. An explanation could
be that experts move farther away from implementation
activities when advancing in their jobs, and therefore
perceive less problems.
The experts reasoned that the problems might come
from developers not caring about documentation (49%
agree), not knowing how to do it properly, lacking time,
or not explicitly considering documentation (46% each),
having only limited personal benefit (41%), and lacking
defined quality goals (35%). Minor reasons for poor
documentation and neglected architectural design are
that other goals conflict with the goal of writing good
documentation (19%), projects follow a fast prototyping
approach, linguistic and cognitive dissonance (inability
to write well, express oneself), lacks of professional
management and of the awareness of the importance of
documentation, and frequent changes in requirements.
While the study was about agile software develop-
ment, most of the interviewed experts (88%) were con-
vinced that the problems are not specific to agile projects.
2.3.4 The Karakos EU project case study
Karakos9 was a project conducted under the FP6. The
Karakos project was the primary context of this research.
Software projects vary greatly in their objectives and
execution. It is therefore important to know the origi-
nal context of a new software engineering idea as it is
always intertwined with a very specific initial context
that leads to its inception (Erdogmus, 2010). Although
other projects had additional influence on the developed
concept, Karakos was the most important context. For
more details on the study see Prause and Zimmermann
(2012). Karakos is picked up again in Section 7.1.6.1.
In this section, it serves for problem analysis and as a
development context of the research.
9A pseudonym for a software project used in the evaluation. See
Section 7.1.6.1 for a description of key characteristics.
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2.3.4.1 Research method
The goal of the case study was to capture and preserve
vivid descriptions of difficulties that can arise in consor-
tium projects in the environment of FP6. Actual work
practices are often different from theoretical “how things
ought to be”-perspectives. Studying the collaborative
work in such a project can therefore offer a complement-
ing perspective. It can show how the necessities of com-
plex collaboration affect best-practice software devel-
opment processes (Boden et al., 2007). The following
questions guided the research process:
• What does the typical EU project look like?
• What is a common denominator of tools and pro-
cesses to preserve knowledge on which a heteroge-
neous consortium can agree?
• How does the consortium character affect planned
software processes?
The research method that is best suited to answer the
above questions is a case study. In fact, a case study
is the original research method for investigating explo-
rative questions, i.e. finding out what is happening, seek-
ing new insights, and generating ideas and hypotheses
for future research. Furthermore, it is used to portray
a situation or phenomenon (Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009).
Case studies explore and explain contemporary software
engineering phenomena within their real-life contexts,
and are recognized as a formal research method (Verner
et al., 2009) with a high degree of realism at the expense
of experimental control (Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009). They
are appropriate when the research questions are “how”
or “why”-type questions, when the events are out of the
control of the researcher, and to understand “what” has
happened due to these events (Yin, 2003). Consequently,
the optimal research method was a case study.
According to Runeson and Ho¨st (2009), the study
can further be categorized as a “Case 2” approach, i.e.
a classical ethnographic study with a high degree of
interaction by the researcher but with a low awareness
of being observed by the subjects. The researchers were
seen as normal participants. The advantage of a Case
2 approach is that it provides a deep understanding of
the phenomenon, and that it can see behind the scenes
of the “official” view of matters. However, it produces a
substantial amount of data and is very time consuming
(Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009):
The researchers were involved with the project for its
entire duration as employees of a major partner in the
consortium. Researchers and their direct colleagues oc-
cupied key positions in the project and were generally in-
volved with some resources in all of the work packages,
and especially in the software engineering work pack-
ages. This allowed for broad insights into everything
that was going on in the project. Participant observations
and close contact with the day-to-day work are neces-
sary to reveal the actual informal and situated work prac-
tices that the collaborative work in a consortium-based
software development project follows. Orienting the
research towards ethnographic methods, offered many
advantages for the analysis of differentiated relations in
complex environments (Boden et al., 2007; Suchman,
1995).
The main means of collecting data were interviews,
on-site observations of project participants and artifact
analysis. During the project duration, respective part-
ners were visited repeatedly for several days. Local and
distributed processes were observed during project meet-
ings, individual work situations and cooperative tasks,
as well as project reviews held by the EC. Informal
interviews were conducted repeatedly with various par-
ticipants and stakeholders. Moreover, researchers were
integrated into the execution of various software pro-
cesses without interruption, and continuously monitored
email, phone conferences, chats and protocols, project
documentation, and internal documents (work papers,
confidential reports, white board sketches). The soft-
ware process was deeply analyzed, and findings were
documented over the full duration of the project in writ-
ten notes with supporting material attached. Afterwards,
the collected material was clustered into findings. In
addition to this, lessons learned were gathered from the
partners each year.
Experimentation in software engineering has shown
that there are many factors that impact the outcome of a
software engineering activity (Shull et al., 2002; Rune-
son and Ho¨st, 2009). In fact, a case study does not need
a strict boundary between studied object and its envi-
ronment but studies their interaction, which may be the
key to understanding. Case study research is inherently
qualitative in nature, not providing conclusions with sta-
tistical significance. But still sometimes generalizing
from a single case is possible (Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009).
A way to achieve a certain degree of generalizability is
to randomly select the case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This is
how Karakos was selected as study subject. Still, per-
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sonal experiences with several similar projects teach that
Karakos is a quite typical example, while being extraor-
dinary successful.
2.3.4.2 Project overview
The duration of the project was more than four years
with a budget of over ten million Euro. Fifteen distinct
partners from seven different European countries formed
the project consortium, consisting of a couple of Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), a few large compa-
nies, some not co-located divisions of a large research
institute, and several universities.
Karakos was selected among the top ten European
projects and gained world-wide attention through talks
and keynote speeches. Its software demonstrations
were successfully presented at international trade fairs.
Karakos is part of three important European cluster
activities and passed its final review with an excellent
rating. More than 70 software developers produced
about 200,000 source lines of Java and C# code that are
published as open source. Karakos can be considered as
a very successful project of its kind, i.e. among other
FP6 projects.
Projects co-funded by the EC as Integrated Project
(IP) under the FP6 are required to bring multiple partners
from at least three different European nations together.
The strategic objectives of the FP6 are to strengthen the
scientific and technological bases of industry, and to
encourage international competitiveness while promot-
ing research activities in support of EU policies (FP6,
2011). In order for a project to receive funding in this
area, both industrial and academic organizations need
to be involved: universities, research institutes, small
and medium-sized enterprises, large corporations, or
even public bodies. Naturally, such research projects
tackle scientific and technical problems leading to a huge
amount of assets and knowledge that need to be pub-
lished, distributed, and exploited commercially. There-
fore, suitable software processes need to be established
that are adequate for the size and complexity of the
project. Comparably high software process maturity in
its frame of reference was a major goal from the start of
the project.
The major activities of the project were distributed
over 14 work packages: project management, require-
ments engineering, specification, technical implemen-
tation and integration, user applications, validation,
demonstration, training and exploitation. Work package
WP14 was dedicated to review and assessment executed
by external reviewers once per year, which was required
by the EU to monitor project progress. Figure 2.6 shows
the structure and organization of the Karakos project.
Work packages form large units of work and are some-
what comparable to sub-projects. They usually start with
the project start and often last until the end of the project.
Each work package exhibits a small number of objec-
tives and accordant tasks, and a set of defined milestones
were planned to monitor the work progress. Several
consortium partners collaborate on one work package to
jointly contribute to the necessary work. Every consor-
tium member possesses a certain area of expertise where
it excels, and this expertise needs to be brought into the
project in various work packages. Each work package is
lead by one project partner (i.e. work package leader)
and also each task of a work package has a task leader
(i.e. task leaders).
The project organization of Karakos comprised an
overseeing Project Board, to which each partner dis-
patched one representative. The overall coordination of
the project was the responsibility of the Karakos project
manager under the authority of the Project Board. The
technical manager had the responsibility for managing
the overall progress of the project with regard to all tech-
nical work. This manager also chaired the technical
board, to which all leaders of a technical work package
have been appointed. The technical board had to ensure
the compliance of the technical solutions developed in
the project with the project’s vision, as well as the scien-
tific and technological objectives in all aspects and in all
of the involved areas of research.
Karakos also implemented a quality manager who
validated the project’s quality objectives regarding de-
liverable documents. This role also oversaw the identi-
fication and management of technical issues and risks.
The more specialized role of a software quality manager
specifically took care of the quality of software deliver-
ables (source code). This role was not originally planned
in the project but introduced later.
2.3.4.3 Iterative and User-Oriented Software Engi-
neering Process
In order to guarantee an agile response to changes and a
close involvement of end-users in the project, Karakos
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Figure 2.6: Organizational structure of Karakos
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applied an iterative and user-oriented software develop-
ment approach. At the end of each iteration, the proto-
type would address one additional application domain
(up to a maximum of three after the third iteration) to
demonstrate domain-independence.
The user-oriented software development process of
the project followed the principles of norm ISO 13407.
ISO 13407 gives guidance on human-centered design
activities throughout the life cycle of computer-based in-
teractive systems. Essential for a human-centered design
process is the inclusion of human users from early on in
the project. Further, expertise from a multi-disciplinary
team greatly enhances the engineering process. There-
fore, the team of Karakos consisted of psychologists,
computer scientists, industrial- and usability-engineers,
designers, and others.
Karakos ran through four full development cycles
with a duration of one year each. Stakeholders (like
the “vision owners” who gave the idea for the project)
had defined vision scenarios prior to the project. Every
cycle started with the refinement of vision scenarios and
derived more detailed technical scenarios from them.
Using focus groups and feedback from the earlier iter-
ations, this would lead to new, refinements of and re-
prioritization of existing requirements. The focus groups
consisted of potential users and asked them to identify
what they would expect from the envisioned software.
Requirements could be prioritized using an overall rat-
ing and customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction values.
Also, relations between requirements (e.g. contradiction
or inclusion) were identified and, if necessary, resolved.
The following steps were then the evolution of the
software architecture and implementation, and the evalu-
ation and validation of (integrated) parts of the system.
The prototype applications for each of the three appli-
cation domains have also been continued, augmented
and evolved. This iterative process ensured a gradual
approximation to the implementation goals with simul-
taneous consideration of the end-users’ needs. Iterative
development is a key feature of user-oriented develop-
ment processes. Also, iterations are valuable to consoli-
date development and to integrate the results that were
achieved so far. Figure 2.7 shows the different phases of
each iteration of the project.
2.3.4.4 Organizing an EU project
There are certain characteristics of EU projects that are
prescribed by the Framework Programmes. For instance
Figure 2.7: Development phases and work packages of
the Karakos project
that consortium partners have to come from at least three
different EU countries. But the choice of most character-
istics is at the discretion of the consortium, e.g. project
duration, requested funding, choice of partners, number
and ambitiousness of goals, work packages and who will
work how much in them, key process activities (like re-
quirements engineering), if developed source code will
be open source, if and what development iterations there
will be.
Lings et al. (2006) recommend to consider distribu-
tion only for well understood and stable projects. This
situation is, by design, different in EU projects, which
have a strong research component that adds a lot of un-
predictability to plans. Work in EU projects therefore
relies very much on self-organization: During the pro-
posal phase, the consortium makes a rough plan of how
partners are distributed among the work packages. How-
ever, all of this is only a rough estimate. Efforts can be
shifted, milestones are hardly measurable, and at that
time, deliverables barely consist of much more than a
vague abstract. This gives EU projects the necessary
freedom to adapt its direction to new research results
and failed experiments (Tolido, 2009). While duration
and funding of the project are fixed, quality and scope
are variable parameters. Of course, EC monitors the
project’s progress, sees its fundamental direction, and
expects collaborative results.
In summary, projects face a lot of uncertainty at low
agreement from their research and consortium natures,
while being widely autonomous and self-dependent.
Plan-driven development may not fit them very well.
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2.3.4.5 The process in practice and internal quality
problems
Several tools were designated to handle the software
process of the distributed consortium, and to capture
valuable knowledge in software process artifacts. In
the proposal stage, the development processes of an EU
project are usually not yet fully elaborated in detail. Al-
though the project contract between EC and the con-
sortium provides a high-level overview, it is part of the
project work itself to define its software process. The
detailed definition of such processes needs to aspire to
be a compromise between the different partners’ ways
of developing software, and their respective engineering
disciplines and habits. Many partners and individuals
had extensive experience in EU projects and designed
the software processes and tools in a way that was sup-
posed to avoid the pitfalls from earlier projects. How-
ever, it turned out that preserving knowledge can be a
hassle in a heterogeneous consortium of several partners.
Communication artifacts The main means of com-
munication were project meetings (general assemblies
and work package meetings held several times a year so
that there was a high likelihood of two persons meeting
at least twice a year for a few days), emails (personal
emails as well as about ten mailing lists), Skype-based
calls and chat meetings, and normal telephone calls. In
general, communication and collaboration between the
partners worked good. Developers reported that some-
times it was necessary to fall back to normal phone calls
when emails would remain unanswered. Sometimes im-
portant documents were sent via email while it would
have been better to archive them in a repository like
BSCW10 and send a link instead. Skype-based phone
conferences turned out to be cumbersome with too many
people in a call so that the consortium later switched to
Skype chats. While this simplified the writing of meet-
ing minutes, it also led to extensive chat logs being sent
instead of carefully distilled meeting minutes.
Software Documentation Following the “Don’t re-
peat yourself!” metaphor — do not duplicate documen-
tation, instead generate it (Spinellis, 2010) — Karakos
employed a wiki for letting several people collabora-
tively write living documents. The wiki of Karakos sup-
ported export to Microsoft Word (Word) documents. At
10www.bscw.de/
times when documentation (e.g. a software architecture
report) had to be delivered, the respective wiki pages
could be exported to a Word document that was then
submitted, while the actual documentation in the wiki
remained a living document. A BSCW server served as
the platform for internal sharing of documents and other
project artifacts like pictures, work-in-progress docu-
ments and reports, but also for submitting deliverables
to the EC. In a folder-like structure, the users conjointly
organized, processed and exchanged documents in their
workspace using Web Distributed Authoring and Ver-
sioning (WebDAV). Furthermore, BSCW offers version-
ing of files and allows configuration of access rights.
The original approach to documentation envisioned to
generate documentation deliverables from documenta-
tion filed in the wiki. On the quality manager’s request, a
post-processing in Word was necessary to fulfill quality
standards, since the layout of generated text did not have
the standardized project look. Additionally, some part-
ners had never worked with a wiki before, and insisted
on a Word- and email-based process for their deliver-
ables, or deliverables for which they performed reviews.
Soon, all reviews and corrections were done in Word,
while changes were not replicated into the wiki anymore.
Eventually, all writing was done in Word; except for
two partners that managed to keep their own process
of writing deliverables with LATEX and Subversion, and
another that promoted Google Docs. From then on, the
wiki was merely used for meeting planning and to col-
lect feedback from others. Few project knowledge was
captured. Instead of keeping the documentation in one
easily editable place (wiki), it became scattered across
various media.
So when developers needed knowledge about another
partner’s software component, they would rather beg
for support then be able to first consult documentation.
A representative of one partner once resigningly noted
about this practice that “getting the necessary documen-
tation is like trying to get blood out of stone”. Follow-
ing a management initiative, some installation instruc-
tions and training materials were added to the wiki. But
the partners’ processes differed in what was considered
standard documentation. For example, when asked to
provide Javadoc for private methods in their code, one
partner complained that this was excessive documenta-
tion, and that it was a problem that those who set quality
standards did not develop themselves. The developers
also did not accept Jira for documenting bugs but rather
reported them informally to the respective developers.
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This confirms the observations that developers are hesi-
tating to create documentation. The consortium nature
of Karakos increases the disparity between supply and
need for documentation, while at the same time reducing
hierarchical influence.
Source code and Subversion For managing and shar-
ing source code, a Subversion repository was set up.
Coding rules were defined to achieve properties such as
readability and maintainability of sources. These cod-
ing rules were tailored to the Karakos developers and
their development environments. The wiki served as
container for the coding rules. An enforcement structure
to monitor and push the compliance to these rules was
not set up.
The coding rules regarding the source code or reposi-
tory were generally ignored. In the end, the source code
accrued a technical debt of about 30% of its total value.
The biggest problems are code duplication and violation
of static analysis rules. Note: This analysis and calcu-
lation is based on Sonar11 with default settings. One
partner feared that an open source release might create
adverse viral publicity in the open source community,
and requested that “no trace-able footprint to any mem-
ber of [organization x] staff” should remain when source
code is eventually released.
The revision control system is a good starting point
for creating awareness, which is essential in distributed
collaboration (Grinter, 1996). Basic awareness support
was set up in form of a commit mailing list. Mails sent
to this list contained the log message, the changed files’
names, and a diff of changes. But many developers
did not read the messages. They requested to be removed
from the mailing list, or had their email client filter
out emails to the trash. Furthermore, some partners
committed very rarely (only twice per year) but then vast
amounts of changes at a time. This behavior is unsuitable
for supporting development awareness (Grinter, 1996).
Also, only few developers wrote useful commit mes-
sages although these are very important (e.g. Hruschka
and Starke, 2011; Buse and Weimer, 2010a). In response
to this, a filter we added to the repository that rejected
empty messages. This resulted in many commit mes-
sages like “a” or “ ”. Individuals and the software qual-
ity manager reminded committers personally and via
email that such messages were useless and should be
11http://www.sonarsource.org/
avoided. Yet that did not change very much in a short
time frame. However, within a year’s time the number
of completely useless or minimally helpful messages
dropped by up to 5% each, while the number of helpful
messages increased from 52% to 60%. None of the de-
velopers made use of linking a commit to a requirement
or bug report.
Sometimes there were up to 10 commits in short suc-
cession with the same message. When bringing this up,
developers stated that those changes actually belonged
together, which contradicts Subversion’s commit atom-
icity concept. The developers attributed their behavior
to poor Subversion12 support in Eclipse, which was used
by the majority of developers (cf. Section 7.10).
A revision control repository should contain every-
thing that is necessary for creating the product, but noth-
ing more (Richardson and Gwaltney, 2005). The de-
velopers in Karakos used to check in everything, entire
working directories. Soon the repository contained de-
bug and log files, intermediate and final compilation
results, and the like. Commit conflicts, version mis-
matches and chaos were the results, and the repository
grew rapidly in size, as well on the developers’ machines
as on the server. After several unsuccessful reminders,
commit filters were installed that would reject a check-in
with the error message “Sorry, you are not allowed to
check in file XY because its name is not allowed” if the
file was, for example, a compiled .class file, or in a
tmp or obj directory. The developers were informed
by email that they should send libraries to administra-
tors for checking them in. This seemed to work at first.
But in fact, a few partners had silently assumed that the
repository was “broken” and could not be used anymore.
So they stopped using it. Even after months, several
reminders and offerings of support, the partners could
not be convinced to actively use the repository again. It
became a common situation that partners were exchang-
ing source code or just executables via Skype. When
partners came together on integration meetings twice
a year, a dialog like the following could be heard fre-
quently: “Could you please send me a newer version of
your component?” – “Yes, sure, wait a minute, I’ll just
compile it for you.”
At the beginning of the project, no clear structure was
defined for the Subversion repository. For some part-
ners, Subversion was a new technology. Some days into
development, one developer took initiative and restruc-
tured the entire repository according to best practices —
12http://subversion.tigris.org/
37
II—
P
R
O
B
L
E
M
S
C
O
P
E:
O
N
T
H
E
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
O
F
S
O
F
T
W
A
R
E
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
A
R
T
IFA
C
T
S
II — PROBLEM SCOPE: ON THE QUALITY OF SOFTWARE PROCESS ARTIFACTS
i.e. having trunk, branches, and tags directories in the
root directory — and wrote an explanatory and defini-
tive email to all (see Figure 2.8). But soon after, the
repository’s chaotic structure returned. This time no one
cleaned up. Several developers reported problems to
understand what is where (“you just don’t know what
to check out or where to commit your changes to”), or
which version is the trunk. General reminders to keep
the repository clean did not show an effect.
Lack of hierarchy In reaction to the above problems,
the role of software quality manager was introduced
to coordinate software quality efforts and to emphasize
their impact. The software quality manager faced some
open reception problems in the beginning. He was seen
as a bureaucratic instance that hindered partners in do-
ing their work. Instead, everyone should proceed with
business “in a reasonable way”. A partner noted that it
was a problem that those who formulated the rules did
not produce components themselves. So it was consid-
ered unfair. In general, the recommendations made by
the software quality manager were often ignored in the
consortium.
To increase the effect of the software quality man-
ager’s statements, a report was established as a new
deliverable to the EC. The report would capture weak-
nesses in the project, and provide quality improvement
advice to the partners. But even that did not create the
hierarchical pressure that might have been necessary to
discipline partners.
2.3.4.6 Case study summary
The Karakos project had much influence on this research,
and created much of its conceptual problem context.
Many of its details were therefore presented here.
The case study showed an example of the organization
of a typical EU project that was, although many prob-
lems occurred, one of the most successful projects of its
kind. Although it was possible to agree on some specific
tools, it was difficult to get project participants to use
them correctly. Problems regarding the preservation of
knowledge were that
• coding rules were defined but not enforced and
therefore ignored, which is considered worse than
not codifying rules at all (Deimel and Pozefsky,
1979),
• developers mostly avoided writing commit mes-
sages, split commits, or rarely committed twice a
year, inhibiting effective coordination of work,
• the structure of the public Subversion repository
dissolved and its contents got polluted with unnec-
essary files,
• much source code or even pre-built binaries were
exchanged between partners, and
• no bug reports were filed, wasting valuable diag-
nostic information.
A major reason may be that hierarchical power is
lacking in a consortium project. But hierarchy is not
everything: Leonard-Barton (1987) summarizes that
organization-wide mandate may increase the switch to
innovative techniques but they rarely meet immediate ac-
ceptance. Organizational members who have not bought
in to a new technology may under-utilize or even sabo-
tage it. A tool that is to be successful in such an environ-
ment faces two kinds of problems:
1. open rejection in the form that the project consor-
tium is unable to agree upon installing it, and
2. hidden rejection in the form that partners and de-
velopers (inadvertently) do not use it.
While dealing with open rejection is a management
decision, consortium partners will usually not object to
technologies that do not obtrude new ways of working
on them. A new technology must be robust enough to
survive although there are deniers, and it must leave de-
niers their freedom to deny. Next, a technology that suc-
cessfully avoids this first pitfall, still needs to cope with
hidden rejection. Instead of making hard prescriptions, a
technology should constantly advertises behavior that is
beneficial to the project. It could relieve technical man-
agement of some of its constant advertising and remind-
ing obligations. For instance, it could remind developers
to increase contributions to documentation and motivate
through direct and visible personal benefit.
2.3.5 Karakos is not a black swan – EU
project survey
Karakos from the above case study was a project in the
EU’s Framework Programmes. To establish a frame of
reference that shows Karakos was not a rare specimen
of its kind, a survey with EU projects was conducted.
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Dear all
I hate to be a party breaker, but I just had a look at the structure of the svn. there are only checked 12 files
ind and the structure is already broken. It is clear that I have to point to some common use of svn (yes i
know, “this are not the way we use to do it”, “no no you are wrong, thats not the way we read it”, etc etc). We
are developing a Open Source project so lets use the de facto standard on how to use svn in a Open Source
project. as created on the Karakos svn there exists three sub dir
[...]
So please of the sake of my mind. make a fresh checkout and merge your work into trunk.
I have taken the liberality to move the files around a bit. So please all make a fresh checkout. and
as always “svn update” often. if there is a conflict, work it out with the person that wrote the code do not
force merge.
[...]
When all are moved to using trunk ill begin removing stuff in brances.
best
xxx [name removed]
Figure 2.8: Email to consortium and Subversion log message of revision 27
2.3.5.1 Background of the project survey
Although there were a lot of seeming process deficien-
cies in Karakos, it still was one of the most successful
projects of its kind, also receiving excellent ratings from
EC officials. This contradiction might either be a failing
in the EC’s assessment process, or Karakos was not so
bad after all. The literature review already illustrated
that internal quality problems are ubiquitous.
Let us revisit the peculiar situation in EU projects
again: Academia and industry — both consortium
partners in EU projects — define their success in
different ways. Industry needs to reduce cost and
increase customer satisfaction through quality, whereas
academia defines its success through publications at
high-reputation venues. To them software quality is
secondary (Grechanik, 2009). Additionally, there is un-
certainty in results because of the research character, and
there is disagreement because of the heterogeneous con-
sortia. (Also refer to the discussion of self-organization
in Section 3.5.3.1.) This, of course, has an impact on
the software processes in EU projects with such unequal
partners. In an organization without a common aim,
components will become selfish and destroy the system.
It is management’s task to give the components a
common aim that is in-line with the organization’s goal
(Deming, 2000). If the Karakos consortium achieved
a comparably high organizational maturity, then it is
reasonable to assume that the Karakos project actually
was successful, according to the common sense that
maturity is related to success (cf. CMMI, 2010).
In order to establish a frame of reference for Karakos,
Prause et al. (2010a) conducted a survey of over 50 FP6
projects with ≈ 100 participants. The questionnaire
asked for availability of quality assurance personnel and,
as a proxy for organizational maturity, consortium-wide
use of software development tools for basic processes
with broad tool support. Participants of the study were
supposed to indicate which tools are used project-wide.
They could either respond with a specific tool, “don’t
know”, or “none”.
2.3.5.2 Project survey results
Project partners rarely assign quality managers to EU
projects; presumably because separate quality depart-
ments or organizationally independent quality managers
rarely exist. 49% of the partners are missing dedicated
quality management roles (38% have no quality man-
agement at all, while 11% of the partners rely on “every-
body” to take care of quality). 14% do at least let such
role be fulfilled by the project. If partners have quality
managers, then they are often members of the develop-
ment team (33%). Only 7% of partners have a non-team
member staffed for this role as advocated by common
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standards. The situation is similar on the project-level
with 63% of projects having no quality managers — in-
cluding 13% that do not know their quality management,
and 7% that see it as a task for everybody. However,
29% have one quality manager in the project and 11%
even have more than one.
Results derived from the project survey regarding the
use of tools are summarized in Table 2.2. Both, “don’t
know” and “none” are taken as indicators of the process
not being executed in a formalized and mature way. For
code reviews, also “Meetings” in person counted as a
tool. IDE-integrated static analysis alone did not qualify
as static analysis. Extensions like Checkstyle13 had to
be used.
Participants of the interview were also asked to rate
the importance of formally conducting the processes on
a Likert scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (abso-
lutely important). Interestingly, only a few project-wide
processes are considered actually important (four out of
eleven). Source code revision control being the most
important one among them. Due to this lack of shared
tools, other process areas certainly experience even less
collaboration.
Not shown in the table are communication processes
(due to a different format of question) which rely very
much on volatile media like meetings, telephone, video
conferences, instant messaging and personal email, and
less on media more suitable for archiving and knowledge
management like emailing lists or wikis. For sharing of
documentation, projects also rely more on suboptimal
types like emails and official deliverables.
2.3.5.3 Karakos in the frame of reference
Karakos aimed at a high software process maturity right
from its start and established consortium-wide tool sup-
port for more processes than many other projects. For
example, Karakos had requirements engineering (top
17%), continuous integration (top 19%), or automated
testing (top 20%). It was also among the first 20% of
projects to recognize the power of wikis for internal
communication, or document sharing using dedicated
archival systems accessible through the web (top 32%)
(Prause et al., 2010a). Karakos also had a dedicated qual-
ity manager and a dedicated software quality manager.
This higher maturity could be the reason why Karakos
was one of the most successful projects.
13http://checkstyle.sourceforge.net/
While Karakos had all the tools in principle, difficul-
ties occurred with the processes and tools in practice.
A lot of problems are based on the fact that available
tools are not used adequately. A reason could be that
established software engineering tools are too highly
specialized and require too much learning for the short,
improvised collaboration of consortia. They might re-
quire too much discipline, which is in stark contrast to
the developers’ desire for autonomy and independence
(Beecham et al., 2008; Singer and Schneider, 2012a).
The problems reported in the Karakos case study in
Section 2.3.4 are not atypical. The survey did not inquire
on the official view of processes but asked the project
everyman of what and how they perceived the tools.
With respect to this, evoked images are to some degree
alike. Karakos is not a black swan, a misleading sample.
Instead, the encountered issues are representative for a
group of widely spread problems.
The survey also revealed that reuse of source code
among the participants was about 27% compared to a
planned 47% of reuse of source code resulting from the
current project. While there are also other possible ex-
planations, this can indicate that there are problems with
reuse that could be a result of internal quality problems.
Participants of such projects reuse only about half of
the source code they were planning to. These numbers
evidence an experience from the open source release of
Karakos: All its components were originally intended
for reuse but only a few components seem to actually
have sufficient quality for reuse. Meanwhile the open
source team has discarded most other components.
2.3.6 Diverse Own Experiences
In addition to the Karakos case study (see Section 2.3.4)
and the survey of EU projects from Section 2.3.5, per-
sonal experiences in several other projects further con-
firm the image portrayed in literature.
2.3.6.1 Bora
The objective of the Bora14 project was to implement
a web-based learning environment. It contained an au-
thoring environment as well as adaptation and person-
alization. The platform integrated a tutoring system, a
computer instruction management system and a set of
14The name is a pseudonym for a software project.
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II-3 — An As-is Analysis of Internal Quality
Software process area Mature Importance
Requirements engineering 17% 2.64
Continuous integration 19% 2.31
Unit testing 20% 2.64
Static analysis 20% 2.89
Source code revision control 21% 3.81
Software metrics 23% 2.45
Code reviews 29% 2.58
Bug tracking 35% 3.03
Test plan 47% 2.98
Project management 68% 3.23
Architectural design 71% 3.41
Table 2.2: Maturity and perceived importance of processes in EU projects
cooperative tools. This environment was used to build
a large knowledge base in an engineering domain, and
served to experiment with a comprehensive virtual uni-
versity.
The Bora project was co-funded in the Fifth Frame-
work Programme for Research and Technological De-
velopment (FP5), started in 2000, and ran over four
years. Over 25 partners from ten countries collaborated
to reach the project’s goals. The numerous courses and
e-learning contents that were created during this project
found re-use in Flail15 (Section 2.3.6.2).
When the software was about to be re-used in later
projects, it underwent a major refactoring to version 2.0
after the original project. The developers working on the
refactoring, however, had not built the first version and
complained that documentation was scarce. Although
they had gathered knowledge from the original develop-
ers, they still had to reconstruct most information from
scattered American Standard Code for Information In-
terchange (ASCII) files, emails and shreds of Javadoc.
The Dendro˘c documentation tool (Prause et al., 2007a)
was created in an attempt to recombine the distributed
pieces of information into one piece of interconnected
and coherent documentation. Despite a high overall user
acceptance of Dendro˘c, which supports the existence
of a documentation problem, Dendro˘c was trying to fix
symptoms of a deeper cause: too few investments in
documentation.
15The name is a pseudonym for a software project.
2.3.6.2 Flail
The goal of the Flail project was to unify and enable
access to electronic materials scattered across hetero-
geneous and unaligned repositories throughout Europe.
Typical contents included such diverse matters like pho-
tographs, blue prints, texts about famous domain experts,
questionnaires, local regulations, or material informa-
tion sheets. Building on a foundation of several reposito-
ries that originated from disparate projects, Flail aimed
at being an open and flexible infrastructure overlay in
the sense of being able to incorporate other repositories,
irrespective of their educational, professional or com-
mercial background. Instead, a virtual super-repository
infrastructure was built on top of existing repositories to
provide uniform access to contents.
Flail was co-funded by the EC and ran for three years.
Mostly universities, some research institutes and a few
SMEs originating from five different European countries
formed the project consortium. Each partner developed
and ran its part of the software on its own servers. The
developed source code was not shared between the part-
ners. Instead the components of the software were con-
nected via web services. Consequently, most of the soft-
ware process artifacts remained the sole responsibility
of the respective partner.
The consequence was that an individual developer had
only very limited capabilities to make a change because
he had no access to the other components. Local testing
on a developers machine was almost impossible, and of-
ten development was slowed down by waiting for a part-
ner. Because of the waiting times, developers sometimes
by-passed service layers, degrading the original architec-
ture and causing outdated architecture documentation.
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Most documentation was the sole responsibility of each
partner. One notable exception was a wiki page which
briefly described all web service interfaces. However,
during the later periods of the project, it turned out that
this information was not enough: telephone conferences
and email discussions were held frequently in order to
jointly reconstruct knowledge of the actual workings of
the system when a change was needed. Meanwhile, since
commercial exploitation opportunities increased, reim-
plementation plans were discussed on the quiet. None
of the partners could do something with his component
alone. Everyone was dependent on the others.
Flail also relied on a five year old installation of Bora
(see Section 2.3.6.1) for data. Bora was never officially
decommissioned but it had not been used anymore since
three years. None of the original developers was em-
ployed anymore, and documentation was almost non-
existent. Only one developer who had learned from the
original developers how to maintain Bora was left. In his
locker there existed the last development machine. When
changes to Bora became necessary because of Flail, it
turned out that no one knew how to set up a development
environment including several required legacy develop-
ment utilities. Fortunately the one development machine
still existed and the developer could do the changes. A
backup was created immediately and a post-it glued to
the computer saying that nobody should touch it.
When the last developer’s contract finally ended, he
gave the advice in private to fight tooth and nail to never
have to maintain that system. Shortly after his departure,
new problems occurred. There was nobody left who
could take care of the problems as nobody knew how
the system worked, and there was no documentation.
So a decision was made to extract all data in a static
form, and to decommission Bora. Then the data could
not be changed anymore but would suffice for fulfilling
contract duties in Flail.
2.3.6.3 Corporate Wiki
Organizational knowledge comprises highly specialized
knowledge, insights and experiences about the organi-
zation’s field of business. Preservation and continuous
sharing of such knowledge among workers is essential
in knowledge-intensive businesses. Knowledge manage-
ment helps to avoid redundant work, to reduce employee
training times, and to adapt to changing environments. It
saves intellectual capital when employees leave, if they
become temporarily unavailable, or if they change to a
different position (McAdam and McCreedy, 2000). Dy-
namic corporate information systems like wikis can be
deployed to support knowledge management (Dencheva
et al., 2011).
Numerous companies, research institutes and private
persons rely on wikis to manage their business-related
knowledge (Danowski and Voss, 2004; Rohs, 2007).
However, most research focuses on Wikipedia and not
so much on wikis in corporate environments (Antin
and Cheshire, 2010; Kittur and Kraut, 2010). Resilient
numbers for work environments are hard to come by.
But problems with contributions to wikis seem not to
be an exception (see also Hoisl et al., 2007). Indeed,
Kraut et al. (2010) find that success stories like that of
Wikipedia are rare. Out of 6000 installations of the Me-
diaWiki software, not even every second one has eight
users or more (Dencheva et al., 2011).
A major problem is that users of public and corporate
wikis have to make personal efforts and invest their own
precious time in creating and improving content that
is often far more useful to others than themselves: an
article’s author already has the knowledge he writes
about. To him, the article is of less value because it
provides only few benefit. Rational beings like humans
will clearly prefer consuming content over producing
it. But a wiki with few contents and poor articles fails
to support knowledge management as there is nothing
to consume. The wiki is not attractive, and the few
contributors are further demotivated as they feel that
nobody else is contributing. In a closed community,
where the number of potential authors is limited and
everyone is a specialist with specialist knowledge, a
small percentage of volunteers is not enough. Instead,
active participation of all is necessary. The observations
in Moknowpedia16 confirm the results in a similar study
of knowledge sharing tools and processes by Reichling
and Veith (2005) (Dencheva et al., 2011).
The Moknowpedia is such a corporate knowledge
management system. It is one of the environments used
in the evaluation of this research. More detailed infor-
mation will be given in Section 7.1.6.4.
The success stories of Wikipedia or wikis used by
open source software projects clearly voted for wikis as
a promising approach. In practice, however, it turned
out that Moknowpedia had some troubles taking off.
16A wiki used by a research institute’s work group to share informa-
tion. More information in Section 7.1.6.4
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II-3 — An As-is Analysis of Internal Quality
Contributions to Moknowpedia were not as many and
as good as hoped. To investigate into the reasons for
low contribution, all members of the work group filled
out a short questionnaire. It asked why they themselves
or someone else was possibly not actively contributing,
and what could be done to improve this situation and
motivate them to contribute. The interviewees reported
various problems. Many interviewees named mostly
shortcomings of the wiki as problems, and said that a
good tool would be reward enough for use (Dencheva
et al., 2011):
Every fifth interviewee answered that the wiki’s syn-
tax was too complex to use and learn. This stopped them
from using it. Also, it was missing a clear structuring.
Half of the interviewees mentioned that there should be
someone who creates the structure. Adding own contri-
butions would be much easier then. Some interviewees
stated that there were so many other group tools requir-
ing their attention that they could not additionally con-
tribute to Moknowpedia. Others said that they preferred
to have a semantic wiki, instead, because it would help
them to better structure the wiki. No opportunity should
be left out to promote the wiki, too. A few persons were
frustrated because they felt they were the only ones to
write and tend to articles in a certain domain. Especially
student employees were missing an instructor that regu-
larly reminded them to contribute, or told them to write
a certain article. Students were also afraid that they were
not competent enough to make professional and quality
contributions. Finally, most interviewees stated that they
did not have enough time to write articles, although they
would really like to do so (Dencheva et al., 2011).
Although there is truth in many of the users’ com-
plaints, an alternate explanation is that they are not mo-
tivated sufficiently to try to overcome the hurdles by
themselves: The reason that they do not have the time —
to learn the wiki syntax, to create a structure, have their
attention drawn to other tools, have no one to tell them
what to do, felt incompetent, and have other important
things to do — is that they do not see enough value for
themselves in contributing. For rational, thinking beings,
a clear disproportion exists: Writing articles costs them
their own time, in the extreme case even making them-
selves replaceable, while others profit from easily acces-
sible information. While the group as a whole would
profit, every single person is tempted to free ride on the
group’s achievements. Reducing the extent of this dis-
proportion is key to increasing contribution (Dencheva
et al., 2011).
2.3.6.4 The long life of quick hacks
A colleague once sent me an email with the following
content (translated into English) when working on a
project:
“Isn’t that your research topic? I have another inter-
esting problem: Somebody programmed something and
hasn’t looked at the code for a very long time, hoping
that the quick & dirty solution would never be used, and
everything was only a prototype anyways. Now he is
looking at his code again after the long time because
it is used after all, and moreover it is for some reason
to be tested. The developer thinks to himself: what for
a complete idiot has produced that shit! It is neither
extensible nor maintainable, not to mention testable. He
feels downright embarrassed that someone else could
see the code, as it might happen that the project is to be
sold to a company...
Couldn’t you develop a solution how this developer
could sneak himself completely out of responsibility for
the code? Then I would like to make use of it :-)”
2.3.6.5 Silicate
Silicate17 was an industrial research project that actually
consisted of two subsequent projects. Although both
projects involved an industrial consortium of a few part-
ners, the software was built by only one partner. When
the first Silicate project was conducted, a second project
was not planned. Also, documentation of the first pro-
totype was not demanded during the second half of the
first project.
The second project followed as a pilot and evaluation
project more than one year after the first project had
finished. None of the developers of the first project were
available anymore. Someones had left, others had been
assigned to new projects. Due to extreme project pres-
sures, a small task force of developers had developed the
first prototype in a short period of time before a trade
fair. They took up vast amounts of technical debt to
be able to finish on time. However, the accumulated
debt was never repaid after the deadline as was origi-
nally intended. When a new team took responsibility for
preparing Silicate for the second project, large parts of
the software were re-written from scratch (Prause et al.,
2011).
17The name is a pseudonym for a software project.
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After all, this experience is nothing new, as
Buschmann (2010) notes: “It’s often easy to real-
ize some fundamental functionality if you ignore the
quality aspects. Progress is immediately visible with
this strategy, but it also creates the illusion that an
architecture is more mature than it actually is. At times
this practice is appropriate, for example, for trade fair
show prototypes. However, such demos are rarely of
production quality. Either significant refactoring is
necessary before the real development can begin or
they must be thrown away. Not communicating the
need for quality but enriching the scaffolding with
further functionality will likely cause massive costs and
schedule slips.” Prototypes, which should be the basis
for subsequent industrial exploitation, need internal
quality. Industry and organizations specializing on
market-oriented applied research demand tools and
techniques which support the creation of internal quality.
2.3.7 Summary
This section drew a picture of the status quo of internal
quality. It started out with a review of research literature,
which showed that documentation and internal quality
problems are ubiquitous in software development. The
image is solidified by examples of popular developer cul-
ture which broaches the issue in various ways including
comics. Also software engineering experts recently in-
terviewed about this issue confirm that documentation is
a problem. Next, a case study of software development
by a multi-national consortium framed the development
context of this thesis. A representative survey in projects
of the FP6 indicates that the Karakos case study is not
a singular case. Finally, several examples of personal
experiences were presented. It is clear that there is a
crisis of internal quality in software projects. As will be
discussed later (see Section 3.2.1.4), improvements are
very likely to move development closer to a sweet spot
of cost-optimal development.
The descriptions of the situation already revealed two
factors of internal quality problems:
• management that neglects the importance of inter-
nal quality, and fails to give priority, time and effort
to it, and
• the individual developer who is not motivated by
seeing no direct personal benefit for himself in in-
ternal quality.
Both factors are important. Either of them is enough
to spoil internal quality. If management is shortsightedly
more concerned with functionality or deadlines, or does
not express a desire for internal quality, then there is not
much that individual developers can do. If developers
are not motivated to invest in quality, they will simply
not do it.
Regulations are not very helpful in such situation, es-
pecially if the role of management in consortium projects
is naturally weaker due to less pronounced hierarchy.
Consortium partners are on equal hierarchical levels.
New technologies that support management with im-
proving internal quality without coercion but through
motivation of individual developers are needed. How-
ever, such technologies should be designed to reduce
susceptibility to open and hidden rejection in the consor-
tium.
2.4 Analysis of Problem Causes
Internal quality deficits are a common problem in soft-
ware projects (see Section 2.3). The reasons can be
found on management and individual developer levels.
While project management is capable of causing poor
documentation through unrealistic project plans, its pos-
sibilities of preventing poor documentation are limited to
enforcing regulations and appealing to developers’ mo-
tivation. The root cause is that writing documentation
is not valued very much by developers. The individual
developer himself has few personal and direct benefit
from his efforts.
This section further investigates into social back-
grounds and causes of the problem, starting out with
the iron triangle of quality and production (see Section
2.4.1), and broad resistance against new processes
(see Section 2.4.2). The actual problem, however, is
attributed to motivation, resistance against innovation,
and the tragedy of the commons (see Section 2.4.3).
After presenting the phenomenon in its original contexts
of sociology and economy, it is then transferred to
software and internal quality (see Section 2.4.4).
2.4.1 How people, processes and technol-
ogy affect quality
People, processes and technology are regarded as the
three main factors that influence quality and productivity.
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People
TechnologyProcess
Quality
and
Productivity
Figure 2.9: The Iron Triangle of quality and productivity
derived from Jalote (2005) and Koch (2005a)
This section seeks to investigate how the three factors
are influenced by the environment, and if the situation
is any different in research reality as compared to the
“common” situation or how things ought to be.
2.4.1.1 The Iron Triangle
High quality and productivity are achieved by having
skilled people use good tools (technology) in a suitable
way. This is often called the Iron Triangle of quality and
productivity (see Figure 2.9, Jalote, 2005). Creativity,
vision and intellect are what makes people indispensable
in every project. But people are imprecise, forget tasks
and make mistakes (Koch, 2005a). Therefore the pri-
mary purpose of processes is to mitigate this problem.
Processes guide the actions that are necessary to solve
a task. A good process never poses a problem in itself.
It is invisible to those who adhere to it (Koch, 2005b).
Finally, technology is there to support people and their
processes. It ought to make them efficient and effective.
There is a definite hierarchy in that triad, with people
being supreme, and tools in a supporting role for both
people and processes. Any tool that fails to achieve this
support should be rejected (Koch, 2006).
2.4.1.2 People
Research projects involve research partners and univer-
sities intentionally. However, a large portion of people
from universities are research assistants, young people
with little experience in software development, perhaps
even without any knowledge in collaborative software
engineering. There are few senior developers, quality
managers or software architects, only senior researchers
who are experts in their research domain, which is not
necessarily software engineering. They started their sci-
entific careers as research assistants, and got promoted
through doing research, not software development prac-
tice. Additionally, young professionals in Germany were
paid 15% less in public service and academia than in
industry (38kEUR18 as compared to 45kEUR19) in 2009.
Paying less might not necessarily buy the best develop-
ers that money can buy, which is particularly interesting
as Boehm (2002) notes that 49.99% of developers are
below average. Freedom and the opportunity to do a
doctorate could compensate for less salary, yet possibly
conflict with the aim of creating maintainable software.
Many research institutes fail to offer long-term perspec-
tives by closing fixed-term contracts. This, of course,
emphasizes personal career goals that are not necessarily
congruent with the company’s needs. Finally, research
brings frequent domain changes and a necessity to adopt
new technologies. Flexibility is more important than a
deeper knowledge of the applied technologies.
2.4.1.3 Technology & Processes
Many technologies and tools used are under develop-
ment themselves and not fully matured. The necessary
flexibility leads to using improvised tools, and ad-hoc
processes. Software Process Improvement (SPI) plays
an important role in industry but it is commonly per-
ceived as incompatible with agile development (Turner
and Jain, 2002).
Due to the nature of research, teams have to operate
in an area of self-organization which is naturally hostile
to processes (see also Section 3.5.3.1). For example,
the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) appraisal results
catalog20 lists almost 3000 companies or divisions, but
no more than ten (mostly Far Eastern) universities at
least at level 2. As a result of small teams and the unsta-
ble environment, there is few room for process-related
specialization or specialized jobs. Specialization is fur-
ther hampered through high fluctuation of personnel.
Research consortia address this problem by choosing
18http://oeffentlicher-dienst.info/c/t/
rechner/tvoed/bund?id=tvoed-bund-2009&g=E_
13&s=1&zv=VBL&z=100
19http://www.spiegel.de/jahreschronik/0,1518,
451712,00.html
20http://sas.sei.cmu.edu/pars/ retrieved 2010-02-06
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skilled partners. But then company, country, culture and
language barriers run in the midst of project tasks. At
the beginning of an EU project there is neither time nor
resources for process harmonization between new con-
sortium partners. Yet this were a complex task in its own
right even if only two parties were involved (Sechser,
2009). A proof of high process maturity is not required,
neither from the project consortium as a whole nor its
members, although an increase in maturity by just one
level has been shown to bring an efficiency improvement
of up to 10% (Clark, 2000). High market pressure is not
existent. This reflects in the way how projects make use
of process-supporting tools, although usage of appropri-
ate tools is even more important in distributed projects
(Carmel and Agarwal, 2001).
2.4.1.4 Agility increases the focus on people
The three factors of people, process and technology in-
fluence the situation of quality and productivity in soft-
ware projects. Due to their inherent characteristics, agile
projects and projects close to research may not have a
maturity level that is comparable to advanced industrial
standards. But when processes are weaker, success de-
pends on heroic deeds of individuals (Humphrey, 1988).
The above sections showed that differences from how
things ought to be are present for all three factors. How-
ever, the problems in one factor may reciprocally inten-
sify problems with other factors. In particular, the effect
of weak processes is that more of the responsibility for
quality is burdened on individuals. The long-term health
of projects rests on individual developers who are less
experienced, underpaid, and who only have short-term
perspectives. Yet they are supposed to use their high
degree of freedom to create good internal quality. If de-
velopers are intrinsically motivated to take good care for
internal quality, then freedom should not be a problem.
From the existence of the software crisis, however, it
seems that there is a deeper cause that could only get
amplified by the weakness of processes and tools.
2.4.2 Resistance against new processes
and technologies
People are the primary resource of a project, and pro-
cesses and tools are only there to assist them in what
they do. However, it may be inevitable to adapt people
to processes and tools. For example, it was described
2.5%
Innovators
13.5%
Early
adopters
34%
Early
majority
34%
Late
majority
16%
Laggards
Time until adoption
Figure 2.10: Adopter categorization on the basis of in-
novativeness (Rogers, 2003)
earlier that young professionals have fewer experience,
cannot yet value documentation and are more likely to
be cowboy coders, and have different motivations. Con-
sortia have to agree on using the same media for commu-
nication and documentation and working processes have
to be harmonized, e.g. when and what to document.
Usually people do not want to change the ways how
they work. Even if a new technique or technology helps
people, it takes its time until it is taken up. In his famous
book, Rogers (2003) classifies five kinds of technology
adopters, signified by how much time it takes them to
adopt a new technology: innovators, early adopters, early
majority, late majority and laggards. The typical Rogers’
bell curve is shown in Figure 2.10.
While Rogers’ diffusion of new approaches is consid-
ered on a voluntary basis, even organizational mandate
does not guarantee that developers accept them any faster
or at all. If they do not regard an approach as useful and
as immediately improving their performance, then they
are highly likely to reject it. Many approaches in soft-
ware development that aim at internal quality have huge
long-term benefits for the whole organization. But their
chances of success are few because the immediate costs
are incurred by individual developers (Leonard-Barton,
1987; Riemenschneider et al., 2002). Approaches that
exploit other motivations of developers could have value
to increase the adaptation of processes and tools (Singer
and Schneider, 2012a).
2.4.3 Economic goods and the tragedy of
commons
In economics, four categories of goods are distinguished
according to the criteria rivalrousness and excludability.
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Rivalrousness decides whether using a good reduces its
availability; goods that get used up by using them are
rivalrous. Excludability determines whether a party can
be efficiently excluded from the good’s use, i.e. market
participants can be effectively excluded from using an
excludable good (Boyes and Melvin, 2010). Examples
of the each kind are given in Figure 2.11.
Both kinds of non-excludable goods share the problem
that, by definition, access to and use of the goods cannot
be controlled. As long as they are available, they are
free for all, i.e. no matter how much they are used,
there is almost no additional cost but only high gains.
Removing fish from the seas or watching free-to-air
television has only a low cost for the individual. In the
case of a rivalrous good like fish, however, the society
bears the cost: the fish taken by one individual is no
more available to another one. An individual has no
economic incentive to not take a fish because if it does
not, it may only find that it is taken by someone else.
The tragedy of commons (Hardin, 1968) is a socio-
logical phenomenon that originates from the rational-
ity of humans. Every use (removing a fish) degrades
the resource, possibly even to the point when it is de-
stroyed (no fish left), if it is not repaired in between the
uses. While the profit of usage is gained by an individual
(fish), the cost of degradation is shared by all (no more
fish). As the resource is non-excludable, there is no way
of making an individual pay for the degradation. This
makes it profitable and rational for the selfish individual
to maximize use at the expense of others, although all
may lose in the long run. Typical examples in the real
world are the high seas fishery or overgrazing of public
pastures. Overuse has possibly even led to the extinction
of entire cultures (Diamond, 2005). In modern societies,
most common goods have been turned into private goods
to protect them from over-exploitation.
Hardin (1968) notes that the same principle applies to
inverse cases like pollution and the like, too. In this case,
something bad is added to a commons: releasing toxic
chemicals into water or dangerous fumes into the air,
or placing unpleasant advertising signs in the landscape.
The mixing of a valuable resource with a low quality
material leads to a lesser quality combined resource, and
possibly to the destruction of a valuable resource.
To non-excludable, non-rivalrous goods a phe-
nomenon similar to the tragedy of commons applies.
Although using the public good does not degrade it, still
someone has to pay for it to become available. The term
free riding stems from the imagery of traveling on bus
without paying for the ticket, thus not paying for the
maintenance of the transport resource. This leads to
under-payment, and, if enough parties act in this way, to
the deterioration and loss of the resource. Often the term
free riding is applied to both kinds of non-excludable
goods, not making the distinction of rivalrousness. With
respect to digital resources like file sharing networks
and Wikipedia articles, free riding has been identified as
the cause of the tragedy of digital commons (Adar and
Huberman, 2000; Hoisl, 2007).
Definition 22 – Free riding
Free riding describes a situation where some of those
who use a public or common good, pay less than required
or nothing for its maintenance. Free riding is a selfish
but rational decision made by an individual.
Definition 23 – Tragedy of commons
The tragedy of commons is a social dilemma in which a
valuable, commonly owned resource loses value through
free riding of individuals. The resource loses more value
than the sum of individual gains so that the group is
worse off.
2.4.4 The tragedy of commons for internal
quality
The tragedy of commons is not limited to the domain
of physical goods. It applies to any virtual or physi-
cal goods that have value to humans. In particular, it
includes the digital goods of software projects and the
information they carry. Another term used in literature
is information-exchange dilemma. Kimmerle and Cress
(2007) see a generic social dilemma in information-
exchange because contributing only has costs but no ben-
efit for the individual while “the entire group suffered
when all members decided to withhold information.”
2.4.4.1 Code ownership
Ownership defines a relation between a software process
artifact and a developer. While ownership grants far
reaching rights to its owner, some legislations consider
ownership to also bring with it the obligation to use it
for the good of society (cf. GG, 1949).
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Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous Private goods
e.g. food, clothing, toys, furniture, pizza
Common goods
e.g. fish, water, air
Non-rivalrous Club goods
e.g. cable television, private golf courses
Public goods
e.g. national defense, free-to-air televi-
sion
Figure 2.11: Four classes of economic goods (Boyes and Melvin, 2010)
In analogy to public laws, ownership of software pro-
cess artifacts in a software team implies
• the privilege to change them, and
• the obligation to use them for the good of the team.
This view is — from a practical perspective — congruent
with Hattori et al. (2010) who see ownership as a quan-
tification of knowledge. The developer who knows the
most about an artifact is considered to be its owner. He is
the one who is probably best prepared to make a change
because he knows the most about it. But while he may
call himself owner of the artifact, he has the obligation
to invest effort in it to keep it in good condition. He is
responsible for its maintenance so that the knowledge
encoded in it is easily accessible to the team.
Definition 24 – Code ownership
Code ownership describes a relationship between a soft-
ware process artifact and a person. Code ownership im-
plies the privilege to change it and be called owner, and
the obligation to invest effort to keep it in good condi-
tion.
Notice that code ownership also applies to other soft-
ware process artifacts; not only source code, as the name
implies. That means, when a project is said to have some
form of code ownership, not only source code but also
other software process artifacts are owned in the same
way. The different forms of code ownership in a project
are described below.
2.4.4.2 Three different code ownership models
Fowler (2006) identifies three broad categories of code
ownership models: strong, weak and collective (or no)
code ownership.
The privilege to modify a software process artifact
can be regulated through policies. This is strong code
ownership. It is the traditional model of software devel-
opment. Some open source software projects like the
Mozilla project follow strong code ownership models
(Mockus et al., 2002).
Definition 25 – Strong code ownership
Strong code ownership restricts the number of develop-
ers that can apply changes to certain parts of a software
to a few individuals or even a single one only.
The advantage of strong ownership is that responsi-
bilities are clear: Grossbart (2011) notes that “normally
ownership mentality is great. When every developer
feels like they own the product it drives quality up and
fuels the passion that leads to inspiration.” Nordberg
(2003) continues that for developers, ownership implies
a direct benefit from increases in the value or generated
income, pride in achievements and appearance, responsi-
bility for problems or routine maintenance, commitment
to long-term involvement, and potential for reuse.
But changes that cross module boundaries are diffi-
cult and time consuming to implement because several
developers must be involved. Only the respective own-
ers of affected software process artifacts are allowed
to change them. Weak code ownership deals with this
weakness, allowing higher agility in development. It
does not restrict which artifacts an individual developer
may modify, and instead allows everybody to change
all artifacts; however, it is still considered polite to talk
changes through with their owners (Fowler, 2006). In
particular, weak code ownership has the advantage that
refactorings (like renaming methods) that modern IDEs
can do and that often affect differently owned source
code all over the code base, and cross-module modifica-
tions are easier to implement because a single developer
can change whatever is necessary.
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Definition 26 – Weak code ownership
Weak code ownership means that developers are allowed
to change any software process artifact. Still there is
an ownership relation between pieces of artifacts and
developers.
Another problem with strong code ownership but also
with weak code ownership is distribution of knowledge.
In these models other developers often do not have much
knowledge about the parts that are not owned by them.
When key developers leave, others cannot easily take
over their respective parts. This can incapacitate the
project (Richardson and Gwaltney, 2005):
Definition 27 – Bus factor
The bus factor (or bus/truck number) is the minimum
number of developers that have to leave the project be-
fore it gets incapacitated.
Code ownership favors developers’ specialization as
they will not learn much about other parts of the software.
Vice versa, specialization causes code ownership as de-
velopers focus more on software process artifact they
are familiar with. Technical debt therefore strengthens
code ownership by making a lack of knowledge more
difficult to compensate with documentation.
For this reason, XP advocates collective code owner-
ship, and software projects like Subversion ban any sign-
posts of explicit code ownership. Anybody can make
changes anywhere as the code base is “owned” by the en-
tire team (Fowler, 2006; Grossbart, 2011). Such projects
instead have collective code ownership:
Definition 28 – Collective code ownership
Collective code ownership abandons any notion of indi-
vidual ownership.
2.4.4.3 Problems with collective code ownership
While the collective code ownership model offers
greatest flexibility, and leads to closer collaboration and
higher knowledge exchange within the team, it has the
huge drawback that it is lacking clear responsibilities.
Some people therefore refer to collective code owner-
ship also as no code ownership. Everyone is feeling
only minimally responsible or accountable for internal
quality and for communicating knowledge. Typical
symptoms are poor documentation, unreadable source
code, inconsistencies in designs, repeatedly returning
bugs and slow fixing, slipping schedules without clear
causes, high turnover in teams, poor communication,
and undisciplined work habits (Nordberg, 2003). Es-
pecially agile development methodologies often build
on the weaker code ownership models. This research
primarily treats this model of code ownership.
Depending on the code ownership model, software
process artifacts are an excludable (strong code owner-
ship) or non-excludable (weak or no code ownership)
good. In the case of weak or no code ownership, arti-
facts constitute a good in software projects that is en-
dangered by free riding and the tragedy of commons.
Strong code ownership can prevent above problems of
non-excludable goods. If, for instance, the individual
developer knew that he would have to work with his arti-
facts forever, he would have a good deal of motivation
to keep them simple to maintain. But the tardiness of
strong code ownership makes it undesirable for proto-
types or in agile software projects.
As software process artifacts are stored in digital me-
dia, they are usually easily replicated. This makes them
appear as a non-rivalrousness good at first. But artifacts
are mutually exclusive due to the minimality constraint
of the knowledge base. One piece of information legally
displaces contradicting or duplicate pieces of informa-
tion. Artifacts represent and cover those unique pieces of
information from the knowledge base. Only one artifact
may represent a certain information at a time; all other
artifacts are secondary artifacts. While an artifact may
have multiple authors that contributed pieces of informa-
tion to it, individual text passages can only have been
authored by one contributor. The optimal artifact hosts
only a limited number of text characters. When there
are, for instance, too many words or if the artifact is not
structured well, it becomes crowded and difficult to read.
This sub-optimality was termed technical debt (refer to
Section 2.2.2.2). Technical debt borrowed on artifacts
by one contributor is incurred by the entire team. This
makes artifacts a rivalrous good.
Consequently, software process artifacts are a com-
mon good in software projects. They belong to and
are easily accessible to everyone but technical debt bor-
rowed on them is born by everyone. A bad artifact repre-
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sents the information in a bad way, and therefore spoils
the knowledge base. Any developer wanting to pick up
the information covered by the bad artifact has to go
through a costly process that may be as expensive or
even more expensive as discovering the relevant knowl-
edge in the first place. The knowledge is effectively
not persisted leading to costly rediscovery. Lynex and
Layzell (1998) openly call this unprofessional anti-team
behavior. But as the developer does not have to fear
bad consequences for spoiling the knowledge base, it is
subject to the tragedy of commons. Or as Gordon put
it: everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Gordon,
1954). Indeed, Graham (2004) has observed that when
“a piece of code is being hacked by three or four different
people, no one of whom really owns it, it will end up
being like a common-room. It will tend to feel bleak and
abandoned, and accumulate cruft.”
2.4.5 Summary of origins
This investigation into the root causes of internal quality
problems started out with the three factors people, pro-
cess and technology. While differences from an ideal
situation were identified, it was reasoned that they only
intensify a deeper cause. The deeper cause was found in
• developers’ reluctance to take up processes and
technologies that incur an adaptation cost on them
while only benefiting the organization as a whole,
and
• the associated phenomena like free riding, the
information-exchange dilemma or the tragedy of
commons.
The problem with non-excludable goods is that ratio-
nal, selfish humans tend to overuse them instead of in-
vesting in their sustainability. Goods that are valuable to
all are destroyed, leading to a net loss for the community.
The same principle applies to software process artifacts
in software projects. Developers will not invest their
own precious time into preserving artifacts in a good
condition because the benefits of doing so are too far
down the road and divided among all developers. Expe-
rienced developers, elaborate processes and advanced
technologies can suppress the effects of the tragedy of
commons. Environments that do not have such favorable
conditions, have few to put up against the tragedy. A
solution that directly addresses the motivation of devel-
opers is necessary here.
2.5 Summary of the Problem
Software development is more like research than engi-
neering. Most of results created during development are
pure knowledge that is discovered by evolving a pro-
totype through several iterations. A key factor in the
evolution of software are developers, who need to learn
and relearn knowledge to be able to modify the software.
Most of their knowledge comes from software process
artifacts that serve as a personal learning environment.
Among the artifacts is source code as the prime output
of the project. But other documentation beyond source
code is no less important.
Source code encodes detailed knowledge that was cre-
ated during the project. Losing a project’s source code is
the biggest risk that software developing organizations
face. Still discarding source code can be without alter-
native if too much background knowledge is lost or too
difficult to recover. Unnecessary effort spent through
poor internal quality was termed interest on technical
debt. It can bring an entire project to a halt, or cause a
total economic loss. Internal quality therefore matters to
reduce costs. It improves development speed and qual-
ity, enables a better hand-over of knowledge, and makes
distributed development practical.
Problems with internal quality were found to be ubiq-
uitous in software development. There is a large volume
of research literature, it is a topic in developer culture,
observed by software engineering experts, evidenced in
a case study and a survey of about 50 EU projects, and
corroborated in personal experiences.
In many projects, non-excludability of software pro-
cess artifacts (i.e. weak code ownership) is desirable as
it lowers bureaucratic barriers for modifying software.
Yet free riding and social dilemmas like the tragedy of
commons result. The reason is a market failure rooted in
adverse personal cost-benefit proportion for contributing
to the knowledge base. A classical response to market
failures is regulation, i.e. a higher instance, authority
or federation, which restricts access to the good. For
example, no source code is allowed to be checked into
the revision repository without prior checks like reviews.
But the bureaucratic approach has two disadvantages:
monitoring and enforcement have their own cost, and
regulations are rigid and inflexible, and possibly difficult
to establish.
A different solution is to privatize common goods. If
the common good is broken up and its shares are given
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to individuals, then every individual now has an interest
in the value of the good and to protect it against negative
influences. This is the advantage of strong code own-
ership. Responsibilities are clear and developers know
that their well-being is tied to their property. The prob-
lem with strong code ownership is rigidity as developers
cannot easily modify others’ property.
A situation with weak or no code ownership is needed,
where every developer is free to change software pro-
cess artifacts, but where a market failure does not occur
although no rigid control is in place. Figure 2.12 shows
a campaign of Dublin authorities ostracizing polluters
of public space, thereby introducing social pressure as
an idea. While Dubliners remain free to litter public
good, but risk a negative reputation when seen by their
peers.
There is more to software quality than dealing with
the tragedy of software process commons. But dealing
with it and the problems of free riding should get a
project one step closer to an efficient level of internal
quality. Appealing to the individuals’ selfishness has
long been known as a way to improve the benefit of all
in societies as if individuals were guided by an invisible
hand (Graham, 2004; Smith, 1776).
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Figure 2.12: Litter is disgusting. So are those responsible.
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State of the Art
First off, I’d suggest printing out a copy of the GNU coding standards,
and NOT read it. Burn them, it’s a great symbolic gesture.
— Linus Torvalds
SOFTWARE development relies on a plethora of tech-nologies and methodologies for its projects andprocesses. Concepts and models like quality or
motivation further add to the complexity of the area.
This chapter defines a frame of reference to preexisting
knowledge in the field.
3.1 Software Engineering
This research can broadly be classified as research in the
field of software engineering.
3.1.1 Introduction
The formerly practically unknown term software engi-
neering found wide use through a conference in 1968
that dealt with common problems of software develop-
ment. Common wisdom is that it was a deliberately
chosen as a provocation in the run-up to the event. It was
intended to make clearer the necessity to let software
development build on the same theoretical and practi-
cal foundations as all the other established engineering
disciplines (Naur and Randell, 1969).
Software engineering has vernacularized as a term for
software development and the study thereof. IEEE Std.
610.12 defines it as “(1) The application of a systematic,
disciplined, quantifiable approach to the development,
operation, and maintenance of software; that is, the ap-
plication of engineering to software. (2) The study of
approaches as in (1).” But if software development is or
ever can be like any of the other engineering disciplines
is still subject of discussion:
Software development has been compared to cooking
(Bruegge and Dutoit, 2000) and arts like painting, writ-
ing or composing, or architecture (of buildings) (Gra-
ham, 2004). Sometimes it is compared to mathematics
or science, (e.g. Bailin, 1997) and sometimes not (Gra-
ham, 2004). Sometimes it is seen as a craft (cf. Seibel,
2009). Clark (2004) argues that software development
is a process involving art, craft, science and engineering.
This work succinctly treats software engineering as the
science of software development, although this might
not be the exact meaning of the term.
Software development is difficult to organize in a hi-
erarchical way. That is, with one leader at the top that
devises all work. Instead, it often is an intricate dance
coordinated under equal partners (Bertram et al., 2010).
So, software engineering goes beyond plain program-
ming. The distinction was impressively described by Pe-
ter Hamer1: “Programming tends to relate very much to
software-production-in-the-small. It also tends to empha-
sise green-fields development over maintenance and/or
reuse. Simply extending a programming paradigm to
large projects results in a mongolian hoards style organi-
sation [and a Gengis Kahn management style?].”
1http://www.unl.csi.cuny.edu/faqs/
software-enginering/archive/SEorigin
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3.1.2 Computer-aided software engineer-
ing
Computer-aided Software Engineering (CASE) is a sub-
discipline of software engineering that is concerned with
the aspects of technical support for software engineering.
It addresses the use of tools during software engineering.
For example, bug reports may be maintained with sticky
notes on an office wall, or be entered into a bug tracker.
The latter is an example of CASE. Any computer tool
that supports the software engineering process has to be
classified as a CASE tool.
Definition 29 – CASE
“The use of computers to aid in the software engineering
process. May include the application of software tools
to software design, requirements tracing, code produc-
tion, testing, document generation, and other software
engineering activities.” (IEEE Std. 610.12)
3.1.2.1 Software process artifact repositories
Software engineering without the aid of computers is no
longer possible to imagine. CASE tools are omnipresent.
They directly help the individual developer, or support
collaboration, knowledge management and other pro-
cesses. CASE tools include diverse applications such
as IDEs, compilers, debuggers, bug trackers, revision
control systems, wikis and many more. Their number is
practically countless.
The Wikipedia.org article on CASE lists as types of
tools, tools for business process engineering, process
modeling and management, project planning, risk anal-
ysis, project management, requirement tracing, metrics
management, documentation, system software, quality
assurance, database management, software configuration
management, analysis and design tools, interface design
and development, prototyping, programming, web de-
velopment, integration and testing, static analysis, dy-
namic analysis, test management, client/server testing,
or re-engineering. But this arbitrary list only gives an
impression of the multitude of CASE tools.
Particularly important for this work on a technical
level are tools that help developers access and man-
age project knowledge, and that are already present in
their development environments. Documentation-related
tools come to attention, for example, IDEs or tools for
generating documentation. But most importantly, soft-
ware process artifacts are stored in repositories that are
managed by CASE tools. For instance, source code is
stored in revision control systems like Subversion or
Concurrent Versions System (CVS)2. Other kinds of ar-
tifacts are stored in other repositories, e.g. requirements
in a Jira issue tracker (Prause et al., 2008), or free-form
documentation texts in a wiki like MediaWiki3.
3.1.2.2 Software process artifact repositories
Software process artifact repositories store and archive
the artifacts that preserve the knowledge of the project
team. There are repositories for artifacts from most of
the activities of the software development process. The
tools vary in their specialization for specific activities,
and some have also been applied to other activities than
their original one. The following paragraphs briefly
treat some kinds of repositories though there are other
repositories like email archives.
File-sharing drives Document sharing tools allow de-
velopers to access the same documents and files. Such
platforms are independent of the actual kinds of files to
be shared, and every project comes up with one way
or the other to share documents. Arguably less so-
phisticated ways are copying files with Universal Se-
rial Bus (USB) sticks or emails. Shared drives that are
accessed through the Local Area Network (LAN), can
be realized in many ways including File Transfer Pro-
tocol (FTP), Network File System (NFS), or WebDAV.
More sophisticated solutions like BSCW or eRoom4 pro-
vide histories for files so that older versions do not get
lost. However, shared files are too generic and have
proprietary file formats making them cumbersome to
modify, and impractical to analyze. This research is
therefore restricted to the more specific types below.
Wikis Wikis are easy to use hypertext systems that
allow developers to directly read and edit documents
(called articles) with their web browsers but without
explicit editorial control. They have low entrance bar-
riers and their structure can evolve freely and all kinds
2http://www.cvshome.org/
3http://www.mediawiki.org/
4http://germany.emc.com/products/detail/
software2/eroom.htm
54
II
I—
S
TA
T
E
O
F
T
H
E
A
R
T
III-1 — Software Engineering
of articles are possible. It provides a work space that
enables the vertical and horizontal exchange of knowl-
edge between group leaders and equal colleagues. The
most prominent example of a wiki is probably Wikipedia.
Wikipedia has several thousand registered users and an
unknown number of anonymous users from all over the
world. The users edit existing articles or add completely
new texts. Millions of articles in different languages
were authored by volunteers in this way (Danowski and
Voss, 2004; Dencheva et al., 2011)
The wiki also keeps track of the revision history of
these software process artifacts. The created artifacts
are plain text with simple layout functions. While a
wiki is web-based, it is not carefully crafted for visitors
but instead wants to involve readers in the process of
contributing to the articles, and in linking the pieces in
meaningful ways (Leuf and Cunningham, 2001). Wikis
aim at engaging internals in the collaborative collecting
of knowledge, not at representing content towards ex-
ternals. Their flexibility and lightness makes them very
suitable for managing generic internal documentation
(Salvaneschi, 2009). In addition to the managed articles,
wikis allow attachment of proprietary files.
There are numerous implementations of wiki server
software. Two major ones are the free MediaWiki that
also runs the famous Wikipedia encyclopedia, and com-
mercial Confluence5 that aims at corporate knowledge
management. Wikis play a major role in this research.
Issue trackers An issue is a software process artifact
covering one unit of work of development. Typical is-
sues are bug reports, feature requests or requirements.
Issues typically have a pronounced structure consisting
of several fields that highlight different properties of the
issue. These can be a short summary, origin information,
involved persons, and links to other issues. Issue track-
ers keep track of issues by storing them in a database
and providing sophisticated management interfaces to
it, e.g. through the web. Issue trackers are pivotal in
the communication of software teams as a knowledge
repository (Bertram et al., 2010).
Renowned examples of issue trackers are Bugzilla6
or Jira7. But also integrated development infrastructures
like GForge8 or Trac9, or online development and col-
5http://www.atlassian.com/software/
confluence/
6http://www.bugzilla.org/
7http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira/
8http://gforge.com/gf/
9http://trac.edgewall.org/
laboration platforms like SourceForge.net10 include is-
sue trackers. While issue trackers are relevant for this
research, they have not been addressed in the implemen-
tation and evaluation due to time constraints.
Revision control systems Software Configuration
Management (SCM) is a substantial component of
engineering in general, and software engineering in
particular (Thomas and Hunt, 2004). SCM addresses
the entirety of configuration items, i.e. all items that
influence the design of one configuration of the product
(Bruegge and Dutoit, 2000). In software engineering,
it encompasses all software process artifacts. Revision
control is SCM applied to source code by the use of
revision control systems. A revision control system
stores source code and distributes updates to developers
via network. It ensures that no file or revision thereof
that was checked in, gets ever lost.
Famous examples are open source CVS and its suc-
cessor Subversion, and commercial products like Vi-
sual SourceSafe11 (cf. Prause, 2006). Recently, also dis-
tributed version control systems like Git12 that no longer
rely on a centralized server have evolved. They have
particularly gained ground in the open source area. This
research only deals with centralized version control. The
problem with distributed version control regarding this
work is that there does not have to be an authoritative
source of the full evolution history. Consequently, a lot
of the history can lie in hiding, in non-accessible reposi-
tories.
3.1.2.3 Automatic documentation
Automatic documentation generators cannot ever pro-
vide new information as they cannot generate what is
not there (Raskin, 2005). But they can support under-
standing by refurbishing existing information in more
easily understandable formats. For example, literate
programming as described by Knuth (1992) interweaves
documentation and source code, i.e. the source code is
integrated in the documentation and is extracted from
there.
This is similar to what tools like DOSFOP (Didrich
and Klein, 1996), Javadoc (Friendly, 1995) or Doxy-
gen do. They extract documentation from source code
10http://sourceforge.net/
11http://www.microsoft.com/
12http://git-scm.com/
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Figure 3.1: Class reference generated by Doxygen
comments inheriting the structure and concept names
from the source code, while organizing the documenta-
tion in a more palatable way (see Figure 3.1). Dendro˘c
automatically interconnects disjunct bits and pieces of
documentation (Prause et al., 2007a). Many Java IDEs
evaluate Javadoc comments to assist the developer on the
spot with tool tips that assist his current implementation
activity. Such tools were called views before.
3.1.3 Development methodologies
A development methodology is the approach to orga-
nizing the software development process. Typically,
groups of plan-driven and agile methodologies are
distinguished. Boehm (2002) notes that both groups
of methodologies have their respective home grounds.
Characteristics of the different home grounds are shown
in Table 3.1. Note that the distinction between plan-
driven and agile methodologies is not sharp, and that
most methodologies rather dwell in a gray area between
the two extremes.
3.1.3.1 Plan-driven development
Plan-driven methodologies aim at large projects with
rather stable requirements, where there is high certainty
in the results to be obtained and high agreement among
the stakeholders (Boehm, 1986). The prototypical repre-
sentative of the plan-driven methodologies is the Water-
fall model (Royce, 1987). Other models include the V-
(Bro¨hl, 1995) or the Spiral model (Boehm, 1986).
Plan-driven development is not the focus of this re-
search. It may be that the concepts developed here are
applicable to such projects as well but due to a lack of
suitable study environments this cannot be further re-
searched.
3.1.3.2 Agile development
Agile software development is increasingly applied in
industry and is also a popular research topic in academia
(Salo and Abrahamsson, 2008; Babar, 2009; Prause and
Durdik, 2012). Agile methodologies entered a golden
age with the publication of the agile!manifesto by High-
smith and Cockburn (2001) and others.
“Agile” means an incremental approach to develop-
ment with a strong focus on project goals and intensive
customer involvement. It has lower risks, few manage-
ment overhead and forwards a good team atmosphere
(Dingsøyr et al., 2006; Salo and Abrahamsson, 2008;
Prause and Durdik, 2012). However, it was first criti-
cized cynically as having many hidden dangers and as
a lame excuse for not doing the necessary things (e.g.
Boehm, 2002; Rakitin, 2001).
Reduction of overheads is indeed one of the central
ideas of agile development: Agile development avoids
activities (commonly called waste) that do not directly
contribute to project goals. Internal documentation is
sometimes regarded as such waste, as it does not con-
tribute a direct value to the end-product. However, it
is important for project success, dissemination, main-
tenance and evolution, and has its place in agile devel-
opment. Agile development cannot serve as an excuse
for not doing important but unpopular tasks like docu-
menting (Tryggeseth, 1997; Abrahamsson et al., 2010;
Rakitin, 2001; Prause and Durdik, 2012).
Today, agile methodologies are mainstream with
about 40% of projects being classified as agile (Toth
et al., 2009). Agile methodologies include the prime ex-
ample XP or wide-spread Scrum (the “rugby” approach)
(Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986; Prause and Durdik,
2012). One of the earliest agile methodologies may
be prototyping-based development (e.g. Naumann and
Jenkins, 1982). Although open source does not perforce
imply a development methodology, it is considered as
an agile methodology due to its similarities in its prime
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Home-ground area Plan-driven methodologies Agile methodologies
Developers Plan-oriented; adequate skills; access to
external knowledge
Agile, knowledgeable, collocated, and
collaborative
Customers Access to knowledgeable, collabora-
tive, representative, and empowered cus-
tomers
Dedicated, knowledgeable, collocated,
collaborative, representative, and em-
powered
Requirements Knowable early; largely stable Largely emergent; rapid change
Architecture Designed for current and foreseeable re-
quirements
Designed for current requirements
Refactoring Expensive Inexpensive
Size Larger teams and products Smaller teams and products
Primary objective High assurance Rapid value
Table 3.1: Development methodology home-grounds (Boehm, 2002)
values like satisfying customers, motivated individuals,
frequent delivery of working software, self-organization
and others (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005).
Boehm (2002) states that agile development method-
ologies are suitable for developing lower-quality soft-
ware that quickly generates value and enables rapid adap-
tation to emerging requirements. This property makes
agile development a viable alternative for the iterative,
emergent and self-organizing characteristics of software
development in research environments. In research en-
vironments scientific value has to be generated quickly,
while pushing the borders of human knowledge con-
stantly reveals new requirements. Other characteris-
tics, however, like requiring small and collocated teams
can be problematic in large, consortium-based research
projects. (Problems of distributed development were dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.3.4.) Processes and tools tailored
to these specific problems are needed.
3.1.4 Summary
Software engineering has emerged as a term to draw
attention away from crafting and arts perspectives, and
towards the virtues of other engineering disciplines. By
making use of computer tools, CASE is concerned with
bringing engineering discipline into software develop-
ment. While CASE generally supports all kinds of soft-
ware processes in various ways, one of its key purposes
is to manage software process artifacts in repositories to
ensure that valuable information does not get lost. Also
obtaining documentation from them of interest to it.
Software engineering has formalized the software pro-
cess into development methodologies. These method-
ologies are generally split into plan-driven and agile
ones that are suitable for different kinds of projects. Ag-
ile development is mainstream and fits well with self-
organizing projects like research.
3.2 Software Quality
Quality is a frequently used term in countless every day
situations. Whenever there is a product (or a service)
there is a quality associated with it. It plays an important
role not only in the software industry but in all produc-
tion or servicing. Its definitions vary from person to
person, making it difficult to give a universal and accu-
rate definition. Quality is a distinguishing characteristic,
an essential property, and dependent on its contexts like
physics, musics or philosophy; it refers to specific char-
acteristics and the achievement of excellence of an ob-
ject, and means excellence in itself; quality is an inherent
property of an object or service, its essence, can be mea-
sured through it, but does not exist without it. Quality is
the “degree to which a set of inherent characteristics [...]
fulfills requirements” (ISO 9000, 2005), the absence of
deficiencies. Quality, as such, is an abstract term that
needs to be regarded in a specific context (Prause, 2006;
Lincke, 2009).
In order to deal with quality, it needs to be modeled
according to its context. One can then better grasp the
cost of quality, and start improving it. This section
introduces into the area of modeling software quality,
the cost and role of software quality in the triangle of
production, and surveys traditional ways of improving
quality.
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3.2.1 The nature of quality
Quality is an abstract and complex concept that is dif-
ficult to grasp. The following sections elaborate more
on its nature through different perspectives, how it is
modeled and its cost.
3.2.1.1 Modeling quality
Quality has been a research topic for ages. However, un-
til today there is no broad agreement on the term. Geiger
(1988) even postulates that the aim of unifying the term
quality would be unreachable in the near future. The
root cause of the problem becomes visible when looking
at the elementary differences of the five perspectives that
exist about quality: there is (i) an uncompromising and
philosophical transcendent one, (ii) an economic and
ingredient-centric product-based one, (iii) a subjective
user-based one, (iv) a process-oriented manufacturing-
based one, and (v) a value-based one that considers cost
and price (Garvin, 1984).
Depending on the philosophical background of qual-
ity, there are many different quality models. They try to
decompose the vague term quality into quality charac-
teristics and sub-characteristics to make it more under-
standable, and eventually measurable.
In the software domain, wide-spread quality models
are those from McCall et al. (1977), Boehm et al. (1976),
Dromey (1995) or ISO 9126-1. The oldest model for
software quality is the one by McCall et al. (1977). It
takes more of a product view instead of a user view
on quality (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 1996). With his
modified quality model, Boehm et al. (1976) aimed
at automatically assessing quality. Dromey (1995) as-
sociates structural elements of source code with prop-
erties that link to higher level quality characteristics.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
model integrates various aspects of quality models based
on international consensus. It is therefore generally con-
sidered as the most useful one (Al-Qutaish, 2010).
The ISO 9126-1 identifies six characteristics: func-
tionality, reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability,
and portability. These characteristics are then further
broken down into sub-characteristics, and attributes. See
Figure 3.2 for a graphical presentation of characteris-
tics and their associated sub-characteristics. ISO 9126-1
has recently been incorporated and superseded by the
Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evalu-
ation (SQuaRE) series of standards (ISO 25000, 2005).
3.2.1.2 Quality characteristics, and internal and
external quality
Sub-characteristics of the six quality characteristics from
ISO 9126-1 can be associated with internal and external
quality. As opposed to internal quality (see Definition
18 – “Internal quality”), external quality is what users
see of the software. For example, analyzability as part
of characteristic maintainability is an internal quality
attribute. Users do not see how analyzable the software
is, i.e. how good developers can diagnose and identify
problems, deficiencies and parts to be changed. Con-
versely, developers do not see how understandable the
software is for users, i.e. how easy they understand how
to use the software for a particular task.
It is obvious that external quality has a direct effect
on how users perceive the software in the context of use
(quality in use). This relationship is shown in Figure 3.3.
The standard also recognizes that internal quality influ-
ences external quality, and that external quality depends
on internal quality. This relationship has been discussed
before: the better developers can modify the software,
the better it can adapt to the users’ needs.
Another interesting aspect is that quality of the de-
velopment process is supposed to lead to better internal
quality. This aspect is traditionally important in quality
improvement initiatives.
3.2.1.3 Adversaries of quality
Reaching high levels of quality in all of the quality char-
acteristics is (usually) desirable but achieving this goal
is often not possible or at least difficult in practice. The
reason is that high quality can only be attained against
opposing forces from various sources. Interestingly how-
ever, sometimes high quality in a sub-characteristics (and
its superordinate characteristic) stands in conflict with
high quality in another (sub-)characteristic. For example,
adding source code to improve the usability of a program
(automation features, special cases, fancy GUI elements,
etc.) will make the source code larger and slower. It may
therefore be impossible to reach maximum quality in all
characteristics due to inner conflicts in the quality model
(Spinellis, 2006).
Another source of problems are the developers who
change the software. Any change to the software is likely
to increase its technical debt. In the best case, developers
prudently and deliberately take the decrease in quality
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Quality
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Accuracy
Interoperability
Security
F. compliance
Reliability
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Fault tolerance
Recoverability
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Replaceability
P. compliance
Figure 3.2: Quality characteristics and sub-characteristics of ISO 9126-1
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Figure 3.3: Quality in the software life cycle of ISO 9126-1 and ISO 25000
Cost
TimeQuality
Figure 3.4: The Golden Triangle of project management
into account because they have no other choice. In many
cases, however, they lack knowledge (inadvertent) or
motivation (reckless) to foster internal quality. This was
discussed in Section 2.2.2.2.
When developers sacrifice quality prudently and delib-
erately, it is normally due to other pressures originating
from the management of the software project. Figure 3.4
shows the Golden Triangle of project management. It
is the traditional view that the three factors quality, cost
and time are opposing constraints (Ika, 2009). In this
view, cost and time have a severe impact on software
quality. For example, finishing a project as quickly as
possible is bad for both cost and quality. However, it is
a typical mistake to assume from this model that there is
a linear dependency between the three factors. Brooks
(2003) describes in his famous book that doubling efforts
does not necessarily shorten project duration. Likewise,
it is a misconception that increasing quality inevitably
leads to increased cost or longer project duration.
3.2.1.4 The cost of quality
Industrial organizations have recently learned that in-
creased quality in production does not necessarily result
in increased cost or time but can, in fact, reduce pro-
duction costs (Harry and Schroeder, 2005). The cost of
quality is commonly expressed in the formula
Ctotal = Cfail + Cprevent + Cappraise + Ctolerance
where Ctotal is the total cost of quality. It consists of
the so-called positive and negative costs of quality. The
negative cost Cfail results from problems of internal and
external quality as in the examples above. The positive
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costs are the cost of prevention Cprevent (e.g. metrics,
process improvements, quality standards) and appraisals
Cappraise (e.g. review, testing, validation & verifica-
tion) (Malik and Choudhary, 2008). Bruegge and Dutoit
(2000) add Ctolerance into the positive costs, where tol-
erance means that the software is enabled to gracefully
deal with problems occurring at run-time itself.
Figure 3.5 shows the inverse relationship that exists
between positive and negative costs: with an increasing
investment in quality, the risk and fatality of software
failures decreases. As the cost functions are non-linear,
there is a minimum (or sweet spot) for the cost of quality
(Galin, 2004).
This minimum is what Crosby refers to when he says
that quality is free: “Quality is free. It’s not a gift, but
it’s free. What costs money are the un-quality things
— all the actions that involve not doing jobs right the
first time” (Crosby, 1980). If quality is for free, and it
reduces the development cost of software, irrespective of
the domain of software, then this is certainly where one
always wants to be. This is true even if there is only a
low cost of software failures like in research prototypes:
No one expects full-fledged, flawless and efficient
functioning from a prototype. A prototype is not a prod-
uct. There are no users that could be dissatisfied or get
annoyed through e.g. usability problems with the soft-
ware. It may be embarrassing if a prototype breaks dur-
ing a presentation or exhibition but painful consequences
are not to be expected. Consequently, there is almost
no risk of external costs of software failures. In Fig-
ure 3.6 the original Ctotal function (dashed curve) uses
a lower failure cost function Cfail (dotted). The new
sweet spot is at a lower software quality cost and level
but not at zero quality (cf. Huang and Boehm, 2006).
Similarly, the sweet spot relocated after new processes,
differently knowledgeable, skilled and motivated devel-
opers, or novel tools affect the various positive costs of
quality in the project.
Internal quality problems, however, make mainte-
nance of the source code more expensive (this was pre-
viously called technical debt). Unmaintainable software
is an internal failure and causes internal negative quality
costs (interest on technical debt). Though the sweet spot
moves towards lesser quality in an environment with low
external failure costs, maintainability is an important
quality characteristic in any software.
The following advice bases on the same rationale: The
Throwaway Code pattern recommends to make it clear
that source code is intended for throwaway by writing
it in a language or with a tool that cannot be used in
a production version. This helps to avoid accidental
transition from prototype to product (Foote and Yoder,
1997). Any other prototype is not a true prototype but
must be expected to last, become a product, and require
maintenance. Internal quality therefore matters.
3.2.2 Reducing internal failure cost with
internal quality
High and low quality both have a cost determined by neg-
ative fault cost and positive costs. External failure cost
directly depends on the application domain of the soft-
ware and its expected maturity, i.e. the damage that the
software causes when it fails. Positive costs prevent fail-
ure costs and balance total cost towards the sweet spot.
Analogously, internal failure cost arises when source
code is expensive to modify because of a lack of internal
quality. This is a problem in maintenance of products
and when prototypes evolve into products. Positive qual-
ity costs analogously cancel out failure costs in internal
quality. This research focuses on internal quality cost
because external quality depends on it, and because the
research environment has negligible external — but still
internal — failure costs.
3.2.2.1 Considerations on avoiding internal failure
Approaches to avoiding internal (and external) failure
costs are diverse. It cannot be said in an across-the-board
fashion what that practically means. In many cases this
topic is what research in software engineering is directly
or indirectly concerned with. It therefore cannot be
summarized in a few paragraphs. There is no silver
bullet for the problem. The following paragraphs (cf.
Prause, 2011) present a few perspectives on avoiding
failures, and making and keeping a software modifiable.
But it is by no means a complete list of approaches. It
rather serves as a frame of reference for integrating this
research into the broader body of knowledge.
Narrowness of necessary knowledge When a soft-
ware grows larger, its complexity increases to a level
that is no longer easily handable. Any successful soft-
ware may eventually grow to that size. Abstraction and
structuring that organize it into an understandable archi-
tecture become necessary. A good architecture means
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that developers can change parts without having to un-
derstand everything. But for the individual developer,
having to adhere to architecture rules can be cumber-
some. In a multi-tier Web-Service project, developers of
front-end components might be tempted to bypass the
middle layer, and directly access back-end layers. This
speeds up development at first but degrades architecture
to a costly mess. Technical debt is the result.
Reuse is a discipline No technology has reuse built
in; instead, reuse is a discipline (Wasmund, 1994). It
is not so much a matter of what technology is used but
rather how it is used. For example, web services, Open
Services Gateway initiative (OSGi) or the Unix toolbox
concept with its many small programs are powerful inte-
gration platforms. With regard to reuse none is in itself
superior to the others, and they all cannot prevent an
architecture from turning into a mess. To enable reuse,
it is more important to look at the processes, then the
technology itself.
Learning supervision Even with the best architecture,
building a software architect’s knowledge costs a hun-
dred million. The combination of deep domain knowl-
edge and system engineering capabilities is invaluable
(Curtis et al., 1988). Letting a project’s architect go, will
have severe negative consequences for internal quality.
Only documenting knowledge and making every effort
to educate new architects can ameliorate the problem.
Standards-compliance and patterns A major road
block to becoming a productive executor of modifica-
tions, is obtaining knowledge about the software. Knowl-
edge acquisition can be sped up by using open norms,
61
III—
S
TA
T
E
O
F
T
H
E
A
R
T
III — STATE OF THE ART
standard libraries and off-the-shelf components so that
developers can use preexisting knowledge, and have less
to learn. Patterns support developers by allowing them
to reuse structural knowledge they already have (Prause
and Reiners, 2011).
Playful experimentation Automated tests are in-
tegrity checks. They allow developers to modify source
code without having to fear to break something. When
they can run automated tests after have made a change,
they immediately see if their change had an unintended
side effect. It has only a low cost for them. A high test
coverage therefore helps developers by allowing them
to experiment with and explore changing the software.
3.2.2.2 Quality of documentation
After all, an important means of obtaining knowledge
is to read it from its written form. The purpose of docu-
mentation is to communicate knowledge, and it has to
be assessed by its ability to impart knowledge (Forward
and Lethbridge, 2002). Documentation is a medium
that stores information, and transmits that information to
readers at a later point in time (cf. Definition 11 – “Docu-
mentation”). Documentation complements blueprints by
providing information that is not necessary to build the
system but adds to its understanding. Tryggeseth (1997)
found in experiments that documentation available to
software maintainers reduces the time they need to un-
derstand a system and learn how to perform changes. It
helps them to better use their skills.
ISO 9000 states that the value of documentation is to
“enable communication of intent and consistency of ac-
tion.” It contributes to satisfying customer requirements
and quality needs, training, repeatability and traceability,
provision of evidence, and the evaluation of quality man-
agement (ISO 9000, 2005). The description concludes
with a reminder that generating documentation should
add value, and not be an end in itself.
However, Lethbridge et al. (2003) found that man-
dated documentation is often unsuitable for its purpose
to impart knowledge. It is frequently out of date, over-
done to the point of outweighing its benefits, and written
so poorly that people might not even try to find use-
ful content in it. And to the worst of all, it can some-
times even be misleading. Lehner (1994) remarks that
such documentation is jokingly termed “Schrankware”
(shelfware) to emphasize its useless character. The rea-
son can be that the effort needed to create good docu-
mentation has been estimated to be twice as much as the
actual effort needed to build the product (Brooks, 2003)
but organizations usually only invest about 20 to 30%
of development efforts into documentation (Pressman,
2001), while it is at the same time an unloved activity
for developers.
Notwithstanding documentation’s primary purpose to
convey information, the following quality characteristics
are defined for documentation (DGQ, 1995):
• Changeability – How easy it is to change
• Timeliness – Degree to which it conforms to the
software
• Unambiguousness – If information is presented
without ambiguity
• Identifiability – How simple it is to find documen-
tation for a certain fact
• Conformity – Degree to which the documentation
conforms to the relevant standards and norms
• Understandability – How well the documentation
does convey knowledge
• Completeness – If all relevant information is con-
tained in the documentation
• Consistency – Absence of contradicting statements
in the documentation
However, determining the quality of documentation is
mostly only possible through human reviewers. Efforts
have been made to assess the readability of documenta-
tion using linguistic metrics like sentence structure or
length. As early as in the 1960s, however, it became
clear that metrics are limited with regard to structured
texts, lists, tables and the like. Metrics ignore content,
layout and retrieval aids like indexes. They were devel-
oped for children’s school books, and not for technical
documentation. Instead, only usability testing applied to
documentation brings reliable results (Forward, 2002).
3.2.2.3 Code styles and smells
The idea of coding rules and the Java Code Convention
is to ease the understanding of source code, and therefore
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contribute to its maintainability (King et al., 1997; Seibel,
2009; Loveland, 2009). Spinellis (2011) adds that “style
is a key aspect of the code’s maintainability [... because
...] meaningless style deviations are simply signals in
the code that carry no data. Information theory has a
specific term for such signals: noise.” Consistent coding
styles are extremely valuable to make source code easier
to understand (Hovemeyer and Pugh, 2004). Moreover,
Nordberg (2003) argues that weak or no code ownership
are only possible with strong coding styles; because
otherwise developers will let source code decay.
Neither maintainability nor understandability are all
about rules-compliant source code. For instance, identi-
fier naming is also an important part of making source
code understandable. But as of today, there is no toolkit
readily available that could assess the goodness of iden-
tifier naming. Only now are researchers starting to un-
derstand how readability of source code differs from nat-
ural languages (Buse and Weimer, 2010b). Promoting
coding rules is therefore more like a pragmatic first step
than an optimal approach. Fixing styles is a low-hanging
fruit: it can be easily achieved by automatic checks, and
does not cause much effort for the developer. In fact,
especially fixing styles is something that modern IDEs
can do automatically. For automating such processes
using static analysis toolkits see Section 3.3.5.3.
When source code is in a suboptimal condition, refac-
toring brings it into a better condition, while not chang-
ing its functional effects. Refactoring targets technical
debt only. However, the when right time for refactor-
ing is, is not easy to define. It has a lot to do with aes-
thetics, while metrics are often outperformed by human
intuition. There is no absolute threshold of how many
instance variables are too many, or how many lines of
source code in a method are too many. Yet there are such
guidelines and a few indicators of troublesome condi-
tions in source code. They can serve as a scaffolding for
developers when learning to identify source code that is
in need for refactoring (Fowler, 1999).
Definition 30 – Code smell
A code smell is an indicator of the need for refactoring
in source code.
Code smells are therefore an indicator of poor qual-
ity source code. The more coding style violations and
smells there are in a piece of source code, the lower its
internal quality.
3.2.3 Quality management
Quality management is conducted on an organizational
scale to improve the quality of products that are created
by the organization. As the Iron Triangle of quality and
productivity (refer back to Figure 2.9) indicated, oppor-
tunities for quality improvement are threefold: improv-
ing the people, improving technology, and improving the
process. Assuming that an organization will buy the best
people and tools that they can get, the focus of quality
management is usually on organizational processes.
3.2.3.1 Terms of quality management
Quality management is the umbrella term for a set of
activities that aim at improving the quality of products.
Definition 31 – Quality management
Quality management means the “coordinated activities
to direct and control an organization [...] with regard to
quality” (ISO 9000).
Quality management consists of the three activity ar-
eas of quality planning, quality control, and quality as-
surance. Quality planning comes as the first set of activ-
ities that deals with deciding what quality goals to set,
and then planning how to achieve them.
Definition 32 – Quality planning
Quality planning is “part of quality management [...]
focused on setting quality objectives [...] and specify-
ing necessary operational processes [...] and related re-
sources to fulfil the quality objectives” (ISO 9000).
The second set of activities is the actual analysis of
products and production processes (e.g. testing) to en-
sure that quality requirements are met.
Definition 33 – Quality control
Quality control is “part of quality management [...] fo-
cused on fulfilling quality requirements” (ISO 9000).
Finally, the third set of activities aims at validating
that the activities done as quality planning and quality
control will actually result in quality.
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Definition 34 – Quality assurance
Quality assurance is “part of quality management [...]
focused on providing confidence that quality require-
ments will be fulfilled” (ISO 9000).
3.2.3.2 Quality management standards from vol-
ume production
The military were early and longtime advocates of stan-
dardization. The purpose of standards is to ensure cor-
rect functioning, to ease maintenance and to extend inter-
operability between products and services. Today stan-
dards are not specific to the military or software domain
but are common to industry.
While standards in general promote quality in one way
or the other, there are standards that specifically aim at
improving quality. These quality management standards
promote organizational characteristics that are effective
at achieving quality goals. Strengths, weaknesses and
risks can then be identified and compared to business
needs. They allow to characterize current practice in an
organization, drive goal-oriented process improvement
activities, and compare the capabilities of competing
organizations (ISO 15504-1).
TQM Going back to Deming (1994), Total Quality
Management (TQM) is a management philosophy dedi-
cated to quality improvement. It involves every partici-
pant of the production process (even outside the produc-
ing organization) in the goal of achieving quality. The fo-
cus is on long-term perspectives within the organization
and with its suppliers. Perfection of the product is the
goal, while cost savings are more of a secondary goal.
Still improved quality can result in fewer production
costs as, for instance, quality control may be omitted
and scrapping may be reduced. TQM fitted better with
far eastern philosophies and was therefore first picked
up by Japanese automobile industry before it eventually
returned back to the USA.
Six Sigma Six Sigma (also 6σ) is a quality standard
that emphasizes the idea of TQM that reductions in de-
fect rates actually lead to cost savings because failure
and control costs are reduced. As opposed to TQM, the
focus is less on a broad, business philosophy and long-
term perspective but on statistically analyzing processes
to quickly reach major reductions in defect rates, and
reach fast and sharp payback. The sigma levels describe
the number of defects per number of opportunities. Oper-
ating at a three- to four-sigma level means that the cost of
defects makes up for about 20 to 30 percent of revenues.
This is where most companies operate. Upon reaching
six-sigma level, there is fewer than one defect per 3.4
million opportunities (Harry and Schroeder, 2005)
ISO 9000 The focus of ISO 9000 is on fulfillment of
expectations and requirements. The standard therefore
defines quality as “degree to which a set of inherent
characteristics [...] fulfils requirements”. It is nowadays
perhaps the most well-known quality standard and has
experienced very wide adoption in industry. The focus
of the standard is on documenting process results to
make work repeatable and reach consistency in goals. It
is mostly criticized for not being suitable for all orga-
nizations, and specifically not so suitable for software
development and agile development (Seddon, 1997)
3.2.3.3 Software quality management standards
The problem with the volume production standards is
that they very much focus on the production of products,
and not on design phases. But software development is
mostly a design process, while the actual step of produc-
tion is taken over by compilers. Success in the design
process is difficult to measure: how to measure the num-
ber of failures there are per 3.4 million opportunities?
Instead capabilities of the developing organization and
the maturity of its processes are assessed. What tools
do they use and how is personnel trained? The idea is
that a mature organization is more probable to deliver
the desired product at the end of the project.
Consequently, improving the maturity of the software
process should lead to better products and development.
Software process improvement and assessment can tar-
get all three factors of people, processes, and tools. It
can aims at empowering developers with knowledge,
skills and motivation, at improving processes by making
them explicit, or commit to development methodologies,
and at supporting work with more sophisticated tools.
At this point, software quality management comes back
to software engineering.
There are several frameworks for assessing the matu-
rity of development organizations. These frameworks
provide support in achieving higher process maturity.
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CMM The CMM is probably the most well-known
software quality management standard. It defines five
maturity levels for organizations, and provides indepen-
dent assessment services for organizations. The least
maturity level is Level 1, with higher levels having ever
more demands (Bruegge and Dutoit, 2000).
1. Initial: Processes are ad-hoc, the environment is
chaotic. Successes mostly depend on the heroic
deeds of individuals and are rarely reproducible.
2. Repeatable: Simple project management controls
cost and time plans. Process discipline ensures that
development follows established methods so that
earlier successes become repeatable.
3. Defined: A set of uniform processes in the orga-
nization is well-understood and is realized in stan-
dards, methods, procedures and tools. These are all
tailored to the respective context.
4. Managed: Based on precise measures, processes
of Level 4 are well quantifiable and predictable in
comparison to processes of Level 3. Management
can easily adapt processes to a new project without
sacrificing quality or adherence to standards.
5. Optimizing: A steady improvement of process per-
formance is taking place. Learning processes are
implemented comprehensive and fast using new
ways and means, and lead to immediate adaptations
to changes and opportunities in the environment.
(Humphrey, 1988)
Reaching level 2 is considered the most difficult step
for most organizations. It requires from them discipline
and fundamentally changing the way how they work
(Kneuper, 2007).
SPICE The ISO 15504-1 standards (also known as
Software Process Improvement and Capability Deter-
mination (SPICE)) is a series of international standards
that incorporate ideas from CMM and other software
process improvement approaches including ISO 9000.
Similar to the CMM, SPICE wants to help an organiza-
tion understand, assess and improve its own processes,
and defines several maturity levels for processes.
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integrated
(CMMI) is a continuation of the CMM that augments
its staged maturity model with a so-called continuous
model, where different process areas each have their
individual capability levels. Examples of process areas
are configuration management, risk management, or
validation. The organization’s maturity level is then de-
termined by a few rules that compute overall capability
from the individual capability levels (CMMI, 2010).
P-CMM The People Capability Maturity Model
(P-CMM) is a transfer of the stages of the CMM to
human resource management. It assesses how corporate
policies improve workforce through, for example, em-
ployment strategies or continuous training efforts. The
five maturity levels known from the CMM are applied
to four process categories of people management:
developing capabilities, building teams and culture,
motivating and managing performance, and shaping the
workforce (see Figure 3.7) (Curtis et al., 1995).
3.2.3.4 Quality management and agile develop-
ment
The general view of agile development methodologies
is that they put less value on the resulting documenta-
tion than plan-driven development. Relying only on the
development team’s tacit knowledge can be a risk if de-
velopers make mistakes because of short-falls in their
tacit knowledge (Boehm, 2002). This shortcoming is
what many quality management standards address with
documentation. But in agile development, documenta-
tion may often be considered as waste. The question is
if there possibly is a clash of opposites between light-
weight agile development focusing on tacit knowledge,
and heavy-weight plan-driven development focusing on
documenting knowledge.
Indeed, it is the view of ISO 9126-1 that heavy and
mature processes lead to internal quality. Typical exam-
ples of such processes are the Waterfall model or the V-
model XT with its integrated CMM processes (Kneuper,
2007), the generating of extensive requirements speci-
fications, software process documentation according to
ISO 9000, testing to an extensively documented IEEE
Std. 829 test plan, or Fagan (1976) source code inspec-
tions. As opposed to this, an agile development team
only plans for the next few tasks, involves the customer
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MATURITY
LEVELS
PROCESS CATEGORIES
Developing capabili-
ties
Building teams and
culture
Motivating and manag-
ing performance
Shaping the work-
force
Level 5:
Optimizing
Coaching, Personal
Competency Develop-
ment
Continuous Workforce Innovation
Level 4:
Managed
Mentoring Team Building Organizational Per-
formance Alignment,
Team-based Practices
Organizational
Competency Man-
agement
Level 3:
Defined
Competency Develop-
ment, Knowledge and
Skills Analysis
Participatory Cul-
ture
Competency-Based
Practices, Career Devel-
opment
Workforce Planning
Level 2:
Repeatable
Training, Communi-
cation
Communication Compensation, Perfor-
mance Management,
Work Environment
Staffing
Level 1:
Initial
Figure 3.7: P-CMM key process areas and levels (Curtis et al., 1995)
to learn requirements as development goes, spreads soft-
ware knowledge in frequent team-meetings and pair pro-
gramming, tests with automated unit tests, and relies on
pair programming for source code reviews.
In a survey with software engineering experts, Turner
and Jain (2002) find that both concepts of agile devel-
opment and mature processes are far from matching
perfectly but also that they are not complete opposites.
Specifically investigating into the issue of formalities,
Prause and Durdik (2012) report that neglecting of for-
malities is not regarded as the essence of agile develop-
ment, and that a lack of documentation is indeed seen as
a problem in agile environments.
Mainstream development often uses a combination
of the light- and heavy-weight practices to better adapt
to the requirements of the environment. But this gray
area allows developers to easily take refuge in excuses
for not writing documentation (Boehm, 2002). They
do not do as much documentation as would be needed
by plan-driven development but at the same time avoid
the counter measures like pair programming that agile
development foresees.
3.2.4 Summary
Quality is a complex concept, often viewed from differ-
ent perspectives. It is an inherent but important property
of a product like software. Before quality can be man-
aged, it needs to be modeled. There exist several quality
models out of which ISO 9126-1 has established itself
as broadly applicable. While high quality is a desirable
feature of a product because it can reduce development
costs and make customers happy, it has several adver-
saries in project reality, ranging from inner conflicts in
the model to management, and motivation of developers.
In a software project there are many ways to reduce
risks for internal quality failures, i.e. the negative costs
of quality. An important way is to strengthen the com-
municative features of software process artifacts that
represent documentation and source code.
Quality management is a set of activities performed
to improve the quality of software on an organizational
level. Quality management standards have a long tradi-
tion in industrial production but there are problems in
applying the conventional standards to software develop-
ment because development is not a production but design
process. Instead, specific standards were developed for
the software domain.
With the rise of agile development, these standards
once again seem to be at odds with development. They
face the accusation of not being adequately flexible but
to be too heavy-weight. Yet their benefit for internal
quality is recognized by experts. There is a need for light-
weight support of internal quality for agile environments
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in general, and for software development in research
environments in particular.
3.3 Testing
Software quality control is the executive part of the ac-
tivities of software quality management. It is concerned
with testing the quality of a software product according
to previously defined quality characteristics. Another
name for software quality control is therefore also test-
ing, although this term possibly suggests a too narrow
scope of activities.
3.3.1 Map of testing
Testing serves the purpose of verifying the integrity of
the project’s knowledge base. An example is implemen-
tation parts that fit together, if execution results in correct
outputs, or if the software fulfill its requirements. Testing
techniques can be classified according to the scope they
test, and to the approach that is applied. Lewis (2005)
presents a detailed overview of testing techniques.
3.3.1.1 Scope of testing
Historically, testing can be seen as the process of vali-
dating that developed software actually does correctly
perform the functions that were envisaged in its require-
ments. But functional and non-functional requirements
together draw an image of the software that goes beyond
pure functionality. Functionality is just one of its proper-
ties or quality characteristics (cf. ISO 9126-1).
Testing not only validates fulfillment of requirements,
but more generally assesses and evaluates the quality of
software. The testing strategy can cover the full scope
of all quality characteristics but may emphasize certain
quality goals over others. Individual testing activities
that are part of the strategy pick out specific quality
aspects for evaluation.
The testing strategy may, for example, favor internal
over external quality of software if malfunctions of the
software are less critical than its evolvability. The strat-
egy may also focus on individual quality characteristics
or sub-characteristics. This depends on the development
organization’s business goals and customers.
In addition to the source code, also other software pro-
cess artifacts like requirements and documentation may
be tested. However, as other artifacts are by definition
not executable, fewer testing techniques are available. In
particular, documentation appeals to human understand-
ing so that correctness becomes hardly measurable.
3.3.1.2 Black box vs. white box
Black or white box testing is a criterion that separates
testing techniques into two categories. Black box testing
describes approaches where input and expected output
of a piece of software is known. The inner workings
that transform the input into output are not considered,
and therefore regarded as a black box. White box testing
denotes the opposite that does not use input and expected
output information but tests internal structure.
Gray box testing is a rare term that describes the mix-
ing of black box and white box testing. Unit testing is
sometimes considered gray box testing because it tests
internal structure while using input data and expected
output (Lewis, 2005).
While black box and white box testing are suitable to
separate testing techniques into two categories, they are
not orthogonal as a criterion to the two dimensions of
manual vs. automatic, and dynamic vs. static testing that
are discussed next. It is therefore not used for structuring
the following discussions of testing techniques.
3.3.1.3 Manual vs. automatic
Manual testing is testing that is exercised manually by
a human tester. A developer running an implemented
algorithm several times with different input values to
validate that it produces the expected output and there-
fore works correctly, is an example of manual testing.
As opposed to this, a developer running unit tests to test
the same algorithm, is an example of automatic testing
(Lewis, 2005).
Manual testing is the original way of testing. Au-
tomatic testing has the great advantage that it is much
cheaper and faster than manual testing once the automa-
tion is set up. It will also produce consistent test results.
Therefore industry and research put a lot of effort into
automating testing with CASE tools. But in areas where
automation tools are not (yet) available, manual testing
is still the predominant form of testing.
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Management also tends to underestimate the value of
manual testing and tend to give it to unexperienced de-
velopers. Bruegge and Dutoit (2000) call this a mistake
because experience and knowledge of the software are
both necessary to detect weaknesses.
3.3.1.4 Dynamic vs. static
Dynamic testing is testing in the classical sense, i.e. exe-
cuting the software to analyze its behavior. Static testing
analyzes software without executing it (Lewis, 2005).
The syntax checking done by compilers is an example of
static testing. Note that a more common term for static
testing is static analysis.
The advantage of dynamic testing is that it can show
that a system actually does what it is supposed to do for
a given input. Dynamic testing is often the technique
that requires less effort in preparation. It means to just
execute the software or part thereof.
But dynamic testing does not always require the least
effort. Sometimes it may be more costly to run a soft-
ware so that a static testing is cheaper. Some static test-
ing techniques can prove that there are no errors. Dy-
namic testing often cannot prove that there are no errors,
it can only increase confidence that there are none.
3.3.1.5 Testing scales
Testing can be conducted at various yardsticks (Bruegge
and Dutoit, 2000): The smallest yardstick of testing
is unit testing at program unit level, i.e. class level in
object-oriented languages.
The next larger scale is integration testing. Integration
testing puts the different parts of the software together
and performs tests at that level. A typical example would
be continuous integration builds.
System testing tests the full system of software (or
parts of it) in conjunction with hardware and other sys-
tems it is supposed to work with. An example is testing
that a ticket vending machine is indeed issuing printed
tickets after successful payment.
Finally, end-user or validation testing ensures that the
system does what customer and user expect from it. End-
user testing is often regarded as a part of system testing
but is listed separately here to reflect the ISO 9126-1
model with its separate “quality in use”.
3.3.1.6 Test documentation
Testing is documented at various phases of the testing
process. Before testing is done, it is planned. Documen-
tation that describes the approach to testing is called the
test plan. It contains information on when and what kind
of testing to apply when, and what is to be done with the
results obtained through testing. A guideline for writing
a test plan document is given by IEEE Std. 829.
In addition to the test plan, also the conduction and
results of tests are recorded in documentation. At the end,
reports of the conducted testing are created (Bruegge and
Dutoit, 2000).
3.3.2 Manual dynamic testing
An example of manual dynamic testing is debugging
that developers do when they develop a new feature or
fix a bug. It is also what Wray (2009) calls code-and-fix
development. In larger a scale, manual testing can be
part of the quality control processes that a software runs
through before being shipped to a customer, and where
procedures are precisely defined as part of the test plan.
However, manual dynamic testing is mentioned only for
completeness. It is not further relevant.
3.3.3 Automatic dynamic testing
Automatic dynamic testing exerts its tests of the running
software without the need for a developers intervention.
When the testing has completed, developer receive a
report stating that the tests were completed successfully
or that there were some problems detected. Automatic
dynamic testing can be made part of a continuous in-
tegration system so that automated tests get executed
regularly or in response to some development event.
Typical examples of automatic dynamic tests are unit
tests. The ratio of parts of the source code that were
exercised by the unit tests compared to those that were
not, result in the test coverage value for source code. Au-
tomatic dynamic testing tool kits allow to automatically
test various other aspects of a software. For example,
user interactions can be recorded and played back so that
graphical user interfaces of applications or web applica-
tions can be tested automatically.
Automatic dynamic testing is also only marginally
important here because execution behavior is related
68
II
I—
S
TA
T
E
O
F
T
H
E
A
R
T
III-3 — Testing
to external quality. However, test coverage from unit
tests is also an expression of internal quality. High test
coverage lets developers change source code without too
much fear that they break something without noticing.
3.3.4 Manual static testing
Manual static testing is first and foremost represented
through reviews.
3.3.4.1 Reviews
Reviews are a major testing technique. In a review, one
or more developers look at the software process artifacts
that were recently created by another developer. The
purpose and benefit of reviews is that they are capable
of detecting 50% to 90% of problems with these arti-
facts early (Ciolkowski et al., 2003). Detecting problems
early is important to reduce the fatality and cost of these
problems (Boogerd and Moonen, 2006). Furthermore,
reviews detect coding style issues, or deter programmers
from introducing logic bombs or trap doors into secu-
rity relevant software (Bernhart et al., 2010; Tanenbaum,
2001). However, code reviews are costly because of the
additional overhead associated with preparation, moder-
ation and cooperation (Johnson and Tjahjono, 1997).
Reviews are a family of similar static testing tech-
niques where audit is an independent examination con-
ducted by a third party. An inspection is a thorough
visual examination of deviations from standards. A tech-
nical review is a systematic evaluation of the suitability
of the product for its use. Finally, in a walk-through the
developer leads members of the team through the soft-
ware while they make comments about potential prob-
lems (IEEE Std. 1028). A Fagan inspection is a formal
technical review in which several people meet at the
same place at the same time to jointly rework a piece of
code (Fagan, 1976). An informal method is looking over
the shoulder in which a colleague of a developer has a
quick, invited look at some software process artifacts.
The kind of reviewing technique applied depends on
how it is integrated into development. Different ap-
proaches to reviewing affect development speed. Formal
inspections might cause too high additional efforts. A
review conducted before modifications are committed to
the revision repository (Review-Then-Commit) can slow
down development, while committing first (Commit-
then-Review) can be dangerous as undesirable changes
might be missed (Rigby et al., 2008).
Reviewing traditionally involves at least two people
in the same place at the same time. However, tools like
Crucible13, CodeCollaborator14, or the Jupiter15 IDE
plug-in, utilize modern means of communication like
web interfaces and instant messaging to significantly
reduce distance and time problems of reviews.
3.3.4.2 Pair programming
Agile development and XP in particular, have introduced
pair programming as their own notion of a testing tech-
nique with review-like effects. Studies like Phongpaibul
(2007) show the effectiveness of pair programming as
a review technique. Pair pressure arises from pair pro-
gramming and has been named as a reason for increased
quality by pair developers (Williams and Kessler, 2000).
The pair partner makes developers keep more of the
promises they made about how they will write source
code (Wray, 2009). A developer who writes low-quality
source code in front of a team colleague, although he
knows better, risks his reputation.
Pair programming has further effects besides its sim-
ilarity to reviews. When a developer talks about what
he is currently programming, it deepens his own un-
derstanding of the matter. The continuous alteration of
how developers are paired off enables spreading of tacit
knowledge in the team. And two developers will notice
more details and potential problems in the source code
than one developer (Wray, 2009). However, pair pro-
gramming is also expensive, especially with teams of
experienced developers (Phongpaibul, 2007).
3.3.4.3 Formal verification
Verification of software answers the question whether a
built software actually is what was intended to be built.
Formal verification are mathematical approaches or sim-
ulations (e.g. model checking) that aim at proving that
a software works according to its specification, and to
show that certain errors are non-existent in the software.
Formal verification is not relevant here because it targets
external quality only, and because it is a very expensive
technique that, however, allows to meet very high quality
standards (Phongpaibul, 2007; Rigby et al., 2008).
13http://www.atlassian.com/software/crucible/
14http://smartbearsoftware.com/codecollab.php
15http://csdl.ics.hawaii.edu/Tools/Jupiter/
69
III—
S
TA
T
E
O
F
T
H
E
A
R
T
III — STATE OF THE ART
3.3.5 Automatic static testing
Automatic static testing evaluates a software to detect
problems without executing it. The concept is interesting
for this research because it allows to draw conclusions
about the internal quality of source code. Automatic
static testing basically consists of software metrics and
static analysis. Metrics quantify some attribute of code,
which may point to errors if threshold values are sur-
passed. Static analysis finds probable errors by looking
for error patterns in source code. However, automatic
static testing has high rates of false positives, and is
therefore more important as a way of prioritizing manual
follow-up activities (e.g. Boogerd and Moonen, 2006).
3.3.5.1 Engineering, measuring and metrics
Measurement plays an important role in engineering and
quality management. It is used to assess the current sit-
uation and track the progress of development through
continuous measuring, to evaluate effectiveness of meth-
ods, and more. Software measurement has become es-
sential to good software development, although this is
not always acknowledged (Fenton and Pfleeger, 1997).
Definition 35 – Measurement
Measurement is the process by which numbers or sym-
bols are assigned to attributes of software process arti-
facts or process activities in such a way as to describe
them according to clearly defined rules (Fenton and
Pfleeger, 1997).
A typical attribute would be the size of a software
process artifact, or the duration of a testing phase in
development. Measurement tries to quantify attributes
so that they can be expressed as a parametric value us-
ing a measurement scale (e.g. bytes). Yet there is no
commonly accepted clear definition for the process of
measuring or what it consists of. While exact measures
on a precisely defined measurement scale are needed for
calculations and scientific use, some attributes cannot be
expressed as such a value. For example, the program-
ming language is an attribute of source code but express-
ing it as a number is senseless; also not all numbers
are suitable for calculating with them. Sometimes the
definition of a scale may be difficult because it projects
several simpler attributes down to a single number but
weighting them against each other may be a subjective
matter, e.g. space and time complexity of an algorithm,
and the goodness of its approximations. The attribute
itself may be difficult to measure, e.g. understandability
is subjective; the measuring device must be accurate
and be consistently handled correctly. Environmental
influences must be controlled to come to exact results
(Fenton and Pfleeger, 1997).
This research depends on the quantification of soft-
ware process artifact quality and quantity, and it needs
to combine both values into one comprehensive score.
In the case of quality with its many aspects and its sub-
jectivity, expressing it as a single number is particularly
problematic. Component values may be weighted differ-
ently and lead to the limitation that obtained numbers
have to be treated with care. Yet exact measurements are
not required and rough approximates suffice.
Caution when measuring If measurement is used to
determine performance of teams or parts thereof, it can
lead to top efficiency, or have devastating effects (Fenton
and Pfleeger, 1997). Umarji and Shull (2009) argue that
metrics have to be used carefully. Although they under-
line the importance of both product and process metrics,
they warn that metrics may be perceived as threats to
developers’ careers. Also, metrics might fail and not
tell the truth. And finally, combining metrics with incen-
tives is problematic because developers might attempt
to manipulate their numbers to obtain incentives. Perry
et al. (1994) note that measuring the output of software
development is particularly complicated because it is
something intellectual, not physical. Still developers are
willing to be measured if appropriate precautions are
taken. Section 3.5 comes back to issues of performance
measurement, motivation and rewards.
3.3.5.2 Software metrics
Software metrics measure some attribute in a software
process artifact or across the whole knowledge base.
They are an objective and context-independent way of
measuring internal quality of software from a product-
based point of view (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 1996).
Lines of code The most famous and probably oldest
software metric is lines of code (LOC) that is obtained by
simply counting the number of lines of source code in an
artifact, module or software. Typical derivations of LOC
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are Source Lines of Code (SLOC) that does not count
empty lines, or thousand lines of code (KLOC). There
are further variations in these definitions, for instance if
comments are counted or not counted.
LOC was proposed as a predictor of quality because
it has significant correlations with several bug predicting
metrics. But instead such metrics are rather size metrics,
than LOC being a quality metric. Still LOC is valuable
as covariate for such metrics (Rosenberg, 1997).
Source code quality metrics A famous metric for
quality of source code is Cyclomatic Complexity by Mc-
Cabe (1976), but Jay et al. (2009) showed it is no better
than LOC. Today there are many other metrics that are
valuable for quality assessments. Briand et al. (2000)
surveyed various metrics. They find that the best metrics
detect 90% of faulty classes at a correctness of 80%. A
toolkit with an implementation of the metrics by Chi-
damber and Kemerer (1994) is ckjm16. However, most
metrics focus on fault detection, i.e. external quality.
Metrics and implementations of toolkits for directly as-
sessing internal quality do hardly exist.
The second to fourth parts following ISO 9126-1 list
software metrics for internal, external and in-use quality.
But these metrics usually refer to the relationship be-
tween specified and implemented indicators. For exam-
ple, to predict analyzability, ISO 9126-3 recommends to
“Count the number of implemented diagnostic functions
as specified and compare it to the number of diagnostic
functions required in specifications.”
3.3.5.3 Static analysis toolkits
Static analysis finds potential problems in source code
without input data and without actually executing a pro-
gram. The spectrum of static analysis tools is quite
large, including topics like security violations, run-time
errors or logical inconsistencies (Ayewah et al., 2008;
Copeland, 2005). This analysis can be used to gener-
ate preliminary reports, guide expert-centered evalua-
tion of source code, and support risk analysis (Plo¨sch
et al., 2008; Boogerd and Moonen, 2006; Großmann,
2009). Static analysis can estimate test coverage for
source code (Alves and Visser, 2009), or like Checkstyle
spare humans from onerous style checking. For example,
static analysis is occasionally used to disallow check-
ing in of non-conformant code into a revision repository
16http://www.spinellis.gr/sw/ckjm/
(Ziesemer, 2011; Vashishtha and Gupta, 2008). The im-
portance of coding styles for source code quality was
discussed in Section 3.2.2.3.
Other well-known static analysis toolkit are PMD,
and its pendant Checkstyle that both analyze source
code. Traditionally, Checkstyle was more focused on
checking styles, while PMD looked for fault patterns,
there has been active cross-fertilization between the two
projects (Copeland, 2005; Smart, 2008). StyleCop17
is a similar program for C# source code. FindBugs18
analyzes Java byte code to identify problems (Ayewah
et al., 2008). There are more static analysis toolkits for
many programming languages. Several of them include
clone detection capabilities to detect copied code.
Checkstyle Checkstyle is a toolkit and component in
several mature quality assessment tools (Haderer et al.,
2010). It tends to concentrate on readability issues (Love-
land, 2009), and check coding styles like the Sun coding
conventions. As such, it is a detector of code smells that
hinder the readability and understandability of source
code (Edwards, 2003; Smart, 2008). Identified code
smells are too many lines in a class, too long lines, wrong
formatting or order of modifiers, duplicate code, or miss-
ing of Javadoc documentation and annotations.
Checkstyle lets profiles be customized to check rules
using four severity levels (error, warning, info, ignore)
for violations. It comes out-of-the-box with the standard
Sun conventions, including more than 120 rules and
standards, dealing with issues that range from code for-
matting and naming conventions to Enterprise JavaBean
best practices and source code complexity metrics.
Meta-analysis tools Sonar incorporates different
static analysis toolkits and metrics to generate project
reports. In the reports, there are figures indicating most
often violated coding rules, indications of software
quality with regard to several characteristics, the amount
of duplicate source code, and an overview of the total
technical debt in the project. Figure 3.8 shows a
screenshot of Sonar’s dashboard that summarizes the
most important project facts on a single web page. Sonar
automatically detects and counts code smells using
static testing (and dynamic unit tests), and computes
quality scores therefrom. The problem is that results can
17http://stylecop.codeplex.com/
18http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 3.8: Sonar dashboard with a project summary
only be an approximation of understandability and other
quality characteristics. In fact, the quality model might
not perfectly reflect personal quality perception. But it
provides an objective approximation of quality based on
a clearly defined model.
Plo¨sch et al. (2008) present a similar tool. It integrates
and combines the results of various static testing tools
into a configurable quality model. The output of the tool
then guides experts to source code where manual review
and rework is advisable. A feature that such tools are
lacking is the ability to associate quality with developers.
3.3.6 Summary
The survey of related work presented testing techniques
that help to assess internal quality. Internal quality test-
ing is mostly limited to testing on smaller scales (e.g.
at class, not integration granularity) and to testing with
techniques which necessitate only few effort. The rea-
son is to not burden developers with too much additional
effort. It will use mostly automatic testing techniques,
and manual testing where results are cheaply available.
Automatic dynamic testing is interesting with respect
to this research as a provider of test coverage data, which
could contribute to assessing internal quality. This re-
search adds another reviewing method to the surveyed
ones that aims at cheap, implicit, distributed, and time in-
terlaced reviews. It is comparable to pair programming:
not keeping a promise to write clean source code will
affect the developers’ reputation.
Static testing and measurement can be used to quan-
tify quality with some limitations. There is the general
assumption that style violations and code smells are in-
versely correlated with internal quality, so internal qual-
ity can be approximated through violation densities. As
the quality model itself is not the focus of this research,
violation densities obtained through Checkstyle provide
a pragmatic approximation of internal quality. Still, the
model could be improved by including other software
metrics as well (e.g. as is done in Sonar).
Software measurement was purported to be capable
of leading to top efficiency in a development team, or
to have devastating effects. The backgrounds and condi-
tions of the two outcomes are discussed in Section 3.5
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3.4 Mining Software Repositories
Mining of software repositories is a field of research that
deals with the analysis of software process artifacts and
the repositories they are stored in. Examples of software
repositories are revision repositories or mail archives.
More and more attention is paid to the unlifted trea-
sures in such repositories for their benefits for projects.
Mining of software repositories has since outgrown its
research niche in the last years. One such treasure is
identifying contribution relations between developers
and artifacts, which is highly relevant for this research.
3.4.1 Contribution, knowledge and owner-
ship
Developers spend 50% to 70% of their time communicat-
ing. But in order for the communication to be effective,
developers need to know with whom to best commu-
nicate with. Developers who are knowledgeable about
software process artifacts are probably best qualified to
fix problems with them, have the most expertise, and
can share much knowledge. Out of this need, the mining
of software repositories discipline has started to develop
ways of identifying who might have knowledge about
certain artifacts. This is the basis for ownership and
responsibility relations. Contribution is synonymous
with ownership and is a quantification of the amount of
knowledge that a developer has about certain artifacts
(Mockus and Herbsleb, 2002; Anvik and Murphy, 2007;
Anvik et al., 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2004; Hattori
et al., 2010).
Source code stored in a revision repository is managed
in two dimensions: space (code in diverse directories
and files) and time (evolution of each file from revision
to revision) (Spinellis, 2003). Revision repositories help
navigating through this space in discrete steps. Many ap-
plications slice the space either vertically, which means
looking at the software configuration at one discrete mo-
ment in time, or horizontally, which means looking at
the evolution of an artifact. Even without branches that
add further dimensions, both slicing approaches are lim-
ited. Without time information, on the one hand, it is
impossible to determine by whom, when or why certain
source code was introduced into the repository. On the
other hand, evolution information is incomplete when
ignoring parallel developments in other parts (meaning
in other files or branches) of the software. All of this
makes mining software repositories for contribution in-
formation a non-trivial matter.
3.4.2 Determining contributors in evolv-
ing artifacts
Practitioners and researchers have come up with differ-
ent ways to mine revision control systems for determin-
ing who has contributed to which software process arti-
facts.
3.4.2.1 Standard tools’ contribution facilities
A simple method is to look at who created a certain
software process artifact. However, this method is far
too inaccurate in iterative and collaborative work, where
artifacts evolve through several revisions, incorporating
changes by different contributors. More sophisticated
methods are provided by revision control systems for
source code, or by wikis, that record who committed
what revision. Such tools can normally also show the
differences between two revisions of an artifact. For ex-
ample, Figure 3.9 is a screenshot of MediaWiki showing
what text was inserted into the new revision of an article.
Subversion provides the command svn blame (and
its equivalent command svn praise) that shows for
each line of a software process artifact when it was added
or edited (revision number) and by whom. Subversion
derives its contributor information from comparing two
subsequent revisions of a file. If a line is new or changed,
then it is considered as having been contributed by the
developer who committed the revision. The command
line output of running svn blame on a source file is
depicted in Figure 3.10. There are three columns for
each line of an artifact:
1. revision when the line was last changed,
2. developer who committed the last change, and
3. the actual line of text.
Versioning systems like popular CVS or Subversion
only make weak assumptions about the artifacts they
manage. They only assume that the objects put under
version control are files, and that updates are commit-
ted to the repository in short intervals so as to be as
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Figure 3.9: MediaWiki showing differences between two revisions
Figure 3.10: Output of svn blame for some file with Java source code
precise and small as possible. Obtaining fine-grained
and useful change information therefore involves heavy
pre-processing steps (Omori and Maruyama, 2008). The
functionality of the Subversion method is limited in that
it
• only considers an artifact’s immediate predecessor,
• does not work with other kinds of artifacts but only
with checked-in files,
• is line-based, i.e. a single character change leads to
re-attribution of the whole line to a new developer,
• ignores structural information (like abstract syntax
trees built from source code, or differently typed
fields in a tracker) and therefore cannot correctly
identify complex changes,
• cannot detect if text is just moved around within
the same file without actual modification,
• does not consider moving/copying of text to differ-
ent artifacts, and
• does not recognize when lines are restored from an
earlier revision but instead considers them all as
new.
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3.4.2.2 Contributor mining in research
Ownership can be defined explicitly defined (e.g. by
project policies), i.e. there is a specification who is re-
sponsible for what (e.g. Nordberg, 2003). For projects
where such specification is not available, research litera-
ture presents several methods for mining such informa-
tion. A selection of methods for obtaining contributor
information is reported below.
Software forensics is a related area that deals with de-
termining and characterizing developers of software pro-
cess artifacts from analyzing their contributions (Gray
et al., 1997). It has, however, a different focus because
it assumes that developers are malevolent, probably un-
known, anonymous or hard to come by.
Tracking developer actions Mining contributions
from a revision repository is like software archeology
because in-between revisions are lost. The goal has to
be to get away from the archeology metaphor, as it will
never be able to generate contribution information with
very high precision (Robbes and Lanza, 2005).
One approach is therefore to record developer actions.
Robbes (2007) uses a change-based software reposi-
tory integrated into the IDE. It identifies the structural
changes a developer makes and tracks them on a seman-
tic level, e.g. addition of methods. Omori and Maruyama
(2008) record the process of changing the source code
as it happens in the developer’s IDE on a textual level
to achieve language independence. Dig et al. (2007)
specialize their recording to refactorings as these are
often large, complex operations that would be difficult
to reconstruct from finer-grained edit operations.
These approaches are limited in practice because they
require that the respective recording software is installed
in all the developers’ editors. Typically only off-the-
shelf version control systems like Subversion are found
in software development environments because they
have proven their value and are accepted by the develop-
ment team. Depending on the organization, it can be dif-
ficult to convince developers to install and use tracking
extensions (see also Section 2.4.2). Developers might
not want to or forget to install the necessary plug-ins;
they might use editors for which the extensions are not
available, or they might start using the extensions late
into the project. Imagine a multi-national research con-
sortium with several independent partners and flat hierar-
chies. Consequently, recording changes as they happen
may not be practically possible, so that recovering infor-
mation from revision repositories through archeology is
the only viable solution.
Provisioned contribution information Instead of
recording change information in the IDE, mainstream
revision repositories and source code can also provide
contribution information. Bowman and Holt (1999)
define a “hacked” relation that either exists or not
between a source file and a developer. The relation is
determined through revision repository logs, credits
files and copyright notices. Hattori and Lanza (2009)
define contribution to a file as “the developer who has
performed the greater number of small changes c on it.
A developer becomes the owner of a file at the moment
he performs c + 1 changes in relation to the previous
owner”, and later from the frequency of changes and as
“whoever performs the greater number of changes on a
file” (Hattori et al., 2010). Ostrand et al. (2010) equally
take into account all developers that have ever modified
a file. Grossbart (2011) proposes the “@author” tag as a
source of contribution information. Anvik et al. (2006)
analyze the structured data of an issue tracker to learn
contribution relationships.
The advantage of information provisioned by off-the-
shelf revision repositories is that it is easy to obtain.
Delete operations are well regarded. The problem is
that change information is often crude. Sometimes only
numbers of added and removed lines can be obtained.
Usually, information is restricted to when, why and by
whom revisions were created. In the best case, informa-
tion is similar to what svn blame provides.
Mining contribution from text changes More de-
tailed information can be obtained by comparing the
text content of different revisions of a software process
artifact. For example, a bug fix is owned by the con-
tributor who contributed most of its lines (Rahman and
Devanbu, 2010). Gıˆrba et al. (2005) define it as the the
percentage of lines in a file that were created or last
edited by a contributor. Only the main contributor is
considered as contributor of the artifact. Schro¨ter et al.
(2006a) “attributed files to the developers that created
most lines in a file” but only considered developers
who owned 50 or more files. Zimmermann et al. (2004)
reconstruct transactions from the changes that were
applied to the source code of code entities. Hata et al.
(2011) reconstruct evolution by tracking the moving and
changing of source code entities using hash indexes.
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3.4.3 Concepts of contribution mining
To overcome the limitations of currently available contri-
bution mining tools, first a new view on source evolution
is required. This view considers the inheritance rela-
tions between software process artifacts and how they
bequeath text to each other.
3.4.3.1 Limitations of common approaches
Several limitations and problems exist with the common
approaches. These are summarized before concepts for
building a better contribution mining are presented.
Keeping track of artifacts Simple renaming or mov-
ing of a software process artifact is easy to detect, as
is detecting changes in an artifact. But renaming plus
changing is not (Zou and Godfrey, 2005). It is not suffi-
cient to look at the evolution of a single artifact. Like-
wise the picture is incomplete when neglecting parallel
developments in branches.
Data from some revision control systems like CVS
lack change set information of software process arti-
facts that changed at the same time. By not providing
information on where an artifact came from, i.e. what
previous names it had, some revision tools complicate
preprocessing steps. Further problems arise depending
on the revision repository and its correct use. Subversion
does provide the original name of an artifact when the
artifact was renamed with Subversion’s rename facility;
but only then. It is inevitable to deal with name changes
to get correct results.
CVS does not record name changes of software pro-
cess artifacts at all, which leads to misinterpretations
(Thomson and Holcombe, 2008). In MediaWiki, renam-
ing is normally handled by moving the whole content
to another article. So strictly speaking, the artifact does
not even change its name. But all these cases must be
handled to obtain correct information.
White space changes Subversion annotates each line
of source code with its respective author and since when
it is there. But if, for example, two developers use dif-
ferent indentation characters (space vs. tab characters),
and their IDE automatically reformats code, Subversion
is misled. The same holds true for MediaWiki.
Revision 1
Af Huv
wouz dis2
Hzut driiz
Revision 2
Af Huv
wouz dis2
Hzut driiz
Revision 3
Af Huv
wouz dis2
Hzut driiz
Figure 3.11: Illustration of a revision undoing changes
Merging Revision repositories often have problems
with merges: They attribute merge results completely to
the developer of the new revision. Origins of contents,
which may be in some other software process artifact
written a long time ago, are neglected. This is especially
problematic as large commits are often merges (Hindle
et al., 2008). Even without merges, simply renaming an
artifact results in all code being attributed to the devel-
oper who renamed the artifact.
Copying and moving Change sets combine several
modifications to software process artifacts into one set.
This ensures the coherence of a logical change with its
local manifestations in the artifact. If not supported by
the revision repository, again change information must
be preprocessed to find the change sets first. Based
on change set information and using the information
retrieval vector model, methods for distinguishing moves
from true additions and deletions exist (Canfora et al.,
2007). However, knowing that something was moved
without recognizing what and where is not enough to
determine contribution.
Undoing changes Contribution determination must
regard the case that some part of a software process
artifact was deleted, and is brought back at a later time.
Figure 3.11 illustrates how the best predecessor of the
third revision is not its direct predecessor. Undoing
changes of a previous revision with a new revision is a
problem when looking at change sets only.
3.4.3.2 Evolutionary similarity of artifacts
The similarity of software process artifacts is important
for reconstructing fine-grained changes that happened
between two evolutions snapshots provided by the revi-
sion control system. Similarity can be defined in many
ways, and depends on the type of artifact. This research
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only deals with text-based artifacts, other artifacts are
left out. Also, the artifacts are “unstructured” in that they
consist of a single text string each. Their only structure
often is that there are lines marked by special characters.
A typical approach from information retrieval to de-
termining similarity is the vector model. It assigns high-
dimensional vectors to each software process artifact
according to the use of key words (Baeza-Yates and
Ribeiro-Neto, 1999). But this kind of content similarity
is not needed here. Instead, similarity denotes evolution-
ary similarity, i.e. similarity that results from having a
common predecessor; where one artifact is the ancestor
of two other ones.
The goal of approximate string matching is to match
strings while allowing for some corruption to have oc-
curred, and to determine what the exact corruption is
(Navarro, 2001). The corruptions are modifications done
by developers, and hence give their responsibilities.
Definition 36 – Edit distance
An edit distance is a metric for the similarity of strings.
It is based on the cost of edit operations that transform
one string into the other.
Tree edit distances A tree edit distance is a metric
that describes how one tree can be transformed into
another one. Strictly speaking, they are not an edit
distance of strings. But some strings, e.g. those that
represent valid source code, have a structure implied
on them through the programming language’s syntax.
Such strings can be transformed into an Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST) so that tree edit distances can be used.
Tree editing enables reuse through finding source
code with similar functionality (Sager et al., 2006), or
tracking structural evolution of functions by exploit-
ing that function names change seldom (Neamtiu et al.,
2005). It is also preferable if syntactic integrity is to be
maintained when merging string-encapsulated deep data
like Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents
(Ro¨nnau and Borghoff, 2012).
The advantage of a tree edit distance is that it is far-
ther away from evolutionary similarity of plain text and
closer to semantics. For this work, it is less suitable
because developers change plain text (to realize seman-
tic changes). It does not work with texts for which no
syntax is defined, too, or when the syntax is violated.
String edit distances The Levenshtein distance is an
edit distance on plain text. It is computed as number of
single character insertions, deletions or substitutions re-
quired to transform one string into another. The distance
is equal to the theoretical minimum number of a editing
key strokes (without mass character manipulations like
deleting lines or copying) when creating a new revision
of a software process artifact (Levenshtein, 1966).
Wagner and Fischer (1974) present a flexible algo-
rithm to solve the distance problem. Their algorithm can
easily be modified to output the minimal sequence of
changes, and be adjusted to give other weights to oper-
ations like white-space editing or deletions. Applying
this metric to the various revisions through which a soft-
ware process artifact has evolved gives a measure of how
many changes have been made by a developer.
A problem is, however, that the algorithm has a run-
time complexity of O(|A| × |B|) = O(n2) for two simi-
lar strings A and B. This can be a problem with lengthy
software process artifacts. Many revision repository sys-
tems like Subversion solved the issue by dealing with
whole lines instead of single characters, i.e. the alphabet
is treated as consisting of entire lines, making it much
bigger while reducing the logical length of strings to
only a fraction of their actual size. The diff tool19 for
computing edit script operates on lines as well. Medi-
aWiki applies the algorithm recursively to modified lines
to highlight smaller changes within the line. Extensive
research also led to O(n
3
7 ) (Bar-Yossef et al., 2004) and
O(nd) (where d is the distance between the two strings)
(Ukkonen, 1983) algorithms for approximating edit dis-
tances. But if also character transpositions are permitted,
time complexity is proven to increase dramatically for
correct results (Lowrance and Wagner, 1975).
Including the transposition operation for chains of
characters would allow to detect moved text parts within
a software process artifact. Although there are algo-
rithms like Lowrance and Wagner (1975) that allow
transposition operations (i.e. swapping two characters),
this is not sufficient to detect moved blocks of text;
and moreover not between artifact boundaries. Instead
moved code can be identified cheaper with information
retrieval techniques (Canfora et al., 2007).
3.4.3.3 Clone detection
In source code analysis, clone detection means to find
similar pieces of source code in the code base. The idea
19http://www.gnu.org/software/diffutils/
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is that there is one original piece of source code that has
been copied to other places. Software quality control is
interested in finding such duplications as they are unde-
sirable in source code. They should be avoided by using
the programming language’s abstraction functionality.
Overview of clone detection Clone detection is ba-
sically an information retrieval problem. Clone pairs
could be seen as documents that are relevant to each
other. But there are fine distinctions. An issue of ongo-
ing discussion is whether textual similarity or semantics
of the system are the most important criterion. One ma-
jor problem is that the detection algorithm should be
resistant against some modifications of the source code.
Other problems are that the algorithm does not know
what source code is a clone candidate. Every artifact
would have to be treated like a candidate because the al-
gorithm is supposed to find all clones. Moreover, clones
are not whole artifacts but only parts thereof, further in-
creasing the number of candidates (Kontogiannis, 1997;
Walenstein and Lakhotia, 2003).
Clone detection is used for assessing internal quality,
and for detecting refactoring needs. It is relevant to
this research as a way of tracking pieces of text that are
moved within a software process artifact, or between two
different ones. For example, if a developer cuts a method
from a file and pastes it into a different one, then it has
two contributors: one who wrote it in the first place, and
one who moved it. While the detection of moved source
code within an artifact could be solved inefficiently with
an edit distance algorithm, this is not possible when it is
moved between two artifacts, or copied.
Examples of clone detection methods To detect the
origins of moved code, Zou and Godfrey (2005) first ana-
lyze characteristic features of source code to obtain struc-
tural information (e.g. function names) and fingerprints.
From the fingerprints they infer merging and splitting
information for source code entities. Weißgerber and
Diehl (2006) use fingerprints to classify revision control
transactions into refactorings and changes. While fin-
gerprints have proven their value, they require an under-
lying structure, and adaptation of the algorithm to that
structure. Cordy et al. (2004) find origins of possibly
copied source code using an islands-and-water metaphor,
where uninteresting water (white space) surrounding in-
teresting islands (actual source code) is ignored.
Advanced methods for identifying copied source code
rely on fuzzy algorithms to abstract from superficial
changes; as well on a crude file level as on the finer code
level (Chang and Mockus, 2008). Developed methods
also include AST models that identify change types and
find similar code (Fluri et al., 2007).
Choice of techniques Clone detection is a research
field of its own right (for several examples see Basit
and Jarzabek, 2007). Sophisticated detection methods
increase efficiency and even add fuzzy matching. For
purposes of this research, some simple techniques are
good and efficient enough. While fuzziness increases
recall, precision is probable to decline. Yet precision is
crucial for this research because erroneously identifying
a piece of text as copied is worse than not identifying it
as a copy at all.
3.4.3.4 Maintaining contribution information
Contribution information is not trivial to obtain. In the
simplest case, it only means accessing the revision repos-
itory. From a performance perspective, accessing the
repository is an expensive operation in its own right.
If further computations are necessary, then it only gets
more costly. Contribution information therefore needs to
be precomputed and cached to make it easily accessible.
Data about data Contribution information is a kind
of metadata:
Definition 37 – Metadata
Metadata is data about data. It adds further information
to individual instances of application data.
While metadata is structured in a machine readable
way, the data it is about may be of an arbitrary kind in
any media. Metadata provides a context for data and
is used to facilitate its understanding. Metadata may
include descriptive information about context, quality
and condition, or characteristics of the data, and can be
recorded with fine or coarse granularity. But metadata at
the granularity of a whole text is too coarse if there are
several authors contributing to the same text.
Instead, fine-grained metadata like character-by-
character or line-by-line contribution information is
needed. It can then be considered as an additional
information that is overlying textual data. It is a kind
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of metadata that contains the authors of the respective
text. For example, if the text “Hello world!” was written
collaboratively by authors A and B, then a second layer
could store the original author of every character like
this:
Hello world! Store 1: Data layer
AAAAABBBBBBB Store 2: Metadata layer
Fine-grained metadata In the following, the term
markup is used for fine-grained metadata to distinguish
it from the broader metadata term.
Definition 38 – Markup
Markup is fine-grained metadata about textual data at
the granularity of characters.
Markup sticks to the text it was attached to. When
the text moves around, the markup moves with it. If text
gets duplicated its markup is so, too. Analogously the
markup disappears when its text is deleted. Markup is
edited in the same way as the source code.
The problem of maintaining markup To not distract
developers who are editing a software process artifact,
the second layer of markup should be stored in a dif-
ferent place (i.e. unlike XML). The problem is then to
keep the second layer in sync with the text in the first
layer while it evolves: Overlay information in the sec-
ond layer should stick to their respective characters in
the first layer. But the associations between first and
second layer can easily get lost due to changes like merg-
ing, moving or copying. The reason is that most editors
(e.g. IDEs) for software process artifacts do not sup-
port managing of such markup. The same holds true for
repositories of software process artifacts that store the
artifacts; like Subversion or MediaWiki. They only store
the first layer containing the text data. Moreover, they
only provide snapshots of the stored evolution of the
text. The exact alterations are unknown. In fact, they are
normally unknown to the revision repository, too (see
Section 5.3). Enabling metadata to survive such evolu-
tionary processes is necessary. Therefore, CollabReview
has to reconstruct them through archeological analysis
of software process artifact evolution (see Section 3.4.2).
3.4.4 Software process artifact halo
Besides shared ancestry as discussed above, there are
other relations between software process artifacts that
have something in common. As software is densely in-
terlinked encoded knowledge, contributions often affect
more artifacts than the ones that were directly touched
by the developer. Such relations easily span across dif-
ferent types of artifacts. When a linked artifact provides
something to the artifact that the developer has modified,
a dependency is created (e.g. inheritance). The quality
of the dependent artifact is influenced by the provider’s
quality. So the dependent artifact’s developer should
have an interest in the provider’s quality (cf. the idea
of TQM Deming, 1994). The providers move into the
artifact’s halo.
Some examples of such halos around artifacts are pre-
sented here: Prause et al. (2007a,b) interconnect docu-
mentation and learning objects in different repositories
using process hints, document similarity, classifications,
or searches for key concept names. Also change times
can hint at a dependency: if changes happen at the same
time, then there may be some underlying link which is
not otherwise detected. Schro¨ter et al. (2006b) analyze
imported packages in Java source code. Similarity in im-
porting the same packages can hint at a hidden relation
between the two software process artifacts. Artifacts
sharing the same space (e.g. the same directory in a
file system) are probably related following the package
pattern. Zimmermann et al. (2004) capture developer
behavior, wanting to be able to give hints like “Pro-
grammers who changed these functions also changed...”
de Alwis et al. (2008) determine the context of source
code entities using language constructs like declarations
of fields, methods, and inner types; extends and imple-
ments relations; return types; field references; method
calls; catching and throwing of exceptions; and creating
of object instances.
3.4.5 Information retrieval
Information retrieval is a science that engages in rep-
resenting, storing, and organizing information to make
them accessible to the user (Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-
Neto, 1999). The book by Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto
contains a good introduction to the whole area. Only
a few of its concepts related to this research are briefly
presented here.
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Response + Response - Totals
Target + tp fn tp+fn
Target - fp tn fp+tn
Totals tp+fp fn+tn n
tp=true positive, fp=false positive,
tn=true negative, fn=false negative,
n=number of samples
Table 3.2: Contingency table for target and response
3.4.5.1 Precision and recall
In order to assess the quality of information retrieval ser-
vices, measurements are necessary. The most important
two concepts here are recall and precision.
Contingency table Both concepts are perhaps best
explained on the basis of a contingency table (cf. Powers,
2007). Table 3.2 shows how the axes of the table are
labeled depending on the domain. The “target” can be
considered as what the “correct response” for a given
item would be, either yes (target +) or no (target -). In
information retrieval, the target is usually whether the
user wants to find a certain document or not. “Response”
is the answer that is given to the user, again either yes
(response +) or no (response -). For instance, if the user
wants to find a certain document (target +) and it is also
actually retrieved for him (response +), the response is a
true positive (tp). Depending on the domain, the table
cell contents can have other names like correct rejection
for true negative, or miss for false negative.
To assess the quality of a retrieval method, the differ-
ent numbers for true and false positives and negatives
are counted in the contingency table. The sum of all four
cells is the number of samples used in the analysis.
Recall and Precision Recall measures if the retrieval
has not left out relevant documents. It is the portion
of correctly retrieved documents (tp) out of all relevant
documents, which is sum of correctly retrieved (tp) plus
incorrectly not retrieved documents (fn).
Definition 39 – Recall
Recall is the percentage of correctly retrieved documents
from all relevant documents.
recall =
|{correctly retrieved}|
|{relevant documents}| =
tp
tp+ fn
Precision measures if retrieved results are not clut-
tered with irrelevant documents. It is the portion of
correctly retrieved documents (tp) out of all retrieved
documents, which is the sum of correctly retrieved docu-
ments (tp) plus incorrectly retrieved documents (fp).
Definition 40 – Precision
Precision is the percentage of correctly retrieved docu-
ments out of all retrieved documents.
precision =
|{correctly retrieved}|
|{retrieved documents}| =
tp
tp+ fp
Correlation Expressing retrieval quality as precision
and recall is limited in that it does not consider the num-
ber of correctly rejected documents, the true negatives.
A more expressive value than combinations of precision
and recall derived from the contingency table is there-
fore correlation. It contrasts true positives and negatives
against false positives and negatives (Powers, 2007).
The correlation obtained from a contingency table is
a special form of the Pearson correlation using only bi-
nary values (the Matthews correlation). The formula for
computing the correlation coefficient is (Powers, 2007):
rM =
tp× tn− fn× fp√
(tp+ fp)(fn+ tn)(tp+ fn)(fp+ tn)
3.4.5.2 Inverted index
The inverted index is a data structure for fast searching
of occurrences of words in documents (cf. Baeza-Yates
and Ribeiro-Neto, 1999). It is an important tool for clone
detection, where each word represents a striking feature
in a software process artifact.
For inserting a document into the search index, it
needs to be preprocessed. The preprocessing extracts
the words from the document, and then creates an index
that maps words to a list. The list contains references to
all occurrences of the words.
The inverted index therefore allows to quickly locate
all occurrences of a word in all indexed documents. A
search just looks up the respective list of occurrences for
a word.
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3.4.6 Summary
Mining software repositories deals with analyzing soft-
ware process artifacts in revision repositories to extract
information that can be helpful in software development.
One such information is responsibility as relation be-
tween developers and artifacts.
The state of the art has ready different approaches for
obtaining contribution information, including the track-
ing of editing operations, reading metadata from revision
repositories, or reconstructing applied edit operations.
The first approach has limitations stemming from devel-
opers’ resistance to innovation, and the second approach
does not provide metadata in the required granularity.
So only the archeological approach remains viable.
The evolutionary similarity of artifacts is defined as
the textual similarity of software process artifacts. An
important concept is reconstructing edit operations. But
a major problem are mass manipulations like tracking
pieces of strings while they move around between ar-
tifacts and get modified. Essential to reconstruction is
the discipline of clone detection, which is basically an
information retrieval problem. Once contribution infor-
mation is extracted, it can be maintained as a markup
overlay over the software process artifact’s text. Rela-
tions between artifacts can further influence contribution
information.
Borrowing from information retrieval, two important
measurements for determining the quality of algorithms
are precision and recall. However, it is often better to
rely on correlations for measuring quality because it is
more expressive.
3.5 Collaboration, Organization
and Motivation
Software development is highly collaborative work. To
achieve project goals, developers have to cooperate in
the many tasks across all activities of the software pro-
cesses. Teamwork in software engineering is only pos-
sible through continuous communication and coordina-
tion. Human aspects of software engineering, i.e. col-
laboration, organization and motivation, are essential to
software development.
3.5.1 Introduction
Software engineering is a highly social process involving
close collaboration between many individuals. Develop-
ers spend most of their time communicating (Mockus
and Herbsleb, 2002), for projects without sufficient coor-
dination through communication are in deep trouble and
prone to fail (Kraut and Streeter, 1995). Human aspects
of software engineering therefore require much atten-
tion. Tools and techniques for allowing collaboration
between individuals, organizing them into reasonable
social structures, and motivating individuals to perform
their role in the larger organization are essential.
3.5.2 Collaboration
Collaboration describes the processes that two or more
individuals run through in order to coordinate their work
and to more efficiently reach a shared goal.
3.5.2.1 Coordination, communication, documenta-
tion and CSCW
The special nature of software development is that it al-
most entirely consists of creating and integrating knowl-
edge. The resulting coordination necessities put high
requirements on communication and documentation.
Coordination through communication Coordina-
tion is the process of aligning the efforts of individuals
and different parts of an organization towards the
common goals and at collectively accomplishing the
necessary tasks. Work must be coordinated to get it done
and to fit its parts together seamlessly without doing
work redundantly. The success of software development
very much depends on how good coordination works. So
it is no surprise that software development suffers when
coordination gets more difficult, for instance if project
size and complexity increase (Kraut and Streeter, 1995).
But also geographical, environmental, cultural and, in
general, perceived distance complicate coordination
(Jime´nez et al., 2009; Herbsleb and Grinter, 1999b).
The reason is that informal communication between
developers is vital to coordination: Developers spend
over 15% of their time communicating informally, while
breakdowns in informal communication lead to misun-
derstandings (Grinter et al., 1999). But as a project
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grows, the number of lines of communication and with
them communication complexity increase exponentially
(Curtis et al., 1988; PMBOK, 2008). Perceived distance
aggravates the cost of communication with difficulty,
inconvenience, and frustration (Grinter et al., 1999).
The only way to reduce coordination problems is to
reduce communication problems, and for this adequate
tool support is needed, particularly if development is
taking place over distances (Carmel and Agarwal, 2001).
CSCW Software development can be seen as a spe-
cialized field of broader Computer-supported Coopera-
tive Work (CSCW) for its use of computer tools to facil-
itate efficient distributed collaboration. A difference is
its innate affinity to computer tools. Yet collaboration
support specifically for software development is not very
common. Most development work like implementation
is still done in isolation by developers. There is a con-
siderable overlap between CSCW and CASE. But the
focus of CSCW is on collaboration support while the
latter one focuses on supporting the developer.
Nonetheless there are attempts to bring CSCW to-
gether with software development. For example, Cook
(2007) demands for computer-supported collaborative
software engineering with his same time support for
implementation. The traditional engineering influences
in software development also let much communication
happen through documentation in standardized forms
like source code, requirements templates like Volere
(Robertson and Robertson, 1999), or Unified Modeling
Language (UML) figures.
CSCW is a multi-disciplinary science that intercon-
nects sociology, psychology and computer science. It
tries to understand social interaction like work, play or
learning to support it with computer tools. The two di-
mensions time (with the two discrete values same time
and different times) and space (same place and different
places) are used to classify tools into a matrix (see Fig-
ure 3.12). CSCW tools are important assets in enabling
coordination through communication and documenta-
tion in software development.
A particular facilitator of distributed collaboration is
the Internet, and its Web 2.0 overlay that has been coined
“a transport mechanism, the ether through which interac-
tivity happens.” (DiNucci, 1999). It enables organiza-
tions to collaborate locally and over a distance, and even
allows weak organizations to form without people ever
meeting or without legal foundations, e.g. some open
source software projects.
Same Time Different Times
Sa
m
e
Pl
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e Face-to-face meetings:
information technol-
ogy enhancing activi-
ties during in person
meeting
Administrative, Fil-
ing and Filtering:
background support
of meetings and
coordination tools
D
iff
er
en
tP
la
ce
s
Cross-Distance Meet-
ings: support for meet-
ings between distant
participants
Ongoing Coordina-
tion: keep work going
without face-to-face
contact
Figure 3.12: Matrix of CSCW tools (Bullen and Jo-
hansen, 1988)
Documentation as communication The role of doc-
umentation is as a medium of communication. This role
has been discussed in Section 3.2.2.2 from the stand-
point of quality. An excellent treatment of software doc-
umentation, its current situation, different perspectives,
related works and its role in the communication within
software projects can be found in the master thesis of
Forward (2002). Among the most important points it
makes is the importance of documentation for communi-
cation, that documentation standards like IEEE Std. 829
(1998), IEEE Std. 1074 (2006), ISO 12207 or ISO 6592
can only define the contents of software documentation,
but not that goals have to be understood first, and that
documentation should aim for the quality level of “good
enough” to ensure that project budget suffices to main-
tain lower quality but up-to-date documentation for most
parts of the software. It is interesting to note that “good
enough” quality is in opposition to standards like Six
Sigma (see Section 3.2.3.2) that aim for perfection. This
difference only underscores the different goals of docu-
mentation as a means of communication, and industrial
product quality.
3.5.2.2 Reputation systems
The Free Dictionary (Farlex, 2012) defines the term
agent:
Definition 41 – Agent
An agent is “a person or thing that acts or has the power
to act”, and “exerts some force or effect” (Farlex, 2012).
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Reputation systems heavily influence everybody’s ev-
ery day life, even if we are not aware of it, in a two-fold
way: They bring structure into chaos, and help agents
to get through life efficiently. Reputation lets agents
make sound judgments about anything in the absence of
better information. At the same time, every agent and
the effects of its actions are continuously evaluated by
other agents and their reputation systems (Farmer and
Glass, 2010).
Definition 42 – Reputation
Reputation is what is generally said or believed about
someone’s or something’s abilities or qualities (Oxford
Dictionary, 1994).
The term reputation system can describe a wide array
of practices, rules, technologies, or user interface ele-
ments. Generally, a reputation system does not need a
technical component. Given a community, it consists of
a model or set of practices that determine how reputation
is formed (Farmer and Glass, 2010). In this work, repu-
tation systems are specifically meant as a not clearly de-
fined kind of CSCW tools that try to capture an agent’s
reputation. They capture reputation statements through
direct observation or by collecting feedback from other
agents (Farmer and Glass, 2010). The PageRank (Brin
and Page, 1998), the h-index (Hirsch, 2005), or eBay20’s
transaction feedback mechanism are reputation systems.
A survey and analysis of reputation systems is presented
in Jøsang et al. (2007). Unless noted otherwise, the term
reputation system means:
Definition 43 – Reputation system
A reputation system is a software system that is capable
of collecting information about things or agents through
observation and feedback. By using internal rules and
algorithms, the reputation system can compute an indi-
vidual score for each thing or agent that is an expression
of a certain subset of its qualities.
A reputation system shows to other agents what to
expect from a certain agent, or from the things it created.
In the highly anonymous e-Commerce of the Internet,
for instance, a seller’s good reputation shows to poten-
tial customers that they can have confidence in really
20http://www.ebay.com/
getting what they pay for. A good reputation means
to the seller that he has an advantage over competitors,
because customers are more likely to spend their money
in his shop (Kennes and Schiff, 2003). To a company,
a high PageRank means more visitors on its web site;
to a scientist a high h-index means having had a lot of
influence on the state of the art. A good reputation is
valuable to them.
The higher the benefit of good reputation, the more
will economic agents invest in achieving a good repu-
tation. An agent will even endure short-term losses if
his acquired reputation secures long-term gains (Kreps
and Wilson, 1982). Economic theory concludes that the
benefits of good reputation entail an equivalent cost for
establishing it, which leads to an equilibrium (Jøsang
et al., 2007). Reputation systems thereby open up the
opportunity to educate agents to well-behaving. This
special sub-type of reputation that is used to create in-
centives for user behavior is also called karma (Farmer
and Glass, 2010).
Definition 44 – Karma
Karma is reputation about users. It is surveyed in order
to create incentives for user behavior.
But reputation systems have their problems, too. Be-
sides the mere difficulties of how to define and measure
good reputation, the system itself may become the target
of attacks by agents that try to obtain good reputation
by fraud. The higher the possible gain of good reputa-
tion, the higher the efforts that attackers may put in their
attacks.
A relationship between karma score and software pro-
cess artifact quality does not necessarily mean that the
karma score is equal to skill, or that more skilled devel-
opers will always write better code. Erich Gamma is
famously renowned for being one of the developers who
introduced the most bugs into Eclipse. A (hypothetical)
low reputation computed from bug counts in his code is
not necessarily attesting him poor skill. It is plausible
that he has taken on ambitious design tasks that are more
likely to cause bugs than only finishing an implementa-
tion (Rahman and Devanbu, 2011). Gamma’s reputation
includes his preference to select difficult and bug-prone
tasks. A bad reputation, however, can still mean that his
code should get an additional review; not because of his
low skill, but because of his fondness for working on
difficult problems.
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3.5.2.3 Principal-agent problem
Originating from information economics, agency the-
ory deals with the contract between a principal and an
agent. The principal offers compensation to an agent in
exchange for his efforts. A conflict stems from the dif-
ferent expectations and reasons that principal and agent
have for entering into the contract. To a certain degree,
agents will pursue their own goals and thereby deceive
their principal. Two important propositions state that de-
ception can be reduced by aligning of goals, and through
information systems that hamper deception (Eisenhardt,
1989).
The more the two parties’ goals differ, the bigger the
problem. If the relationship is only temporary, goals are
less likely to be aligned. In a consortium, for instance,
partners and their employees (who themselves possibly
also only have fixed-term contracts) can be regarded
as the agents that pursue their own goals. Their self-
interested behavior is favored by weak internal structure
of the temporary consortium organization that represents
the principal.
3.5.3 Organization
An organization is a social system that has relatively
long-enduring and defined objectives that it pursues.
It has a formal structure consisting of individuals and
groups that have roles, and it has behavioral rules and
processes. Implicit and explicit rules, norms and sym-
bols characterize the so-called organizational culture
(Fro¨hlich, 2002).
3.5.3.1 Self-organization
Humans are complex systems: one mind alone is highly
complex, but put together in groups, many beings form
a greater, even more complex organization. Creativity to
cope with problems, however, occurs most at the border
of disintegration; in the zone between stable operation,
and the reign of unorderly instability (Stacey, 1996).
Self-organization is emergent and adapting to new chal-
lenges; it is near this edge of chaos where innovation
occurs (Powell, 2006). This is especially important in re-
search, where there is poor agreement on ever-changing
challenges and proposed solutions are highly uncertain.
Figure 3.13 shows a Stacey diagram of self-organization
in the middle between order and chaos.
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Self-organizing zone: paradoxical
irregular regularity and unpredictable
predictability, dynamics of complexity
allow
novelty and creativity
Figure 3.13: Stacey diagram of conventional, self-
organizing and chaotic zones (Stacey, 2012)
However, this area is process-hostile by definition.
A business process is a structured set of activities that
produce a specific service or product. Besides the actual
instructions necessary for creating the result, a process
can include quality assurance activities, e.g. state that
and how a result is to be documented. A process is a
set of rules for collaboration that makes the outcome
of production reliable, and creates certainty among the
involved persons. It reduces the individuals’ freedom
for acting selfish — which according to Deming (1994)
is a big problem in the Western world — and thereby
enables effective and efficient collaboration. Nordberg
(2003), for example, mentions that weaker ownership
models require strong coding styles.
But processes make an organization inertial and in-
flexible. Therefore agile development relies on self-
organizing teams. However, self-organizing organiza-
tions have problems to establish processes, i.e. rules for
achieving quality. Quality cannot be achieved through
rules in such environments. People have to use their
common sense, and they must be able to communicate
about the perceived quality of artifacts. Selfishness is
tamed by motivating people to show cooperative (social)
behavior.
A typical example of the problem is cowboy coding,
as a reference to the mythical American west. It means
shooting from the hip with no process. The cowboy’s
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focus is on hacking. Ingenious artistry pushes team-play
aside. Social aspects of cooperative programming like
comments, documentation, coding rules and reviews, are
disdained21. As such, cowboy coding is a threat to inter-
nal quality in environments with weak code ownership.
The absence of laws and sheriffs (i.e. processes) leads
to selfish and all but sustainable behavior. However, per-
sonal responsibility and ownership is argued to act as
a counter measure that motivates cooperative behavior
(Prause and Eisenhauer, 2008).
Humans are as they are. Many character traits seem
to be genetically hard-wired into their brains as modern
research in psychology shows. For example, aggression
and altruism have been shown to be partly inheritable
(Zimbardo and Gerrig, 2003). To deal with this fact,
organizations can move closer toward the standard man-
agement zone to exert more control through processes,
and prevent the system from falling apart. But they can
also try to change the game, while letting the system
organize itself.
3.5.3.2 Mechanism design
Game theory is a mathematical theory for modeling
strategic and deterministic decision processes. It has
been used to describe human behavior in economic, de-
cision, concurrency and conflict situations called games.
Every participant of a game (the player) tries to optimize
his payout by pursuing a suitable strategy (Brockhaus,
2005). The theory is successful at describing human
decisions although it is a great simplification of reality,
where many more factors like informedness, probability,
and utility influence actual decisions.
It is not a necessity of games that one’s gain is an-
other one’s loss. Such a game would be called zero-sum
game. Instead the players’ striving for personal gain
can lead to optimized overall efficiency and therefore
to a win for the group. One example is the division of
labor: the brewer, the butcher and the baker create the
goods desired by fellow-citizens. But they do not do
it for benevolence or because they are forced by some
planning entity but for their own profit. Smith (1776)
calls this the invisible hand, which makes individuals
serve the community out of their pure self-interest.
Whether individual self-interest serves the community
in a win-win game or harms it, depends on the rules of
21see also http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?CowboyCoding
the game. For example, the Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany (Art. 14GG) states that owner-
ship obligates (“Eigentum verpflichtet”). In a software
project, the ownership for source code obligates the de-
veloper to maintain the source code in a good shape so
to serve the project community. The game mechanics
are designed to make self-interest serve the community.
It is often difficult to analyze and understand all aspects
of a game in real life. Sometimes players simply com-
pete directly for an obvious resource. But other times,
a secondary resource is affected, or the players’ actions
cause hidden side-effects. Mechanism design theory is
concerned with how admission to a market system can
be regulated to achieve a desired outcome or kind of
game (Brockhaus, 2005).
An example is a big organization that lets its divisions
compete to better survive in the market as a whole. Mix-
ing cooperation and competition has been termed coope-
tition. It leads to superior performance because it keeps
everyone on their toes but is not recklessly selfish so to
become destructive (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996).
However, Deming (1994) warns that selfish components
destroy the superordinate organization when left to them-
selves. Designing competition in a way that benefits the
superordinate organization is the concern of mechanism
design.
3.5.3.3 Externality
When there are two players engaged in an economic
game, they align their strategies of actions towards their
individual goals. Modeling work as a game by using
measuring and rewards, leads to improved performance
by cutting down on activities that do not add benefit. But
as Johnson (2007) put it: “Perhaps what you measure
is what you get. More likely, what you measure is all
you get.” The problem is when the model of the game
is incomplete. Then players’ actions may have negative,
not measured side-effects on other players, and on the
performance of the entire system.
The cost or benefit of side-effects of players’ market
actions is called transaction spillover or externality. It is
the cost of a transaction between two players that is not
explicitly included in the transaction. It is typically bore
by a third party that was not involved in the transaction
in the first place (Boyes and Melvin, 2010). For exam-
ple: due to schedule problems, a company might bring
in a short-term consultant to implement some part of a
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software. In the transaction between company and con-
sultant, money is exchanged for added functionality in
the source code. If quality is not part of the game; if the
consultant gets his job done quick but dirty, then techni-
cal debt arises. This is an externality of the transactions.
When the consultant leaves, the efforts for cleaning up
technical debt is left to the original development team.
A developer who does not document his source code but
rushes on to his next task, creates negative externality.
One way to prevent externality is regulation, i.e. to
set up and enforce rules that forbid actions that cause
an externality. However, this can result in suboptimal
overall performance. Regulation prevents two parties
from together negotiating an efficient solution, in which
they find a way to deal with the externality in a more
cost-effective way. For instance, strict coding rules and
reviews can prevent externality. Both developers would
have to do the same amount of documentation for the
source code they develop. It may be, however, that
one developer is more apt to writing documentation and
cleaning up technical debt. So they can negotiate a differ-
ent distribution of documentation workload. According
to the theorem of Coase (1960), making an externality
quantifiable for inclusion in transactions, leads to more
efficient resolutions than strict regulation does.
The alternative to strict regulation is Pigovian taxing
that is levied on an externality. The externality is said to
be internalized, i.e. calculated into the cost of transac-
tions. It allows steady regulation of the amount of un-
wanted activity, and leaves room for individual decisions
and optimization. The inverse of Pigovian tax is the
negative Pigovian tax, which encourages activities that
have a positive externality. It can increase the amount of
favorable activities that are carried out (Collard, 2009).
3.5.3.4 Gamification
Gamification has emerged as a means to motivate users
of some information technology platform to behave in
desirable ways. The idea has gained considerable at-
tention in numerous domains like productivity, finance,
health, education, sustainability, news or entertainment
media (Deterding et al., 2011).
Definition 45 – Gamification
Gamification refers to the use of design elements char-
acteristic for games in non-game contexts. (Deterding
et al., 2011)
Gamification can be used in environments where it
is difficult to motivate people to show desired behavior
when no other means are available. It would therefore fit
into domains like self-organizing work contexts, where
a high freedom of individuals is to be maintained. For
example, consortium-based, research or agile software
development organizations. But it can also fit into in-
dividual work situations. Figure 3.14 shows collectible
badges like “Regional Manager (have more than 10 re-
gions in a single class), Close To The Metal (use 5 pre-
processor directives), Stubby (generate method stubs
10 times) or Interrupting Cow (have 10 breakpoints in
a file)”22 that are intended to make developers try out
certain development features.
Gamification models user behavior in a serious con-
text and associates with it the possibility to collect points,
badges or other rewards in order to increase the amount
of desirable behavior shown by users. It can be consid-
ered as an in vogue sub-field in the transition zones of
game and mechanism design theories.
3.5.4 Management and motivation
Management deals with the organization of work and get-
ting people to get it done. How this happens, of course,
also has an influence on the quality of work results. Man-
agement deals with the application of economic theories,
and provides the tools to make them work as desired.
3.5.4.1 Motivation
Nerdinger (2001) describes motivation as direction, in-
tensity and persistence of behavior. Direction denotes a
decision for a specific behavior. It explains why persons,
given alternate choices, choose the one they choose, and
why they reject the other ones. Intensity is the power put
into the respective decision, i.e. how strong the decision
is for one of the alternatives. Persistence describes the
will to overcome problems that are in the way of reach-
ing the goals previously set. Why is one person able to
stay on course even when facing serious problems, while
another one is easily distracted by the smallest issues?
22http://visualstudiogallery.msdn.microsoft.
com/bc7a433b-b594-48d4-bba2-a2f24774d02f, re-
trieved 2012-09-20
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Figure 3.14: Badges to make developers try out functions in VisualStudio
Definition 46 – Motivation
“Motivation encompasses all processes related to delib-
eration on incentives and expectancies for the purpose
of choosing between alternative goals and the implied
courses of action.” (Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, 1987)
VIE model Vroom (1964) in his Valence-Expectancy-
Instrumentality (VIE) theory sees motivation for a cer-
tain action as the sum of products of expectancies, in-
strumentalities and values:
Motivation =∑
(valence × instrumentality × expectancy)
where expectancy describes what one thinks with what
probability a certain event will directly result from one’s
behavior, that in turn causes an indirect event with prob-
ability instrumentality, which has some subjective value
or valence. The value can be positive (e.g. a reward) or
negative (e.g. punishment).
This research interprets the VIE model in a way that
valence does not have to be one single, objectively mea-
surable, monetary value. Valence can be a subjectively-
weighted combination of various values. For example,
it can be a sum of money, praise, recognition, and sev-
eral other feelings, where each component like money
may have a different subjective value depending on the
individual. A seemingly identical result of actions may
have a much different valence for a different individual.
Adding a little reward to the result of some actions may
increase the probability that desired behavior is shown
more often. For example, DiPalantino and Vojnovic
(2009) show that desired behaviors increase with grow-
ing rewards. However, the relationship is not linear.
Intrinsic and extrensic motivation Likewise, va-
lence can have immediate or indirect value, and based
on this, classical psychology discriminates two kinds of
motivation:
• intrinsic motivation that drives doing an activity
just for its inherent satisfaction, and
• extrinsic motivation that has some separable con-
sequence, which causes favorable or unfavorable
perceptions (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
There are different hypotheses about mutual influ-
ences of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Woodworth
(1918) postulated that extrinsic motivation can crowd
out intrinsic motivation, so that no motivation is left
when finally extrinsic rewards are taken away. Support
for the motivation crowding theory was found by Mell-
stro¨m and Johannesson (2008); Frey and Jegen (2000)
and others. However, Boal (1981) found in a meta-study
that intrinsic motivation is not necessarily crowded out.
Social effects Industrial and organizational psychol-
ogy deals with describing, analyzing, explaining, prog-
nosticating, and shaping human work. It researches re-
lations between working conditions and human behav-
ior and perception, as well the behavior of groups and
individuals in collaborative organizations. It is closely
related to Business Psychology that studies human be-
havior and reasons for its change in economic situations
(Brockhaus, 2005).
When dealing with groups of individuals, six social
effects affect group performance and motivation (Wegge,
2001):
• The social loafing effect reduces individual perfor-
mance in the absence individual performance as-
sessment. As opposed to other negative effects, it
is probably not a conscious process.
87
III—
S
TA
T
E
O
F
T
H
E
A
R
T
III — STATE OF THE ART
• The free rider effect reduces performance and oc-
curs when persons consciously decide to work less
because they think that others can counterbalance
their effort.
• The sucker effect reduces performance and is a re-
action to free riding when others refuse to counter-
balance the free riders’ deficit.
• The social facilitation effect increases performance
based on perceived rivalry.
• The Ko¨hler and social compensation effects im-
prove performance but are not relevant to this re-
search.
Heneman and Hippel (1995) note that effective team-
work can be developed through a combination of team-
based and individual merit pay only. If only team play
is rewarded, then there are places for social loafers and
free riders to hide. If only individuals are rewarded,
then individual selfishness will harm the team. What is
needed are according mental models and measurements
for both group and individual assessments.
3.5.4.2 Leading with psychology
Individual persons and entire teams display different
types of motivation. A theoretical basis of motivation
sources for software development can be taken from
psychology. According to Krumbach-Mollenhauer and
Lehment (2007) (cited after (Prause et al., 2010b)) peo-
ple become motivated
1. solely through the satisfaction of being completely
absorbed by the tasks they are currently working
on (self-fulfillment),
2. through the prospect of being able to influence deci-
sions and to design processes, but it can also mean
power over customers and colleagues (power to
shape),
3. if they can continuously increase their expertise
and broaden their experience. Such people want
to deeply look into things and to understand the
context (curiosity and learning),
4. if they can take pride in any kind of results they
achieve from their work such as products or con-
cepts and in their company as a whole (workers’
pride),
5. if they are accepted and liked by the team they work
in, are important in it, or if the social structures of
a team create a harmonious atmosphere, and if the
team copes well with difficulties (social relation-
ships),
6. if they experience appraisal for reaching a certain
goal as an individual or as a group. Appreciation
constitutes an affirmation of an achieved task (ap-
preciation),
7. if they perceive a secure working situation, feel con-
tinuity in their tasks and sense certain predictability
in their colleagues and managers (confidence), and
8. if their demand for winning, achieving status sym-
bols, or advancing job positions gets satisfied. This
aspect is mostly accompanied by receiving mone-
tary or non-cash/time-based benefits (tangible as-
sets and status).
3.5.4.3 Examples of rewards and incentives
Incentives and rewarding schemes are omnipresent in
today’s world to promote all different kinds of behav-
iors. Their impacts on motivation and work performance
have been studied in management and economics. The
PMBOK (2008) lists recognition of and rewards for
desirable behavior as a key process in team manage-
ment. Humphrey (1997) stresses its key role in achiev-
ing high performance. However, Deming (1994) argues
that badly chosen reward programs can leave people dis-
heartened and asking themselves why they supposedly
performed worse than others. Rewards cannot address
all motivators: Self-fulfillment and curiosity and learning
are strong intrinsic motivators but are impossible to ad-
dress with rewards. Similarly, confidence is an environ-
mental parameter set by the organization that is difficult
to influence. Workers pride is clearly associated with
the perceived quality of the software being developed;
merely awareness can be enough to activate this motive.
But it avoids individual contention that is essential for
the inclusion of non-performing team members. The
power to shape can be granted as a reward to employees
in the form of privileges. While social relationships take
place outside the reach of machines, the advent of social
networking platforms shows that enhancement and fa-
cilitation through information technology are possible.
Appreciation, though meant as a social interaction, can
profit from information technology based intelligence.
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Tangible assets and status are the typical motives ad-
dressed by rewards (Prause et al., 2010b).
Ahlgren et al. (2007) compare examples of individual
and group based incentives. The meritocracy principle
(found in some open source projects) can address power
to shape. Formalizations of meritocratic models such
as the stone society (Merel, 1999) prove feasibility for
enterprise environments. However, a meritocracy comes
into conflict with traditional organizational structures,
and bears a danger for the team spirit if privileges are
lived out in an offending way. In the World Wide Web
(WWW) or scientific world, quality control is performed
by the respective community, and well-performers are
rewarded with high reputation expressed through the h-
index (Hirsch, 2005) or PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998),
respectively. Prause et al. (2010b) present some more
examples like ranking, scoring and reputation systems
combined with donations and publications. An example
of a funny reward are ones like AT&T’s “Thief of the
Week award” (Poulin, 1995).
3.5.4.4 Dimensions in the incentives space
From a discussion of various rewarding schemes, Prause
et al. (2010b) derive an incentives space with several
dimensions. These dimensions, although mostly indi-
vidually variable, are not completely orthogonal or in-
dependent of each other. A prize cup, for instance, is
something that one can take away, but more than this it
is something to show-off. In the following, the identified
dimensions are shortly summarized.
The Anonymous vs. Personal (AvP) dimension deter-
mines if real names of participants are published, or if
people act under aliases or without names. Competitive
vs. Achievement (CvA) discriminates competitive re-
warding systems that lets individuals or groups compete
against each other against an achievement system that
evaluates absolute progress of the whole group. Durable
vs. Consumable (DvC) contrasts consumable rewards
that are used up or destroyed against durable ones that
endure over time and cannot be lost again. The differ-
ences in Guaranteed vs. Luck (GvL) are that if one is
performing well then the reward is either guaranteed or it
just increases the chance of winning it without a guaran-
tee. Depending on the Intermittent vs. Continuous (IvC)
dimension, rewards are given away either continuously
(for example an always up-to-date ranking table), or only
every now and then (e.g. if a certain period of time is
over). Individual vs. Group (IvG) lets participants either
act as lone fighters or act together with other individuals
in a group to also receive the reward together. Public
vs. Closed (PvC) concerns the dissemination of results
that are either published to everybody (including bosses
and other externals) or are kept confidential within mem-
bers of the group. Regarding Proclaimed vs. Discov-
erable (PvD), with proclaimed awards the participants
know in before hand what their reward will be, as op-
posed to a discoverable one where it must first be won
before it is revealed. The Punishment vs. Reward (PvR)
dimension specifies if either those that perform better
than the other ones are rewarded, or if those that perform
worse are punished. Show-off vs. Take-away (SvT) de-
scribes if the main purpose of the reward is to show-off
a status or achievement of its owner, or if it is some-
thing of material/personal value to take home (without
necessarily presenting it to others). Targeted vs. Open-
ended (TvO) classifies rewards according to whether for
a targeted reward a certain goal must be reached before
the reward is given, or an open-ended reward will grow
and grow the more is achieved. Tangibility is addressed
by Virtual vs. Real (VvR), which says whether the re-
ward is paid virtually or physically.
3.5.4.5 Hawthorne effect
The Hawthorne studies were a series of experiments
conducted in an electric manufacturing plant in Chicago
starting in 1924, and extending for about one decade.
They are renowned for investigating into possible rela-
tionships between illumination levels and worker pro-
duction rates. The surprising finding was that worker
output and job satisfaction increased irregardless of in-
creases or decreases in illumination levels. The first
four experiments manipulated production conditions to
record changes in performance and satisfaction. The
later two experiments did not consciously manipulate
conditions but rather changed them only through the
presence of experimenters and their associates (Franke
and Kaul, 1978).
The changes in production rates were first attributed
to unmeasured changes in human relations. Later works,
however, found that other factors like discharge of in-
subordinate workers, fatigue reduction, exercise of disci-
pline or economic incentives could be held responsible.
In particular, the Hawthorne effect is associated with
changing worker productivity simply by giving them
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attention, and changing something in their work environ-
ments (Franke and Kaul, 1978). The effect is a potential
threat to the validity of productivity studies and experi-
ments.
3.5.5 Summary
A central component in software development are the hu-
man developers. Consequently, collaboration, organiza-
tion and motivation are important for successful projects.
This section presented theoretical foundations and re-
lated work with regards to the human factors in software
development.
Collaboration becomes possible through coordination
between individuals. Technically, coordination requires
communication that is supported through CSCW tools
and documentation. But collaboration also depends on
the willingness of individuals to cooperate, which is in-
fluenced by reputation as a means of groups of agents to
discipline each other. The principal-agent problem is a
situation in which the individuals’ goals are not aligned
with the goals of the organization it belongs to. An im-
portant finding was that coordination and collaboration
do not depend on the perfection of internal quality but
would benefit most from a moderate increment.
So, collaboration also builds on organizations. The
most adaptive and agile forms of organizations are self-
organizing, where a large degree of responsibility is
assumed by the individual. To align such individuals
with the organization, mechanism design can be used.
It also allows to reduce negative effects of externalities,
and to motivate developers with gamification.
There are several theories regarding motivation, which
is an indication of the complexity of the topic. The
balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and
the social effects of groups on an individual’s motivation
further add complexity. Motivation is a major concern
of management, which can address different sources of
motivation. A typical method is also to use rewards,
the choice of which spans a high dimensional space.
Finally, just observing work practices can already lead to
improved performance, which is a threat to the validity
of scientific studies.
3.6 Comparable Works
The invention and explication of the concept of technical
“reputation systems”, has given rise to this emerging kind
of software tools. Their rise was mostly promoted by
the need for discipline in the Web 2.0 with its millions
of anonymous users. Opportunities grew in the open
source and open contribution communities facilitated by
the Internet. In parallel, the possibilities for measuring
user behavior through hardware, technology and algo-
rithms are ever-increasing. Also motivation and patterns
for harnessing motivation-addressing tools have made
much progress. Today reputation systems not only target
open source and Web 2.0 domains but have begun their
conquest of closed corporate habitats.
The tools and techniques presented below have facets
similar to the work presented here. However, none of
them combines them into one encompassing concept
from quality assessment, measurement, and responsibil-
ity identification, over reputation systems, to rewarding
schemes in order to change motivation in favor of inter-
nal quality.
3.6.1 In ubiquitous computing
Yamabe et al. (2009) develop the idea of integrating
electronic payment systems with pervasive computing
to alter consumer behavior in every-day situations. In-
centives in form of micro-payments are given to or col-
lected from users to promote environmentally sustain-
able or commercially wanted behavior. For example,
when occupying air-conditioned space while also non
air-conditioned alternatives are available, then additional
micro-payments are demanded. The price of these pay-
ments, however, is low in comparison to the price of the
actual service. In their evaluation they compare some of
the effectiveness of their four incentive models. Their
reasoning is similar to this research, but in a different do-
main (ubiquitous computing instead of distributed soft-
ware development) and with different objectives (envi-
ronmental sustainability instead of quality improvement).
They show that a small nudge in form of a reward with
negligible cost can change human behavior.
Similarly, Jahn et al. (2010) provide users with feed-
back on their energy performance. Feedback alone can
be enough to lead to a change in behavior. Consequently,
presenting to developers how they are affecting the inter-
nal quality of source code, could have a similar effect.
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3.6.2 In online collaboration
Coderwall is a social network for “tech’s most talented
makers to connect, share, build, and be inspired.”23 By
contributing to open source projects or by publishing
on the internet, developers can unlock badges and earn
reputation from their peers.
Lampe and Johnston (2005) researched the mecha-
nisms of the Slashdot24 virtual community. Members of
the community post messages that are reviewed by other
members of the community. By contributing much to the
community with posts and reviews, members earn more
rights and influence when reviewing the posts of other
members. The mechanism that grants such members
more power is based on a reputation system.
Adler et al. (2008) present the WikiTrust system,
which estimates the trustworthiness of text passages in
articles of the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. Their
tool is a web-based add-on that highlights words of an
article in different colors based on their trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness is defined by them as the expected
lifetime of words in an evolving article. The assumption
is that correct statements will remain unchanged for a
longer time. By being the author of long-lived words,
authors earn high karma scores. A certain word’s
trustworthiness estimation is then based on its author’s
reputation. However, their tool is not a classical reputa-
tion system as the authors’ scores are not disclosed.
DiPalantino and Vojnovic (2009) simulate developer
behavior on community web sites. They find that in-
creasing rewards leads to increased contributions of the
desired kinds by the community.
Hoisl (2007) and Hoisl et al. (2007) use social rewards
and a reputation system to motivate members of a re-
search institute to contribute to the department’s wiki.
Their work has some similarities to what is presented
here but it only uses light-weight analysis of the articles,
is more restricted in the scope, does not aim at software
development, and has a simpler reputation model.
3.6.3 In software development
TopCoder25 is an Internet platform that organizes pro-
gramming competitions to solve problems sponsored by
23http://coderwall.com/
24http://slashdot.org/
25http://www.topcoder.com/
third parties. Statistics including overall ratings of devel-
opers are created. The winner of a competition can earn
prizes like money and recognition, whereas TopCoder
retains the license rights to the developed software.
Bacon et al. (2009) propose a software development
marketplace where users of a software can anonymously
offer amounts of money for the implementation of a
feature or fixing of a bug in a free software. Developers
will see the total amount of money bid for a change, and
can choose to accept the offer. So when enough money
is offered, the change will be implemented. This process
drives the software towards an equilibrium between the
changes most wanted by the community and what is
implemented first.
Loveland (2009) use static analysis (and Checkstyle,
in particular) to “provide a quick, automated, objective,
assessment of code quality” in student assignments. Sim-
ilarly, Edwards (2003) relies on it for automatic grading.
Smith (2005) has combined static analysis with manual
reviews to assess the quality of source code created by
students in programming assignments. Reports are gen-
erated as a basis for grades. Their tools are designed for
educational environments, where the individuals’ con-
tributions are clear. They do not deal with collaborative
software development, other kinds of software process
artifacts than source code, or consider rewarding mecha-
nisms for environments outside the educational area.
Singer and Schneider (2012a) want to use gamifica-
tion methods to make developers adopt good program-
ming practices. In Singer and Schneider (2012b), for
example, they motivate student developers to commit
source code to the revision repository more often by
awarding points for a commit. The overview of awarded
points is emailed to the developers. The focus of their
work is more on the motivation end, and puts less empha-
sis on the responsibility relationship between developers
and their artifacts.
3.6.4 Summary of comparable work
Reputation systems have found their way into many do-
mains, and are used there to “optimize” user behavior.
These works show that small rewards can already influ-
ence user behavior into the desired direction. Of particu-
lar interest for this research are certainly works that deal
with supporting the collaboration of individuals in wikis
like Hoisl et al. (2007) by rewarding contributions to a
knowledge exchange platform.
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Reputation systems have also been successfully ap-
plied to the software development. Particularly relevant
seems to be the works of Singer and colleagues, who
also use gamification to adjust developer behavior.
None of these works, however, defines responsibility
at the granularity level of strings in collaboratively writ-
ten texts. Only the WikiTrust system computes karma
scores from text on the individual contributor level. But
instead of publishing such scores in order to change be-
havior, they use it to highlight the quality (here trustwor-
thiness) of texts and passages for the readers of these
texts.
3.7 Summary
Software engineering has emerged as a term to draw
attention away from the crafting and arts perspectives of
software development towards the virtues of engineering.
These are the use of appropriate tools, the careful docu-
mentation of decisions and achievements, and following
a chosen development methodology.
The goal of software engineering is to obtain higher
quality software. Software quality management specif-
ically deals with this goal by modeling quality, and by
adhering to managements standards. But the typical in-
dustrial standards like ISO 9000 or Six Sigma are less
applicable to software development. Consequently, other
standards were created, first and foremost the CMMI.
While better suited to software development, manage-
ment standards are still confronted with the accusation
of not being wholly compatible with agile development.
They are still considered as too heavy-weight; although
their advantages for documentation (which has its place
in agile development, too) are accepted.
Testing is part of software quality management and,
in particular, quality control. Software can be tested in
various ways, including manual vs. automatic, and static
vs. dynamic methods. Software testing and measure-
ment can also serve to quantify quality. Moreover, test-
ing has some limited capabilities to measure the internal
quality of software.
Mining software repositories deals with another per-
spective on the software under development. It allows
to obtain information about what developers are knowl-
edgeable about what parts of the software, and give a no-
tion of responsibility. Clone detection and information
retrieval are techniques that assist in excavating such
information from repositories.
As software is a highly collaborative process with
humans in the center, also aspects of collaboration, orga-
nization and motivation are relevant. As far as internal
quality is concerned, it is important to note that not per-
fection as mandated by software quality management
standards is the goal, but just “good enough” quality.
Finally, related concepts and approaches from other
domains and in the domain of software development
were discussed. These approaches are only made possi-
ble through recent advances in various supporting tech-
nologies.
Software engineering is an attempt to make software
development more rigorous through formalizations. But
those formalization, especially those from other indus-
trial production environments, tend to be too heavy-
weight for the fluent and knowledge-intensive product
software. Instead, it may be possible to combine tech-
nologies and understanding offered by the advances in
testing, mining software repositories and management
into re-designing game mechanics. It allows to create
tool support for a new technique that grabs human devel-
opers by their motivation to increase the internal quality
of software. This may be sufficient to lead to “good
enough” internal quality.
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Chapter 4
Thesis Statement
A system must be managed. It will not manage itself. Left to them-
selves in the Western world, components become selfish, competitive,
independent profit centres, and thus destroy the system. The secret is
cooperation between components toward the aim of the organization.
We can not afford the destructive effect of competition.
— W. Edwards Deming
SELF-ORGANIZATION is the predominant form of or-ganization in agile projects, and a compromise be-tween high agreement and certainty, and plain un-
organized chaos. The problem is, however, that without
proper protection, the projects’ common properties (soft-
ware process artifacts like source code) will fall victim
to the carelessness and selfish goals of individuals. The
reason is free riding on information exchange. It leads to
the tragedy of software process commons. Developers
invest too few effort into internal quality because costs
are immediate while the rewards are too far into the fu-
ture and distributed among the whole team.
Traditionally, strict rules and heavy processes protect
common properties. But they are naturally incompatible
with self-organization. For example, in an agile project
extensive planning may be not practical. Additionally,
the problem is more severe in distributed, consortium
or research projects where people, processes and tech-
nology are inferior to premium standards. Consequently,
appreciation of quality and forces protecting the com-
mon property must come from somewhere else. A way
to protect common property through other means than
bureaucratic rules and their strict enforcement is needed.
The solution is to give a sense of value to the under-
or unvalued common property. When developers have
immediate value from software process artifacts, they
will start to protect them with reasonable effort. A co-
ercive force from outsiders (like management or quality
managers) monitoring rules and their abidance is then
no longer necessary.
One strategy is to give developers a long-term and sus-
tainable interest in the software process artifacts them-
selves; a developer who knows that he will work with
the source code he wrote forever, will have a different
attitude towards internal quality than a consultant, who
just wants to get the job done in a few weeks and then
moves on to a different company. But this approach is
often impractical due to organizational structures and
business plans; and it may still not be enough as rewards
are too far into the future and too ineffective. Young
developers might furthermore lack the experience to rec-
ognize the long-term importance of documentation.
This is where gamification based on reputation comes
into play. Reputation can make explicit how good some-
one treats the project’s common property. Depending
on how much benefit a good reputation — or how disad-
vantageous a bad reputation, respectively — is, the more
will developers do for their reputation, and the more they
will care for the common property.
I claim that gamification through computer tools that
compute reputation scores, and an according reward-
ing system, can motivate developers to take more care
for software process artifacts themselves, resulting
in better internal documentation and quality of the
whole software product.
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The proposed tool support has three effects:
• First, it automatically assigns responsibility for
quality in collaboratively created work. This pre-
vents diffusion of responsibility.
• Second, communication about software process ar-
tifact quality is facilitated in form of non-obligating
feedback by peers and quality assessment tools.
This enables learning and, together with the first
point, creates a notion of peer pressure as nobody
wants to disgrace himself.
• Third, rewards can be given for good quality. This
compensates for the personal costs implied by in-
vesting in improving quality, and thereby reduces
marginal costs of poor quality that the whole team
would have to bear.
To obtain responsibility information, computer tools
observe how developers interact with the project’s com-
mon properties like source code in a revision control
repository, or general documentation in a wiki. Inter-
acting with software process artifacts means assuming
responsibility for their quality. Consequently, revision
repositories of artifacts can be mined for responsibility
information. It is important to note that the tool support
focuses more on the relevance for quality, than on the
quantity of contributions.
A new communication channel dedicated to the ex-
change of opinions about software process artifact qual-
ity is established. The channel is geared not only toward
the communication between humans, but also between
machine and man. Tools like software metrics that con-
stantly monitor artifacts send information through the
channel as well as the developers’ peers who just capture
their impressions when working with an artifact. This
builds up a database with a detailed artifact quality land-
scape. Developers receive the feedback that is a precon-
dition for learning, and feel that someone or something
is watching their actions. However, they are not forced
to comply. They can still chose to ignore the feedback
and work their way.
Responsibility and quality data can be combined to
earn developers a karma score. Typically, someone who
is mainly associated with high quality software pro-
cess artifacts will have a higher karma score than some-
one who is mainly associated with low quality artifacts.
Karma scores additionally motivate well-mannered be-
havior through suitable rewarding mechanisms. This
fosters the sustainability of common property.
At the same time, this kind of quality assurance does
not restrict the necessary freedom through strict guide-
lines. Instead, developers are engaged in a market game
where they optimize their behavior for maximum effi-
ciency between the poles of pro-social caring for the
common property and short-term effort constraints due
to their other pressing tasks. Developers can borrow
technical debt when they deem it necessary.
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Chapter 5
Design Process and CollabReview Concept
The first 90% of the code accounts for the first 90% of the development
time. The remaining 10% of the code accounts for the other 90% of
the development time.
— Tom Cargill
THIS chapter describes the concretion of the researchquestion presented in the previous chapter. It de-tails the iterative design process that embossed the
final conceptual model, and sets the frame of the re-
search goals as characterized through requirements. The
result is the CollabReview concept.
Definition 47 – CollabReview concept
The CollabReview concept is the conceptual framework
that tackles the research question of this thesis.
The CollabReview concept is later implemented in
the CollabReview prototype.
Definition 48 – CollabReview prototype
The CollabReview prototype implements support for the
conceptual framework described by the CollabReview
concept in software.
So CollabReview concept describes the theoretical
framework, while CollabReview prototype means the
prototype which implements the concept in a software
system. In some cases throughout this work, a distinction
between concept and prototype is not necessary. For
example, an experiment tests the theoretical concept
through deployment of the prototype. In these situations,
the term CollabReview is used without the concept or
prototype epithet.
The process how CollabReview was developed is de-
scribed in Section 5.1. After introducing iterative de-
sign, it delves into the list of key requirements that are
demanded of both the CollabReview concept and the
prototype. But not all of the requirements were clearly
defined from the beginning of the research. Instead, they
developed iteratively while the concept matured. This
maturation process as designated by several milestones
as sources of requirements is presented, too.
Section 5.2 presents how the evolution of software
process artifacts in a software project is modeled. The
model is a necessary foundation for computing reputa-
tion scores as it provides the mathematical parameters. It
builds on the state of the art that was presented in Chap-
ter 3. Construction of the model requires to reconstruct
software development processes from snapshots of the
project’s revision repository. The reconstruction uses an
algorithm that tracks the authorship of collaboratively
written artifacts (see Section 5.3).
The computed reputation scores are finally fed into
rewarding schemes. But rewarding schemes have to
be adapted to the respective software project situations.
Schemes and possible adaptations are discussed in Sec-
tion 5.4.
5.1 The Research Process
CollabReview was developed following an iterative de-
sign process. The primary goal of reducing software
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development costs resulting from internal quality fail-
ures drove the research. Yet the concrete set of require-
ments evolved through various iterations. Section 5.1.1
introduces the overall design process, how it led to re-
quirements, and how outcomes and requirements were
repeatedly refined through feedback and lessons learned.
Section 5.1.2 enumerates the final list of requirements.
They are the result of the design process and are linked
to the iterations detailed in Section 5.1.3. The thesis
process is summarized in Section 5.1.4.
5.1.1 The iterative process of this research
The research was organized as an iterative process result-
ing in and improving on the CollabReview concept and
prototype. Iterative design involves humans from early
on and in different stages of development. It so reduces
the costs and risks of user rejection. A test with users
can result in amendments to the requirements (Mantei
and Teorey, 1988; Nielsen, 1993):
Definition 49 – Iterative design
Iterative design is a software development methodology
with steady design refinements being made based on
user testing and other evaluation methods.
An iteration starts out with a prototype that is then
tested under close to reality conditions, e.g. with real
users. However, the exact kind of appropriate testing
depends on the fidelity of the prototype, which may be
anything from paper drafts to functional artifacts. Expe-
riences from the tests are then analyzed to refine the de-
sign of the prototype. Each new iteration of development
builds on experiences from previous iterations, so that
functionality and quality of the design are successively
increased and improved. The whole design process is a
continuous research process that informs the evolution
of the project outcome.
The advantage of iterative design is that an unpre-
dictable reality is regarded from early on in the project.
Especially if humans are involved, even well-thought-
out ideas may turn out to be inadequate, making drastic
changes in the project direction necessary. Fundamental
problems will therefore be detected cheaply, and mis-
leading paths can be discarded without the excessive cost
of having been down the wrong road too far (Mantei and
Teorey, 1988).
The research followed an iterative development
process running through several iterations (see Section
5.1.3). Each iteration involved some kind of prototype or
experimental setting to better understand the researched
problem and its environment. After each trial, an
analysis of the experimental results was conducted. This
analysis generated lessons learned to strengthen the
understanding of the problem and to guide development
of a viable solution. In some cases, when the value
of a lesson learned was considered significant for
the research success, the lesson would additionally
be transformed into a high-level requirement. These
requirements were stored in a requirements database
(see Section 5.1.2).
Requirements keep the development process focused
on desired outcomes. Without requirements, project
work is prone to losing track due to obstacles and over-
concentrating on partial aspects. As opposed to this,
requirements enable assessing the success of interme-
diate and final results obtained during the development
process. They allow to measure the progress and to ul-
timately validate the final project outcomes against the
original goals.
In a research project, requirements are often less
rigidly formulated than, for instance, in a commercial
software development project. This necessary degree
of freedom allows research projects to better adapt to
and exploit new insights that arise from research. Still,
requirements keep the focus on goals so that project cir-
cumstances and events do not lead the research project
astray.
5.1.2 List of requirements
Several conceptual and technical requirements are de-
manded from CollabReview. The highest-level and most
important ones are listed here in the order in which they
first appeared or were distilled during the iterations of
the research. Table 5.1 summarizes the requirements.
5.1.2.1 Requirement-1: “Improve internal soft-
ware quality”
Summary: The goal of the CollabReview concept is to
reduce the costs resulting from internal quality problems
in software. Internal quality problems result in source
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# Design requirements of CollabReview
1 Improve internal software quality
2 Appeal to individuals’ motivation
3 Flexible applicability
4 No hazard to the team
5 Robustness and resistance against attacks
6 Involve contributors without dependence
7 Validity of computations
8 Few overhead for users
9 Easily understandable
Table 5.1: Summary of requirements
code that is costly to maintain. Since reducing the cost
of internal failures with software tools is sometimes not
effective, mitigation should instead begin earlier by fo-
cusing on improving internal quality so as to avoid inter-
nal quality problems. The purpose of the CollabReview
concept is therefore to improve the internal quality of
software. The prime requirement for CollabReview is
that its use should lead to an increased quality and quan-
tity of documentation created by developers.
Criterion: There is an increase in the quantity and
quality of documentation created by the development
team.
Origin: Re-attribution from usability problems to de-
veloper personality (Section 5.1.3.1)
5.1.2.2 Requirement-2: “Appeal to individuals’
motivation”
Summary: The goal of the research is to address the
individuals’ motivation to care more for the internal qual-
ity of software. That means, that the concept and proto-
type should not enforce compliance by strict regulation.
For instance, a check-in script could inhibit checking in
of bad source code, but it would take flexibility away
from developers. Instead, developers should still be al-
lowed to do so but should be given a motivation to not
do it. The CollabReview concept should give developers
a nudge in the right direction.
Criterion: Developers show more of the desired be-
havior although they are not forced to comply, i.e. they
still have a choice.
Origin: Re-attribution from usability problems to de-
veloper personality (Section 5.1.3.1)
5.1.2.3 Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”
Summary: The concept and prototype should be flexi-
bly applicable to various different software development
environments, and social contexts in particular. Soft-
ware projects vary in applied methodology, distribution
of development, team sizes, code ownership models,
hierarchy, or necessary external quality. Research, for
example, where prototypes need to stay modifiable, dif-
fers from rocket science, where prototypes need to be
error-free. The CollabReview concept and prototype
therefore need to support different definitions of respon-
sibility and quality, types of software process artifacts,
and rewarding systems.
CollabReview should be capable of handling data
from small- and medium-sized projects with up to a few
dozen developers, a few thousand revisions, and a code
base of a few ten thousand lines of source code. While
the concept should theoretically scale well to all sizes of
projects, the prototype is to be tested in projects of up to
medium size; and needs to handle the data that emerges
from these projects. Harmonization of processes from
different organizations is difficult, especially when only
done for the short duration of a project. In a consortium,
fixed quality standards for all would be impossible to
establish because of the partners’ different processes.
The concept should be flexible enough to accept different
standards.
Depending on the environments, different ways of
assessing quality are suited best. CollabReview should
incorporate cheap and objective automatic tool-based
assessment as well as valuable and subjective human
feedback, and hybrid assessments of both methods.
Criterion: The prototype is flexible with regard to the
determination of responsibility, the assessment of qual-
ity of artifacts and the assessment method, the kind of
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artifacts and their revision repository, size of the project,
distribution of development, and the rewarding mecha-
nism.
Origin: The initial concept and first reviews (Section
5.1.3.2)
5.1.2.4 Requirement-4: “No hazard to the team”
Summary: The concept and prototype should not pose
a hazard to the development team. CollabReview has a
strong social component addressing factors such as so-
cial loafing, free riding, or reputation, and may include
some form of competition, which must be a friendly and
sportive. It can potentially have negative social effects
that damage team work and thereby endanger project
goals. It could create rat races in which developers reck-
lessly pursue the objectives promoted by CollabReview
without considering other important objectives in their
work, harm the team spirit by inciting team members
against each other, or the CollabReview prototype might
be demotivating because it is perceived as being arbitrary
or unfair.
Criterion: There are no or only weak manifestations
of hazards to the team.
Origin: Showing feasibility of the prototype (Section
5.1.3.3)
5.1.2.5 Requirement-5: “Robustness and resis-
tance against attacks”
Summary: The CollabReview prototype should robustly
compute its reputation scores and have a certain robust-
ness against attacks from malevolent users and contrib-
utors. While it is not feasible to make a prototype in-
vulnerable to attacks, it will need to have some basic
defense mechanisms.
Criterion: The prototype and its reputation system
should be robust and resistant against attacks.
Origin: Research into responsibility and robust au-
thorship (Section 5.1.3.4)
5.1.2.6 Requirement-6: “Involve contributors
without dependence”
Summary: The CollabReview concept and prototype
should not be dependent on broad user support right from
the start. For example, some developers might initially
reject CollabReview out of laziness. In some project
environments without a distinct hierarchy, it may be im-
possible to force developers to actively use a new tool.
Even if forcing developers were possible, then whole-
hearted cooperation could not be expected (cf. Section
2.4.2). Instead, CollabReview needs a bootstrapping
mechanism to get started even without initial active user
contributions. Additionally, especially users who con-
tribute less to quality, will want to avoid CollabReview.
Therefore it should be inevitable for all contributors of a
project.
Criterion: The prototype does not require broad user
support from the start, and individual contributors cannot
shun its effect.
Origin: Deeper analysis of the ecosystem (Section
5.1.3.5)
5.1.2.7 Requirement-7: “Validity of computa-
tions”
Summary: The CollabReview prototype computes
karma scores from responsibility and quality informa-
tion. Karma scores and the underlying information
should be valid to enable acceptance by users, and to
correctly guide users to the desired behaviors. There
should be a metric that suits the purpose of identifying
responsibility for collaboratively written text. It has to
be valid (scores derived through metrics correlate with
reputation in reality) and consistent (computations in-
volving responsibility show consistent results). Such
metric should be implemented and used in the CollabRe-
view prototype.
Criterion: Responsibility and quality information, and
the resulting karma scores are valid.
Origin: Exploration of rewarding schemes (Section
5.1.3.6)
5.1.2.8 Requirement-8: “Few overhead for users”
Summary: CollabReview should cause only a low over-
head in work effort for contributors. While contribu-
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tors should invest more effort into internal quality, there
should be only few added effort directly related to inter-
action with the CollabReview prototype. For example,
users should not spend much time with submitting or
reading reviews, but they should invest more time in
writing clean source code. In order to obtain necessary
information from developers, it has to be easy for them
to enter it into the system. If the additional effort for
using the CollabReview prototype consumes too much
time, developers will not use it. But the CollabReview
prototype should also be capable of incorporating review
information that is generated automatically. For exam-
ple, CollabReview should take review information from
metrics or static analysis.
Criterion: Only low direct overhead is caused to users.
Origin: Moknowpedia experiment (Section 5.1.3.7)
5.1.2.9 Requirement-9: “Easily understandable”
Summary: The prototype should
1. be easily understandable for its users, and
2. help them to improve their scores.
Firstly, that means the prototype should have a flat learn-
ing curve that makes it easy for users to understand what
is going on. But secondly, it should provide feedback
to contributors that helps them to improve their quality.
While working with source code and other documenta-
tion, developers form an opinion about it in the minds,
e.g. if it is good or bad. This opinion can be stored and
utilized to later identify spots for improvement. Develop-
ers should receive feedback about the quantity and qual-
ity of their documentation and how they can improve on
it.
Criterion: Users understand the prototype and how to
improve the quality of artifacts.
Origin: AgileLab field experiment (Section 5.1.3.8)
5.1.3 Details of the research iterations
This section details the milestones that the research
reached while it went through its several iterations. Fig-
ure 5.1 displays the milestones in chronological order
drawn on a curved line spiraling outwards. It is vaguely
inspired by the spiral model of software development
by Boehm (1986). The four directions indicate what
kind of milestone was reached: better understanding
of the problem and its domain (problem analysis), ba-
sic research and concepts to help solving the problem
(concept research), an implementation or prototype to
show technical feasibility (technical prototype), or an
experiment where users where confronted with concepts
and prototypes (experiment). The following subsections
(as numbered in the graph) briefly report the research
history and progress. Each subsection corresponds to
one of the milestones.
5.1.3.1 Re-attribution from usability problems to
developer personality
The initial source of requirements were personal ob-
servations of developers working on different software
projects like Bora. How they followed their work
practices revealed a desperate need for and lack of
implementation-related information (see Section 2.3.6).
A first step was therefore to build the prototypical
Dendro˘c system. Dendro˘c would collect bits and pieces
of accessible written documentation from several media
like Javadoc, emails and text files scattered through-out
the projects sources (see Figure 5.2). Using information
retrieval techniques, all this information would be com-
bined into a hypertext document that would be easily
accessible through the developer’s browser (Prause,
2006).
While the reception of Dendro˘c among its users was
positive, the amount of information that could be made
available in this way was not sufficient. There were
too few texts that could serve as documentation. Tools
can make documentation less costly to write or con-
sume but they cannot generate information which is not
there (Raskin, 2005). To improve the internal quality,
more and better documentation is needed (Requirement-
1: “Improve internal software quality”).
Processes have limited suitability in environments
with low certainty and agreement (see Section 3.5.3.1).
Instead, the factor human has to be addressed directly.
Here, a lack of motivation to write documentation was
identified as root cause. A requirement is therefore that
the concept should address the motivation of develop-
ers to write documentation (Requirement-2: “Appeal to
individuals’ motivation”).
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Problem analysis Concept research
Technical prototypeExperiment
5.1.3.1 Re-attribution
5.1.3.2 Concept
5.1.3.3 Feasibility
5.1.3.4 Authorship
5.1.3.5 Ecosystem
5.1.3.6 Rewarding
5.1.3.7 Moknowpedia
5.1.3.8 AgileLab1
5.1.3.9 TornBond2
5.1.3.10 ReputationForge5.1.3.11 MicroEditCastigator
5.1.3.12 ScrumLab3
Figure 5.1: Iteration milestones in the spiral of conducted research
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Figure 5.2: The Dendro˘c system for constructing inter-
connected documentation from scattered pieces of text
(Prause et al., 2007a)
Another observation was that developers were miss-
ing a communication feature. When they were sitting in
front of their IDEs, they would complain about barely
understandable source code, cursing its author. This sit-
uation is also expressed by Figure 5.3. Source code is a
kind of documentation and has therefore been defined as
a broadcast medium, i.e. it is a one-way communication
channel without a backwards way (see Definition 11 –
“Documentation”). However, feedback would allow to
improve texts to make them understandable to a wider
audience, allows the authors to learn how to write better
documentation, receive praise for good documentation,
and generally lets complaints be heard by those respon-
sible. Adding a way to communicate back was hence de-
rived as the second requirement (Requirement-9: “Easily
understandable”).
5.1.3.2 The initial concept and first reviews
From the initial set of requirements, the basic concept
was drafted. Figure 5.4 depicts three developers working
on three different files of source code. While develop-
ing source code, the developers automatically form an
opinion about it. In this situation, a software tool gives
them the opportunity to write down their feelings and
impressions, and attach them to the respective file of
source code. Such tool would then look up the develop-
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Figure 5.3: Developers are notorious for having a strong
opinion about source code, and trying to communicate it
(Widder, 2012)
ers’ responsibilities for files of source code, and com-
pute a ranking table which ordered developers according
to their quality reputation. Hence, developers are held
responsible for their source code in a statistical, overall
view. When this table is published, all developers can
see who contributed how well to the project’s code base,
which should trigger a beneficial competition for quality,
and through the feedback help developers to learn to
write better code (Prause and Eisenhauer, 2008).
This first concept was presented to experts with dif-
ferent backgrounds to gather qualitative feedback. The
goal was to identify strengths and weaknesses. The con-
cept was valued as being a fundamentally promising
idea that is worthwhile further investigations. Yet the
concept review also revealed some potential problems
and weaknesses. The results are discussed in more detail
in Section 7.5. But drafting of the concept and its expert
reviews led to the following further requirements:
In environments with weak code ownership, reviews
happen inherently while developers are familiarizing
with source code, and incur only few additional efforts
for reporting impressions (Requirement-9: “Easily un-
derstandable”). In order to reduce the need for review-
ers, and reach some independence and objectivity, Col-
labReview should support automatic reviews based on
metrics (Requirement-8: “Few overhead for users”). De-
termining responsibility is not trivial in a collaborative
environment, and how actual responsibility is defined is
dependent on the project context. A suitable responsi-
bility metric has to be defined (Requirement-7: “Valid-
ity of computations”), and responsibility metrics should
be exchangeable in the implementation (Requirement-
3: “Flexible applicability”). Furthermore, a tool that
triggers competition within a team might be a danger to
the team. Another requirement is that the implemented
concept does not harm the project by endangering team
spirit (Requirement-4: “No hazard to the team”).
5.1.3.3 Showing feasibility of the prototype
In the next iteration, the first CollabReview prototype
was built. The primary purpose was to test the techni-
cal feasibility of the required functionality. The basic
architecture was designed, and an implementation with
a reduced set of functions was created. Additionally, the
secondary purpose of the prototype was also to serve as
a higher fidelity version for another assessment round
by experts. This time, examples of the computational
process, screenshots and an architecture specification
were available to experts. Results of the second review
round can be found in Section 7.5.
Figure 5.5 shows the prototype’s original architecture
and basic relations between the different parts of the
software in the context of a project: developers check-in
source code into a revision control system, which is ana-
lyzed by the prototype. Reviews come from developers
in the role of reviewers, and from arbiters which mea-
sure aspects of the source code (Prause and Apelt, 2008).
The figure is provided as a reference for the original
architecture that was presented to the experts. Refer to
Chapter 6 for a description of the final CollabReview
prototype.
Based on the first prototype, reviewers noted that a
rat race might occur: in a rat race, developers would
recklessly chase top ratings in the quality ranking. They
would thereby get exhausted, or neglect other project
duties. Rat races should not occur (Requirement-4: “No
hazard to the team”). Reviewers also pointed out that
the responsibility metrics would need to be robust as
developers might try to attack the reputation system
through them (Requirement-5: “Robustness and resis-
tance against attacks”).
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Quality 
Reputation 
… of each piece of code they work with. 
… and intuitively form an opinion ... 
In modern software development, weak code ownership models are sometimes used. 
This can be a problem for code quality, because everybody’s property is nobody’s 
property. 
But, when working with foreign code, developers build up knowledge about it… 
A novel tool records and collects the developers’ tacit reviews… 
… and computes average document quality scores. 
Looking up the individual developer’s influence for each document  
in the version history yields personal responsibility scores. 
Personal quality scores are derived… 
… and used for a quality reputation ranking. 
Additional efforts are small, but cowboy coding is effectively inhibited, because every 
developer is held statistically responsible for his code. This triggers a beneficial quality 
competition and trains a common coding style. 
Figure 5.4: Poster of the original concept
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Figure 5.5: Internal and user communication in the first
CollabReview prototype (Prause and Apelt, 2008)
The first prototype proved the technical viability of
the concept. It supported that development based on
the initial architecture should be continued. However,
tests with software process artifact corpora from larger
projects revealed scalability problems. The amount of
data that has to be processed by CollabReview, made it
slow (importing an existing project could take several
days) and required gigabytes of database space. The next
prototype should be able to handle the data of typical
medium-sized projects with a few dozens of developers,
thousands of revisions and several ten-thousands of lines
of code (Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”).
5.1.3.4 Research into responsibility and robust au-
thorship
The goal of the next iteration was to elaborate the def-
inition of responsibility, to develop a robust algorithm
for obtaining corresponding responsibility information
(Requirement-5: “Robustness and resistance against at-
tacks”), and to try the prototype with larger sets of data.
Section 5.2.3 goes into the details of several alternatives
for defining responsibility. The choice was made to de-
fine responsibility by means of authorship, i.e. those
who added or changed the source code. It included clone
and copy detection to improve robustness of the algo-
rithm. The algorithm is described in Section 5.3. It was
tested to work with larger sets of data.
5.1.3.5 Deeper analysis of the ecosystem
The next iteration investigated into target ecosystems of
CollabReview, and into EU projects specifically. An em-
pirical study showed that the implementation of project-
wide processes reveals potential for improvement (see
Section 2.3.5). This is in congruence with experiences
from the Karakos case study (see Section 2.3.4). A tool
that is to improve this situation has to cope with open
and hidden rejection. It needs to be inevitable for the
developers and not require broad support right from the
start (Requirement-6: “Involve contributors without de-
pendence”).
5.1.3.6 Exploration of rewarding schemes
The studies also showed that rewards other than a
simple ranking list are needed depending on the social
and hierarchical situation in the target environment
(Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”). Work during
this iteration focused on ways how to harness computed
reputation scores to influence developer behavior.
Motivational themes of psychological leadership were
analyzed (see Section 3.5.4.2), a classification schema
for rewards (called incentives space, see Section 3.5.4.4)
was created, and a small study with potential users inves-
tigated into effective rewards (see Section 5.4). Validity
of the computation of karma scores was identified as
important factor of fairness (Requirement-7: “Validity
of computations”).
5.1.3.7 Moknowpedia experiment
This iteration concentrated on bringing CollabReview
into first contact with real users. At the same time, ap-
plicability of the concept to other documentation than
source code was investigated, e.g. wiki articles. Ex-
pert feedback from a scientific workshop (see Section
7.5) attested potential to applying the concept to collab-
oratively written articles like wikis. The CollabReview
prototype should therefore support more than one kind
of documentation (Requirement-3: “Flexible applicabil-
ity”). Subsequently, the CollabReview prototype was
modified to support wiki articles as well as source code.
It was successfully trialed in a real work context (see
Section 7.6). The experiment also showed that reviewing
is a valuable but costly contribution and that the over-
head for making such contributions has to be minimal
(Requirement-8: “Few overhead for users”.)
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5.1.3.8 AgileLab field experiment
The first field trial with wikis was followed by a field
trial in the domain of source code in the AgileLab4. An
agile development team following XP development prac-
tices (including pair programming) would receive daily
overviews of their personal scores. Due to different opin-
ions about what constitutes good quality between the
investigator and the organizers, the definition of quality
was a matter of discussion. The iteration showed that the
quality model needs to be exchangeable (Requirement-3:
“Flexible applicability”). The prototype defined qual-
ity as the percentage of source code entities for which
documenting source code comments were available. It
employed static analysis to derive quality scores. Money
was used as a reward in this trial.
While the experiment failed to achieve a significant
change in behavior, it provided valuable lessons learned
about social effects in agile teams. See Section 7.7
for detailed information on the trial results. Addition-
ally, usability and understanding issues were revealed
(Requirement-9: “Easily understandable”).
5.1.3.9 TornBond design experimentation
The main lessons learned from the previous experiment
were that developers had problems understanding karma
scores, that they did not see how the measures influenced
them and what the practical implications were, and that
feedback took too long and was too infrequent. As a
consequence of these lessons, the next prototype was
intended to experiment with the design of the CollabRe-
view prototype to improve on various factors. An en-
vironment was needed where continuous development
was ongoing, and with easy access to the developers.
A suitable environment was found in TornBond5,
where a small development team developed and refac-
tored an open source software. The software is a base
technology of several of that organization’s current
projects, and some of the developers would also base
their own research on this software. Karma scores were
tracking technical debt. Owners of technical debt would
be presented with the amount of technical debt they
owned. They could decide for themselves if they wanted
4A pseudonym for a student software project used in the evaluation.
For more details refer to Section 7.1.6.6.
5The name is a pseudonym for the software project used in the
evaluation, see Section 7.1.6.3 for more details.
to reduce their debt. That seemed to be a desirable
goal for each individual. The experimentation was not
intended to generate quantitative experimental data with
high validity but to bring forward the design of the
prototype. More details and some results can be found
in Section 7.8.
5.1.3.10 ReputationForge prototype
The next prototype emphasized immaterial rewarding
mechanisms that should be applicable in distributed
projects without much peer-pressure, hierarchical power
or availability of financial compensations. Instead, fun
and intrinsic motivation were the way to go.
Therefore, Agaraj (2012) developed a social game to
promote earning of higher karma scores. Reputation-
Forge was trialed in two wiki environments; one envi-
ronment was the original environment of Moknowpe-
dia where ReputationForge showed slight improvements
over the original Moknowpedia prototype, and the other
one was the wiki of Vyrygh6. The prototype was mostly
successful, especially in the difficult EU context; see
Section 7.9.
5.1.3.11 MicroEditCastigator field experiment
The MicroEditCastigator prototype penalized an article
editing behavior in Moknowpedia, which harmed the
readability of the change logs. Users showing this be-
havior argued that acting differently would cause higher
costs for them, or necessity a change of habits. It was an
optimal candidate to investigate why some prototypes
failed while others succeeded: This prototype would
test if a minor change in behavior could be achieved
although users do not agree that their behavior is not de-
sirable. Although the prototype was hated by most users,
it succeeded at suppressing or reducing the undesired
behavior (see Section 7.10).
5.1.3.12 ScrumLab field experiment
The last iteration’s prototype moved back to the source
code domain. Two software teams would be rewarded
with better grades for closely following coding conven-
tions. The final experiment was a success and is de-
scribed in Section 7.11.
6A pseudonym for the software project described in Section 7.1.6.5
that was also used in the evaluation.
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5.1.4 Summary of the research process
During the research, a number of requirements regard-
ing the concept and its prototypical implementation in
CollabReview were defined. They encompass key so-
cial aspects of team work like not harming the team
spirit, and technical requirements that the CollabReview
prototype should be adaptable to different development
environments.
The research followed an iterative design process with
several iterations to develop the concept and evolve the
CollabReview prototype into its final form. The resulting
concept is explicated in the rest of this chapter. Details
on the prototype and its implementation are given in
Chapter 6.
5.2 The Computational Model
CollabReview is a reputation system that computes
karma scores for developers depending on the quality
of contributions. Its purpose is to analyze how people
behave in order to promote well-behaving in a commu-
nity; observed subjects are held responsible for what
they do to the society and its resources on a broad
scope. Subjects that show a lot of desirable behavior
should have higher scores than subjects that show less
desirable or less of the desired behavior. In particular,
CollabReview looks at how well developers document
to make them write more and better documentation. The
model that underlies computations in CollabReview is
presented in Section 5.2.1.
The central questions CollabReview has to answer for
analyzing developer behavior are
• how important are the affected software process
artifacts (see Section 5.2.2),
• what artifacts and how much has the individual
contributor affected them, either in a
– direct,
– technically indirect, or
– socially indirect
way (see Section 5.2.3), and
• how is the condition of artifacts affected by the
individual subject (see Section 5.2.4)?
The exact computation of how responsibility and in-
ternal quality lead to reputation scores is described in
Section 5.2.5, and illustrated by examples in Section
5.2.6.
5.2.1 Modeling software process artifacts
Initially, the model consists only of developers in the
team.
Definition 50 – Team
The software team U is the set of all agents that are,
were or will be developing the software.
Let there be the developers of the software team u ∈
U . In addition to the team, there is the revision repository
which stores the software process artifacts.
Definition 51 – Revision repository
The revision repository is the set of all past and current
software process artifacts a ∈ At that have been created
by the agents of the software team until time t, plus the
empty artifact aε.
For simplicity, the index t is left out in A unless it is
needed to signify a change in time. In this model, an
artifact a is a 6-tuple of
a :

s content string
i identifier (name, branch and revision)
o marked as obsolete (or delete) date, or ∅
m fine-grained authorship information
c who created (committed) the artifact
x reserved for extended information
with s being the actual text of the artifact as a string; the
artifact’s identifier i as obtained from the revision reposi-
tory; the date o when the artifact was marked as obsolete
in the repository (e.g. deleted or replaced by a newer
revision), or ∅ (null) if the artifact is still active; the
author c who created the artifact by committing it to the
revision repository; fine-grained authorship information
m for each character; and extended information (like
create date of the artifact) which is not detailed here.
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Definition 52 – String
A string is a sequence of n characters s = c1c2...cn.
A substring is any consecutive sub-sequence of s with
s′ = cici+1...cj−1cj with 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
After some time into the project, the agents start de-
veloping and add software process artifact to the revision
repository.
Definition 53 – Develop
Developing is the process of modifying, copying or delet-
ing the contents or properties of software process arti-
facts a ∈ A by adding to or removing substrings from
the artifacts’ content, changing their identifiers, marking
them as obsolete, or changing the extended information.
The initial repository contains only the empty artifact
A0 = {aε}. While the agents are developing At →
At+1, they repeat one or more of the following actions
until the project is finished:
• modify: agent u takes an artifact a from A, modi-
fies its contents and commits (i.e. saves) it into the
revision repository as a′ with a = p(a′) its parent,
so that At+1 = At ∪ {a′}.
• copy: agent u creates a copy of artifact a and
commits it into the revision repository as a′ with
a = p(a′) its parent, so that At+1 = At ∪ {a′}.
• delete: agent u replaces artifact a ∈ At with its
copy a′ which is marked obsolete, so that At+1 =
(At \ a) ∪ {a′}.
By construction, each artifact a′ ∈ At+1 \ {a0} has
a parent artifact a = p(a′). The artifacts therefore form
a tree structure with the empty artifact aε as the root.
See Figure 5.6. It shows the tree of the evolution of an
artifact. The agents who created the different revisions
are noted in the nodes. The numbers at the edges specify
the edit distance between two artifacts ∆(a, a′). As a
measure of similarity, a string edit distance (see Section
3.4.3.2) measures the minimum number and size of edit
operations (e.g. inserting and deleting of characters) that
convert one string into another one.
Starting with empty artifact aε as the tree’s root, any
new artifact a′ is attached to a parent artifact a ∈ At so
A
A
B
C
B
A
C
2 3 4 5 6 70 1
5
2
3
1
4 1
7
Revision:
Figure 5.6: Software process artifact evolution with sim-
ilarity distances noted at the edges, and authors in the
nodes (Prause and Apelt, 2008)
ε (abc) (bcd) (bcdef)
(zabc) (bcde)
3 2 2
1 3 1 1
Figure 5.7: Parent relations forming a straight tree
that the edit distance to the parent ∆(a′, a) is minimized.
In the best case, for each artifact a′ ∈ At+1 holds that
p(a′) ∈ A is its optimal parent, i.e. the one that is most
similar to it for all a′′ ∈ At+1: p(a′) = a ∈ At with
∆(p(a′), a′) = ∆(a, a′) ≤ ∆(a′′, a′)∀a′′
However, the true parent of an artifact a′ is not
necessarily the one with the smallest similarity distance.
If the agents’ actual actions are not available anymore
but only the series of revision repository snapshots
At, At+1, At+2, ..., the true parents have to be guessed
in practice. This was named software archeology (see
Section 3.4.2). Additionally, it may practically be too
costly to determine the optimal parent as all artifacts
a ∈ At would have to be checked.
The path from an artifact a
′n
to the root aε is straight
within the set of revisions. It does not include dead-
end artifacts that introduced changes that were later un-
done. Consider the insertion of the following artifacts
(of strings) in this order in Figure 5.7: (abc), (zabc),
(bcd), (bcdef), and (bcde). The dashed line is a possi-
ble parent relation that is rejected because when (bcd)
is inserted, (abc) is closer. (zabc) therefore becomes a
dead end. The dotted lines are alternatives for parents
of (bcde). The case that two potential parents have the
exact same distance is resolved non-deterministically
because it rarely occurs in reality.
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5.2.2 Importance weight of software pro-
cess artifacts
Some software process artifacts are more important than
others. For example, the maintainability of a central
class in source code that is invoked by several others
might be more important than an obscure one that can be
easily replaced or removed from the software. Likewise,
a page in a wiki that attracts much more attention by
its readers and contains valuable information is more
important than, for instance, a page with last week’s
table soccer results from the work group’s famous “El
Classico” matches. A bigger software process artifact
might be more important than a smaller one.
For this reason, CollabReview assigns different
weights to artifacts using exchangeable weighting
functions w(a) ∈ [0..1]. The prototype has available
• a unit weight measure which assigns the same
weight w to all artifacts,
• a size weight measure which assigns a higher
weight to larger artifacts, and
• a view-count weight measure which assigns more
weight to artifacts that are read more often (cf.
Dencheva, 2010).
However, more elaborate weight measures are possible
using information mined from software repositories (cf.
Section 3.4).
5.2.3 Responsibility of contributors for
software process artifacts
Responsibility is a relationship between agents and soft-
ware process artifacts that has to be quantified in order
to compute reputation scores, and make agents care for
the artifacts they are responsible for. Let responsibility
be defined as:
Definition 54 – Responsibility
An agent (u) is called responsible when it either already
has had or has the obligation to have an effect on an
artifact software project artifact (a).
Responsibility is the state of being responsible (Farlex,
2012).
Several agents can share responsibility for software
process artifacts or parts thereof. In this case, the respon-
sibility of an individual agent u for artifact a is
r(u, a) ∈ [0, 1]
with the sum of all agents’ responsibilities∑
u∈U
r(u, a) = 1
for a certain artifact.
There are different ways for an agent to become re-
sponsible. If an agent modifies software process artifacts,
his responsibility is a manifested effect. This is called
direct responsibility (Section 5.2.3.1). If the agent’s re-
sponsibility has not yet had an effect but is rather an
obligation, then this is termed indirect responsibility. In-
direct responsibility can result from links in the software
process artifacts (technical indirect responsibility, Sec-
tion 5.2.3.2), or from social relations in the development
team (social indirect responsibility, Section 5.2.3.3). The
following subsections explain the choice of the responsi-
bility measure in CollabReview.
5.2.3.1 Direct responsibility
The concept of responsibility is closely related to owner-
ship through knowledge (cf. Section 2.4.4.1). The agent
leaves direct traces of his knowledge in the software
process artifacts, and obtains responsibility for them.
Therefore, responsibility that arises from ownership is
termed direct responsibility.
Philosopher John Locke believed that something
which is owned by no-one — e.g. because it does
not yet exist, like to-be-written source code — can be
appropriated by “mixing one’s labor” with it (Hoppe,
2004). In consequence, the developer who creates
a software process artifact becomes its legitimate
owner. Authorship for software process artifacts is a
pragmatic way of defining ownership and responsibility.
Techniques for obtaining authorship information were
discussed in Section 3.4.2.
5.2.3.2 Technical indirect responsibility
While ownership leads to responsibility, responsibility
does not necessarily cause ownership. Responsibility
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can also stem from links between software process ar-
tifacts. If a developer’s software process artifacts are
“close” to another’s ones, the developer has probably an
increased interest in that these other artifacts are in good
condition because a bad condition could irradiate on his
own artifacts. For example, bad application interfaces
can adversely affect the developer’s source code, poorly
tested but required sub-routines can lead to failures in
own code, and modules dependencies on undocumented
modules pose a danger for future adaptability. This kind
of responsibility is called technical indirect responsibil-
ity.
Indirectly responsible developers will fix problems
themselves or try to influence the directly responsible
ones because the indirect responsibility negatively af-
fects their own reputation score. Indirect responsibility
can therefore create an additional peer-pressure in cases
where directly responsible developers are not so much
concerned with their reputation score.
Using suitable algorithms, a computer system is capa-
ble of detecting indirect responsibilities in close artifacts.
Section 3.4.4 discussed mining contexts of software pro-
cess artifacts. This can be employed to reveal closeness.
5.2.3.3 Social indirect responsibility
The social context of the software project poses the sec-
ond kind of indirect responsibility. Social happenings in
the team leave traces in software process artifacts7.
Social indirect responsibility often is difficult to an-
alyze but can have strong influences. Sometimes, sign-
posts of indirect responsibility can be found in the soft-
ware process artifacts. For instance, the Java language
knows of an @author JavaDoc tag which explicitly
assigns responsibility. However, this information can be
wrong and not reflect reality. Some software projects
also ban the @author tag because they do not want to
create the impression of exclusive ownership (Grossbart,
2011). Apart from similar few examples, this kind of
responsibility is difficult to detect.
However, it can be worthwhile to explicitly override
or augment direct responsibility in order to utilize the
same peer-pressure effects as with technical indirect re-
sponsibility. For instance, a single person could be ap-
pointed quality manager for a whole project, or become
7cf. Conway’s Law, “organizations [...] are constrained to produce
designs which are copies of the communication structures of these
organizations” (Conway, 1968)
quality assignee for certain software process artifacts.
Developers could get randomly assigned as co-officers
for artifacts. In pair programming, the navigator has
much more influence than just an observing role. This
could be reflected. In a large group of developers, devel-
opers could be assigned to logical sub-groups, e.g. the
employees of one partner in a consortium project, where
each developer has a certain responsibility for the arti-
facts created by the other developers in his sub-group.
5.2.3.4 Mixed responsibility and fairness
The computing of responsibility scores in CollabReview
does not necessarily rely on a single kind of responsi-
bility measure. Direct responsibility can be mixed with
technical or social indirect responsibility; different kinds
of direct responsibility measures can be used; and varied
weights can be applied when combining responsibility
measures.
Responsibility values determined by one responsibil-
ity measure can also be distorted to obtain better results.
To understand what is meant by this, consider the fol-
lowing situation: The lines of a source file were written
by different developers. A wrote 50 lines, B wrote 30,
C wrote 15 and D wrote 5 ones. It would be fair if A
had r(A, a) = 0.5 of the responsibility, while B, C and
D would receive their fair shares, i.e. r(B, a) = 0.3,
r(C, a) = 0.15, and r(D, a) = 0.05. However, works
by other authors like Gıˆrba et al. (2005) or Hattori and
Lanza (2009) assign full ownership (i.e. responsibility)
to the single major contributor, i.e. r(A, a) = 1 and
r(B, a) = r(C, a) = r(D, a) = 0.
Also all authors could receive equal shares
r(A, a) = r(B, a) = r(C, a) = r(D, a) = 0.25.
Or shares could be inverted based on the reasoning that
minor contributors might be more influential to the ar-
tifact’s quality. These are design decisions to be made
depending on the context.
5.2.3.5 Excursus: Computed developer specializa-
tion
A figure that is later used to characterize different code
bases is the developer specialization index.
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Definition 55 – Developer specialization
The developer specialization index (ids) ∈ [0, 1] is a
measure of how well developer contributions are dis-
tributed over all non-obsolete software process artifacts
in a revision repository. The closer ids → 1, the more
responsibility is concentrated on single developers.
The ids is defined as the average over all non-obsolete
software process artifacts of the sum of developers’
squared contribution ratios
ids =
∑
a∈A
∑
u∈U
r(u, a)2
|A|
For example, let there be two developers and two
artifacts: If each developer is solely responsible for one
artifact, then ids =
(12)+(12)
2 = 1. If both developers
are each 50% responsible for each artifact, then ids =
(0.52+0.52)+(0.52+0.52)
2 = 0.5.
5.2.3.6 Choice of responsibility in CollabReview
For this research, several direct responsibility measures
were implemented and tested. The goal of the investi-
gation was to identify a suitable responsibility measure
that produces sufficient results. Section 7.3 presents the
results of this investigation.
CollabReview implements a direct responsibility mea-
sure that assigns responsibility to the last editor of a line.
Different contributors to a software process artifact are
assigned fair shares in responsibility. The authorship
algorithm includes a clone detection algorithm to iden-
tify strings that are moved or copied between files. The
algorithm is described in detail in Section 5.3.
Definition 56 – Line
A line l is a non-extensible substring length in an arti-
fact’s content string s = c1c2...cn that does not contain
any new line characters (with i1, i2, ..., ik being the new
line characters’ indexes), i.e. it is either
• the empty string l = ε = s,
• the whole string l = s, if s contains no new line
character,
• a prefix l = sp = c1...ci1 with 0 < i < n that ends
at the first new line character,
• a suffix l = ss = cik+1...cn with 0 < ik < n that
starts after the last new line character,
• or a true substring l = s′ = cij+1...cij+1 that starts
after a new line character and ends at the next one.
5.2.4 Quality of software process artifacts
Quality assessments in CollabReview come in the form
of reviews that are cast votes that democratically deter-
mine quality.
Definition 57 – Review
A review is an object that clumps together one (or more)
ratings of a software process artifact with a text comment
(Farmer and Glass, 2010).
Several reviews can be attached to a single software
process artifact. Each review contains an integer score
representing the rating, and a text message. Once an
agent u logs on to CollabReview, it can assign quality
scores to artifacts a: s(u, a) ∈ [−10,+10] The range
wraps symmetrically around 0, so that 0 is a neutral
rating. Positive numbers indicate good quality ratings
and negative ones represent bad quality ratings. How-
ever, this is only a recommendation. The range should
be adapted to the needs of the respective domain (e.g.
source code versus wiki).
Quality consists of a number of different quality at-
tributes, some of which are even opposing (see Section
3.2.1). Is it possible to express such a complex thing in a
single number? Answering this question is not the goal
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of CollabReview. It does not want to represent quality
in its full entirety but to give a voice to something which
might perish in ignorance otherwise. For achieving hard
and defined quality goals, classical formal technical re-
views might be more suitable (see Section 3.3). Note
also that CollabReview does not rely on exactly mea-
suring quality. Making sense of mere numbers is not
covered here. Concrete ratings are heavily influenced
by multiple factors like quality goals or team experience.
Instead, CollabReview captures impressions of the per-
ceived quality of software process artifacts, and this is
first and foremost maintainability (including readabil-
ity).
An agent can revise its assessment of an software
process artifact at any time. However, an agent cannot
have more than one review per artifact at a time. There is
no need for more votes per agent since agents can always
modify their review to keep it up-to-date. CollabReview
calculates an artifact’s quality rating as the average over
all quality ratings for it.
5.2.4.1 Timeliness — Aging of reviews
Software process artifacts are subject to continuous
change. More precisely, when an agent modifies an
artifact, the modified artifact is considered as a new
artifact that supersedes the old one. The old one is
marked “obsolete”. A review, however, remains attached
to the now-obsolete old artifact. On the one hand, the
old review may still be appropriate to the new artifact
to some degree, so it should not be discarded outright.
On the other hand, it is probably not fully to the point
anymore as well. Asking the reviewer to update his
review would put additional burden on him while not
guaranteeing that the review would be updated. There-
fore, CollabReview uses an aging of reviews, which
gives older reviews lesser weight in comparison to more
up-to-date reviews. The review is said to lose timeliness
[0, 1] 3 t(u, a)→ 0 when the artifact changes.
CollabReview computes timeliness by means of string
edit distances ∆(a, a′). The timeliness t(u, a) of a re-
view by agent u for artifact a′ is the edit distance be-
tween that artifact a′ and its actually reviewed ancestor
a in relation to its creation cost ∆(aε, a). Because later
revisions can have more changes than was the size of the
artifact a at review time, negative timeliness is excluded:
t(u, a′) = max
(
1− ∆(a, a
′)
∆(aε, a)
, 0
)
5.2.4.2 Manual and automatic reviews
The idea of letting developers write reviews is to capture
their thoughts so this information does not get lost, and
to foster communication inside the team. With simple
and fast interfaces in place, the overhead burdened on
developers can be kept minimal.
Still, it is appealing to support human assessments
with automated testing. While quality is indeed difficult
to measure automatically, automated testing adds (possi-
bly inaccurate but) objective data (see Section 3.3). Col-
labReview therefore also allows to incorporate data from
automatic testing. Such data can help to get the complex
interaction between humans and CollabReview started
by feeding the initial data into the system (Requirement-
6: “Involve contributors without dependence”).
A toolkit that provides automatically generated qual-
ity assessments effectively becomes an agent, which is
called arbiter here. Arbiters either review artifacts im-
mediately after they enter CollabReview’s database and
thus immediately provide an objective basis for subse-
quent human review; or an external tool can feed the
information into CollabReview (e.g. through web ser-
vices) when it has it ready. Arbiters can use data from
automatic static or dynamic testing (see Section 3.3), as
long as the results can be converted into quality scores
on the artifact level. CollabReview uses Checkstyle
for Java code to create automatic reviews depending on
how many code smells and style violations it finds in
the source code (see Section 3.2.2.3). But this default
behavior can be easily extended and adapted to other
environments as long as an appropriate software toolkit
is available. For example, arbiters could also submit bad
reviews for highly complex classes as determined by
some source code metric. Test coverage reports that are
generated through an continuous integration build could
be evaluated to provide quality assessments for classes
with a low or high test coverage.
It could be possible that human reviewers might feel
ineffective compared to code arbiters. Hence the ar-
biter’s reviews should not outweigh human reviews. In
CollabReview, the reviews of humans and arbiters are
treated equally.
5.2.4.3 Anonymity and rejection of reviews
Although software quality would benefit, a reviewer
might refrain from writing a bad review in fear of bad
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consequences for himself. A loss in overall source qual-
ity might seem less costly to the individual developer
than having trouble with a colleague (Elster, 1989). Sea-
man and Basili (1997) report that familiarity among the
inspection participants decreases willingness to report
defects, as well as physical closeness does. And Insko
et al. (1985) note that judgments made publicly in front
of a group are subject to conformity, i.e. the assimi-
lation of opinions and behavior. CollabReview makes
allowance for this problem through its feature to submit
a review anonymously.
By default, reviews are submitted anonymously. Col-
labReview records all reviews consisting of a quality
score and a comment, and lets everybody view them.
While agents are encouraged to include a text comment
with their ratings, this is not per se necessary to submit
the rating score. Such comments are, however, helpful to
those responsible for the software process artifact, and
they explain and justify the rating. This is important
because an anonymous review may be rejected by any-
one, who is then publicly noted as having rejected the
review. The rejecter may add a rejection reason to the
review, which can then be viewed by the submitter of
the review. A rejected review does not have its quality
rating counted, but still remains visible.
The author of the review now has two options to deal
with her rejected review: She may edit and re-issue
it anonymously, although it can then, of course, then
be rejected again, or she can submit the review non-
anonymously, which makes the review unrejectable. An
unrejectable review has its rating score counted until the
review is either revised by its author or until its time-
liness has gone out-of-date. As the reviewer has now
revealed her identity through her non-anonymous review,
it is possible for others to get in contact with her. This
part of the interaction is not modeled in CollabReview
anymore because the identities are disclosed anyways.
Instead, developer and reviewer are encouraged to dis-
cuss their disagreements in person to settle their dissent.
If this is not possible, issues should be escalated to a
higher instance to make a decision (Humphrey, 1997).
The anonymity feature protects the identity of the re-
viewer, which should suffice in a cooperative environ-
ment. Those who are responsible for the artifact will
fix the problem in the artifact first, instead of just re-
jecting the review and thereby escalating the situation.
CollabReview is therefore not a menace to team spirit
because reviewers can remain secret, which prevents per-
sonal grudges (Requirement-4: “No hazard to the team”)
and lets reviewers be more neutral with the reviews.
Still, CollabReview cannot be misused as a vehicle for
carrying out personal conflicts: While the ones respon-
sible for a software process artifact are not necessarily
obvious, responsibility is not concealed. This has noth-
ing to do directly CollabReview. A malicious reviewer
could, for instance, scrutinize the revision log of an arti-
fact, and infer who is responsible. He could then specifi-
cally target artifacts by that developer with bad ratings.
But this is the reason why authors may reject reviews
that they deem unfair. In case of an unjustified review,
the ones responsible for the artifact have a way to defend
themselves, too, by rejecting the review (Requirement-4:
“No hazard to the team”).
5.2.4.4 Computing a software process artifact’s
quality rating
A software process artifact’s quality rating q(a) is com-
puted from all non-rejected review ratings for this arti-
fact:
q(a) =
∑
u∈U
s(u, a)t(u, a)](u, a)
∑
u∈U
t(u, a)](u, a)
with the rejected review function
](r) =
{
0 if review of a by u is rejected
1 otherwise
5.2.5 Putting it together to karma scores
It depends on the kind of software process artifact, what
kind of karma score is best suited to work towards the
goal of improving the quality and amount of internal
documentation. In a wiki, almost any article is a direct
contribution to internal documentation. So both quality
and quantity of the written texts should go into the scores.
Badly written source code, however, can implement the
behavior that is expected from the software but it does
not necessarily contribute value to its documentation.
The developers write source code as means of achieving
set project goals. It is not the intention of CollabReview
to support this. Instead, it wants to support the secondary
goal, i.e. obtaining a good internal quality.
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Therefore, different ways of combining attributes into
one karma score are needed. Such a combined karma
score is also called robust karma score (Farmer and
Glass, 2010). CollabReview can be used with different
karma models to support various documentation contexts
(Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”).
5.2.5.1 Open-ended and closed-range scores
Basically, karma scores can be open-ended or closed-
range. An open-ended karma score allows the users to
collect ever more points. There is no upper limit. For
example, the number of artifacts contributed by a user
is an open-ended karma score. The advantage of open-
ended karma scores is that they are a perpetual motivator
because a user will be able to continue to collect points
forever. It honors long-term contribution. But this is
also the problem: it is frustrating for new users to see
how few points they have in comparison to users who
have gathered a huge amount of points over years.
A closed-range karma score stays within a certain
value range no matter what the user does. For instance,
the average quality of artifacts contributed by a user is
such score. A new user can directly gain the top score
and is not disadvantaged in comparison to other users.
But in the case of average quality, this kind of score
possibly fleeces new users because even if they first
enter the game late, they can immediately score as high
as users who have done well over a long time, or score
better than them with less effort.
Combining an open-ended and a closed-range score
usually results in an open-ended score. However, it is
possible to reduce the effect of the open-ended score by
reducing its weight in comparison to the closed-range
score, or by scaling the open-ended score with a non-
linear (e.g. logarithmic) function. But the score still
remains theoretically infinite. Another option is to take a
user’s rank with regard to this score instead of the score
itself, and adding it as a modifier to the closed-range
score.
5.2.5.2 The fundamental metrics quantity and
quality
While the karma score models can incorporate different
input depending on the documentation context, all mod-
els used here have two basic karma scores for quantity
kr and quality kq at their heart. Quantity karma scores
kr sum up all the partial responsibilities r(u, a) that the
agent has made to all artifacts. These are open-ended
karma scores. Within the formula, software process arti-
facts are weighted by their importance w(a):
kr(u) =
∑
a∈A
w(a)r(u, a)
To compute the overall quality score kq that is
awarded to agent u for contributing to all the software
process artifacts a ∈ A, CollabReview depends on arti-
cle importance w(a), quality q(a) and responsibilities
r(u, a). The quality karma scores are closed-range
scores. With this data, the reputation score kq(u) of an
agent u is defined as the average of the twice-weighted
artifact quality scores:
kq(u) =
∑
a∈A
w(a)r(u, a)q(a)
∑
a∈A
w(a)r(u, a)
5.2.5.3 Bonus points
While the core of the karma score models consists of
contribution quantity and quality, the scores can be fur-
ther modified to honor other desirable behaviors. That
means that developers get bonus points b(u) for specific
desirable efforts in addition to their base karma score.
For example, there can be a bonus for writing reviews.
Reviews are no core contribution but they help to im-
prove the quality of software process artifacts. They are
therefore an important contribution to the CollabReview
concept.
The points awarded by a bonus mechanism should
be few in comparison to the core karma scores. Still
the bonus to the scores can get everything started and
be a valuable contribution. Bonus points can bootstrap
the interaction between agents and CollabReview
(Requirement-6: “Involve contributors without depen-
dence”).
5.2.6 An example of karma scores
Consider the following scenario from Dencheva et al.
(2011) as a simplified example of how karma scores can
be computed from the above parameters. In the exam-
ple, karma scores are used to improve participation in a
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corporate wiki in order to increase knowledge exchange.
Note, that in the example, no negative quality scores
are used as any contribution to the wiki is considered
valuable.
Sonny creates a new article in the documentation wiki.
Rico reviews the article with a rating of “average”. For
his review, Rico receives one point, while Sonny receives
ten points for his average-quality article. Later, Gina
edits Sonny’s article, replacing about one third of the
text. The article’s ten points are now split proportionally
between Sonny (seven points) and Gina (three points).
In addition, Rico’s review loses timeliness because it
applies to a quite different, older revision of the article.
Rico only retains a bonus of 0.7 points for his old review.
Gina adds a new review of “good” to the article, giving
her an extra point for the review itself. When the voted
quality of the article is determined from reviews, Gina’s
new review weighs more than Rico’s old review. There-
fore, the average rating of the article is almost “good”.
Because of its quality, fifteen points (instead of ten) are
now distributed among contributors of the article. This
leaves Sonny with ten points, Gina with five points plus
one for her review, and Rico with 0.7 points. When Rico
refreshes his review, he gets the full point again.
The above example illustrates that there are two ways
for users to collect reputation points: The first one is to
provide a quality assessment of an article in form of a
rating and a review comment. The quality assessments
are used to democratically determine the quality of an
article. A fresh review earns the user one point. How-
ever, this worth decreases as the review ages due to later
changes to the article. The reviewer has to refresh his
review to regain the full point. A reviewer cannot have
more than one active review per article, but can revise
his review at any time.
The second — and more important — way to earn
reputation points is by contributing to wiki articles. The
amount of reputation points that are awarded for a con-
tribution to an article depends on three criteria: quality
of the article as determined by above democratic review
process, importance weight of the article (e.g. size, page
views), and ratio of the contributor’s contribution to all
contributors’ contributions to the article.
5.2.7 Summary
This section introduced the computational model behind
CollabReview. It described how the evolution of soft-
ware process artifacts is modeled, how the key dimen-
sion responsibility can be computed from direct and in-
direct responsibility, and how the quality of artifacts can
be obtained from manual and automated reviews. In this
model, the importance of artifacts, the aging of reviews
and the anonymity of reviewers are considered. All of
this leads to the karma scores that CollabReview uses to
influence developer behavior.
Reputation and karma systems need to be carefully
adapted to the domain and project context that they are
applied to/in (Farmer and Glass, 2010). CollabReview
provides a host of “adjusting screws”. Of particular
importance is the evolution algorithm that determines
direct responsibility through authorship. It is at the core
of karma computations, and therefore both complex and
vital for the correct functioning of CollabReview. The
next section introduces an algorithm that reconstructs au-
thorship information of sufficient quality from snapshots
of software process artifact evolution.
5.3 Authorship Algorithm
CollabReview computes karma scores from quality and
responsibility information for textual software process
artifacts like source code or wiki articles. Responsibility
information is primarily based on direct responsibility,
which means partial authorship of collaboratively writ-
ten texts. However, obtaining metadata with authorship
information in satisfying quality is not trivial (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2). This section presents an algorithm based on
Prause (2009) for maintaining markup (i.e. fine-grained
metadata) for collaboratively written texts. The algo-
rithm reconstructs artifact evolution in the context of
other evolving artifacts from snapshots of the evolution
history.
5.3.1 Characteristics of the algorithm
The granularity of the information that is obtained
through the algorithm is exactly one author per line of
raw text. This author is the developer who originally
created the line of source code. That means it is not
necessarily the same developer who has put the line into
the software process artifact. Therefore, the algorithm
makes a distinction between trivial lines which do not
take authorship with them when moved (like empty lines
or other lines that occur frequently) and non-trivial lines
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which do retain their authorship. Trivial lines assume
the authorship of the developer who last edited them.
So as to obtain the authorship information, the algo-
rithm constructs an all-encompassing unique version his-
tory of the evolution of software process artifacts that
enables maintaining of authorship markup (see Defini-
tion 38 – “Markup”). Building this history includes two
search steps: In the first search, the algorithm searches
for the most similar artifact a for a′ ∈ A, so that it can
be used as its the parent a = p(a′) (described in Section
5.3.3). It reconstructs the editing operations between the
two artifacts. In the second search, it performs a clone
detection on text that has been inserted into the artifact.
If it finds that the text is copied from a different artifact,
it transfers the original markup of copied code from the
other artifacts a′′ to this one (described in Section 5.3.4).
Both search steps bestow a certain tampering resis-
tance to the algorithm (Requirement-5: “Robustness and
resistance against attacks”). First, it is difficult for a
malevolent developer to conceal or forge authorship for
a whole artifact. As the first search looks at all software
process artifacts that ever existed until now, he cannot
mark an artifact as deleted and later restore it under his
own name. Second, it is also not possible to simply copy
text from somewhere else and claim it under his own
name. The clone detection would recognize that the text
is taken from somewhere else.
Figure 5.8 shows source code with authorship markup.
The different authors are signified by different back-
ground patterns and font colors. Several authors con-
tributed to the source file. The file had its name changed,
and went through multiple iterations. In the upper half
of the image, the algorithm presented here and svn
blame produce the same results. In the lower half, how-
ever, there are some notable differences: The Javadoc
comment was copied into the artifact from a different
artifact by developer Green. This is not recognized by
Subversion: it notes the developer who copied the com-
ment into the artifact as developer of the text (Green);
and not the original developer (Blue). Likewise, the
line System.out.println("Hallo Welt!");
(originally added by Green) was changed from German
to English by Red, and later reinserted from an older
artifact to change it back to German by Pink. This is why
Subversion notes Pink as author, while it is originally
Green. While Subversion can output author information,
too, it is less accurate, and can more easily be misled by
text or by restoring text from deleted revisions.
5.3.2 High-level description of the algo-
rithm
All artifacts a ∈ A are treated equally, no matter if they
come from a different branch, are marked as deleted, or
were renamed. Name, branch and version information
from the SCM tool is retained only to identify a software
process artifact in the repository space, but only for this
purpose. So the set of all software process artifacts and
changes is one huge tree with aε as its root, and the edges
representing parent relationships between the individual
artifacts. Also time stamps and revision information
from the revision repository are used to insert artifacts
in the correct order, but are otherwise discarded. The
underlying model is explained in Section 5.2).
The structure with parent relationships allows soft-
ware process artifacts to inherit most of their markup
from their ancestors. Textual differences between the
artifact and its parent a′ = p(a) are either inherited from
other artifacts (i.e. they were copied into the artifact), or
are new to the artifact and the whole evolution history.
The basic idea of the algorithm is that each artifact
has one parent from which it inherits the majority of its
text with associated markup. Only some minor modifi-
cations come either from other artifacts or are new to all
existing artifacts. Inserting a new artifact a into the set
of all artifacts A means that the artifact gets its text from
the originating repository, and then gets its authorship
markup assigned to it before it gets stored. This process
is made up of seven steps:
1. Get artifact’s plain text from the project’s revision
repository.
2. Find the artifact a′ that is most similar to the text of
the new artifact a to minimize the number and cost
of edit operations (see Section 3.4.3.2). This artifact
becomes the new artifact’s parent a′ = p(a).
3. Determine an edit script that transforms the parent
a′ into the new artifact.
4. Apply the edit script to the parent artifact’s a′ text
(effectively converting it to a) and its markup. The
edit script leaves gaps in the markup where insert
operations were applied.
5. For areas inserted by the edit script, determine if
and where they were copied from, and copy markup
from there.
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Figure 5.8: Markup as obtained by the algorithm (left) compared to svn blame (right) (Prause, 2009)
6. If no suitable origin is found for an areas, then
assign authorship to the developer making the
changes.
7. Add the new artifact to the set of all artifacts.
The following subsections briefly go through all of
the algorithm’s seven steps to describe them in a little
more detail.
Step 1: Get artifact’s plain text This step depends on
the implementation of the revision repository in which
all software process artifacts are stored. It only gets the
text of the next artifact a that is to be inserted into the
set of all artifacts A.
Step 2: Find the artifact’s parent This step deter-
mines the artifact A 3 a′ = p(a) which will be the
artifact’s parent. An artifact’s optimal parent is one that
is most similar to it. Similarity is defined by means of
string edit distances (see Section 3.4.3.2).
Finding an artifact’s parent is a computationally ex-
pensive problem due to the sheer amount of compar-
isons: for an optimal result, the distances between the
new artifact and all of its potential parents a′ ∈ A would
need to be compared. Therefore, Section 5.3.3 discusses
heuristics that find an approximate result with signifi-
cantly less comparisons than an exhaustive search.
Step 3: Determine edit script An edit script provides
a list of insertions and deletions that — when applied
in the correct order — transforms one string into an-
other. The script usually denotes the shortest (or least
expensive) such list of edit operations. It can be said
to reconstruct a developer’s editing operations. Yet the
algorithm that finds the edit script between two string
has a computational complexity of m × n with m and
n being the lengths of the two strings (Wagner and Fis-
cher, 1974). Therefore, only insertions and deletions of
full lines of text are allowed, significantly reducing the
magnitudes of m and n.
Step 4: Apply edit script Next, the developer’s recon-
structed edit operations are applied to its parent found in
Step 2. This effectively transforms its text into the text
of the new artifact a. More importantly, the edit script
also modifies a copy of the parent artifact’s a′ markup
in parallel. This way, the markup of the new artifact is
again consistent with its text content.
Regarding the edit operations delete and insert:
Markup disappears when characters it is attached to are
deleted, or moves with them when they move. During
Step 4, insertion edit operations lead to markup gaps
where new characters were inserted. They are dealt with
in the next steps.
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Step 5: Handle copied code If text is inserted by an
edit operation, then this text does not yet have markup
associated with it. The first possible origin of inserted
text is that the text has been copied from somewhere else.
This step tries to find out if the text was copied or moved
from another place, i.e. it was cloned. If yes, then also
the missing markup is cloned from there. The details are
addressed in Section 5.3.4.
Step 6: New markup for new code The second pos-
sible origin of inserted text is that it was not in one of
the existing artifacts before. This means that the text
was probably written by the developer anew. Text is
considered totally new if it was not cloned, i.e. no origin
from where it has been copied was found. These areas
are enriched with markup that has that developer as an
author who inserted the artifact’s text into the revision
repository. New metadata storing the respective author-
ship can be generated, and fill the gaps left in Steps 4
and 5.
Step 7: Enter artifact into the set of all artifacts Fi-
nally, the new artifact is added to CollabReview’s own
internal revision repository. Some of the search data
structures that are needed during Steps 2 and 5 need
to be updated when a new artifact enters the set. This
happens during this step, too.
5.3.3 Details of algorithm Step 2: Find the
artifact’s parent
This section details Step 2 from the description of the
algorithm in Section 5.3.2. The aim of this step is to
find the artifact a′ ∈ A that is most similar to the new
artifact ∆(a, a′) ≤ ∆(a, a′′)∀a′′ ∈ A. The more similar
both artifacts are, the less is the amount of work for the
subsequent processing steps. A better match here means
better results, too, because it reduces the chance to make
a mistake in the later step of finding the origins of text.
5.3.3.1 A distance metric for software process arti-
facts
Searching for the most similar software process artifact
necessitates that a distance metric between two artifacts
is defined. The search task is then to minimize this dis-
tance. In information retrieval a typical distance model
is the vector model. It compares term frequencies in two
texts (or strings) through vector multiplication. This dis-
tance aims at semantic or deep similarity (Baeza-Yates
and Ribeiro-Neto, 1999).
As opposed to this, the similarity of the surface rep-
resentation — i.e. the string itself, not its semantic con-
tent — is more interesting here. Developers write, copy
and move lines and characters around; not necessarily
whole semantic text blocks. For this same reason, the
algorithm uses plain string edit distances and not tree
edit distances that would rely on syntactic structure (see
Section 3.4.3.2).
The Levenshtein distance is a metric based on the
number of edit operations (insertions, deletions and sub-
stitutions of single characters) that transform one string
into the other. However, computing it is costly (see Sec-
tion 3.4.3.2). Therefore, the algorithm simplifies dis-
tance computation by not editing on character granu-
larity, but sub-string granularity. Some characters like
the newline character appear very regularly in source
code and make a good separator for sub-strings. The
algorithm can work with line granularity by breaking
up strings into lines first. That reduces computational
complexity and makes it a sufficiently fast metric for
large numbers of distances.
While in the original form of the edit distance both
operations (insert and delete) have the same cost, vari-
able costs can be set, too. The algorithm sets the cost for
inserting a line to the line’s length in characters, while
deleting has the cost of half the line’s length. These
costs better reflect the effort that a developer would have
to put into the text when modifying it manually. The
edit scripts that the algorithm generates are similar to
the ones known from common diff tools.
5.3.3.2 Nearest neighbor heuristics to speed up pre-
decessor search
Finding the most similar software process artifact for
an artifact is equivalent to solving the nearest neighbor
problem in a high dimensional Euclidian space using
string editing as distance metric. In this space, an arti-
fact is represented as a point. The naı¨ve approach com-
pares every point (i.e. every newly inserted artifact) to
all other points, resulting in a high run time complexity.
Weber et al. (1998) already showed that optimizations
based on trees perform badly in high dimensional spaces.
The so-called curse of dimensionality with an exponen-
tial growth in the number of dimensions, has not been
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overcome in recent years. All solutions suffer from little
performance gain over the naı¨ve approach (Andoni and
Indyk, 2008).
String editing is a space with a high and dynamic
number of dimensions. An algorithm cannot search it
linearly due to computational cost. Instead, it applies
heuristics to reduce the number of candidates to be com-
pared. A correct nearest neighbor is not required. An
approximate result suffices. So there is no need to do
an exhaustive search or to guarantee that the result is
correct. An important aspect that simplifies the nearest
neighbors problem is that only one result is needed; not
many or even a pairwise similarity of all artifacts. The
following sections discuss heuristics that propose candi-
dates for nearest neighbors. Only those candidates are
tested.
5.3.3.3 Similar names heuristic
Related software process artifacts in a revision repository
are often identified by a similar name (e.g. file name in
Subversion, or article name in MediaWiki). This obser-
vation allows three heuristics: There is a chance that the
ancestor of an artifact has the same name (SMNAME).
Among these the most recently added one is very a prob-
able candidate (SNGLPRDCSSR). Other candidates are
files with similar names, especially with those names
that differ only in their directory prefix (SIMNAME).
The sets of candidates Cx proposed by the heuristics are
CSNGLPRDCSSR ⊆ CSMNAME ⊆ CSIMNAME
and the computational cost for testing all candidates in a
set c(Cx) is linear in the number of elements in the set
c(CSNGLPRDCSSR) ≤ c(CSMNAME)
≤ c(CSIMNAME)
while the recall R(x) is
R(SNGLPRDCSSR) ≤ R(SMNAME) ≤ R(SIMNAME)
The tradeoff is between search cost and recall of the
nearest neighbor.
5.3.3.4 Inverted index heuristic
An inverted index (see Section 3.4.5.2) can heavily re-
duce the set of nearest neighbor candidates while still
making good guesses. The inverted index stores features
(i.e. sub-strings or lines, respectively) of all software pro-
cess artifacts. Each stored line has a link to the artifacts
in which it appears. This is the inverted index. When the
nearest neighbor of an artifact is needed, an INVERTE-
DINDEXn heuristic looks up origins for most distinctive
lines of that artifact in the inverted index. This results in
a set of n candidates to be tested.
Source code of computer programs tends to repeat
trivial lines, i.e. lines that are easy to write or are auto-
matically generated by an IDE. In C-like languages, a
typical example of a highly recurrent line is “}” (with an
arbitrary amount of white-space) or the blank line. Actu-
ally, only distinctive lines with a low occurrence count
are suitable. Only they give a low number of high quality
candidates that share one distinctive feature. Therefore,
trivial lines do not provide good hints on what artifacts
might be closely related.
While white space in a line adds to the distinctiveness
of a feature, white space changes are sometimes done
automatically by tools like IDEs. That means, on the one
hand, that an actually good feature might no longer be
usable because a tool changed the white space (e.g. tab
character converted to spaces and vice versa, or changes
in indentation due to nesting in source code). On the
other hand, white space is often adjusted by such tools
anyways to standardize the look of source code. For
these two reasons, the algorithm automatically normal-
izes the white space in all lines before looking them up
or storing them in the inverted index.
Table 5.2 presents an overview of the recurrences of
lines in two software projects Karakos and FreeCol8.
Karakos has about 160,000 different lines (note, this is
not the number of lines of code in the project but the
number of different features), and FreeCol about 90,000.
For example, 30% of all lines occur exactly once in all
software process artifacts of Karakos. If a new artifact
has one such line, there is one highly probable nearest
neighbor candidate guessed from this line. Some other
lines occur (statistically) multiple times per artifact (e.g.
}). These lines have a very bad predictive capability due
to low precision, and cannot be used. Trivial lines are
probably rather re-written anew every time instead of
being copied. A feature/line x is considered trivial if its
normalized distinctiveness t is less than threshold T :
t(x) = 2
− xoccur
|A| < T = 0.55
8An open source project; for a description of this project refer to
Section 7.1.6.2.
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Number of occurrences x that a line (without leading &
trailing white space) has in different software process
artifacts, i.e. a low number means high distinctiveness
Number of lines that have a total of
x occurrences in all software pro-
cess artifacts
159,580 features 86,621 features
1 occurrence 30.3% 5.4%
2 occurrences 15.2% 4.5%
3 occurrences 12.5% 3.8%
4 to 9 occurrences 26.7% 17.9%
10 to 99 occurrences 14.0% 54.0%
100 to 10,000 occurrences 0.1% 14.5%
10,000 or more occurrences (abs. no.) 7 (abs. no.) 15
247,356 (or 962,972 resp.) (abs. no.) 1 (abs. no.) 1
Table 5.2: Distribution of occurrences per feature in Karakos/FreeCol software process artifacts (Prause, 2009)
In the above formula,
xoccur
|A| > 0
is the number of appearances of a line divided by the
cardinality of software process artifacts. It follows that
y = 1− xoccur|A|
with
−∞ < y ≤ 1
so that y →
{
1 for rare lines
−∞ for frequent lines
}
lines. Hence
z = 0 < 2y/2 = 2y−1 ≤ 1
with z → 0 for frequent lines and z → 1 for rare lines.
The threshold T = 0.55 for trivial lines was chosen by
looking at empirically determined distinctiveness values.
It corresponds to a distinctiveness of 0.85, which means
the line has about 15 appearances in 100 artifacts. While
the optimal value for T may vary for a different source
corpus, it need not be adapted individually. The majority
of lines have only a few occurrences in the source code.
Table 5.3 lists some distinctiveness examples of different
lines.
When this heuristic makes a guess for probable can-
didates, it first picks the most distinctive lines from that
artifact. For this, it can use the occurrence counts of each
line. A line with only a low occurrence count has a high
distinctiveness. All artifacts found through the inverted
index are proposed as candidates. The heuristic goes
on to pick the next most distinctive line until the set of
candidates has reached the desired cardinality. The IN-
VERTEDINDEXn heuristic returns a set of n candidates.
5.3.3.5 Tree search heuristic
All software process artifacts in the database (except for
the first one aε) have a parent. Adding artifacts one by
one to the database implies that all artifacts are integrated
into a single finite tree structure. Each leaf (or node) of
the tree thus represents one artifact.
The TREESEARCH heuristic exploits this structure:
It starts out at the root of the tree. This is the current
search node. Then it compares the distances between the
artifact and the search node or its children, respectively.
If the distance between the search node and the new
artifact is minimal, i.e. smaller than the distance between
the new artifact and all the search node’s children, then
search node is returned as candidate. Otherwise the
search continues with the child that has the minimum
distance to the new artifact. Figure 5.9 illustrates how
the TREESEARCH finds a node in three iterations using
nine comparisons in total.
5.3.4 Details of algorithm Step 5: Handle
copied code
This section details Step 5 from the description of the
algorithm in Section 5.3.2. In the previous section, a
nearest neighbor search found the one software process
artifact a′ ∈ A for a new artifact a that is most similar
to it, and hence is the artifact’s parent a′ = p(a). Step 4
determines an edit script δa′ a that transforms a′ into a,
and applies it. The execution of δa′ a leads to markup
gaps in the markup of a where sub-strings were inserted.
Such sub-strings may either have been copied from some
other artifact, or they are all new. Inserted areas are
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String xoccur t(x)
new Limbo(".", new File(argv[0])); 1 0.999
new File(directory).mkdirs(); 93 0.992
return (java.lang.String) org.ap[...] 143 0.987
final String name = owlModel.get[...] 222 0.980
import java.io.IOException; 1069 0.907
return result; 2130 0.824
} catch (IOException e) { 2144 0.823
*/ 20612 0.153
} 247356 0.000
Table 5.3: Examples for normalized distinctivenesses of Java source code from Karakos (Prause, 2009)
called markup gaps as there is no markup assigned to
them yet. Dealing with gaps is twofold:
1. decide if gap contents are all new, and
2. if not, determine where the string was taken from.
A string is all new, if an origin where it was copied
from cannot be found. Clone detection finds the origins
of copied or moved source code. It is a special kind of
information retrieval and deals with a similar situation
(see Section 3.4.3.3). However, any syntactic structure
apart from separable lines is not necessarily available in
the texts of software process artifacts. Clone detection
may therefore only rely on this basic structure. However,
if there is more than one possible origin found for a line
then its context of surrounding lines can be considered:
the larger the matching context, the more probably a
certain origin is the original origin.
Figure 5.9: Three iterations of a tree search (Prause,
2009)
5.3.4.1 Identifying possible origins of sub-strings
Clone detection always involves a transformation step to
bring code into an internal representation (Ducasse et al.,
1999). For clone detection, the algorithm presented here
first splits a software process artifact into its lines. Each
line is then normalized by omitting leading, trailing and
surplus white space. All remaining formatting and con-
tents of a line are considered the line’s fingerprint and
help distinguishing one line from another.
After normalization, the algorithm hashes and stores a
line in an inverted index. It can use the same inverted in-
dex that is maintained by the INVERTEDINDEXn heuris-
tics (see Section 5.3.3.4), so it does not need to maintain
it itself.
When edit script δa′ a transforms an already inserted
artifact into a new one, it often inserts substrings at
distinct positions, thereby creating several disjunct gaps.
This lets the clone detection treat the gaps separately
as this reduces the computational effort when dealing
with each of the smaller gaps. Now in each gap, it needs
to find a mapping between lines in the new artifact and
lines in old artifacts.
The clone detection splits the text in the markup gap
into one or many lines. For each line, it normalizes the
lines in the gap, and looks up original occurrences in the
inverted index. If there is one or more original occur-
rences of a line, references to all of them temporarily
overlie the respective line (called covering) before they
are further processed as described in the next section.
5.3.4.2 Origin overlays honor the context of a line
Each (overlapping) covering tries to grow to also include
the next or previous line in the gap. However, growing
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Figure 5.10: Selecting origin by size of footprint (Prause,
2009)
by a line is only allowed if the next or previous line in
the origin also match. When all coverings have grown
to their maximum extent possible, any overlapping con-
flicts are resolved. If two origin mappings overlap, then
the bigger one prevails. So in the end, only a single
covering exists for each line.
Figure 5.10 presents a case where there are four poten-
tial sources for the content of a gap. Although “Source 1”
has a match in the line i++, it is overridden by “Source
2” because it is a longer mapping, and therefore has
a prevalence of 2. However, the second line of the
mapping (“// print greetings”) from “Source
2” is in turn overridden by “Source 4” because it is even
longer (four lines). The last line (“exit(0);”) is at-
tributed to “Source 3” although it only has a length of 1.
But this line is not claimed by any other overlay.
In a final step, when covering was resolved, markup
is copied from the identified origins. Text in the gap that
has been found to not have an origin is associated with
newly created authorship markup. The authorship infor-
mation comes from the revision log: The developer who
committed the revision to the repository is considered to
be the author of the respective text.
5.3.5 Summary of authorship algorithm
This section presented an algorithm for associating fine-
grained metadata with collaboratively written text. This
approach is different from usual metadata that is stored
at the crude level of software process artifact granular-
ity that loses information when sub-strings are moved
from one artifact to another. Metadata at artifact level
granularity also leads to inaccurate information if text
disappears during artifact evolution. Instead, the algo-
rithm considers parallel branches of artifacts, and “dead”
artifacts that are marked as deleted. It is aware of the
full history of the artifact and does not lose information
if an artifact is temporarily deleted but later continues
to evolve. Line-based edit scripts allow keeping the ar-
tifact’s markup synchronized with the artifact’s content
while it evolves.
A modified Levenshtein distance is employed to com-
pute distances between artifacts in order to find closest
relatives and generate short edit scripts δa′ a. The nec-
essary nearest neighbor search is facilitated by a set of
search heuristics which are compared to each other in
Section 7.2. Substrings inserted by the edit script are
classified into (i) strings copied from somewhere else (in-
cluding obsolete artifacts), and (ii) new strings. Markup
of new strings (case ii) is assigned to the artifact’s com-
mitter. Copied strings (case i) retain the markup from
the most probable original source of the string. Origi-
nal sources of strings are determined with a basic clone
detection algorithm. The clone detection does not ana-
lyze changes on a deep semantic level but on a surficial
character-based one to reconstruct the “how” of changes.
It normalizes white space and favors long consecutive
blocks of lines.
5.4 Rewarding Schemes
Karma scores alone do not change behavior. Instead,
karma scores must be deployed in a way that they create
positive or negative exchange value for the users (see
Section 3.5.2.2). A rewarding scheme does this. It trans-
forms karma scores into exchange value for users. This
section summarizes the general design considerations.
The actual rewarding schemes are presented in the de-
scriptions of the respective experiments.
5.4.1 Karma scores and exchange value
The development of a suitable rewarding scheme is not
the primary concern of this thesis. They are a tool — an
important one, but a still tool — to create an exchange
value for karma points. A successful scheme ensures
that karma scores are delivered to the users, while at the
same time they minimize undesired side-effects and do
not get into conflict with the environment’s constraints.
The various field experiments with the CollabReview
prototype have led to the development of a set of reward-
ing schemes.
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5.4.1.1 Fitting a rewarding scheme to the situation
Karma scores will only change user behavior, if they
somehow intervene in the user’s life. While some inter-
vention is wanted and necessary, the intervention can
be a too strong or too weak. A miscalibrated interven-
tion either overemphasizes the exchange value of karma
scores, pushing other goals aside, or it does not unfold
its desired effect. In industrial contexts, karma among
peers may have a much weaker role than in open source
(Prause and Durdik, 2012).
Sometimes a scheme may be impossible to imple-
ment. For instance, monetary compensation may not be
possible in some open source projects, or hierarchical
enforcement structures may not be available or not be
strong enough in consortium projects.
Also legal considerations play a role: contracts can
restricts the use of monetary rewards, and the application
of physical punishment may pretty much be unethical.
In other cases, a rewarding scheme could be ruled out
because it is expected to create unbearable side-effects.
While punishment has a very strong influence on behav-
ior, its demotivating side-effects often make rewarding
the better choice.
It depends on the subjective value of a reward for a
person, how strong its motivational effect is (see Section
3.5.4.1). In the simplest case, the exchange value for
karma points can be monetary. Money can be traded
in for something else that the individual desires herself.
But the reward does not necessarily have to be mone-
tary. In fact, money is not always the best choice, and
there are interpersonal and cultural differences in how
well money is appreciated (Casey and Richardson, 2009).
The following questions can help when suiting a reward-
ing scheme to the situation (Prause et al., 2010b):
• Is it attractive for every user?
• Will it continue to be attractive for a long time?
• Will the strength of the effect not be too strong nor
too weak?
• Is it cost-effective, both with regard to maintenance
efforts and financial cost?
• Does it fit into the organizational and administrative
structures of the social context?
• Does it not exclude certain users?
• Are users going to feel self-effective?
• Will it be acceptable to all stakeholders?
It depends on the social situation what rewarding
schemes may be possible, and expected to work best.
One must look at and understand the constraints and pos-
sibilities of the social environment. Then the rewarding
scheme can be adapted to the domain where the karma
system is employed. The next section aims to hint at
what rewarding schemes might be effective.
5.4.1.2 Effectiveness of rewards
As a first step to understand the effectiveness of different
rewards, Section 3.5.4.4 introduced a categorization of
rewarding schemes based on different dimensions. The
resulting incentives space can be used for altering the
characteristics of rewards and for navigating in this com-
plex space.
A small survey interviewed 16 subjects from a work
environment (all colleagues, mostly male non-student
computer scientists). It investigated what characteristics
would be both acceptable to users and have a strong
effect. It asked two questions about each dimension:
1. Which alternative do you like more?
2. Which alternative do you think is more effective?
Described in terms of the different dimensions from
the incentives space, the subjects in the survey preferred
a rewarding scheme which lets groups (IvG) achieve
(CvA) durable (DvC) rewards (PvR) for take-away
(SvT) through specific targets (TvO) in a predictable
(GvL) way. They had no significant preference for real
(VvR) and proclaimed (PvD) rewards, or personalized
(AvP) and publicly visible (PvC) results. They were
indifferent towards an intermittent or continuous (IvC)
system.
The subjects considered a scheme most effective
which lets non-anonymous (AvP) groups (IvG) compete
(CvA) in a public (PvC) contest for durable (DvC),
real (VvR), proclaimed (PvD) rewards (PvR) through
specific targets (TvO) in a predictable (GvL) way.
They predicted that show-off rewards are no more
effective than take-away (SvT) ones that are either given
intermittently or continuously (IvC).
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Comparing data from above sets, the difference be-
tween what subjects like and what they feel effective
slightly shifts opinions towards punishment (PvR), and
real (VvR) rewards in a competitive (CvA), personalized
(AvP), targeted (TvO) and proclaimed (PvD) rewarding
system.
Section 3.5.4.2 presented an overview of typical psy-
chological work motives. Asking for those motives,
the subjects considered Curiosity and Learning, Self-
realization and Community as their main motives (Prause
et al., 2010b).
5.4.2 Reward patterns
A lot of different rewarding schemes were realized for
the various field experiments of CollabReview. This
section disassembles these experiments to distill emerg-
ing patterns from them, and categorizes the patterns us-
ing the dimensions of the incentives space. It does not
present the actual rewarding scheme of the experiments.
The rewarding schemes are detailed later as part of the
validation in the evaluation chapter.
5.4.2.1 Praise ranks
The praise ranks is a leader board rewarding scheme,
where all users are sorted into a ranking table according
to their score. The table is constantly visible to all, caus-
ing a continuous incentive through showing-off. Praise
ranks are a highly competitive reward as there can be
only one first rank (Farmer and Glass, 2010). As long as
a competition does not degenerate into personal conflicts
but stays friendly, it is known to bring the best results
(Humphrey, 1997). While top users are rewarded with
an outstanding first rank, poor performance results in
punishment in the form of being the last in the table.
However, the worse ranks do often have a lower pres-
ence. Ranking positions are usually durable: if there is
not someone else who overtakes a user, then that user
will maintain his rank. Progress and success in the table
is guaranteed to the individual as long as he is better
than the others. And the reward of being better is clear
to everyone: a higher rank in the table.
Praise ranks were used in most field experiments be-
cause they are cheap, easy to realize, and effective. There
the ranks were visible mostly only inside the team but on
some occasions externals to the group would get insight.
In general, ranks continue to work for ever because it is
always possible to collect more and more points. But
the rank in the table is a purely virtual reward.
5.4.2.2 Shame ranks
Shame ranks are very similar to the praise ranks but in-
stead of presenting good karma, they present bad karma.
Basically, the feature that distinguishes them from praise
ranks is that they build on punishing the worst perform-
ers, and not praising the best. A shame ranks scheme
was used in the TornBond trial.
5.4.2.3 Individual Prize
The individual prize is a reward that is given to an indi-
vidual top-performer. While it is basically guaranteed
to the top-performer, there may be a lottery in case of
a draw. In principle, the prize is given anonymously. If
there is an award ceremony in the closed group, while
this is not necessary, then others are aware of the prize.
The prize is something durable for the winner, not to
show-off but to take away. Prizes are given for targeted
achievements at predetermined times, and are of real
nature.
5.4.2.4 Individual Penalty
The individual penalty is not the direct PvR pendant to
the individual prize. A penalty is bound to a certain
threshold. If the user transgresses this threshold at a
previously defined moment in time, then the penalty is
applied. As there is no award ceremony, the individual
punishment is more anonymous and internally closed to
the group.
5.4.2.5 Team Prize
Similar to the individual prizes, a team prize is given
to a group of individuals. The advantage of this prize
is that it honors teamwork and distribution of work in
the group. Members of the group push each other to
higher efforts through peer-pressure and social sanctions,
while weeding out hiding places for free riders and social
loafers. But, as a negative side-effect, this also creates
tension and friction inside the group. Therefore team
prizes should be combined with individual rewards, too
(Heneman and Hippel, 1995).
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5.4.2.6 Levels
Every user has a level, initially starting as a newbie. A
new level is reached if the user has acquired a certain
number of points. Each level is indicated next to a user’s
name, and often shows a corresponding icon (Dencheva
et al., 2009). This mechanism addresses the users’ drive
for achievement (Dencheva et al., 2011).
5.4.2.7 Hero of the week
Once per a predefined time interval (e.g. week) the not
too seriously meant title Hero of the week award (HotW)
is given to the individual user who contributed most dur-
ing that time. This mechanism is a chance for newcom-
ers to quickly achieve something. It rewards extensive
but short-term contribution (Dencheva et al., 2011). As
opposed to many other rewards tested for CollabReview,
the HotW is consumable, i.e. after becoming the HotW,
the title has to be re-earned, otherwise it is lost without
leaving any benefits behind; unless possibly being re-
membered as a having been the HotW. The title HotW
is announced (in non-virtual but real setting) to all mem-
bers of the organization (or unit), and potentially even
to a wider audience.
5.4.2.8 Medals
Medals are virtual awards that are earned by individu-
als for achieving targeted goals like reaching a specific
karma score. While medals are in the first instance given
anonymously, the individual can show them off (Agaraj,
2012). Medals cannot be consumed, are not dependent
on luck, are awarded at a certain time, are shown-off
to the community, but are mostly limited to the virtual
world.
5.4.2.9 Notifications
Notifications provide private feedback to users in re-
sponse to events. While feedback can be positive or
negative, notifications are most often neutral or posi-
tive. However, notifications are guaranteed, consumable
achievements for individuals, not shown-off, somewhat
discoverable, and purely virtual.
5.4.3 Summary of rewarding schemes
For karma scores to be effective, an exchange value is
needed. While money is a simple and proven choice,
it is not necessarily the best one. Indeed, building a
rewarding scheme that fits well into its environment well,
is a science of its own (e.g. Farmer and Glass, 2010;
Agaraj, 2012). In the experiments with CollabReview,
a series of different rewarding schemes were realized.
From the schemes, a few patterns were extracted and
classified within the dimensions of the incentives space.
This provides guidance and support to others who try to
suit a rewarding scheme to their environment.
Table 5.4 presents an overview of characteristics of the
patterns with regard to dimensions of the incentive space.
The numbers express how strong a specific characteristic
is present in a pattern. A number closer to 0 means
that the pattern is more like the left end of the spectrum,
whereas a number closer to 1 means that it is more like
the right end of the spectrum. For example, the team
prize pattern is a bit anonymous but mostly personalized
on the AvP dimension.
The last two columns present the results from the user
interviews regarding what they wished to have in a re-
warding scheme, and what they considered to be most ef-
fective. Roughly estimated, the rewarding schemes that
were implemented in the field trials have a slight ten-
dency towards the “best” characteristics as determined
by a set of experts, and a strong one towards what the
initial set users liked to have. However, the user wishes
could not be fully regarded due to other constraints and
possibilities of the later project environments.
While having few statistical significance, the two last
rows show how well a rewarding pattern matches with
the users’ wished for rwp and considered best r
b
p reward-
ing pattern. The values presented are Pearson corre-
lations. Prizes and team prizes were regarded as very
effective, while shame ranks were least wished for.
5.5 Summary of Design
This research followed an iterative process. It started
with the goal of improving internal software documen-
tation through reputation, and an initial set of require-
ments related to this goal. The set of requirements
was extended and refined, while development cycled
through design, implementation, trial and evaluation
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Dim. Praise Shame Penalty Prize Team Prize Level HotW Medal Notif. Wish Best
AvP 1 1 0 0.3 0.3 0.7 1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8
CvA 0 0 1 0 0.3 1 0 1 1 0.4 0.6
DvC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 0.4
GvL 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
IvC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0.6
IvG 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
PvC 0.7 0.7 1 0.7 0.3 0 0 0.7 1 0.4 0.1
PvD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.4 0.3
PvR 0.7 0.3 0 1 1 0.7 1 1 0.7 1.0 0.8
SvT 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.8 0.5
TvO 1 1 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0.1
VvR 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.6 0.7
rwp 0.10 -0.71 0.10 0.61 0.71 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.22 - -
rbp 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.29 0.57 0.51 0.56 0.31 -0.04 - -
Table 5.4: Overview of characteristics of the reward patterns
phases. Most of the work based on the CollabReview
prototype, which was developed and enhanced during
this process (Section 5.1).
CollabReview models the software process artifact
evolution as a tree with parent and child relationships
between two artifacts. By means of its model, CollabRe-
view can assess key factors like responsibility (based on
the authorship for artifacts) and timeliness of reviews.
Reviews, which are written manually or automatically,
are CollabReview’s means of getting information about
the quality of artifacts into its model. In the end, it
computes robust karma scores for developers from the
information in its model (Section 5.2).
Authorship information for the responsibility and
timeliness computations is maintained as fine-grained
metadata on the text content of software process artifacts.
Yet tracking this metadata in acceptable quality is not
trivial. The optimal parent needs to be found, and the
developer’s changes have to be reconstructed from
snapshots of software process artifact evolution from the
revision repository. The algorithm relies on techniques
of information retrieval, string manipulation, and clone
detection (Section 5.3).
In the end, when karma scores for the developers are
available, they lack a well-calibrated exchange value.
CollabReview feeds the karma scores into a rewarding
scheme to generate the exchange value. The exchange
value can be of monetary nature but does not necessarily
have to. Other possibilities are countless. A first step
into the building of successful rewarding schemes has
been made but the topic would be too broad to be fully
dealt with in this research. Instead, CollabReview uses
a sufficient rewarding scheme as a tool to deliver an
exchange value for its karma scores (Section 5.4) but
does not research into building the optimal rewarding
scheme. After all, when humans are involved, results
can be surprising. It is my experience that fitting a
rewarding scheme into a project environment is complex
and difficult due to the many social and organizational
factors that sometimes rule out rewards, or make others
more or less effective.
124
V
I—
T
H
E
C
O
L
L
A
B
R
E
V
IE
W
P
R
O
T
O
T
Y
P
E
Chapter 6
The CollabReview Prototype
Kane ga naru ka ya.
Shumoku ga naru ka.
Kane to shumoku no ai ga naru.
Is it the bell that rings,
Is it the hammer that rings,
Or is it the meeting of the two that rings?
— Ancient Japanese poem1
CHAPTER 5 described CollabReview as a socio-technical system of a technical solution in thesocial context of software development project
work. The technical part of this system is formed
by the CollabReview prototype. It is a software that
implements the CollabReview concept. The prototype
evolved alongside the concept, and was used for the
validation and evaluation work that are presented in
Chapter 7. This chapter presents the architecture, design
and implementation of the prototype.
6.1 Architecture
This section describes the inner workings of the soft-
ware, i.e. its architecture and design. Section 6.1.1 gives
an overview of the CollabReview prototype, and how it
integrates into the Information Technology (IT) infras-
tructure of an organization. Section 6.1.2 summarizes
the individual subsystems of CollabReview.
1cited after Barankin (1964)
6.1.1 Overview of the prototype’s archi-
tecture
The CollabReview prototype is a web-based application
that integrates into the IT infrastructure of a software de-
velopment organization. While it can be used to improve
different kinds of internal documentation, one instance
of CollabReview handles only one specific type of docu-
mentation, e.g. source code or wiki articles. This is due
to the fact that every kind of documentation has its own
peculiarities — for instance with respect to the reward-
ing scheme — which makes treating different kinds of
documentation alike a suboptimal decision.
6.1.1.1 Integration of the prototype into IT infras-
tructure
The core of the CollabReview prototype itself is called
the CollabReview server. It is a Java-based web appli-
cation, which makes it easily accessible to all develop-
ers of the team, and lets the prototype access the neces-
sary information through the company’s LAN. The Col-
labReview server runs on a dedicated Linux or Windows
server with a Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE)
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application container. All instances in the field trials
used Tomcat2 as container.
CollabReview requires access to a SQL database to
manage its internal data. The database operations are
facilitated through the Hibernate3 data persistence frame-
work, which allows simplifies the mapping of Java ob-
jects into the relational schema of mainstream database
management systems. The CollabReview prototype
uses MySQL4 with InnoDB engine by default because
MySQL is a widely used database management system
that is free for open source projects, and its InnoDB en-
gine supports transactions to preserve the integrity of the
database. However, Hibernate supports other database
management systems and their SQL dialects as well.
CollabReview needs full read access to the revision
repository which contains the software process artifacts
to be analyzed because it will need to analyze all arti-
facts. Access information to the repositories is provided
through the configuration data. For example, in the case
of source code, it can use credentials of a user that was
granted access to the Subversion for this purpose. It can
also read its data by accessing the database, e.g. that of
a wiki, directly.
The CollabReview server consists of about 400 Java
classes with about 32KLOC. The server front end, which
is a web interface to the most important functions of
the server, adds an additional 5KLOC in Java Server
Pagess (JSPs). To run smoothly, it needs about 2Giga
Byte (GB) of Random Access Memory (RAM) in the
virtual machine, and several tens of GB for the database.
Updating the internal software process artifact evolution
model with new artifacts can be computationally inten-
sive but does not require special hardware.
In addition to the core application, the prototype also
consists of separate program parts that run on the devel-
opers’ machine. For example, there is an IDE plug-in for
VisualStudio, which developers can use to easily report
their reviews of source code back to the core application.
However, these features were not used in field trials.
6.1.1.2 Core data structures of the prototype
The key data structures in CollabReview are Artifact,
Author and Review. Normally they are present both
2http://tomcat.apache.org/
3http://www.hibernate.org/
4http://www.mysql.com/
in the main program and the database (an exception here
are the Author objects, which can be mapped trans-
parently to the revision repository if it has its own user
management). These are the elements that implement
the data model that was presented in Section 5.2.1.
The Artifact class holds information about the
artifacts a ∈ A that have been imported from the revision
repository. It consists of
• the artifact’s unique identifier (name, branch, revi-
sion) as given by the revision repository,
• its content string to enable fast access for internal
computations of CollabReview,
• a reference to the parent artifact a′ = p(a) and the
according similarity distance ∆(a, a′) – which are
needed in timeliness calculations,
• a reference to the author who created the artifact
by committing it to the revision repository – which
are used by some responsibility metrics,
• the dates when the artifact was created and when
it was marked obsolete – so that artifacts can be
filtered by specifying a time, e.g. only artifacts that
were “current” at a certain time, and
• the authorship markup of the artifact’s content –
which is the basic input of responsibility metrics.
The Author class models agents that contribute to
the project. An agent is uniquely identified by its name
string, which usually is the user name under which the
agent is also known in the revision repository. In addi-
tion to this, an agent can have an encrypted password,
which is needed for authentication when logging in, an
email address so that an agent can receive notifications
from CollabReview, an administrator flag that grants
extended rights to the user like viewing server status
and changing configuration settings, and a disabled flag
that revokes log-in rights from real persons, e.g. if a
developer has left the team.
The Review class represents the authors’ reviews of
artifacts including the quality information. A review has
• a numerical primary key that is used in the database
schema to relate it to other entities,
• the name of the review’s author to connect the re-
view to its author,
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• the review’s description text that the author has
provided,
• the quality rating as the most important ingredient
into quality score computations,
• a flag if the review is anonymous so that it can be
decided if either the author of the review should
be revealed to others, or if the review should be
unrejectable instead,
• who the review was rejected by to mark it for ex-
clusion from artifact quality calculations and to re-
member who was responsible for the rejection, and
potentially a description string of the reason to de-
fend the rejection, and
• the cached timeliness value of the review to allow
faster computations of karma scores related to re-
viewing and authoring.
The CollabReview server has the CollabReview
run-time singleton as its core element that links together
the individual modules of the whole application. The
singleton facilitates access to these key data struc-
tures. Access is realized through the Repository
for Artifacts and Reviews, and through the
AuthorManager for Authors, which all maintain a
back reference to the singleton object.
6.1.1.3 Importing artifacts into CollabReview
One instance of CollabReview is required for each kind
of a project’s software process artifacts. CollabReview
reads all artifacts from the revision repository to build its
internal model of artifact evolution. It creates a model of
the revision repository history that contains artifact key
information like contents, and augmented with precom-
puted additional information like authorship for perfor-
mance reasons. The access is realized through importer
classes that copy artifacts from their original repository
(see also 6.1.2.3).
CollabReview regularly polls (every few minutes) the
revision repository for updated revisions of the software
process artifacts. This is necessary because not all revi-
sion repositories support or provide a notification mech-
anism that could be used for updating the internal model.
Any new artifacts found are successively imported in
the order in which they were committed to the revision
repository. While importing the artifacts, they are trans-
formed and integrated into the internal model, also as-
signing authorship markup for the responsibility com-
putations. CollabReview can maintain several layers of
markup with authorship information computed by differ-
ent authorship algorithms if needed.
6.1.1.4 Inputting reviews into the prototype
The CollabReview server provides several interfaces for
feeding reviews into the system. The server’s web in-
terface allows navigating to a software process artifact,
and to submit a review there. Additionally, the server
provides web widgets with a review form that can be em-
bedded into the web interfaces of other applications, e.g.
wikis. In order to improve use frequency of the exten-
sions, the perceived distance between the two contexts
of use should be as small as possible. For the same rea-
sons there are plug-ins for IDEs, which users can install
in their IDE to provide seamless integration with their
development environments. Such plug-ins use the web
services for reviewing that are provided by the server (cf.
Section 6.2).
In addition to these interfaces for human feedback,
arbiters (see Section 5.2.4.2) generate review informa-
tion based on an automatic analysis of software process
artifacts. Internal arbiters run inside the CollabReview
server. They regularly check for new or updated artifacts
in the Repository, or get notified by it when a change
has occurred. As example, a Checkstyle arbiter imple-
mented in the CollabReview server, gets notified of new
Java artifacts and then soon checks their style. Check-
style’s audit events are collected, and submitted to the
Repository object as reviews. External arbiters run
independently of the server. They can be integrated into
the nightly build or some other process, and then submit
their project report to CollabReview. For instance, the
Cobertura5 test coverage tool could run after a successful
build and then submit its XML report, so that artifacts
with a low test coverage receive a bad rating.
When a review is submitted to the Repository ob-
ject, it gets stored in the database, and potentially re-
places an existing review for the same software process
artifact (or older version of it) by the same user. The
timeliness of a newly submitted review is 1.0. When
new artifacts are added to the repository, the timeliness
of affected artifacts is automatically reduced. Depending
5http://cobertura.sourceforge.net/
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on the amount of change that happened to the artifact
since the last review, new (versions of) reviews and up-
dates to the timeliness automatically propagate through
to the karma score metrics that have registered to receive
change notifications.
6.1.1.5 Plug-in architecture
Most of CollabReview’s subsystems and components
can be configured and exchanged using plug-ins. This
enables the prototype to be flexibly adapted to differ-
ent environments. The plug-ins to use are defined and
configured through the master configuration file that is
bundled with the server at build time. The configuration
file can later also be modified when the application has
been deployed to the server.
Typical components that can be configured as plug-
ins are the internal data model and storage engine, input
filters, the importer, user management, reputation/karma
score metrics, service daemons, web interfaces, arbiters,
and algorithms for responsibility, similarity, quality as-
sessment, and weighting of artifacts.
6.1.1.6 User management and authentication
User management and authentication of users are han-
dled through the AuthorManager.
Normally, the user data of all authors is stored in
the database. But an AuthorManager can also imple-
ment transparent access to the user management of the re-
vision repository. For example, the AuthorManager
can map users through to MediaWiki’s user manage-
ment. This reduces the effort for system administrators
and users, as they only need to maintain user accounts
in one system (see also Dencheva (2010) for MediaWiki
and Agaraj (2012) for GForge user management).
A user does not necessarily have to be a natural per-
son. It can be any agent, i.e. including daemons and
software metrics running inside the CollabReview server.
In addition, there can be implicit users who do not (need
to) directly interact with the CollabReview server. Any
one who has contributed to the revision repository, will
automatically get an implicit user account in CollabRe-
view. While such users cannot automatically log on to
CollabReview, karma scores for them will be automati-
cally computed without further administrative efforts.
A user may be an administrator. Administrators are
normal users but in addition to this, they get access rights
to the administrator area of a CollabReview server. The
administrator area is a set of web pages in the CollabRe-
view server, where administrators can change some con-
figuration options during server run-time of the Col-
labReview server.
Some of the read-only services that a CollabReview
server offers, are unprotected. Prior authentication is not
necessary to access these services. For example, the ser-
vice which outputs the current HotW candidate can be
accessed freely. However, most services like entering a
review into CollabReview, require authentication even if
the review is stored into the system using the anonymous
flag. The reason is that there has to be a link between
Author and Review to prevent unauthorized submis-
sion of large numbers of reviews. Every reviewer should
only have one (possibly weighted) vote per artifact.
When a user authenticates to the CollabReview server,
an internal session object is created and becomes associ-
ated with the user. A user who wishes to directly inter-
act with a protected service in the CollabReview server,
needs to present a valid session ticket. Direct interac-
tions are, for example, accessing the web interface of
the server with a web browser, or accessing application
web services through an IDE plug-in.
6.1.2 The major subsystems of the Col-
labReview prototype
This section describes the CollabReview server from the
perspective of its internal structure.
Figure 6.1 shows a simplified UML class diagram of
the CollabReview server. Abstract classes/interfaces are
printed in italics. The diagram only includes classes
which are either central to the architecture or are men-
tioned in other chapters, and only some fields and meth-
ods of the actual implementation. At the root of the
graph is the CollabReview class, which holds the
key components together:
• AuthorManager: Creates and deletes user ac-
counts for developers, reviewers and administra-
tors.
• ConfigurationData: A nested structure of
key and value pairs to configure all elements of
the server, stored for run-time (re-)configuration.
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CollabReview
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1
1
WorkerDaemon
1
1
Author
name:string
email:string
encryptedPassword:string
administrator:boolean
disabled:boolean
1
0..n
ArtifactResponsibility
assessResponsibility(artifact,author)
listResponsibilities(artifact):list of Author
ArtifactQualityAssessor
assessQuality(artifactId)
computeQualityFromReviews(
         reviews)
ArtifactSimilarity
findTransformScript(
       artifact,string,maxEditCost)
ArtifactWeight
measure(artifact)
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
ReputationMetric
{Hookable}
fi lter
beginVisiting()
visit(artifact)
endVisiting()
getName()
getAuthorScore(author):float
getAuthorRank(author):integer
1
0..n
BasicRepository
WikiAuthor
MediawikiImportWorker
SubversionImportWorker
DefaultArtifactQualityAssessor
TokenEditSimilarity
LineCountArtifactWeight
SizeArtifactWeight
UnityWeight
WikiArtifactWeight
Artifact
{Hookable}
artifactIdentifier
content:string
markup
creatorName:string
ancestorId
distance:integer
createDate:date
obsoleteDate:date
hooks:list
1
0..n
1
0..n
MetricQuality
MetricQuantity
MetricTechnicalDebt
MetricReviewAgedCount
MetricMetaMetric
metric:list
1
1..n
...
Review
artifactIdentifier
authorName:string
text:string
rating:integer
timeliness:float
isAnonymous:boolean
rejectedByName:string
rejectionReason:string
ArtifactIdentifier
name
branch
revision
1
1
1
1
Markup 11
HibernateAuthorManager
WikiAuthorManager
Hook
getPriority()
Hookable
hooks:list
addHook(hook)
removeHook(hook)
ArtifactChangeHook
10..n
PostAddHook
ArtifactInstantiatedHook
PreAddHook
SetReviewHook
...
AuthorshipArtifactResponsibility
EditorArtifactResponsibility
LatestContributorResponsibility
...
HibernateRepository
Figure 6.1: Simplified class diagram of CollabReview server
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• Importer: Manages the ImportWorker im-
plementation that fetches software process artifacts
from the revision repository to put them into the
Repository. This gives the prototype the flexi-
bility to add to different kinds of artifacts.
• LifecycleManager: Forwards application life-
cycle events (start up, shutdown) to registered life-
cycle listeners (not detailed further).
• MailManager: Sends emails to users and admin-
istrators, e.g. if an artifact was reviewed, or if an
error occurred, respectively (not detailed further).
• MeasurementsManager: Provides metrics for
measuring artifacts with regard to various aspects
like their importance in relation to other artifacts.
• Repository: Access to the data persistence
layer where artifacts and reviews are stored.
• ReputationMetricManager: Container for
all the reputation/karma metrics that are computed.
• WorkerDaemon: A background worker thread
for recurring tasks like polling the revision reposi-
tory for updates (not detailed further).
6.1.2.1 AuthorManager component
The AuthorManager maintains a list of all agents
that are known to the server. Known agents have con-
tributed by modifying software process artifacts in the
revision repository or have written one or more reviews,
or they perform only read accesses. As long as there are
any traces of contributions left in the system, an accord-
ing Author entry must exist for data integrity reasons.
However, Authors can be marked as disabled which
prohibits them from interacting directly with CollabRe-
view any more; they can still indirectly interact through
the revision repository.
New users (Authors) can be created by the
AuthorManager by just specifying a new unique
name. Other properties of the user (email, password,
etc.) can be set and changed on the Author object
itself. After that, Authors can be saved, and later be
listed or loaded. Depending on whether the underlying
database supports transactions, changes have to be
committed explicitly.
The AuthorManager is an interface which
must be implemented by a class. Currently, there
are two implementations of the AuthorManager.
HibernateAuthorManager stores its Authors in
the server’s database using the Hibernate framework.
WikiAuthorManager transparently maps requests
to a MediaWiki database but only supports read op-
erations. They work as expected but use data that
comes directly from the MediaWiki database: a user
created or any change made in MediaWiki becomes
immediately visible. Write operations like creating a
new user are not permitted/supported to protect data
integrity from concurrent modifications in MediaWiki
and CollabReview.
6.1.2.2 ConfigurationData component
The CollabReview server is highly configurable. This
makes it flexible and adaptable to different kinds of soft-
ware process artifacts (see Requirement-3: “Flexible ap-
plicability”). Almost all components take their own con-
figuration information. Some components can be fully
customized by configuring a different implementation
for an interface.
A ConfigurationData object is usually cre-
ated by reading a configuration file at start up. It
has a name and value itself, and can contain nested
ConfigurationData objects. A sub-tree of the full
configuration tree is passed to a component to configure
its behavior.
6.1.2.3 Importer component
The Importer is responsible for retrieving all relevant
software process artifacts from the project’s revision
repository. The actual work of importing is done by
a revision repository-dependent implementation of the
ImportWorker interface, which can be configured
using ConfigurationData. The ImportWorker
implementation is started in regular intervals to poll the
revision repository for new artifacts and revisions.
Currently, there is a SubversionImportWorker
that crawls a Subversion repository using configured ac-
cess information. Unwanted artifacts (e.g. non-source
code artifacts) can be left out by defining a filter. In Sub-
version, artifacts are grouped into directories, and there
are operations that affect an entire directory, i.e. all arti-
facts that are contained in this group. The import worker
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therefore creates, maintains and deletes groups in the
Repository to reflect mass manipulations of artifacts.
It also analyzes the directory structure to derive branch
and tag information according to the popular convention
of putting artifacts in the trunk into a directory named
“trunk”, and artifacts in a branch into a sub-directory
with the branch name in “branches”.
Additionally, there is a MediwikiImportWorker
which analyzes the database of a MediaWiki (cf.
Dencheva, 2010). As there are no branches and no
mass manipulations of artifacts, the import worker does
not need to support such operations. Agaraj (2012)
implemented an import worker for the GForge wiki
plug-in.
6.1.2.4 MeasurementsManager component
The MeasurementsManager contains basic metrics
for measuring certain aspects of software process arti-
facts. All metrics implement their respective interface,
and are fully configurable and exchangeable.
ArtifactResponsibility measures the ratio
of responsibility that an author has for an artifact. Sum-
ming up all responsibility ratios of authors gives 1 (see
Section 5.2.3). The LatestContributorRespon-
sibility implements the CONT metric, Editor-
ArtifactResponsibility implements EDIT, and
AuthorshipArtifactResponsibility imple-
ments AUTH. For more detailed explanations of the
different authorship algorithms and a comparison with
further implemented derivatives see Section 7.3.2.4.
The ArtifactQualityAssessor determines
the quality of an artifact by looking at its reviews.
Currently, there is only the DefaultArtifactQua-
lityAssessor implementation, which takes the
average review rating of all reviews for this artifact
weighted by the reviews’ respective timeliness as
defined in Section 5.2.4.4.
Likewise, there is only the default TokenEdit-
Similarity implementation for the ArtifactSi-
milarity metric. It determines the similarity between
an artifact’s content string and another string by means
of the string edit distance. It only allows for operations
on full tokens, which are separated by a specific sepa-
rator character, for instance the newline character. The
edit operations have a cost that is proportional to the
length of the tokens.
ArtifactWeight determines the importance
of a software process artifact, so that more impor-
tant artifacts can receive a higher weight w(a) in
the various computations. Exemplary implementa-
tions are LineCountArtifactWeight which
assigns a higher weight for artifacts with more lines,
SizeArtifactWeight which counts the number
of characters, UnityWeight which returns the same
weight for all artifacts, and WikiArtifactWeight
which considers artifact size and view counts. See
Section 5.2.2 for a discussion of why there are different
artifact weights.
6.1.2.5 Repository component
The Repository is the data store for reviews
(Review) and software process artifacts (Artifact).
It is Hookable, which means that it implements a
Publish-subscribe pattern. The Repository pub-
lishes certain events to listeners that subscribe to them.
For example, such events are generated when a new
Artifact is about to be added to the repository, or
after a new Artifact has been added to the repository.
Groupings allow to apply mass manipulations like
renaming or deleting to software process artifacts in
the Repository. Artifacts can be put into group-
ings, groupings can be altered, and they can be deleted.
Groupings were introduced to be able to better reflect
the changes to files in a revision control system like Sub-
version.
Reviews and Artifacts use ArtifactIden-
tifiers to refer to certain software process artifacts.
The identifier encapsulates an artifact’s name, branch
name, and the artifact’s revision number. The revision
number has to be increasing for different revisions of
the artifact but does not need to be successive. Numbers
may be left out between two revisions.
6.1.2.6 ReputationMetricManager compo-
nent
The ReputationMetricManager maintains a col-
lection of reputation and karma metrics. It has a filter to
exclude unwanted artifacts from the scores. For exam-
ple, it allows to exclude branches in a software project
where only the trunk is to be analyzed. The manager
bestows the filter upon all metrics managed by it unless
they explicitly override it.
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When the server starts, the manager ensures that all
artifacts that are not filtered out, are visited by each
ReputationMetric following the Visitor pattern.
This visiting serves to initialize the karma scores,
because each metric caches the respective scores for
the agents. After the initialization is complete, each
ReputationMetric hooks (see Section 6.1.2.5)
into events that can influence its scores following the
Publish-subscribe pattern. This hooking allows the
metric to immediately update cached scores whenever a
respective change occurs. Up-to-date karma scores are
always available from the respective metric.
At the moment there is a dozen different Repu-
tationMetrics which are not all detailed here. The
most important ones are
• MetricQuality which computes the average
quality of an agent’s contributions to software pro-
cess artifacts,
• MetricQuantity for an agents’ amount of con-
tributions to artifacts,
• MetricTechnicalDebt for an estimate of the
cost of technical debt an agent has brought into the
source code in Euro,
• MetricReviewAgedCount which is the sum
of the timelinesses of all of an agent’s reviews, and
• MetricMetaMetric which combines other
metrics into a new one using basic mathematical
operations like adding or multiplying (see also
Section 5.2.5).
6.1.3 Summary of architecture
This section gave an overview of the architecture of the
CollabReview prototype. First, it introduced overarching
concepts, and how a CollabReview server integrates into
the infrastructure of a software project. Its plug-in mech-
anisms make it adaptable to different environments, and
allow for future extensibility (see Requirement-3: “Flex-
ible applicability”). In the second part, it explained the
inner workings of the server in more detail while build-
ing on a class diagram of the most important classes.
6.2 Application and User Inter-
faces
CollabReview provides a set of interfaces to users and
applications. They integrate into various environments
to show user and reputation information, facilitate the
submission of reviews, and allow generic access to Col-
labReview.
6.2.1 Web user interfaces
As a web-based application, CollabReview has a range
of interfaces that allow all kinds of accesses to its func-
tions through web browsers. The web portal user inter-
face allows access to all functions that CollabReview
provides, making it independent from the actual environ-
ment. However, the web portal may not be well suited
for every application context. For example, instead of
having to log on to a different web page to rate an arti-
cle in the wiki, it is better from a usability perspective
if a reviewing widget is directly embedded in the arti-
cle page. The set of available functions can therefore
be extended through servlets and JSPs. Additionally,
ExtensionServlets can be configured in the con-
figuration files so that they are only available in some
installations of the CollabReview server.
6.2.1.1 CollabReview web portal
The CollabReview web portal is the default web user
interface that is available in all installations of CollabRe-
view. After logging on at its starting page with valid
user information (see Figure 6.2), the user has access to
all the basic functions of CollabReview. Users can
• browse the library of non-obsolete software process
artifacts (see Figure 6.3),
• see a detailed information page for each artifact,
including authorship and responsibility information
(colors in the source window), its ancestors and
quality rating, submitted reviews, and users can
submit own reviews, and view or reject other ones
(see Figure 6.4),
• view their personal page which shows information
like the user’s best or worst rated artifact, the num-
ber of reviews, which reviews have been rejected,
what the timeliness of their reviews is, the average
quality of one’s own artifacts etc.,
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Figure 6.2: CollabReview portal log in page
Figure 6.3: Browsing artifacts in CollabReview portal
• and admins can check internal states, e.g. the
progress of the software process artifact import
from the revision repository.
6.2.1.2 Widgets
Widgets are small applications and incomplete web
pages that are embedded into other web pages. They add
extended or new functionality to their surrounding web
page in the user’s browser. Widgets are analogous to
IDE plug-ins for web-based tools and are an easy way of
extending an existing web application. Several widgets
have been developed for CollabReview that made it inte-
grate into existing software like the Moknowpedia wiki,
or GForge. For example, Figure 6.5 shows the main
page of the Moknowpedia wiki with diverse embedded
widgets. The individual widgets are described below.
Reviewing widgets Reviewing widgets add review
submission functionality. Figure 6.6 shows screenshots
of such widgets for MediaWiki. Figure 6.6a is a widget
embedded into a MediaWiki page with radio buttons for
rating the article, a text field for the review comment, a
check box for anonymous or non-anonymous submis-
sion, and scales for average artifact quality (stars), ar-
tifact importance (accelerator panel), and timeliness of
the own review (traffic light).
Clicking the “Alle Bewertungen!” (all reviews) link,
leads to the list of reviews in Figure 6.6b. Left of the
text is a number that counts the stars (quality rating) that
the review gave to the artifact. “Zuru¨ckgewiesen” means
that the second review has been rejected. The third and
fourth review have been submitted anonymously without
a text comment. The fifth review was submitted non-
anonymously.
Clicking the “anonym” link leads to the review re-
jection form for the respective review; shown in Figure
6.6c. It contains a warning message that rejecting the
review will reveal the identity of the rejecting user. The
form offers a text field to enter a rejection reason.
Figure 6.6d shows a simplified reviewing widget em-
bedded in GForge. The number of reviews and average
quality rating for the artifact have numerical representa-
tions, and reviews cannot be rejected or listed directly.
Moknowpedia domain ranks and rewards Domain
ranks are the ranks of users with regard to a certain
karma score. For example, a quality rank would list the
users with the highest average quality score irregardless
of any other aspects. A user who only contributed to a
single top rated artifact would have a top quality score,
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Figure 6.4: Viewing artifact details in CollabReview server web portal
whereas someone who contributed much more but to
worse rated artifacts would receive a lower score. Figure
6.7 shows some widgets that present a domain rank.
Next to the photo of a user of the wiki, his level is pre-
sented (see Figure 6.8). The level directly results from
his karma score. The levels are intended as a rewarding
mechanism to motivate users to increase their score (see
Section 5.4.2.6). The ranking table and HotW aspirant
as shown in Figure 6.5 serve the same purpose.
6.2.1.3 ReputationForge
The ReputationForge extension presented by Agaraj
(2012) is a social game that acts as a rewarding mecha-
nism to motivate users to achieve higher karma scores. It
integrates into the GForge platform in two ways: Firstly,
it provides simple widgets as presented above, e.g. for
submitting reviews in the GForge wiki. But secondly, it
consists of a fat widget that does not interact or augment
its surrounding web page but is a full web application of
its own that runs in its own tab in the GForge plug-ins
tab. ReputationForge is an extensive social game imple-
mented in an interactive and asynchronous web applica-
tion. It would not have been feasible to fully integrate
it into the GForge web interface; instead, it has its own
frame inside one of the tabs of the GForge web interface.
Figure 6.9 is a screenshot of the starting page of Reputa-
tionForge running in its own tab in the GForge project
view. Apart from its web interfaces, ReputationForge
also interacts with users through emails. The Reputa-
tionForge system is not detailed here any further.
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Figure 6.5: Moknowpedia main page augmented with several widgets
(a) Moknowpedia widget
for adding a review
(b) Moknowpedia widget
listing reviews
(c) Moknowpedia widget
for rejecting a review
(d) GForge widget to submit a re-
view
Figure 6.6: Reviewing widgets
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(a) Who has the highest quantity? (b) Who is writing the most positive reviews?
(c) Who has the most up-to-date reviews? (d) Special feature: write mail to low scoring user
Figure 6.7: Moknowpedia domain ranks and special features
Figure 6.8: Moknowpedia avatars augmented with levels resulting from karma scores
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Figure 6.9: Main page of ReputationForge within a GForge project
6.2.2 Web services
The CollabReview server provides web service inter-
faces for communicating with other applications like
external extensions or IDE plug-ins.
6.2.2.1 Karma scores overview
The karma scores web service generates XML output.
It contains the karma scores of every user with respect
to all configured ReputationMetrics. It therefore
grants external application full access to the computed
karma scores. The web service was used in the field
experiments to periodically collect data on developer
karma scores so that their development history could be
analyzed afterward.
The web service is a read only service without
access restrictions. It is accessible at URL http:
//[CollabReviewServer]/accounting/
xml?method=getOverallStats in every server
instance. The service was mostly used during eval-
uations of this research to monitor the individual
developers’ progresses. Figure 6.10 contains a listing
with the output of the karma scores web service for
Moknowpedia. The response is, of course, wrapped in a
standard-compliant Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
response for transport. This is not shown here.
6.2.2.2 Quality report text
Figure 6.11 shows a report that is generated by a
configurable ExtensionServlet at URL http:
//[CollabReviewServer]/extension/
ProjectReport. The web service does not take
input and is read only. Its reports were used during the
ScrumLab6 evaluation to inform developers of their
score, to explain them where their scores come from,
and to hint them on how to improve their score.
The report consists of a ranking table that presents
each developer’s quality scores, i.e. the average quality
of the files they are responsible for, followed by a short
report for each non-obsolete artifact. Per artifact, the
report starts with the artifact’s name and current revision.
Next is the main responsible person (called “main con-
tributor”), and her responsibility percentage printed in
brackets. After that all reviews for the artifact are repro-
duced, including the quality rating and the reason. The
reasons were generated automatically through static anal-
ysis using Checkstyle with the Java Code Conventions
(King et al., 1997). Javadoc violations were counted
twice (marked with !), or thrice (marked with !!) in
the case of public members.
6A pseudonym for a student software project used in the evaluation.
For more details refer to Section 7.1.6.7.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<accounting>
<head>
<protocol><version>1.0</version></protocol>
<server><name>moknowpedia</name></server>
</head>
<totals>
<contributor name="A*****">
<score type="quality">1.9</score>
<score type="quantity">5.2</score>
<score type="score">9.8</score>
<score type="busyreview">10.0</score>
<score type="bias">7.9</score>
<score type="agedcount">9.0</score>
<score type="loneranger">0.0</score>
<score type="silfwiki">18.8</score>
<score type="averagereviewage">0.9</score>
</contributor>
<contributor name="A*****"><!-- ... --></contributor>
<contributor name="A***"><!-- ... --></contributor>
<!--
...
-->
<contributor name="Z***"><!-- ... --></contributor>
</totals>
</accounting>
Figure 6.10: XML output of karma scores web service
6.2.2.3 Review web service
The review web service reads and writes reviews from
and to a CollabReview server. IDE plug-ins access this
service to provide integration with the server.
The service expects several input parameters: a com-
mand string (as explained below), the user’s account and
password, and a target software process artifact. The
artifact can either be the full name of the artifact or a
fragment of its name. In the latter case, the service will
try to guess an artifact which resembles the name as
closely as possible. This special handling is necessary
as the full artifact name might not be known to the IDE
plug-in because it only knows its file name on the devel-
oper’s local hard disc.
The command string is either save or load. The
save command takes the three additional parameter
strings rating, text and anonymous. Rating is
an integer number string with the review’s rating, text
its comment, and anonymous a boolean string specify-
ing if the review should be submitted anonymously.
Load loads a stored review from CollabReview. Fig-
ure 6.12 shows the response to a load request. The re-
sponse is wrapped in a standard HTTP response with
content type text/plain. The first line of the re-
sponse is the version number of the web service. Com-
ments start with a “#” character. The content of the
response is encoded as key-value pairs.
All responses contain the status key, which is ei-
ther “ok” or “error”. A load response additionally
contains the rating value, whether the review is marked
as anonymous, and the review text. An error response
contains a description of the error and a stack trace for
analysis of the cause.
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Project quality performance overview (generated: 2012-06-29 08:00:01)
=====================================================================
Developer quality score overview:
+------+----------------------+-------+
| Rank | Developer | Score |
+------+----------------------+-------+
| 1 | a********* | 10.0 |
| 2 | e*********** | 10.0 |
| 3 | a********** | 10.0 |
| 4 | i************ | 10.0 |
| 5 | b******** | 10.0 |
| 6 | x************* | 9.5 |
| 7 | f********* | 9.3 |
+------+----------------------+-------+
/Android/G*******************************/Waypoint.java (rev. 371)
--------------------------------------------------
Main contributor: b******** (90.4%)
Review (rated 10): Source file statistics: Lines: 156 \
Violations: 0 (0 x1, 0 x2, 0 x3) Violations per Line: 0.0
******
/Android/G********************************/R.java (rev. 115)
--------------------------------------------------
Main contributor: f********* (59.1%)
Review (rated -7): Source file statistics: Lines: 30 \
Violations: 95 (34 x1, 5 x2, 17 x3) Violations per Line: 3.2
Line 0: File does not end with a newline.
Line 10 (!!): Missing a Javadoc comment.
Line 11 (!!): Missing a Javadoc comment.
Line 11 (!): Name ’attr’ must match pattern ’ˆ[A-Z][a-zA-Z0-9]*$’.
Line 13 (!!): Missing a Javadoc comment.
Line 13 (!): Name ’drawable’ must match pattern ’ˆ[A-Z][a-zA-Z0-9]*$’.
Line 14 (!!): Missing a Javadoc comment.
Line 14: Name ’ic_launcher’ must match pattern ...
Line 14: ’=’ is not preceded with whitespace.
Line 14: ’=’ is not followed by whitespace.
Line 16 (!!): Missing a Javadoc comment.
[more violations and files truncated]
Figure 6.11: Quality report for a Java project
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1.0
#CollabReview WebService response
#Tue Jul 03 13:39:05 CEST 2012
status=ok
rating=7
anonymous=true
text=das bin ja ich!
Figure 6.12: Loading a review from the web service
Figure 6.13: Review plug-in for VisualStudio
6.2.3 IDE plug-ins
IDE plug-ins are provided to reduce the perceived dis-
tance between the developer’s usual working environ-
ment, and the reviewing platform. They enable develop-
ers to swiftly change into the reviewer role. Reducing
the distance is crucial for increasing the chance that de-
velopers will submit reviews. Whenever a developer is
working with a piece of source code, he automatically
forms an opinion of it. When he then wants to submit
a review, he can select “Submit Review” from the con-
text menu and be presented a review dialog to submit or
update his review (Prause and Apelt, 2008).
Only one IDE plug-in has been developed so far. De-
velopment of plug-ins for IntelliJ and Eclipse IDEs was
planned but discarded in favor static analysis and devel-
opments for wikis. Figure 6.13 presents the Graphical
User Interface (GUI) of this plug-in for VisualStudio7.
7http://www.microsoft.com/visualstudio/
6.2.4 Email notifications
The CollabReview server can send emails to developers
on various occasions. For example, if a review is submit-
ted for one of the developer’s artifacts, he can receive
an email with the review rating and comment. However,
not every instance of the server has to make use of all
notification emails. Instead, notifications have to be con-
figured separately depending on the project context.
Sending of mails is facilitated through the Mail-
Manager. The advantage of emails is that they can ad-
vertise and attract users to CollabReview and the karma
scores. Emails push information to the user instead of
requiring him to pull the information himself. But if a
user receives too much of such information, it can annoy
him and make him protect himself from such inadvertent
information by installing a filter for such emails. Conse-
quently, caution must be exercised what events are tied
to emails. A variety of email notifications have been
implemented and used in CollabReview.
6.2.4.1 Review notifications
Review notifications are sent whenever a review is up-
dated or when a new one is submitted for a software
process artifact. Only contributors who are above a re-
sponsibility threshold of 5% will receive the email. Con-
tributors below the threshold are not considered to have
made a relevant contribution to the artifact, and should
not be bothered unnecessarily. The notifications are im-
plemented with a SetReviewHook that gets invoked
automatically when a review is added or updated.
The email in Figure 6.14 says that the user’s article
has been reviewed with a rating of “very good”. The
comment implies that the reviewed article is an awesome
screenshot. Review notifications were only used in Mo-
knowpedia. In programming environments where source
code was analyzed, review notifications were considered
unnecessary because a review based on static analysis oc-
curred immediately after a change was submitted. Who-
ever changed source files received immediate feedback
because summaries with the new karma scores were then
sent to all developers.
6.2.4.2 Hero of the week
The HotW award was part of Moknowpedia. To an-
nounce the winner, an email was sent to the work group’s
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From: MoknowPedia
To: m***********@fit.fraunhofer.de
Hallo J******,
dein Artikel "*******" wurde gerade
anonym mit _sehr gut_ bewertet!
Optionaler Kommentar der Bewertung:
Großartiger Screenshot, M***. Du
bist der gro¨ßte!.
Bester Gruß,
Euer MoKnowPedianer
PS: Diese URL fu¨hrt dich direkt zum
Artikel: http://moknowpedia/media
wiki/index.php5/***
Figure 6.14: Artifact reviewed notification mail
From: MoknowPedia
To: [some-group]@fit.fraunhofer.de
Hallo zusammen,
J*** hat sich diese Woche mit 6,1
Punkten sehr verdient um die
Moknowpedia und den Wissensaustausch
in unserer Gruppe gemacht. Da ko¨nnen
die anderen nur staunen und du¨rfen
sich ruhig ein Beispiel nehmen! ;-)
Seid fleißig,
Euer Moknowpedianer
Figure 6.15: Hero of the Week announcement
internal mailing list once a week. Figure 6.15 shows
such email. It states who the HotW is and how many
points he earned during the week, and that others should
follow his example.
6.2.4.3 Daily quality score report
In the AgileLab, developers did not have access to Col-
labReview for organizational policies. Moreover, push-
ing information to them instead of having them consult
a web page was considered as a better way. Instead, a
From: CollabReview server
To: [some-list]@*****.uni-bonn.de
Dear participant of the *** lab,
this daily mail informs you about
the current Javadoc reputation ranks
Javadoc reputation ranking table:
1. S************ (5.39 points)
2. S********** (5.37 points)
3. L******* (5.00 points)
4. S*********** (4.96 points)
5. K************** (4.83 points)
6. K************* (4.41 points)
7. U************** (4.26 points)
8. P**************** (3.80 points)
9. V************** (3.00 points)
In order to improve your reputation
scores consider writing
* Class descriptions (important)
* Method descriptions (public
methods more important than
private ones)
* Variable descriptions, and
* @param, @return, etc. tags for
methods.
Note, your reputation score not only
depends on the Javadoc for classes/
methods/variables committed by you
but all classes/methods/variables in
files that you have contributed to.
Figure 6.16: Daily email with quality ranks
daily email was sent to their general mailing list in the
evening, giving them an overview of their current scores.
A reprinted email can be seen in Figure 6.16.
6.2.4.4 Technical debt ranks
A similar mail was sent to the general mailing list of the
developers of TornBond. The intention was to increase
the developers’ awareness of their scores. It contained
an estimate of the amount of technical debt that each
developer brought into the project, i.e. it expresses the
cost in Euro that it would cost to fix the coding style
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problems made by the respective developer (see Figure
6.17).
An email would be sent whenever there was no com-
mit for 15 minutes after the developer had committed a
new revision of the source code to the revision reposi-
tory. However, these emails were not well-received by
the developers (see also Section 7.8).
6.2.5 Summary of CollabReview proto-
type interfaces
The CollabReview server provides interfaces for other
applications and for human users. Besides its flexible
plug-in infrastructure that allows components to be in-
serted directly into the server, interfaces are also pro-
vided through network access, either as web services or
as web pages and widgets. Additionally, the prototype
“interfaces” with users by sending emails.
Originally, the CollabReview server only provided a
web front-end for users for major interactions. However,
closer integration with the user’s working contexts was
necessary to (a) increase the usability of the provided
functionality, and (b) increase the reach and presence
of the reputation system. Therefore email notifications
and IDE plug-ins were necessary. Latter ones made
web services necessary, which also proved useful for
collecting data.
6.3 Summary of the prototype
The previous chapter elaborated the theoretical concepts
of CollabReview, its development process, and the con-
ceptual and technical requirements. The CollabReview
concept is a socio-technical system that requires support
from software tools. Therefore, this chapter completes
the above concept by presenting the CollabReview pro-
totype. It is the software implementation of the technical
parts of the system, and provides all necessary function-
ality. In its final form, it is the result of an implementa-
tion that evolved alongside the concepts to support them
during their several iterations.
The heart of the CollabReview prototype is the Col-
labReview server. It extracts software process artifacts
from their repositories, estimates artifact quality based
on reviews and quality metrics, assigns responsibilities
to developers, computes karma scores, provides vari-
ous kinds of user interfaces, and exposes application
interfaces through web-services. It currently consists
of about 400 classes with a total of 32 KLOC of Java
code. The prototype is available as open source under
the Apache 2.0 license on SourceForge.net8.
Its modular architecture and far-reaching configura-
tion capabilities gave it the required flexibility to adapt
it to different test environments. The next chapters vali-
date that the concept and implementation are sound and
function as required, and evaluate the benefit of Col-
labReview for software projects based on a series of
experiments.
8http://sourceforge.net/projects/
collabreview/
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Liebe Entwickler,
eine A¨nderung wurde in das SourceForge repository u¨bertragen und
anschließend auf Konformita¨t zu den Java Coding Conventions u¨berpru¨ft.
Diese Mail informiert euch u¨ber eure aktuelle Code-Qualita¨ts-Reputation
nach dieser A¨nderung.
Technische Schuld insgesamt: 437200EUR (Vera¨nderung: -500EUR).
Javadoc Reputations-Rangliste:
1. p*******: -3.28 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +100EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
2. a*******: -4.35 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +800EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
3. h*******: -4.82 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +1500EUR (Vera¨nderung: -300EUR)
4. l*******: -5.04 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +500EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
5. s*******: -6.05 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +1500EUR (Vera¨nderung: -100EUR)
6. f*******: -6.05 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +3000EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
7. h*******: -6.11 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +3000EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
8. p*******: -6.40 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +418400EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
9. t*******: -6.64 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +6800EUR (Vera¨nderung: -200EUR)
10. P*******: -7.31 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +400EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
11. a*******: -8.73 Pkte, Tech. Schuld: +1200EUR (Vera¨nderung: ---)
Die U¨berpru¨fung einer der Dateien im A¨nderungssatz ergab (beispielhaft):
Datei: /***/*CryptoImpl.java
Bewertung: 0
Bewertet durch: Checkstyle
Erkla¨rung: I have some problems with this file
(0 show-stopper(s), 26 problem(s), 1 warning(s)).
The most critical ones are:
1. (line 26, criticality: problem): Name ’IDENTITY_MGR’ must match
pattern ’ˆ[a-z][a-zA-Z0-9]*$’.
Source: private static String IDENTITY_MGR = ***.class
2. (line 40, criticality: problem): Method ’createHIDForAttributes’
is not designed for extension.
Source: public HID create***(Part[] parts) {
3. (line 40, criticality: problem): Parameter parts should be final.
Source: public HID create***(Part[] parts) {
4. (line 40, criticality: problem): Expected @param tag for ’parts’.
Source: public HID create***(Part[] parts) {
5. (line 43, criticality: problem): ’try’ is not followed by whitespace.
Source: try{
Figure 6.17: Technical debt ranks mail
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Chapter 7
Validation and Evaluation
Walking on water and developing software from a specification are
easy if both are frozen.
— Edward V. Berard
THIS chapter wants to answer the research questionof this work. It validates the CollabReview con-cept and prototype against the set of requirements
that were defined in Section 5.1.2, and evaluates the
benefits of CollabReview for the software development
process. The goal is also to create a realistic image of
the benefits and disadvantages of the concept. Valida-
tion and evaluation can contribute to each other and are
very much linked, while still being different processes.
Following the definitions in system design as described
by Marwedel (2011), validation is the rigorous process
of checking whether requirements are met:
Definition 58 – Validation
Validation determines whether or not the requirements
are fulfilled by CollabReview (either concept or proto-
type, as applicable to the respective type of requirement).
Surveying data about a design while taking into ac-
count various criteria, and preparing this data for selec-
tive comparison, is the process of evaluation.
Definition 59 – Evaluation
Evaluation surveys quantitative information about key
characteristics of CollabReview to allow differentiated
valuation and interpretation.
Consequently, the processes of validation and eval-
uation both contribute to each other in the evaluation
of a concept at large. Section 7.1 details the evaluation
procedure including a description of the environments in
which the various studies took place (see Section 7.1.6).
The following sections each describe the studies that
were conducted as part of the validation, and are summa-
rized in an overview in Section 7.12. The data collected
from these studies validates whether the CollabReview
concept and prototype fulfill all of the requirements that
are reported in Section 7.13. Subsequently, the valida-
tion result contributes to the concluding evaluation of
CollabReview.
7.1 Procedure
The goal of the evaluation is to analyze, estimate, discuss
and show what the value of CollabReview is. The gen-
eral procedure is to first validate the CollabReview con-
cept and prototype against the set of requirements from
Section 5.1, and to then evaluate the concept through a
discussion of validation results (see Section 7.14). While
the validation of a requirement is basically a yes or no
answer, giving this answer may require an evaluation of
relevant characteristics by itself.
The validation of some requirements is simple be-
cause the answer is obvious. For example, some ones
can be validated by looking at the architecture of the
CollabReview prototype. Other requirements, however,
have to be addressed in separate studies.
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Definition 60 – Study
A study is a detailed scientific investigation and analysis
of a situation (Oxford Dictionary, 1994).
Several studies were conducted for this research. The
ones presented first are more concerned with technical
aspects, e.g. validity of karma scores. Later ones de-
ployed CollabReview in natural environments to study
social effects. An overview of conducted studies is pre-
sented in Section 7.12. It revolves around Table 7.7 on
page 209, which summarizes the most important facts.
7.1.1 Evaluation methods
Rosson and Carroll (2002) distinguish analytic and em-
pirical evaluation in usability engineering. Analytic
evaluation is somewhat analogous to the static analysis
of software, while empirical evaluation is like dynamic
analysis (see Section 3.3.1): The first one examines fea-
tures and characteristics of the subject of study to draw
its conclusions, while the second one actually trials the
subject to gather data under real conditions. With regard
to this research, both evaluation methods are defined as
follows:
Definition 61 – Analytical evaluation
Analytical evaluation means evaluation methods that
examine features and characteristics of CollabReview
theoretically, i.e. without actually using the prototype.
Analytical evaluation methods include architecture
analysis, logical deduction and expert interviews with
experts who have not used the prototype themselves.
Definition 62 – Empirical evaluation
Empirical evaluation means evaluation methods that trial
the CollabReview prototype (or parts thereof) in a real
world setting (potentially with real users) to gather data.
7.1.1.1 Concept Evaluation
Concept evaluations are an analytical evaluation method.
They took place throughout the research process, also in-
cluding very early phases of development. The concept
developed so far and partial aspects of it were reviewed
by users and other stakeholders. Usually, evaluations
are done by experts in the field who judge the concepts
based on descriptions, prototypes or other presentations
in a controlled environment. Expert workshops can be
organized as personal one-on-one interviews, or as fo-
cus groups where a small group of experts engage in
a group discussion about the concept (van Boeijen and
Daalhuizen, 2010).
Definition 63 – Concept evaluation
Concept evaluations are an analytical evaluation method
where experts judge concepts that have been presented
to them in a suitable way.
Concept evaluations provide two kinds of feedback:
First, experts assess the practical significance of the
CollabReview concept. It reveals flaws in the concepts,
shows if experts deem an approach valuable, and if they
can imagine using it themselves. Second, the experts
also evaluate the CollabReview prototype, and partial
aspects like the rewarding system, or its architecture.
This can help to better realize the underlying concepts.
The advantages of concept evaluations are two-fold.
First, they provide feedback early in the development
process before too much effort is spent in an unpromising
direction. Second, they give cost-effective access to
environments where experiments are not (yet) possible
or advisable, because e.g. they are not easily accessible,
functional prototypes are not available, or to mitigate
risks of the effects that a field experiment can have on
the environment. While expert opinions are subjectively
colored, they exploit the experiences of experts that each
gained through many years of practice.
Expert feedback (including developers that have ac-
tually worked with CollabReview) complements the in-
formation necessary for assessment of the concept. Of
course, analytic evaluation cannot replace empirical eval-
uation.
7.1.1.2 Experiment
The main empirical evaluation method is the experiment.
Other methods like expert interviews with actual users
of the prototype are possible, too.
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Definition 64 – Experiment
Experiment is the testing of the CollabReview concept
(or parts thereof) represented through the CollabReview
prototype in an empirical setting that may be purely
technical with real-world data, or it may additionally
include human subjects as users.
An experiment artificially alters the independent vari-
able to then show that the dependent variables have
changed as well. The ideal experiment establishes a
causal relationship between both variables without the
shadow of a doubt that the observed dependence could
also have some other origin (Grinnell et al., 2011).
Experiments can have varying degrees of naturalness.
Harrison and List (2004) define a field experiment as
an experiment taking place under “natural” conditions
regarding several dimensions like the pool of human sub-
jects, or the environment the subjects operate in. They
note that often there is no sharp line between laboratory
and field experiments. While field experiments limit the
experimental control of the experimenter, field experi-
ments have the big advantage of a natural context which
is essential for studying human behavior. Often field
experiments sacrifice a bit of internal validity to improve
the external validity of the experiment.
Internal and external validity of experiments The
validity of studies describes how much trust there is in
that the results of the study are actually the result of the
phenomenon they ought to investigate. An ideal experi-
ment results in certainty about the relationship between
the independent and the dependent variable. Uncon-
trolled factors are threats to that certainty. They can even
invalidate research results. Evaluation of a research de-
sign distinguishes between internal and external validity
(Grinnell et al., 2011).
Definition 65 – Internal validity
A study is internally valid if its result is unambiguously
interpretable. Internal validity declines with an increas-
ing number of plausible alternative explanations due to
uncontrolled confounding variables (Bortz, 2005).
Internal validity is attained by ruling out any rival hy-
potheses for a change in the dependent variable by creat-
ing a clean environment. The only cause for a change in
the dependent variable may be the independent variable.
However, controlling the environment variables means
that it is less natural. Controlled substitutes of natural
variables might no longer represent reality, or other nat-
ural influences might have been forgotten. The results
of the experiment would then no longer generalize to
settings outside the research situation (Grinnell et al.,
2011).
Definition 66 – External validity
A study is externally valid if its result can be generalized
beyond the specific conditions of the research situation
and subjects. External validity declines with decreas-
ing naturalness and representativeness of the surveyed
samples (Bortz, 2005).
Group research designs of experiments Group
research designs resemble an ideal experiment most
closely. They create results on the highest level of the
knowledge continuum because they aim to establish a
causal connection between independent and dependent
variable. Their results are therefore most likely to be
valid and generalizable to other situations (Grinnell
et al., 2011).
In classical experimental design, there are an experi-
mental and a control group of subjects. The subjects are
assigned randomly to one group or the other thereby es-
tablishing two groups that are equivalent with respect to
all important variables. After measuring the dependent
variables in a pretest, the experimental group receives
the intervention, while the control group does not. At the
end, the dependent variables are measured again. The
control group design helps to control for rival hypothe-
ses: a measured difference for the experimental group
that also manifests in the measurements for the control
group is likely to be due to rival hypotheses and not due
to the independent variable (Grinnell et al., 2011).
In quasi-experimental research it is not possible to
distribute subjects randomly into control and experi-
mental groups due to practical, ethical or other lim-
itations (Plante, 2011). Evidence provided by quasi-
experimental design is considered below the gold stan-
dard of true experimental design but they are often the
most appropriate method to build knowledge about a
topic (Manuel et al., 2011).
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Pretest and posttest results of the experimental group
from a classical experiment can also be compared with-
out data from the control group. The control group can
then be left out. Such an experimental design is then
called one-group pretest-posttest design (Grinnell et al.,
2011), or within-group design. Whereas the compari-
son between control and experimental groups is called
between-group design (Plante, 2011).
7.1.2 Statistical tools
There are two important statistical tools used in the anal-
ysis of the data collected in the experiments. They are
discussed here shortly.
7.1.2.1 Correlation
A correlation describes a relationship between variables
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn}. How-
ever, it may not be confused with causation, but only that
the variables are somehow associated. The correlation
coefficient −1 ≤ r ≤ +1 is a numerical expression of
the strength of the relation, where r < 0 denotes an
inverse relation.
Pearson and Spearman correlations The Pearson
correlation is the most commonly encountered corre-
lation. It finds a linear relationship between the two
variables, and allows regression analysis to derive a lin-
ear function that can predict the value of y for some x.
Unless noted otherwise, correlation coefficients r mean
a Pearson correlation.
Another important correlation is the Spearman rank
correlation. This correlation is computed by bringing
the values of both variables into rank order first, thereby
discarding exact values and only keeping their order. The
Spearman correlation can be used to test for monotonous
but non-linear relationships. Its correlation coefficient is
given here as rs.
Strength of a correlation |r| = 1 denote perfect,
maximum strength relations, with |r| → 0 meaning
that a relation is weaker to non-existent, or has not been
found. The strength of a correlation is usually its squared
value r2.
Coefficient Strength
0.00 No association
0.01-0.09 Trivial
0.10-0.29 Low or moderate
0.30-0.49 Moderate to substantial
0.50-0.69 Substantial to very strong
0.70-0.89 Very strong
0.90+ Near perfect
Table 7.1: Nomenclature of social science correlation
strengths (de Vaus, 2002)
The greater the coefficient r, the stronger the rela-
tionship. But what r constitutes a strong or weak re-
lationship? For example, is r = 0.4 weak, moderate
or strong? Interpreting the strength of a correlation is
relative, depending on the context. Physical sciences
typically find high values for r because of the immediate
influence of simple natural laws. However, if outcomes
have more than a single cause, no two variables are likely
to be very strongly related (de Vaus, 2002). This work
therefore follows the nomenclature in Table 7.1 when
social and human factors are involved. Correlations of
0.3 ≤ p < 0.5 indicate “moderate to substantial” rela-
tionships in such situations .
Significance of correlations Statistical significance
means that one can be confident that a detected correla-
tion is not found by chance but is actually there. This
work sets the significance threshold at p = 0.05. It
means the statistical chance for finding a correlation al-
though it is not there is ≤ 5%.
Significance is undermined by low correlation
strengths and small sample sizes. If a correlation is not
found to be significant due to small sample size, then
that does not mean that the correlation does not exist
with exactly that same strength. It only means that one
cannot be confident in the result and that probably a test
with a larger sample size is needed.
Furthermore, differences between correlation coeffi-
cients are not easy to interpret statistically. Significance
tests for the difference have to be done to establish con-
fidence in results.
Relation to precision and recall As a final remark,
correlations are preferable to measurements of precision
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and recall where possible because of its higher expres-
siveness. Refer back to Section 3.4.5.1 for a discussion
on this.
7.1.2.2 k-fold Cross-validation
Cross-validations are used when hypotheses were gener-
ated from an original set of data, and it is impossible to
collect further data for testing those hypotheses. This is
often the case when all available data was used to train a
prediction system. In order to still show generalizability
of the prediction system, it can be trained with a subset
of the data, reserving the rest for validation.
A k-fold cross-validation divides the whole set of data
— i.e. non-obsolete software process artifacts — into k
partitions. Each of these partitions is then used once as
test set, while all other k − 1 sets are used as training
data. After k rounds the results are averaged. A good
value for k is k = 10 (McLachlan et al., 2004).
7.1.3 Ethics
The names of software projects (except for some public
open source ones, which were only studied but where no
experiment took place) have been changed, and names of
organizations have been left out. Additionally, the names
of all subjects that were part of surveys or experiments
have either been left out as well, or have been exchanged
with pseudonyms for privacy reasons.
The data used by CollabReview consists mostly of
data derived from revision repositories, e.g. software
process artifacts or authorship information. Also, when
it applies static analysis to artifacts, it does not have ac-
cess to information that not any other member of a devel-
opment team would have available anyways. CollabRe-
view does not collect new data but merely recombines
existing data. An exception to the previous statement are
manual reviews that are provided voluntarily by users in
the experiments that involved wikis. The data gathered
by CollabReview is therefore not considered as critical.
7.1.4 Terminology of people
Due to the diverse studies in which CollabReview was
trialed, there is a large number of different “people” in-
volved. Depending on the context, different terms are
used. This section clarifies the used terminology.
The broadest group of people are stakeholders. Stake-
holders have some form of interest in CollabReview,
because their work is affected by it, because they want to
employ it to make change, because it affects the software
product, because of scientific interest, and so on.
Definition 67 – Stakeholder
A stakeholder is any person that has some form of inter-
est in CollabReview.
People who interact with the CollabReview prototype
are its users. Users provide input to it by using its user
interfaces, submit reviews, or contributing to software
process artifacts. And users also read its output on web
pages, in emails, or other user interfaces. Users are
aware that they are either directly or indirectly commu-
nicating with the CollabReview prototype.
Definition 68 – User
A user is a stakeholder that consciously either sends in-
put to the CollabReview prototype or receives its output,
or both.
A contributor is a specialized form of user. Contribu-
tors do not need to receive output from the CollabReview
prototype; they only send input to it. Contributors con-
tribute to software process artifacts or submit reviews.
They use the user interfaces — and for this receive input
from the CollabReview prototype if necessary — only
for this purpose.
Definition 69 – Contributor
A contributor is a user that primarily sends input to the
CollabReview prototype, and who if necessary receives
its output for this purpose only.
Contributors are further specialized into developers
(see Definition 8 – “Developer”). Developers have a
strong computer science or software engineering back-
ground. They are contributing directly to the software
that is being developed in the software project. Program-
ming, i.e. writing software, is their most prominent activ-
ity but can extend to related reviewing or documentation
activities.
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The persons participating in an experiment are tra-
ditionally called subjects. Subjects are not inevitably
users of the CollabReview prototype. For example, in a
between-group experiment, the experimental group are
users but the control may lack the knowledge of their
interaction with the CollabReview prototype. Therefore,
in the context of experimental design, they are called
subjects.
Definition 70 – Subject
A subject is a person that is participating in a scientific
study.
Employees are special kinds of persons, who are often
stakeholders, users or even contributors of a CollabRe-
view prototype. However, persons are called employees
if not their interaction with the CollabReview prototype
is primarily characterizing their role but the employment
relationship within their work context.
Definition 71 – Employee
An employee is a person that is primarily characterized
by an employment relationship within the evaluation
context, and not by the relation to the CollabReview
prototype.
Similarly students are persons, who instead of an em-
ployment relationship, have an educational relationship
with their context.
Definition 72 – Student
A student is a person that is primarily characterized by
an educational relationship within the evaluation context,
and not by the relation with the CollabReview prototype.
7.1.5 Targeted user group
CollabReview is designed to improve the internal qual-
ity in software projects. The targeted user group of Col-
labReview is twofold:
First, it is all the stakeholders who have an interest in
the internal quality of software. These stakeholders can
be customers who realize that internal quality influences
the external quality of the product they are acquiring,
managers of the software developing organization who
want to improve internal quality to reduce long-term
development and maintenance costs, quality assurance
personnel who are looking for a tool to support their
work, or the developers themselves who want to reduce
their pain of having to work on unmaintainable software.
This first kind of users is not necessarily distinct from
the following second one.
The second kind are users who have to work with Col-
labReview and who are affected in their daily work be-
cause it attempts to influence their work practice. While
also quality assurance personnel and sometimes even
managers can be direct users of CollabReview, the tar-
geted users are first and foremost the developers. The
validation of CollabReview focuses on developers as tar-
geted users in order to show that CollabReview actually
works. While it is interesting to see how other users
employ CollabReview to further their goals, this is only
marginally important for the evaluation of the concept.
Still, it is important to better describe developers and
their social context that gives distinction to them. One
software project is not like another. There are huge dif-
ferences. CollabReview is intended for software projects,
where developers have a high degree of freedom of how
they use their time. In a project, where management hur-
ries developers from the implementation of one feature
to the next, there may be no room for CollabReview.
Management support is a prerequisite.
Apart from that, favorable projects for CollabReview
are projects which are not too strictly organized or for-
mal but self-organizing because CollabReview addresses
the motivation of an individual that has freedom to de-
cide how to work. Strict quality control leaves few room
for CollabReview as a light-weight method. Also, Col-
labReview aims to be cost-effective in projects with
few resources for quality improvement. It relies on few
formalities and adds few overhead, making it suitable
for agile development projects. Possibly, CollabReview
helps inexperienced or cowboy developers more because
they have not yet learned to value internal documenta-
tion for its long-term benefit. In general, developers with
only a short-term perspective on the software need more
attention to their motivation to care for internal quality
than developers who have a long-term perspective, be-
cause the latter ones know that they will have to pay
the interest on technical debts. The atmosphere in the
team should probably be good and friendly, so that Col-
labReview is not perceived as a threat or misused as a
tool for bullying. In summary, CollabReview is intended
150
V
II
—
V
A
L
ID
A
T
IO
N
A
N
D
E
V
A
L
U
A
T
IO
N
VII-1 — Procedure
for projects with few pressure and quality control, that
are self-organizing, agile and less structured, with partly
inexperienced personnel with short-term interests, in an
academic, not too serious environment.
Three kinds of projects fit this characterization:
• EU projects have immature processes and are self-
organizing because of the uncertainty of the do-
main and the diverse partners that have few time to
harmonize. Some partners might neglect internal
quality and thereby harm the quality of the whole
project. Communication and collaboration are dif-
ficult due to the physical distance between partners.
And the lack of hierarchy makes quality manage-
ment difficult.
• Programming labs are teaching activities at univer-
sities but also should deliver results that add value
for the department. Still, the department has few re-
sources for quality control, and a mostly academic
interest in the software results. The students are
inexperienced developers with only a short-term
interest in the software they develop.
• Internal projects at a research institution can be sim-
ilarly self-organizing as most other work, most em-
ployees only have short- to medium-term interest
in the developments, and a strong quality control is
not available.
CollabReview should be evaluated in projects selected
from these archetypes.
7.1.6 Study Environments
Several different environments hosted the studies that
were conducted for the validation and evaluation of Col-
labReview. An overview of and introduction to them is
given here.
7.1.6.1 Karakos
Karakos is perhaps the most important project with re-
gard to the motivation of the development of the Col-
labReview concept (also refer back to Section 2.3.4,
which introduced Karakos from the problem analysis
perspective). As such, it is naturally predestined for
inclusion in the study environments. However, the Col-
labReview prototype was not yet ready for user testing
before the project ended. Only technical experiments
with the CollabReview prototype were therefore exe-
cuted with the Karakos code base. The experiments
were evaluation of the algorithm (see Section 7.2) and
benchmarking of its consistency (see Section 7.3).
The key facts of Karakos that are relevant for the
evaluation are: The project involved about 70 developers
from commercial and scientific partners from various
European countries. At the end of the project, sources
were published as open source.
The evaluation results are based on the source corpus
in the Karakos development repository after 30 months
into the project. It encompasses 350,000 SLOC of Java
code. At the time of study, the repository contained
more than 1600 revisions. Hence, an average of 214
SLOC are added with each commit. This is about ten
times the SLOC per commit than that of FreeCol. The
reason is sub-optimal use of the project’s Subversion
repository. It was chosen intentionally as it poses a
challenge for the used algorithms but also adds to the
realism of experiments. Developer specialization (see
Section 5.2.3.5) is very high at ids = 0.97. As a counter-
part for Karakos, the same experiments were conducted
in the FreeCol project where developers made better use
of its Subversion repository.
7.1.6.2 FreeCol
FreeCol is an open source game project at Source-
Forge.net1 resembling a strategy game classic where the
player is colonizing a new continent. For illustration
of the maturity of the game, a screenshot is shown in
Figure 7.1.
57 developers have contributed to the game since 2002
when Java development replaced more and more of its
original C code. It was project of the month at Source-
Forge in February 2007. Ohloh2 reports that the code
base is mature and well-established, and the develop-
ment team is large and active with increasing year-over-
year commits. 114 KLOC of its total 166 KLOC are
Java code that evolved over several years. There are
≈ 600 Java files. The repository contains more than
7000 revisions. Thus the average commit adds 21 SLOC.
This means that commits are fine-granular and few work
happens between two commits. Developer specialization
is rather low at ids = 0.47.
1http://sourceforge.net/projects/freecol/
2https://www.ohloh.net/
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Figure 7.1: Screenshot from the FreeCol game
FreeCol was selected as the code base for the evalua-
tion of the authorship algorithm (see Section 7.2) and as
an environment for testing the consistency of reputation
computations (see Section 7.3) because
• the entire development history beginning from the
first revision is available, which reduces the risk of
skewed results due to missing information,
• a medium number of developers are involved, i.e.
a good mixture of not only a single one or two
developers with many commits, or many commits
from only a few developers,
• it has a reasonably sized code base that is neither
too small nor too large, and
• it is a Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS)
project, and consequently is inherently compara-
ble to an agile development project (Goldman and
Gabriel, 2005).
In addition to FreeCol, also the source code of the
open source project Log4j is used in one study. However,
Log4j is used in that case among several other projects,
and has not been chosen for any particular characteristics
but just to increase the size of the corpus of available
source code. It is therefore not further characterized
here.
7.1.6.3 TornBond
TornBond is the open source release of parts of the soft-
ware developed in Karakos. Current work mostly covers
bug fixing and refactoring of the old sources. About
10 developers are contributing to a code base of 150
KLOC of Java code (plus 40 KLOC of C# code). De-
velopment is taking place on the open source hosting
platform Sourceforge.net. The repository contains about
1200 Java files and 400 revisions (Prause and Eisenhauer,
2012).
Most of the developers belong to a single unit of a
research organization, where development is handled
as an internal agile project. TornBond is a future base
technology used in other projects including scientific and
commercial ones, and hence is in the long-term interest
of the organization. Some of the developers are young
researchers who plan to build their own researches on
the software. Consequently, they also have a long-term
interest in it. However, at the moment the overwhelming
technical debt inherited from the previous project is a
major topic in discussions between developers.
The source code of TornBond was selected as an ex-
perimentation environment (see Section 7.8) because
• many developers should have a self-interest in keep-
ing technical debt low,
• management has a long-term interest in the project,
• it is the living successor of Karakos,
• its development is organized in an agile way, while
being open source at the same time,
• it has a medium size and number of developers, and
an active development team, and because
• it enables easy access to the development team to
better observe effects of interventions.
7.1.6.4 Moknowpedia
A few years ago, two work groups at Large Anonymous
Research Institute (LARI)3 decided that they needed a
new form of managing their project knowledge. In a
dedicated discussion, it was decided to set up the Mo-
knowpedia based on the MediaWiki software for doc-
umentation and knowledge management. Typical top-
ics of articles are news, projects and persons, technical
3pseudonym used for anonymization
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documentation and tutorials, trade fair exhibitions, sem-
inars and workshops, publication planning, processes,
interesting links, or IT infrastructure. However, first ex-
periences with Moknowpedia showed that participation
and contribution was not as active as hoped. This is a
common problem . Only a few members of the groups
actively participated. Not everybody seemed equally
motivated to contribute. There was a higher number of
people willing to consume than those willing to produce.
“You should write an article about this!” was often heard
but rarely done. In the end, the total number of articles
remained low; leading to a limited exchange of knowl-
edge. Most information was still conveyed in the old
ways like hallway conversations or explicit requests for
documentation. Instead, the goal was that information
was provided pro-actively through a central and well-
known repository. In order to improve knowledge ex-
change in the groups, the articles’ quality and quantity
needed to be improved. This situation made Moknow-
pedia an ideal environment for field experiments with
CollabReview (Dencheva et al., 2011).
During the last four years, 50 users wrote 7000 revi-
sions in over 1000 articles, and more than 800 reviews
for articles (Prause and Eisenhauer, 2012). While being
interdisciplinary, most of the users of Moknowpedia are
computer scientists working as student employees and
research assistants.
Karma scores in Moknowpedia In Moknowpedia,
users earn karma points by serving their work group
with valuable contributions. For example, writing high
quality articles earns users a certain amount of karma
points. The users’ karma points are published, resulting
in appreciation by their peers. This gives users some-
thing in exchange for their efforts, and motivates them
to systematically collect more points (Dencheva et al.,
2011). Moknowpedia implements two ways of earning
karma points.
The first way is to contribute to well rated wiki articles.
Responsibility is determined through authorship. The
artifact weight w(a) function prefers bigger and more
often viewed articles: a logarithmic function of article
size in characters, and the average number of article
views per week. Size is included to represent the fact
that larger articles potentially contain more information
because they aggregate more contributions. The page
view frequency is included to accommodate the fact that
the article probably contains more interesting informa-
tion, and is referenced more often in other articles. It
should therefore have a higher weight. Multiplying the
two numbers results in an article’s weight w(a).
Karma scores are computed by multiplying a user’s
quality and quantity scores. So, in the worst case, an ar-
ticle does not award its contributors any points. Reviews
are created manually by users only and negative ratings
are not possible. As users do not have to create articles
as essential part of their work, the rationale is that any
contribution to the wiki should be honored.
The second way to earn points is by submitting re-
views. A user will get bonus points on his score based
on the sum of the timeliness of all of his reviews. Refer
back to Section 5.2.6 for a description of how scores are
computed.
Rewarding in Moknowpedia The Moknowpedia
uses three kinds of rewards (Dencheva et al., 2011)
combining some of the rewarding patterns as described
earlier:
• When users collect a certain amount of points they
are promoted to a new level (see Section 5.4.2.6)
which earns them a level icon next to their profile
picture (see Figure 6.8 on page 136).
• The total number of points of each user is displayed
in a ranking table, with top users at the top of the
table (see Section 5.4.2.1).
• Once per week the “Moknowpedia Held der Woche”
(Hero of the week award) title is awarded to the user
who earned most karma points during the past week
(see Section 5.4.2.7). Winning the title is rewarded
with a chocolate bar, a mentioning in the weekly
meeting, and an email to the groups’ mailing list.
Since the end of the experiment, chocolate is not
awarded anymore and the winner is no longer men-
tioned in the weekly meeting.
7.1.6.5 Vyrygh
Vyrygh is an EU project similar to Karakos. Its duration
is four years. There are nine partners from five Euro-
pean countries in the project consortium. One partner
provided the development infrastructure including a Sub-
version repository and a wiki based on a GForge server.
When Vyrygh started, it was intended as a major eval-
uation environment of CollabReview. Regarding the
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development of source code, the originally agreed upon
conditions were favorable for the evaluation: more than
50 developers working on a code base in a Subversion
repository, and with an official commitment to produce
high-quality software which was also demanded from
the EC’s project officer. Harsh sanctions had even been
formulated in the consortium agreement.
However, it turned out that the software development
process would be unsuitable for evaluation. After one
and a half years, there were still only about fifteen com-
mits to the Subversion repository per month. Only seven
developers had contributed to the source code. Out of
those seven, two had not contributed to the core software
at all, and one had contributed less than ten lines. The
architecture specification foresaw twelve components
but only three were available in the development reposi-
tory. When the project’s software quality manager raised
these issues to the technical committee, the consortium
argued that such data could not be used since it would
not reflect the way the consortium works. Most partners
would commit their components first to the partners’
own repository as long as the development work took
place. The valuable commit history is effectively lost,
bereaving CollabReview of determining precise author-
ship and responsibility. Lastly, the available source code
and its developers were further cluttered into Java and
C# fractions, further degrading the source code’s suit-
ability for data gathering.
So it was decided to not use the source code of Vyrygh
in the evaluation. But the project’s wiki was used. Not
as much as desirable but that made its wiki a suitable
environment; just as much as Moknowpedia. The wiki
of Vyrygh is used in the field experiment presented in
Section 7.9. Scores are computed analogous to Moknow-
pedia (see Section 7.1.6.4). Yet the rewarding scheme is
ReputationForge as presented by Agaraj (2012).
ReputationForge rewarding system The Reputa-
tionForge system implements a persuasive reputation-
based social game. It aims at increasing the participants’
engagement in a team’s wiki. It is the result of an
extensive conceptual investigation into a range of be-
havioral studies and existing reputation-based systems.
The main ingredients of the concept are aspects of
creating an online community and social network, where
developers can earn points for personal enjoyment and
self-fulfillment (Agaraj, 2012).
ReputationForge promotes a soft competition between
users, who are divided into newbies and advanced users.
Participants choose tasks from a set of available tasks
and complete them by contributing to the wiki. The
tasks are bound to different reputation scores computed
by CollabReview, e.g. rating articles, improving one’s
quality score, or contributing to articles. The task’s
basic objective is to achieve an absolute score, a relative
change to the current score, or to improve one’s rank.
Additionally, tasks can have a time limit, or necessitate
a steady contribution for a period of time. Selected tasks
have to be fulfilled one by one before a new task can
be started. The successful completion of a task awards
participants a medal and overall karma points, which
are visible to other users (Agaraj, 2012). Figure 7.2
is a screenshot from ReputationForge showing the set
of tasks that are currently available to a user. An info
box overlies the selection screen, giving the user further
information of the task that he has just completed.
7.1.6.6 AgileLab
The AgileLab was a post-graduate teaching activity of
the software engineering department of a local university.
The lab took students into the daily work of software
development, familiarized them with agile development
methodology, and generated software artifacts that were
intended to be actually used in the department’s work.
The lab’s realism made it a favorable environment for a
field experiment. Also refer to Prause et al. (2012) for
the study.
The topic of the lab was to improve a static analysis
toolkit for Java software. The analysis components of the
toolkit were written in Prolog, while the toolkit library,
its Application Programming Interface (API) and the
integration with the Eclipse IDE were written in Java.
However, only the development of the Java parts was
deemed suitable for a study.
The development team consisted of instructors and
ten student developers following an agile development
methodology around a kanban board (see Figure 7.3).
Programming was done in pairs. During the semesters
before the lab, the students had received training on the
topics software engineering in general and agile method-
ologies like XP in special lectures and seminars. Solid
programming experience was expected. The project ran
for four weeks from September 5th until 30th. Devel-
opment took place in a large office space from 9 am till
5 pm up to 6 pm every day. 725 revisions were created
in the project’s Subversion repository during this time,
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Figure 7.2: Choosing the next task from the available tasks in ReputationForge
Figure 7.3: AgileLab kanban board
including a few contributions from non-lab participants
Prause et al. (2012).
Except for its pair programming, all of this made
the AgileLab a suitable evaluation environment for Col-
labReview. During the field experiment, a CollabReview
prototype computed quality and quantity karma scores
for the developers (see Section 7.7).
A pragmatic definition of internal quality Maintain-
ability means “the capability of the software to be mod-
ified” (ISO 9126-1, 2001). The idea of coding rules is
to ease the understanding of source code by reducing
distracting style noise so that it gets easier to read (e.g.
King et al., 1997; Seibel, 2009; Spinellis, 2011). See
Section 3.2.2.3 for a discussion of coding styles and
source code quality.
How to measure internal quality was a matter of dis-
cussion prior to the lab. Consensus was that quality was
to be defined through the understandability of source
code. Yet the full set of Java code conventions that the
Checkstyle4 toolkit could check were not considered
sensible by all discussants. Some rules were consid-
ered too much as not to hinder the effective realization
of functionality, too constraining or, like the “do not
use tab characters for indentation”-rule, even counter-
productive. Also, the organizer’s wanted to discuss some
rules with the developers while development was on-
going. In the end, only rules regarding the use of Javadoc
(API documenting comments) were upheld. As smallest
common denominator, internal quality would be defined
through the correct use of Javadoc comments.
Checkstyle was hence configured to only check for
completeness of Javadoc documentation: every source
code entity missing a Javadoc comment or according
tags (like @param, @return or @throws) was a rule
violation. The higher the density of violations (i.e. vi-
olations per line of code) in a file, the lower its quality
rating. A file not missing any comments had a quality
rating of +10, while higher violation densities caused
lower ratings. With this definition, a file’s quality rating
could be arbitrarily low, so it was cut off at −10 in the
worst case.
4http://checkstyle.sourceforge.net
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7.1.6.7 ScrumLab
The ScrumLab was a post-graduate teaching activity
of LARI at a local university. Students got first-hand
experience with the Scrum development methodology
by working on a software project in a self-organizing
software team. The ScrumLab featured two independent
Scrum teams with a total of seventeen developers. The
two teams only met in the first and the final meeting.
The project topics were a web-based industrial robot
management system, and a geo-caching game on the
web and for mobile devices.
Prior to the lab, the instructors had provided a few
topics from which teams were allowed to choose. The
students then received training on the Scrum methodol-
ogy and created user stories to elaborate on the scope
of the project. During the lab, the instructors answered
questions regarding the process. Additionally, they func-
tioned as product owners and customers who prioritized
user stories, and reviewed deliverables.
A review meeting with the customers was held once
per week. In this meeting, the students played planning
poker for estimating the efforts of story points to be real-
ized in the next sprint. Daily “stand-up” meetings were
held within the team through teleconferencing without
the presence of instructors. Organizing them was up to
the team and its Scrum Master. The lab lasted for over
two months, allowing every student to be the Scrum
Master of his team for at least one week. Progress moni-
toring and coordination was supported by a virtual Kan-
ban board based on Jira and GreenHopper5 (see Figure
7.4). Apart from these meetings, the students were free
to organize their development activities as they liked. In
particular, presence at a specific place for development
was not expected.
During the development time from April 13th until
June 29th, the teams created ≈ 300 and ≈ 600 revisions
in their Subversion repositories. At the end of the lab,
Team A had written ≈ 5 KLOC, and Team B twice as
much.
Many aspects of the ScrumLab were inherently favor-
able for the evaluation of CollabReview, e.g. two sepa-
rate development teams, agile development, as well as
size and duration of both teams’ projects. In addition to
this, several organizational aspects could be adapted to
the needs of the experimental design (see Section 7.11).
5http://www.atlassian.com/software/
greenhopper/
Figure 7.4: ScrumLab Kanban board
Definition of internal quality Quality assessment in
the ScrumLab was set up similar to that in the AgileLab.
Reviews would be created automatically through Check-
style audits. Quality ratings depended on the average
number of violations per line of code. No violations
meant a review rating of +10, while every 0.1 violations
per line more meant a decrease of 1 in the rating. Below
a rating of 0, the rating would approach −10 asymptoti-
cally with the number of violations per line.
As opposed to the AgileLab environment, Checkstyle
used its complete set of default rules, i.e. including rules
like formatting problems, magic numbers6, or Javadoc.
Javadoc violations, however, were weighted twice in
the case of private class members, and thrice in case of
public members.
7.2 Evaluation of Authorship Algo-
rithm
This section describes the evaluation of the authorship
algorithm with respect to its soundness and robustness
against copying of source code (Section 5.3). The eval-
6That is, using a number in source code without explaining it; say,
using 42 without explaining where it comes from, or why it is not 41
or 43.
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uation of the authorship algorithm is based on Prause
(2009).
7.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this experiment is to provide a prelimi-
nary validation of the algorithm’s correctness. It shows
that the authorship algorithm of CollabReview
• can handle small- to medium-sized projects’ data
(Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”),
• is not obviously flawed (Requirement-7: “Validity
of computations”),
• produces results that are better than the results ob-
tained with comparable methods, and
• reveals a certain robustness against copying and
moving of text (Requirement-5: “Robustness and
resistance against attacks”).
7.2.2 Method
The authorship algorithm is applied to the evolution his-
tory of source code of the software projects Karakos
and FreeCol (introduced in Section 7.1.6.1 and Section
7.1.6.2, respectively). The shorter the distance between
the current artifact and its supposed predecessor, the
less and smaller are string edit scripts. This reduces the
chance of making a mistake during subsequent steps (e.g.
clone detection). However, as an exhaustive search for
the predecessor is computationally too expensive, heuris-
tics are used. They do not guarantee finding the nearest
neighbor but deliver good results with significantly less
effort. In this process, data of the nearest neighbor search
heuristics is collected. The heuristics were introduced in
Section 5.3.3.2 and following sections.
At the end, the authorship results obtained with the
algorithm are compared to the results of Subversion
blame. The results are further analyzed to draw conclu-
sions about the qualities of the algorithm.
An important characteristic of the two projects used
for this validation is that their entire development history
beginning from the first revision is available. Addition-
ally, several developers contributed; otherwise determin-
ing authorship would be trivial. The code base is neither
too small nor too large because a small code base would
not be representative and a large code base could pro-
duce problems that are out of the scope of a prototype
but would require software of product maturity. Finally,
the projects differ in their nature to show that the algo-
rithm works in different environments.
Due to several hundred hours of precomputing neces-
sary for the experiments, they were only done with two
projects. While more data would increase the validity
of the data, rock-solid results were not deemed worth-
while. The experiment generates intermediate results.
Later experiments, will further increase confidence in
the results.
7.2.3 Data
Conduction of the experiment generated two kinds of
data: data about the nearest neighbor search heuristics,
and the actual authorship data.
7.2.3.1 Analysis of nearest neighbor heuristics
Table 7.2 lists the results for the projects Karakos and
FreeCol: Hits is the number of correct nearest neighbors
found by the heuristic, Recall is this number divided
by the total number of insertions, Badness is the aver-
age factor by which the suspected nearest neighbor’s
distance is off of the distance to the optimal one, and
Comps. is the average number of comparisons done per
software process artifact.
The analysis of the different heuristics covered 7500
software process artifacts in Karakos and FreeCol, re-
spectively. When searching for the nearest neighbor, all
different heuristics and an exhaustive search were run in
parallel. The exhaustive search delivered the true nearest
neighbor of the new artifact, and the optimal distance.
After that, it was checked which heuristics found the
same artifact as the exhaustive search, or another one
with the same, optimal distance. Due to the costliness
of the exhaustive search, it was not possible to add all
artifacts without waiting for results for weeks.
7.2.3.2 Differences in the authorship data
The data compares the results of the algorithm with
results obtained from Subversion blame.
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Karakos FreeCol
Heuristic Hits Recall Badness Comps. Hits Recall Badness Comps.
TREESEARCH 149 2% 91.5 18.1 2333 31% 132.9 94.3
SNGLPRDCSSR 1533 20% 96.8 1.0 1307 17% 161.2 1.0
SMNAME 1612 21% 91.1 2.0 7144 94% 3.1 27.2
SIMNAME 4360 57% 1.8 7.1 7242 95% 1.1 43.8
INVERTEDINDEX1 4628 61% 4.9 1.0 5977 78% 9.6 1.0
INVERTEDINDEX2 5054 66% 3.1 2.0 6713 88% 2.3 2.0
INVERTEDINDEX5 5414 71% 1.7 4.9 7107 93% 2.2 5.0
INVERTEDINDEX10 5624 74% 1.4 9.8 7182 95% 1.2 9.9
INVERTEDINDEX20 5790 76% 1.1 19.0 7220 95% 1.1 19.7
INVERTEDINDEX50 5995 79% 1.1 48.0 7253 95% 1.1 24.3
INVERTEDINDEX75 6092 80% 1.1 70.4 7275 96% 1.1 50.9
INVERTEDINDEX100 6150 81% 1.1 86.3 7285 96% 1.1 70.2
INVERTEDINDEX200 6299 83% 1.1 101.5 7315 96% 1.1 87.7
All combined 6307 83% 1.1 - 7588 99% 1.1 -
Table 7.2: Comparison of nearest neighbor heuristics
Karakos All non-obsolete artifacts in Karakos total
927,305 lines including white-space and comments, and
including branches. For 336,965 lines, or 36% a dif-
ferent author is reported (12 million out of 33 million
characters or 37% did not match).
The average distance between two artifacts is 2172
characters; or 2231 characters if only non-obsolete soft-
ware process artifacts are considered. 57% of all arti-
facts are non-obsolete artifacts, which means that many
artifacts are still in their early forms. A high number of
1763 artifacts (40%) have a distance of 0 to their nearest
neighbor. This phenomenon is mainly due to reorganiza-
tions of the repository and to branching, which leads to
new artifact names in Subversion. It is supported by the
observation that the number is almost cut in half (949 or
21%) when only non-obsolete artifacts are considered.
The average number of different authors per artifact is
4.49, or 3.58 if the authors of trivial lines are not consid-
ered. If obsolete artifacts are not considered, the result
is 4.37 and 3.56 authors per artifact, respectively. This
is as expected as obsolete artifacts are early artifacts
and their history is therefore not so colorful. The two
main contributors for artifacts usually contribute 85%
and 11% (considering only non-obsolete artifacts: 86%
and 9%).
FreeCol Non-obsolete software process artifacts in
FreeCol total 269,981 lines (9,603,912 characters) in-
cluding white-space and comments. For 88,848 lines or
33% a different author is reported (2,955,080 characters
or 31% did not match). The average distance between
an artifact and its parent is 1025 (483 for current arti-
facts). There are 10581 artifacts of which 868 (or 8%)
are non-obsolete, thus artifacts have been revised several
times. 690 artifacts are not different from their predeces-
sor (branches and renames) and 227 are not yet obsolete.
The average artifact has 6.66 contributors (6.35 exclud-
ing trivial lines). When including obsolete artifacts, the
average artifact has 7.44 (7.03 excluding trivial lines)
contributors. This could mean that either track of some
origins was lost or that a few individuals reworked the
code. Two main developers normally contribute 65%
and 18% to an artifact (59% and 21% for non-obsolete
artifacts only). The average artifact is moved, renamed
or branched 4.24 times.
7.2.4 Results
From the data, the following results are obtained for the
nearest neighbor heuristics and the mined authorship
information.
7.2.4.1 Results for nearest neighbor heuristics
Relying on the inverted index is most promising. But
there is only a small increase in the accuracy of IN-
VERTEDINDEXn for greater sample sizes. An investiga-
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tion into what sizes of n are required so that INVERTE-
DINDEXn includes the correct result, found that for great
n, INVERTEDINDEXn becomes worse, and even worse
than random sampling. It seems that lines with medium
certainties are misleading. Hence, it does not make sense
to stick to the INVERTEDINDEXn heuristic for great n as
the tradeoff between precision and speed gets unfavor-
able soon.
It is possible to increase hit rates by combining dif-
ferent heuristics. This increment is explained by com-
paring two heuristics with regard to for which artifacts
they hit or miss. For each artifact, a heuristic can ei-
ther hit (1) or miss (0), resulting in two data rows. It
is now possible to compute a Matthews correlation rm
between the two heuristics. rm → 1 would mean that
both heuristics succeed and fail in the same cases, while
rm → −1 means that they complement each other. If
there are two negatively correlated heuristics, then they
can be run in parallel with a good chance to achieve
better results. As expected due to their similarity, the IN-
VERTEDINDEXn heuristics correlate strongly with about
rm = 0.5 (for very different sample sizes, e.g. INVERTE-
DINDEX1 and INVERTEDINDEX200) to rm = 0.95
(e.g. INVERTEDINDEX100 and INVERTEDINDEX200).
The name based heuristics have a strong correlation of
rm = 0.95 between SNGLPRDCSSR and SMNAME, and
about rm = 0.45 between SMNAME or SNGLPRDCSSR,
and SIMNAME. Correlations with INVERTEDINDEXn
are stronger for smaller n ≤ 10 (r ≈ 0.7) and weaker
for bigger n ≥ 50 (rm ≈ 0.3). For Karakos all cor-
relations are non-negative, though, and there was no
correlation between TREESEARCH and any other heuris-
tic. For FreeCol there are negative correlations of about
rm = −0.2 between TREESEARCH and INVERTEDIN-
DEXn and the name based heuristics.
Running different heuristics in parallel does not
always guarantee better results. For example, strongly
positively correlated heuristics do add few benefit to
each other because they make similar predictions (e.g.
INVERTEDINDEX100 and INVERTEDINDEX200, or
SNGLPRDCSSR and SMNAME). Weak correlations do
not allow for a prognosis if they would add benefit to
each other. Strongly negatively correlated heuristics,
however, return very different results and would add
benefit. INVERTEDINDEX100 and SNGLPRDCSSR
seem to complement each other sufficiently well to
justify running them in parallel. Also combinations with
TREESEARCH increased the recall. But the heuristic
was not further analyzed because of bad run-time
characteristics and resulting database access overhead in
Karakos.
7.2.4.2 Results for authorship data
A small, hand-crafted software evolution was used to
test if the algorithm could recognize specifically crafted
text manipulations: Source code was moved to another
software process artifact, recovered from an obsolete re-
vision, modified by different authors, merged with con-
tents from other artifacts and indentation was changed.
As shown before, these are the features that the algo-
rithm can handle. Hence, this should lead to different
results between the algorithm and Subversion blame.
At first, the amount of reported authorship differ-
ences for Karakos of 36% may appear quite high. But
Subversion does not detect clones, and as 20% to 30%
clones have been reported for projects (Basit and Jarz-
abek, 2007), this could be the primary reason for the
differences. A manual check for sanity of the results
found that about 14% of the source code in Karakos
are auto-generated from Web Services Description Lan-
guages (WSDLs) and that most areas are therefore at-
tributed to the same author who checked in such artifact
first. Subversion attributes it to the author who checked
it in. Besides this, many artifacts had been moved around
without telling Subversion about it so that the history
was lost. In FreeCol the results are similar. One major
factor here is that the multi-line license information con-
tained in each artifact is attributed to the same author by
the algorithm. But the biggest difference comes from
code reformatting that is not handled separately by Sub-
version.
The different number of authors per artifact in
Karakos and FreeCol when trivial lines are left out or
not left out indicates that cloning of non-trivial lines was
successfully identified. The reason is that trivial lines
are not copied if not in the context of a non-trivial line.
The strong presence of major contributors in Karakos
for each artifact is concordant with the expectation
that there is strong implicit code ownership due to few
collaborative development across organizational borders
(cf. Conway (1968)’s Law).
7.2.4.3 Known limitations
The limitation of algorithms that determine contribution
by looking at what is there, is that they cannot honor
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contribution for things that are not there. For example,
if there was a misleading comment or dead source code
that a developer removed to improve quality, then such
algorithms will have no way of honoring that kind of
contribution. Developers cannot own deleted source
code. Likewise, having made contributions that were
deleted by another developer, cannot be honored.
The algorithm can be unfair to major contributors
when someone else contributes just a bit to their software
process artifacts. For instance, if Bob breaks source code
of Alice with just a few changes, Alice would be most
effected by the bad rating scores because she contributed
the most characters and lines.
7.2.4.4 Discussion
To verify that the implementation of the algorithm does
what it should do, extensive testing was done: unit tests,
a test repository with chosen features (like renaming of
artifacts, copying of substrings, restoring of substrings
from outdated artifacts, indentation changes) and manu-
ally studied results for two natural project repositories
Karakos and FreeCol. But defining what correct behav-
ior is, is difficult: The algorithm efficiently finds a near-
est neighbor but it cannot guarantee that this is the one
the developer based his new version on. This informa-
tion is irrecoverably lost due to the way common revi-
sion control systems work (cf. Section 3.4). On the one
hand, trivial lines should not be attributed to the same
author. For example, the first author that introduces the
line “}” into an artifact should not always be recorded as
the author of this line. So the line has to be recognized
as trivial. On the other hand, considering too many lines
as trivial would not detect code areas that are moved
from one artifact to the other. The algorithm solves this
issue with an occurrence statistic which is only a crude
mechanism. Yet it is efficient and also works for not
formatted source passages like comments.
From looking at evolution snapshots (revisions) one
cannot find out if code was copied from somewhere else
or if it was written anew. Whenever results between
Subversion and the algorithm differ, it is probable that
Subversion errs but there is no guarantee that this holds
true in all cases or that there is not a third author involved
which was not identified (e.g. using someone else’s
account or pair programming).
Starting at revision 1928 (in FreeCol) a new developer
committed several revisions after reformatting with his
IDE. As opposed to Subversion, CollabReview’s algo-
rithm is able to cope with resulting indentation differ-
ences. Yet it also has problems with lines that are split
into two.
Though it is bad practice to commit artifacts that can
be auto-generated (Richardson and Gwaltney, 2005),
the Karakos repository contains several of these. Auto-
generated source code has a tendency to look homoge-
neous, which means that there are few very distinctive
lines but lots of semi-distinctive ones, resulting in long
search times. Furthermore, until identified as trivial code,
large parts of these software process artifacts will appear
cloned and be attributed to the developer who checked
them in for the first time.
7.2.5 Summary
The algorithm and its implementation underwent rig-
orous testing using unit tests and a specifically crafted
software evolution history. It correctly identified moved
and copied source code, and the right predecessors of
software process artifacts.
The next step was to trial the algorithm with the data
from two real-world projects. It was applied to the evolu-
tion history of projects with several thousand revisions,
hundreds of thousands of lines, and several developers
(Requirement-3: “Flexible applicability”).
First, it was tested how good the nearest neighbor
heuristics are. While a nearest neighbor is not perforce
the true predecessor that the developer used, it is the
most probable one. Finding a nearest neighbor means
to reduce the number of edit operations that transform a
predecessor into its successor, and thereby reduces the
chance for errors in the transforming process. A revision
control system that only considers the single predecessor
(SNGLPRDCSSR) of a software process artifact is prone
to make many mistakes. While the true nearest neighbor
is hard to find, the algorithm finds a very good neighbor
in most cases using different heuristics.
Next, various key facts were measured in the source
code, and then checked for soundness. It was found that
the algorithm made authorship attributions that deviated
in over 30% of the cases from the results obtained by
Subversion blame. A manual analysis into the possible
origins of the deviations supported the plausibility of the
results (Requirement-7: “Validity of computations”).
However, a limitation with data from real projects is
that the true development history cannot be recovered
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anymore, i.e. it is unknown if source code was actually
copied from an identified predecessor and if it is the
right source. So there is no way of verifying the correct-
ness of obtained results. The algorithm may be unfair to
developers who clean up software process artifacts by
deleting something, as well as to major contributors if
someone degrades the quality of their artifacts. Regard-
less of this limitation, the results from this study support
that the algorithm is
• sound and
• robust due to its resistance against copying of
source code (Requirement-5: “Robustness and
resistance against attacks”).
Many programming languages share their similarity
with regard to the use of new line characters. This char-
acteristic is exploited by most revision control systems
including Subversion or MediaWiki. In particular, most
wiki source code is similar, too. The results obtained
for Java that were presented here should therefore well
transfer to those other languages. Further experiments
will show that the algorithm and reputation scores calcu-
lated by it are consistent and sound.
7.3 Consistency of Karma Scores
If karma scores and the authorship information obtained
through the authorship algorithm is consistent, then it
further supports the correctness of the authorship algo-
rithm. It is also a matter of predictability and fairness
that karma scores are consistent.
This section shows that karma scores computed by
CollabReview are consistent. The implications are that
developers have rather constant styles regarding the
cleanliness of their source code, and more importantly,
that CollabReview can associate source code consis-
tently with developers.
7.3.1 Purpose
In this evaluation, the authorship algorithm is further
evaluated by analyzing the authorship information ob-
tained from it, and the resulting karma scores. Its pur-
pose is to show that
• if karma scores are consistent across software
process artifacts in a revision repository, then
authorship information has to be consistent as well
(Requirement-7: “Validity of computations”),
• the authorship algorithm is better, or at least compa-
rable to other ways of obtaining authorship informa-
tion, (Requirement-7: “Validity of computations”)
and
• it investigates the influence of the weighting func-
tion w that gives different weights to artifacts.
7.3.2 Method
The method is introduced with an example before the
consistency test procedure, and a quality definition is
provided. An important aspect is that possible reasons
for introducing bugs (or technical debt, respectively) into
source code are manifold but programmers are certainly
an important factor. There are interpersonal differences
that are rather constant (Schro¨ter et al., 2006; Brown
et al., 2010).
7.3.2.1 Example of the procedure
Figure 7.5 visualizes an example of how the evaluation
of the concept is conducted: The developers Red, Green,
Blue and Yellow (from left to right) are collaboratively
developing code, i.e. contributing to software process
artifacts that are possibly edited by other developers
as well. Their code base consists of five non-obsolete
software process artifacts (A, B, C, D, E from left to
right). Red contributed to A and C, Green to A, B, C
and D, and Blue to C, D, and E, while Yellow only
worked on E. The authorship algorithm determines that,
for example, A was mostly written by Red with some
help from Green, while C contains code from Red, Green
and Blue.
In addition to this, quality ratings are available for all
of the software process artifacts. They are combined
with authorship information to derive karma scores.
Some artifacts, however, are left out in the karma score
calculations. In the example, there is enough data
to compute a good karma for Red, as he is the main
contributor to well-rated artifact A. Yellow achieves an
average karma score from his contributions to E, while
Blue and especially Green receive low scores from their
contribution to poorly rated D.
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Figure 7.5: Predicting software process artifact quality
using developer karma scores
Next, a quality rating of the previously left-out soft-
ware process artifacts is predicted by combining their
authors’ karma scores. In the best case, this predicted
quality score is equal to the actual assessed quality score.
The better both scores match, the better authorship in-
formation has to be (given that authors are consistent in
their coding cleanliness).
7.3.2.2 Four-step evaluation procedure
Developers are individuals with varying coding abilities
and attitudes towards software and quality. This human
factor will reflect in their contributions. If different
developers are involved in the evolution of different
parts of the code base, then different parts will have a
different quality. Although other factors play a role, too,
this relationship is no coincidence (Schro¨ter et al., 2006).
The quality of a developer’s contributions affects the
quality of the software process artifact. So, developers
who make high quality contributions should be involved
in better artifacts more often. Consequently, they should
have a higher karma score because quality is the result
of their abilities and dispositions.
The simple four step procedure for checking the con-
sistency of karma scores works as follows:
1. Assess the quality of some software process arti-
facts to generate a set of quality samples (training
set). This is q(a).
2. Compute developers’ karma scores as the average
quality of their contributions (training).
3. Use authorship information and karma scores to
predict the quality of the remaining artifacts (pre-
diction). This is q′(a)
4. Correlate predicted and assessed ratings of artifact
quality. A high correlation means that authorship in-
formation is consistent and karma scores are sound.
The evaluation uses the evolution history of source
code from the projects Karakos, TornBond, AgileLab,
FreeCol and Log4j7 that were presented in Section 7.1.6.
7.3.2.3 Quality assessment of artifacts
The evaluation procedure requires quality assessments
for all software process artifacts of the project. While
abilities and dispositions do not change easily, a lot of
factors affect the quality evidenced in an artifact (cf. Sec-
tion 3.5.2.2). Among them is that reviewers might not
be consistent in rating the quality of artifacts due to sub-
jectivity in what comprises good quality; or that the best
developers might pick the most ambitious and bug-prone
tasks (see also Section 3.5.2.2). These deviations are
an unwanted noise because they originate from factors
which are not part of this analysis. Instead, quality as-
sessments should be made through objective measuring,
and not be affected too much by task difficulty.
To reduce the influence of such noise, quality is de-
fined here as the cleanliness of source code, i.e. code
styles and the absence of code smells. The difficulty of
an implementation task should not affect a developers’
coding style too much. Also see Section 3.2.2.3 with
regard to this topic.
7An open source project used as an evaluation environment, see
Section 7.1.6.2
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For each artifact a ∈ A, Checkstyle submits a qual-
ity review s(u, a) : A→ [−10,+10] (from bad to good
quality): the problem density ρ1 is calculated as the num-
ber of problems per non-empty line of source code. To
compute ρ1, each problem is weighted according to four
severity levels (from irrelevant to critical) with weights
0, 1, 3, and∞. Before computing the value of q(a) from
density ρ1, three corrections are applied to keep values
distributed nicely over the interval [−10,+10], without
too many artifacts at quality levels −10 or +10: First,
a generally higher or lower quality in different projects
is therefore adjusted by adding a project-dependent con-
stant cq value to ρ1. Second, if the defect per line ratio
ρ1 > 0 then ρ2 = 3
√
(ρ1)4, otherwise ρ2 = ρ1. Finally,
ρ3 = max(−10,min(10, 7− ρ2)) = q(a) gives the as-
sessed quality score.
7.3.2.4 Comparison with other algorithms
Several ways of obtaining authorship information are
known in literature (see Section 3.4.2). The authorship
algorithm used in the CollabReview prototype should
output information that is at least as good as that of
other algorithms. Its results are therefore compared to
that of other algorithms. Let there be several authorship
functions
rx(u, a)→ [0, 1]
where x is one of the algorithms from the families de-
scribed in the following paragraphs.
CONT authorship algorithm Subversion maintains
metadata about who the contributor of a revision of
a source file is. During development, source files go
through a series of revisions, each with its own contribu-
tor. The CONT algorithm considers the last five contrib-
utors as sharing authorship. The latest contributor has
about one third of the authorship for a file ( 13 ≈ 0.333),
followed by the next one who has about one third of the
rest
(
2
3
)1 × 13 ≈ 0.222, and so on for all other contribu-
tors
(
2
3
)n× 13 . If one contributor appears multiple times
in this list, his contribution shares add up. This measure
does not consider the amount or type of changes. It is
thus rather coarse.
EDIT authorship algorithms Subversion’s blame
command annotates each line of source code with its
respective author. In order to get this information, Sub-
version compares each revision of a file with its previous
revision. If a line is new or changed, then it is owned by
the developer who committed the revision. EDIT assigns
authorship proportionally to the number of lines owned.
EDIU gives same authorship to all programmers who
edited at least one line of the file. EDII inverts author-
ship, i.e. major editors receive only few authorship.
AUTH authorship algorithms The third family of au-
thorship algorithms is AUTH, which are based on the al-
gorithm used in the CollabReview prototype (see Section
5.3). It improves several short-comings of Subversion’s
algorithm. Consequently, this algorithm better traces
code ownership back to the original author. AUTU is
defined analogous to EDIU.
Comparison baseline: PACK Schro¨ter et al. define
an algorithm that binds reputation to imported packages
instead of developers (Schro¨ter et al., 2006b). Their al-
gorithm is not an authorship algorithm and does not need
a file’s evolution history. Instead, it looks for imported
Java packages like java.lang in the source code, and
computes the reputation of packages. The results ob-
tained with this algorithm are provided for comparison
as PACK.
Different weight functions In addition to the author-
ship algorithms, also the influence of the weight function
w(a) should be investigated. While the reputation model
makes no prescriptions what w should look like, three
versions are used here:
• ws gives software process artifacts a weight relative
to their size in characters,
• wl counts the lines in a artifact, and
• w1 assigns the same weight to all artifacts.
7.3.3 Data
The evaluation generated data on the distribution of soft-
ware process artifacts over quality classes, karma scores,
and data on the correlation between predicted and as-
sessed quality of artifacts. This section presents that
data.
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Figure 7.6: Number of FreeCol artifacts per quality class
7.3.3.1 Distribution of artifacts into quality classes
Before other data was generated for each project, the
project-dependent quality adjustment constant cq was
calibrated first. The goal was that software process arti-
facts were approximately normally distributed over all
quality classes without a too long tail at class −10. Fig-
ure 7.6 shows the distribution of artifacts over the qual-
ity classes for project FreeCol. The distributions for the
other projects are similar.
7.3.3.2 Karma scores
The developers’ karma scores are computed from quality
assessments of source code they contributed to. As an
example, karma scores for three combinations of author-
ship algorithms and artifact weights are displayed in Fig-
ure 7.7. Each triplet of bars represents the karma scores
for one developer. For brown (middle) bars, software
process artifacts are weighted according to size ws(a)
and authorship information has been obtained with the
AUTH algorithm. For violet (lower) bars, artifacts are
weighted uniformly w1(a) instead. Cyan (upper) bars
differ from brown bars because CONT is used.
7.3.3.3 Cross-validation of predictions and assess-
ments
Figure 7.8 depicts the relation between assessed and
predicted quality ratings for each artifact as scatter plots
after performing a 10-fold cross validation. The plot has
been altered for presentation in a way that ranks are used
for y coordinates. A small random value has been added
before computing ranks to make them unique. But this
-10 -5 0 +5 +10
ws(f), CONT
ws(f), AUTH
w1(f), AUTH
Figure 7.7: Quality karma scores by three selected au-
thorship algorithms in FreeCol
alteration has only been applied to the plotted data. It
does not affect the computation of correlations. All of
the correlations are significant at p  0.05. The next
section will compare the results of more algorithms.
7.3.3.4 Comparison of prediction quality by means
of karma
The comparison of authorship algorithms is based on the
idea is that better algorithms should give more precise au-
thorship data, which in turn should result in more precise
karma scores, and therefore in better predictions. Table
7.3 estimates the quality of different algorithms in terms
of Spearman’s rank correlation between assessed q(a)
and predicted software process artifact quality q′(a). For
every combination of authorship algorithm and project
there are three values for each of the analyzed weight
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Figure 7.8: Scatter plots of predicted and assessed quality for FreeCol
measurements ws, wl and w1. For all authorship algo-
rithms, the correlations are significant at p  0.05 be-
cause of the high number n of non-obsolete software
process artifacts in all projects.
7.3.4 Results and discussion
There is an approximately normal distribution of soft-
ware process artifacts onto quality classes. After the
distribution was tested, further analyses of karma scores
were made to draw conclusions about the underlying
authorship algorithms.
7.3.4.1 Discussion of results from karma score
analysis
The choice of authorship algorithms and especially ar-
tifact weights can result in very different karma scores
for a few users. This might be problematic because it
could create feelings of arbitrariness and of being treated
unfair in contributors. In most cases, however, the dif-
ferences do not very much matter for the predictions of
software process artifact quality. Over the full breadth
of all artifacts and authors, the results are generally fair.
Also, the differences between authorship algorithms and
weights are small and not statistically significant. That
means that authorship algorithms and weight should be
chosen under consideration of other characteristics, e.g.
which ones seem more fair or robust.
7.3.4.2 Discussion of results from cross-validation
of quality prediction
Due to large n in the data sets, all correlations are highly
significant with p  0.05. The relationship between
developer and software process artifact definitely exists.
The average values for the projects are Karakos
rs = 0.32, TornBond rs = 0.38, AgileLab rs = 0.21,
FreeCol rs = 0.43, and Log4j rs = 0.27. The good
predictability in FreeCol was much expected due to its
good history, whereas Karakos suffers from copied and
generated source code. The loss of the (bad) original
history seems to aid prediction in TornBond. The weak
correlations for AgileLab probably result from its pair
programming nature. For Log4j, the reasons for weak
predictions may lie in a poor history due to legacy code
and third-party contributions.
In general, the correlations coefficients are similar to
results obtained with PACK by Schro¨ter et al. (2006b).
They are neither much better nor much worse. This
indicates that the results are reasonable.
7.3.4.3 Discussion of results for comparison of au-
thorship algorithms
CONT is rather crude because it only considers devel-
opers who recently contributed. It computes reputations
that are quite different from the other algorithms. Yet
it still achieves acceptable results. EDIU gives slightly
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Karakos TornBond AgileLab FreeCol Log4j Avg.
ws wl w1 ws wl w1 ws wl w1 ws wl w1 ws wl w1
CONT .33 .33 .33 .34 .33 .39 .09 .08 .39 .31 .31 .41 .30 .30 .32 0.30
EDIT .31 .31 .32 .43 .34 .39 .36 .17 .38 .43 .44 .43 .26 .25 .26 0.34
AUTH .31 .31 .31 .32 .32 .39 .26 .24 .41 .39 .39 .41 .25 .25 .29 0.32
EDIU .33 .31 .30 .35 .35 .44 .17 .12 .38 .46 .46 .43 .25 .25 .23 0.32
EDII .32 .30 .31 .31 .29 .38 .18 .17 .18 .43 .45 .46 .25 .27 .26 0.30
AUTU .34 .33 .33 .37 .37 .41 .26 .25 .25 .46 .46 .48 .32 .31 .30 0.35
PACK (.36) (.40) (.09) (.43) (.28) 0.29
Table 7.3: Prediction quality as Spearman correlations for different authorship algorithms and weights
worse results than its proportional counter part EDIT be-
cause it loses some information by treating minor and
major editors alike. Minor contributors who are less
represented in proportional algorithms, seem to have a
relatively strong influence on source code; this effect re-
flects in still good values for EDII, too. However, in the
case of AUTU this loss seems to be beneficial. On the
average, the AUTH algorithms report more developers
per software process artifact because a developer can
become associated with an artifact just by contributions
copied into the artifact by another developer. Conse-
quently, more predictors are available per artifact.
Karakos’s poorer revision history conceals true author-
ship. Here CONT has an advantage because it only looks
at who touched a software process artifact recently. This
seems to be the better alternative if only poor history is
available. AUTH’s fuzziness and copy detection could
be a bit too ambitious in attributing text to its original au-
thors, leading to a worse performance compared to EDIT.
FreeCol’s good history reflects in better predictions by
all algorithms. The results for all other projects are not
as good, and especially AgileLab with its pair program-
ming development methodology adversely affects pre-
diction. But not only by authorship algorithms, but also
for PACK’s performance, although it is constructed in-
dependently from authorship information. There may
be an implicit authorship due to a possible preference
of developers for certain tasks that involve respective
packages. However, there was only few indication of
a direct relation between authors and package imports:
Among all contingency tables for combinations of au-
thors and packages, only 16% (FreeCol), 2.2% (Hydra),
6.4% (Log4j), or 3.4% (LinkSmart) revealed a phi coef-
ficient |rφ| ≥ 0.1.
The average correlations for the different weights wl
(rs = 0.31), ws (rs = 0.31) and w1 (rs = 0.34) over
all projects and algorithms exhibit that weighting all
software process artifacts with the same weight is favor-
able. Although larger software process artifacts contain
a large sample of a developer’s coding style, it should
not outweigh samples from smaller artifacts.
Generally, there is a tendency that projects with more
developers per software process artifact show a higher
predictability. This higher diversity of reputation indica-
tors leads to fewer smoothing, and allows more differ-
entiated predictions that lead to better results (Schro¨ter
et al., 2006b). While all correlations are significant, pair-
wise differences between two correlations are not neces-
sarily significant. Differences are only probable trends
without statistical confidence.
7.3.4.4 Threats to validity
Correlations express that a relationship between two vari-
ables exists. For prediction, a cause-effect explanation is
not necessary. It is impossible to say if something else is
responsible for both observations. For example, package
imports influence quality as they indicate complexity.
Schro¨ter et al. (2006) argument that package imports
indicate task complexity. Some developers could have
bad luck having to write more complex source code.
Through specialization on certain parts of the source
code, complexity could radiate onto developers. How-
ever, the experiment was designed to reduce the effects
of such confounding factors: Checkstyle measures how
“clean” source code is, and cleanliness of source code is
rather independent of task complexity.
Karma scores are based on observations of manifested
programming behaviors. But social and other effects can
impact behavior by e.g. superposing developers’ atti-
tudes. For instance, time pressure can influence program-
ming behavior. Psychology refers to attitudes as bound
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to a target object and changeable over time. For a dif-
ferent object, a developer may reveal a different attitude
(Eiser, 1986). Social effects of group work like the free
rider or sucker effects can further affect performance
and developer attitudes (see Section 3.5.4.1 or Wegge,
2001): For example, if there are two developers with
different quality attitudes working on different function-
ality but in the same software process artifact, it may
be possible that the one with the lower quality attitude
leaves problems for the other one to fix; or, conversely,
the one with higher standards could resign and give up
his own higher standards. These effects are not modeled
in the reputation system. If dynamic coding behaviors
are modeled in a static fashion, then prediction is less
accurate. Still the correlations are substantial, and would
rather become better with better modeling.
7.3.5 Summary
A reputation system was trained to recognize developers’
programming behavior regarding cleanliness of source
code. Training data were software process artifacts that
were associated with quality ratings. Cross-validations
showed that artifact quality can be predicted from the
contributors’ karma scores. Consequently,
• results are no coincidence, but karma scores are
consistent,
• CollabReview associates source code consistently
with developers,
• authorship data is sound and authorship algorithms
work correctly, (Requirement-7: “Validity of com-
putations”) and
• developers have rather enduring coding styles.
The correlations between predicted and assessed qual-
ity ratings are substantial but far from perfect. First, this
is due to shortcomings in the algorithms but also due to
social influences that are unpredictable and difficult to
model. Second, karma scores may not be suitable to reli-
ably identify “bad” programmers because excellent ones
might have an affinity for more difficult tasks (see Sec-
tion 3.5.2.2). Third, while the investigated authorship
algorithms have some tampering resistance, they are not
immune to attacks. The scores’ reliability and robustness
would have to be improved much more. Nonetheless,
the scores’ quality is sufficient for this research because
a significant relationship exists between karma scores
and source code.
The choice of authorship algorithms and weights influ-
ences karma scores and the precision of predictions. Yet
differences are statistically insignificant and rather small.
The authorship algorithm should be chosen according
to other criteria like fairness and expected robustness as
well. In particular, the precision of AUTH is fine com-
pared to the other algorithms. It outperforms algorithms
like CONT. Above that, it has been designed with robust-
ness in mind. It is a good choice for CollabReview.
The results of this study do not show that computed
karma scores are the same as actual social reputation.
This issue is addressed in the experiment in Section 7.4.
7.4 Validity of Computed Karma
Scores
While karma scores computed by CollabReview are con-
sistent, it is not clear that they actually measure what
they should. They might not measure the actual social
reputation in the development team. This section is par-
tially based on Prause and Eisenhauer (2012) and Prause
et al. (2012).
7.4.1 Purpose
The CollabReview concept builds on karma scores to
foster well-behaving. However, an unanswered question
is whether the karma scores derived from collaboratively
created software process artifacts are valid. The question
is: Do karma scores measure something meaningful?
Karma scores should reflect the developers’ reputa-
tion in reality to some degree. But karma scores and
reputation do not have to match exactly. They measure
partially different things. Karma scores do not aim to
compute developers’ social reputation, but the scores
that developers should have according to the value of
their contributions for internal quality. While there is
certainly a connection between contributions to internal
quality and how valuable one’s contributions are per-
ceived by their peers, they are not the same thing. In
fact, scores may be a bit off because they are supposed
to alter contributor behavior. Thus the purpose of this
study is to show that karma scores measure something
like how well developers contribute to documentation
and internal quality (Requirement-7: “Validity of com-
putations”).
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7.4.2 Method
If developers differ in their willingness to contribute to
documentation, then their willingness should manifest
in documentation. It should
• earn them an according social reputation with their
peers, and
• lead to high contribution in alternate forms of doc-
umentation.
Karma scores measure contributions to documenta-
tion, which are manifestations of willingness to con-
tribute. They should hence correlate with social repu-
tation and with further contribution to other forms of
documentation. If positive correlations are found, then
it means that karma scores are valid. This study there-
fore has to show that karma scores indeed correlate with
social reputation and with contribution to other docu-
mentation. It is divided into two according parts:
The first part addresses social reputation. It builds
on quantitative data analysis and inferential statistics.
The results are combined with qualitative observations
to back them up. Social reputation is surveyed through
interviews with developers of Moknowpedia and Torn-
Bond. The interviewees were supposed to say whose
contributions, in their opinion, had added the most value
to the project, considering both quantity and quality.
They were asked to first rate the reputation of their team
members and to then rank them from best to worst. From
all the ranking lists for a project, mean ranking positions
of each developer were computed to obtain the team’s
average ranking list. This list is then compared to Col-
labReview’s ranking list using the Spearman rank corre-
lation.
The second part of this study compares developers’
karma scores to manifestations of other documentation
as proxies. It correlates karma scores obtained from
source code with (a) the quality of Subversion commit
log messages in AgileLab, and (b) contributions to gen-
eral documentation in Moknowpedia.
There are three different karma scores compared for
each developer: The quantity score as the amount of
contributions, the quality score as the weighted mean of
the quality of artifacts he contributed to, and a combined
score which multiplies a developer’s quality and quantity
scores to obtain a single measure of contribution.
7.4.3 Data and results
The data of the two sub-studies for social reputation and
other proxies is presented in the respective subsections.
7.4.3.1 Computed karma vs. social reputation
Fourteen interviews were conducted for Moknowpedia
(≈ 28% of users), and eight ones for TornBond (80%
of developers). Several participants of Moknowpedia
were not interviewed because they were not available
anymore (new job, moved to different work group), or
were known to have used the wiki very rarely so that
they would not be able to make a qualified statement. A
few persons were in both teams and interviewed twice.
They reported to find rating for TornBond a bit more
challenging. One person rejected to participate in both
interviews, mentioning a feeling of lack of competence
to assess others’ contributions. He perceived reputation
scores as something which would generate performance
data while capturing only a small portion of his daily
work, and he had a bad feeling about this.
The Spearman correlation between reputation in-
quired from the team members, and the combined score
computed by the reputation system is rs = 0.88 for
Moknowpedia, and rs = 0.68 for LinkSmart. These
results are an evidence for the validity of reputation
scores. The combined scores reflect the actual opinion
in the peer group well or very well, respectively.
In Moknowpedia, a deeper investigation revealed that
the correlation between the quantity score of the devel-
opers’ contributions and their reputation (rs = 0.88) is
much higher than the correlation between quality score
and reputation (rs = 0.35) (see Figure 7.9). Actual repu-
tation in the community is mostly dependent on the quan-
tity of contributions. The reason may be that almost any
kind of contributions to the wiki are welcomed. Indeed,
authors of wiki articles very often receive good ratings
for their articles. Additionally, there is only a very weak
observable but positive dependency between a devel-
oper’s quality score and his quantity score (rs = 0.19).
An explanation is that bigger articles tend to receive bet-
ter ratings because they are more elaborate.
In TornBond, the correlations between a developer’s
reputation and quantity score is rs = 0.49, and rs =
0.53 for quality scores (see Figure 7.10). Both ones
are weaker than the correlation between reputation and
combined score. But quality has a more important role
168
V
II
—
V
A
L
ID
A
T
IO
N
A
N
D
E
V
A
L
U
A
T
IO
N
VII-4 — Validity of Computed Karma Scores
C
om
pt
d.
Social
1 10 20 29
1
10
20
29
r = 0.25
(a) Quality reputation ranks
C
om
pt
d.
Social
1 10 20 29
1
10
20
29
r = 0.88
(b) Quantity reputation ranks
C
om
pt
d.
Social
1 10 20 29
1
10
20
29
r = 0.90
(c) Combined reputation ranks
Figure 7.9: Scatter plots of computed karma scores and social reputation in Moknowpedia
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Figure 7.10: Scatter plots of computed karma scores and social reputation in TornBond
here. There is no observable relationship between the
quality and the quantity of an author’s contributions.
The TornBond code base contains some .NET source
code which was not considered in reputation computa-
tions but which is still recognized by the team. Mainly
one developer was affected by this. The correlations
between reputation and combined score (rs = 0.66) or
quality score (rs = 0.60) are stronger, when this de-
veloper’s quantity score is adjusted manually to better
reflect the amount of his contributions.
7.4.3.2 Karma score vs. other proxy
This part of the study correlates karma scores computed
from source code quality with contributions to other
forms of documentation as a proxy. Availability of data
allowed for correlating karma scores from AgileLab
source code with AgileLab commit messages, and for
correlating karma scores from TornBond source code
with Moknowpedia contributions. The correlation re-
sults are presented in Figure 7.11.
Commit log message proxy In order to obtain the nec-
essary commit log message data, all revisions created
during the AgileLab and their according log messages
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Figure 7.11: Scatter plots of quality karma scores versus other proxies
were examined. 471 revisions were created by the 10
developers who were part of the experiment (another
≈ 300 revisions were committed by other developers
working on other sub-projects); some 60 revisions were
not counted because they were submitted within seconds
of an earlier commit with an identical log message, hint-
ing that the developer just split his commit into parts. In
my experience, it is quite common that this happens due
to usability problems with the Subversion integration
in a major IDE. From the remaining commit messages,
each one was classified as bad (completely useless, e.g.
empty, “commit”, ...), ok (some effort made but not
much information payload, e.g. “implemented the con-
cepts”), or good for messages that add some meaningful
information. According to this classification, 342 com-
mits were considered as good, 83 as ok, and 46 as bad.
There is a correlation of rs = 0.55 between a devel-
oper’s final quality score and the amount of non-bad
commit messages among all his messages. It may be
possible that not all developers were familiar with the
commit message concept from the start of the project.
Therefore, additionally only messages that were created
during the second half of AgileLab were examined. Here
the correlation is rs = 0.61, which is statistically sig-
nificant at p < 0.05 for N = 10. The result implies
that a developer’s disposition to provide good commit
messages hints at how likely he is to provide Javadoc in
his source code.
Wiki proxy The developers of TornBond are a subset
of the users of Moknowpedia. So it was possible to
compare their karma scores from source code quality
with their contributions to the Moknowpedia wiki. A
positive correlation of rs = 0.41 was found. While the
correlation is not significant at p = 0.11 ≮ 0.05, it still
seems probable that both are related.
7.4.3.3 Threats to validity
The automatic quality assessment (adherence to coding
styles) in TornBond is possibly not fully congruent with
what developers personally consider good quality of
source code. Also, the development teams only consist
of a few developers, which is quite common for agile
teams. But due to the set’s small cardinality, correlations
are on the edge of p < 0.05 significance. Similarly,
differences between the presented correlations within
Moknowpedia and TornBond are hardly significant in
both teams.
The correlation for reputation in Moknowpedia is very
strong. However, Moknowpedia includes some aware-
ness mechanisms. An influence on the users’ percep-
tion cannot be precluded, although interviewees were
instructed to assign ranks according to their opinion, and
to not consider the presented ranking list. Furthermore,
the presented ranks were subject to discussions in the
team before, so it is probable that interviewees did not
just repeat scores but considered them in a critical dis-
pute.
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The environments chosen for the study are sub-
optimal due to these factors. But it were the only envi-
ronments where a sufficient amount of data (software
process artifacts and reviews) was available, or where
users could be interviewed.
7.4.4 Summary
The purpose of this study was to find out whether the
karma scores computed by the CollabReview prototype
are valid, i.e. if they measure contribution to internal
quality. Karma scores were therefore correlated with
indicators of contribution to documentation.
In the first part, developers were interviewed about the
contributions of their fellow developers. Correlations
were strong and significant, and not supposed to per-
fectly measure social reputation. Instead, they measure
the value of a developer’s contributions for the team in
terms of internal quality, which may be different. For
example, a developer may contribute a lot, is perceived
by her peers as working hard and getting things done,
but produces hardly comprehensible source code. So her
karma score and contribution to documentation is low,
although the perception in the team is a bit different.
In the second part, the developers’ karma scores were
compared to other forms of documentation created by
these developers. Correlations were weaker here but
still there. One of the correlations was only moderately
strong and not significant, which, however, is rather due
to the small sample size available.
In summary, correlations between karma scores and
• social reputation were
– near perfect (rs = 0.90) in Moknowpedia and
– very strong (rs = 0.68) in TornBond, and
• manifestations in other documentation were
– substantial (rs = 0.61) for commit log mes-
sages in AgileLab, and
– moderate (rs = 0.41, not significant) for con-
tributions to Moknowpedia.
Karma scores approximate the developers’ contribu-
tion to internal quality and their disposition to do so.
A repetition in larger studies with cleaner conditions is
desirable to improve confidence in the results. However,
an appropriate environment was not available during this
research. Even without further studies, all correlations
except for the fourth one were significant and support
the validity of karma scores (Requirement-7: “Validity
of computations”).
7.5 Analytical Concept Evaluation
CollabReview was evaluated with expert feedback at
different stages of its development.
7.5.1 Purpose
Evaluation of the concept is based on feedback that was
collected from interdisciplinary and international com-
munities to obtain early results. Expert opinions allow
access to environments where empirical evaluation based
on experiments is not possible due to time constraints,
availability or potential risks to ongoing work through
the experiments.
Several concept evaluations were conducted in the
frame of this research. The main purpose of obtaining
feedback was to improve the concept, and to learn about
its feasibility and applicability in other domains. While
in principle the opinions could contribute to the valida-
tion of all requirements, the workshops mostly focused
on the social aspects of CollabReview, and less on tech-
nical details.
7.5.2 Method
In order to analytically evaluate the CollabReview con-
cept, the whole concept and parts of it were repeatedly
presented to audiences with different backgrounds. The
workshops included discussions with other researchers,
research colloquiums in the department, and reviews and
discussions based on scientific papers at international
workshops and conferences.
The events where the CollabReview concept was dis-
cussed include five medium-sized workshops with ten
to twenty international scientists in the areas of software
engineering and collaboration, seven paper-based indi-
vidual reviews (two to three anonymous international
experts each), four medium-sized discussion rounds with
junior and senior multidisciplinary scientists from the
work group, a larger panel from a related research group,
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countless individual reviews with close colleagues and
international experts, and a series of almost 40 inter-
views led with international practitioners and researchers
at a major software engineering event.
7.5.3 Results
Discussions of the concept tended to create controversy
among the experts that reviewed it. Several times heated
discussions arose with the presenter being in the middle
between the front lines of two opposing factions. One
expert’s opinion best summarizes this, when he noted
that the concept was dangerous “but it will probably
generate some attention”. Especially the karma scores
were subject to criticism, so it was recommended that
it “may be possible to make something of it without
calculating personal reputation scores”. Another expert
stated that attempts with ratings were already made 30
years ago and that it “did not work out formerly”. It was
expected that there would be some resistance to its use,
and that many would not feel comfortable with it.
Integration into the development environment was
seen as a potential weakness. It was doubted that Col-
labReview would make sense in combination with for-
mal reviews. However, if CollabReview emphasized
its support as a “post-review” approach, other experts
argued that both could co-exist. CollabReview might not
be equally well suited for commercial and open source
environments. It may be too optimistic to assume that
the “approach will be accepted by a software team un-
der the pressure of real development conditions”. Many
industry experts shared the view that CollabReview was
not suited for commercial development (Prause and Dur-
dik, 2012). One expert proposed that motivating devel-
opers to create high quality source code by making sure
they know that they will have to work with their source
code forever. In such a situation, a developer has his very
own interest in keeping source code in good shape. The
problem is that this is not always possible and wanted
because it creates high dependence on the individual de-
velopers. Still, the CollabReview concept may be more
suitable for environments where the long-term perspec-
tive is missing. A psychologist recommended to “Just
try it! Reactions [of people] can be very different from
situation to situation.”
The experts saw the possibility of hazardous social
effects. One expert pointed out that in online “commu-
nities it is usually clear how the reputation score works;
there is no perceived loss or gain of standing among
one’s peer group, since the participants are unknown to
each other.” If they are known to each other and can
influence each others scores, however, the situation is
different. Other experts feared that a rat race might oc-
cur, in which developers get exhausted by chasing top
quality ratings. Later experiments will be cautiously
investigated for the occurrence of rat races, and undesir-
able consequences (Requirement-4: “No hazard to the
team”).
Also on an individual level hazardous effects are pos-
sible. One expert feared that a “smart manager would
use the results to fire the worst developer.” In such a
situation, CollabReview would be perceived as a threat
and face extreme opposition.
As a result of this, developers might try to attack the
reputation system, e.g. through the responsibility metric
or the quality metric. So CollabReview needs to have
some defense mechanisms. But as long as CollabReview
is not associated with too high potential win or loss,
attacks should not be too elaborate.
A potential problem identified in the concept evalu-
ations was the rating bias of contributors. Understand-
ability is not an objective measure, “because it bases
on human perceptions”. A contributor who is new to
the project might rate source code differently, leading
to skewed scores. The usage of objective metrics like
“bugs in file”, “time to fix a bug” or “time until code is
changed again” might be better. Also, experts predicted
that everyone thinks that he wrote good source code, so
everyone would rate himself best. But reviews should
be independent. Therefore arbiters were created.
Experts expressed the opinion that the concept was
probably difficult to get right, and that the best way
how to do it has not yet been found. A simple-minded
approach was deemed likely to fail. With respect to
this, the present research provides a telling critique of
potential problems. Furthermore, the experts feared
that information contained in review comments was in
danger of getting overseen due to the more influential
karma scores, which do not reproduce the provided text.
Potential for unfairness was recognized in the way
how responsibility is computed. One expert noted that if
one developer (Alice) breaks the source code another one
(Bob) with just a few changes, then Bob would get all
the bad points although it is Alice’s fault. CollabReview
only approximates scores. Yet if Alice tends to regularly
break source code, she will statistically end up with an
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overall rating worse than that of Bob because she is
always involved in broken code.
While opponents often expressed their opinion ve-
hemently, the majority of experts expressed that they
think that a reputation system can in fact improve source
code and documentation quality (e.g. 34 out of 40 in
Prause and Durdik, 2012). The CollabReview concept
was found to be “quite innovative”. One expert explic-
itly named looking at reputation to improve quality as
a strength, and another expert explained: “The idea of
using a reputation score as a quality tool is clever, is new
to me at least, and is potentially effective.” For example,
the manager of a Russian software company said after
one of the discussions: “When it’s finished, I want to
have it.”
7.5.4 Summary
Receptions of the CollabReview concept were controver-
sial. Proponents and disputants often got into heated dis-
cussions. While bringing CollabReview into real work
environments might be difficult because it can
• have hazardous effects on
– group and
– individual levels,
• be exposed to attacks against its reputation system,
• suffer from non-objectivity of reviews, and
• be perceived as unfair,
most experts considered CollabReview worthwhile be-
ing tried out, and thought that it can work.
The early conceptual evaluation revealed issues that
actually eventuated in the field experiments described
later. This can indicate that the obtained results are trans-
ferable to other kinds of software projects as well. But
experts seem to agree that the CollabReview concept is
not equally well suited for different software develop-
ment environments. The feedback also provided hints
for improving the concept, and addressed the feasibility
of the CollabReview prototype.
7.6 Moknowpedia Field Experi-
ment
The Moknowpedia experiment was the first experiment
of CollabReview with real users. Its description is mostly
based on Dencheva et al. (2011). As described in Sec-
tion 7.1.3, names of subjects have been changed for
anonymity.
7.6.1 Purpose
The previous studies validated only certain aspects of the
CollabReview prototype like the validity of computed
karma scores. The effects of the prototype on the team as
a whole have not been studied before. The Moknowpe-
dia field experiment addresses this matter, and clarifies
if Moknowpedia enhanced with CollabReview
• increases the amount of internal documentation,
• improves the quality of software process artifacts
(Requirement-1: “Improve internal software qual-
ity”),
• involves deniers to preserve the unique expert
knowledge of everyone (Requirement-6: “Involve
contributors without dependence”),
• keeps the cost of operation low (Requirement-8:
“Few overhead for users”),
• does not force contribution (Requirement-2: “Ap-
peal to individuals’ motivation”), and
• avoids not cause destructive phenomena like rat
races or bullying (Requirement-4: “No hazard to
the team”).
7.6.2 Method
The field experiment brings the CollabReview prototype
into a wiki that is in productive use, and gathers data
over the period of several months. The focus of the ex-
periment is explorative, and relies on qualitative data and
human aspects. It should obtain a good impression of the
impact of the reputation mechanisms on a personal level,
albeit at the cost of only a small number of probands and
limited statistical significance.
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It was not feasible to divide the whole group of users
into two groups. A within-group design experiment
was therefore devised. Before adding CollabReview to
Moknowpedia, all members of the work groups were
interviewed and filled out questionnaires. This was to
capture the initial spectrum of opinions as a base line.
The goal of the questionnaires was to survey if contents
improved, and whether the reviewing extensions were
accepted, and to gather future design recommendations.
A second round of interviews was executed after the test
phase with similar questionnaires. The results of both in-
terviews could then be compared. Yet probands did not
know that there would be a second interview. A possible
social desirability bias would then be in effect during
both interviews and cancel itself out. Additionally, the
time of several months between the two interviews was
probably too long for probands to remember earlier an-
swers. Before and after the test period, the users were
interviewed with questionnaires.
The test phase itself — between the two interviews —
ran for four months. During this time, any incidents and
observations regarding the modified Moknowpedia were
recorded. In addition to the interviews, actual usage
data was collected, and compared to data of the four
months right before the test. Although the test phase
of about four months of productive use was long, the
results might still be influenced by seasonal events like
holidays.
The target user group in the field experiment are self-
organizing project teams at a research institute with flat
hierarchies. Individuals have far-reaching freedom and
autonomy in organizing their work. Explicit instruction
or punishment are, at most, rare. Intrinsic motivation is
valued very much. Staff members are mostly researchers,
one third working students, and two executive managers.
The vast majority has a computer science background
with a few exceptions that still have good computer
knowledge.
7.6.3 Data and results
At the start and end of the test, the work group had 18
and 16 members, respectively. Due to fluctuation in
personnel, only 15 employees were able to participate
for the full test period.
7.6.3.1 Measured results
By analyzing the data in databases and server logs, the
four months before the review extensions were added
are compared to the four months of the test period. Start
of the test period was February 18th, 2010.
The number of new article revisions created during
the measured period raised from 320 to 517, which is
an increase of about 62%. As the four pre-test months
span Christmas time, the test period was also compared
to the same period in 2009. Here 363 new revisions
were created, which still means an increase by 42%. The
average number of characters per article in Moknowpe-
dia grew from 5324 to 6134. So, articles tended to grow
in size. I the same period one year earlier, the number of
characters per article was 5703, which is also less than
during the test.
In addition to an increased number of contributions,
also an increased number of article views was recorded.
MediaWiki counted 176 page views in the four months
before, and 258 views during the test phase. This is an
increment of 47%. The number of page views is lower
than that of changes because MediaWiki does not count
page views that recur in a short period. So, editing an
article does not necessarily increment the read counter
every time.
Finally, data regarding use of the review tool was
surveyed. After the test phase, there were 237 reviews in
the database. 155 reviews (more than half of all reviews)
additionally contained sensible comments. In total, these
reviews were submitted by 16 different users. Only one
user who had participated for the test’s full duration had
not submitted a single review.
Even after the test phase is over, Moknowpedia’s re-
view facilities keep being used, and new reviews are be-
ing added continuously. However, no more chocolate is
awarded and the HotW is no longer mentioned in official
meetings.
7.6.3.2 Quantitative interview results: Effects on
Moknowpedia and acceptance
The pre- and post-test questionnaires contained twelve
statements to which users should express their degree
of agreement on a Likert scale: “fully agree”, “agree”,
“neutral”, “disagree”, “absolutely disagree”. Items 1 to 8
concerned the effect that reviewing extensions had on the
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Figure 7.12: Results of Moknowpedia pre- and post-evaluation interview (Dencheva et al., 2011)
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Wiki contents. The remaining four items related to the
reviewing extensions themselves. Detailed agreement is
presented in Figure 7.12.
Assigning one (“absolutely disagree”) to five points
(“fully agree”) to each user’s agreement, an average
agreement score is computed. The average agreement of
first and second interview can then be compared to see
how agreement has changed. The texts of the different
statements, translated into English, and the associated
agreement scores — absolute and relative change be-
tween first and second interview — are listed in Table
7.4.
The answers substantiate that Moknowpedia and its
contents improved during the test. In the second inter-
view, users disagreed with the positive statements about
Moknowpedia in only seven cases, as compared to 22
before. Many users that were previously undecided, later
agreed to positive statements.
Four statements regard the reviewing extensions them-
selves (see Table 7.4). Before the test, there were several
users that were not sure of whether rewards would moti-
vate them (Item 9). Through the test, these users changed
to agreement. Also, the number of skeptics decreased
so that afterward a slight majority was in favor of the
reviewing extensions. However, the statement of Item
9 was still the one confronted with the most objection.
Similarly, most users initially did not think that they
would invest time in writing reviews (Item 11). This
has clearly changed towards acceptance: the number of
agreeing users grew from four to ten, and disagreeing
users decreased from six to two. Although the majority
of users agreed from the start that reviewing would make
sense, after the test they even more agreed (Item 10).
An interesting question was if acceptance of the re-
viewing system was especially high among profiteers.
But there were only weak Spearman rank correlations
between the items 9 to 11, and the user’s position in the
ranking list. The strongest correlation was rItem11 =
0.25 for Item 11 (rItem9 = 0.14, rItem10 = −0.06):
Profiteers might be more willing to do reviewing work
than others. A more probable explanation is that do-
ing review work leads to profiteering. Yet none of the
correlations is significant. It could be that there is no
relation between profiting from the review extensions
and advocating them.
The last depicted item was mixed into the statements
as an indicator of a possibly changing response bias. It
was intentionally formulated diffusely (The integration
of a reward system into the wiki is interesting.). The
intention was that it could reveal a bias towards giving
more positive feedback in the second interview. We ob-
served only a small change in feedback behavior (3.7
points, +0.2), so it seems that there is few social desir-
ability bias, thus supporting that observed improvements
in the other items are real.
7.6.3.3 Anecdotes
The experimenters and designated confederates were
integrated into the natural work environment of the
probands, and could observe first-hand what happened
during the test period. This section presents a collection
of anecdotal stories from the test.
Curiosity Trudy had missed the meeting in which the
Moknowpedia extensions were introduced. She was
curious and went to her colleagues to ask them how she
could try the extensions. As the extensions were already
installed in Moknowpedia, she could start using them
without problems.
Missing comment Gina went to one of the adminis-
trators of Moknowpedia and complained that somebody
gave her article a bad review rating without writing a
comment. The administrators themselves could not do
anything about it, but after this incident, Moknowpedia
was updated to allow rejecting of seemingly unjustified
reviews. Yet there were no further incidents like this
one.
First activity Lou, who was registered in Moknow-
pedia but had never written an article before, started to
regularly write and review articles. Within one week,
he made it from zero points to the fifth position in the
rankings. He stated that the extensions motivated him to
start contributing to Moknowpedia.
Frustration During the evaluation, Izzy became Hero
of the Week several times in a row. This frustrated
other users. They complained that there must have been
something wrong with Moknowpedia. As a consequence
of this, Izzy deliberately chose to contribute less to give
others a chance to earn the title, too.
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# Statement Pts. Chng.
1 Moknowpedia is generally attractive 4.0 +0.73
2 The articles in the wiki are substantial 3.6 +0.53
3 The total number of articles is satisfactory 3.3 +0.27
4 The articles are interesting to read 3.5 +0.60
5 The wiki contains important and useful information 4.5 +0.20
6 Article core information is comprehensible and easy to find 3.9 +0.53
7 The treated topics are diverse 4.0 +0.60
8 It is worth using Moknowpedia 4.1 +0.47
9 A reward motivates me to use the wiki more actively 3.0 +0.47
10 A mechanism to rate the quality of articles is valuable 3.9 +0.53
11 It makes sense to invest time in reviewing and commenting 3.6 +0.80
Table 7.4: User agreement to items in Moknowpedia post-test questionnaire (Dencheva et al., 2011)
Playful competition Incited by the fact that a col-
league had overtaken him in the rankings, Larry went
to several colleagues, asking them for hints on how he
could quickly gather some more points. They gave him
the advice that an easy way to get some points was
to write reviews. Within a few hours, Larry reviewed
dozens of articles until he had again overtaken said col-
league. For the next weeks, he kept an eye on the rank-
ings, watching to remain ahead of that colleague. Al-
though he reviewed articles primarily to get the points,
his reviews were fair and contained valuable review com-
ments.
Anti-hero Caitlin had been a minor contributor, only
contributing what she had explicitly been requested to.
She never submitted a review and for a long time, none
of her articles had received a review, leaving her with
zero points. She was proud of being the last one in the
reputation ranking with zero points. One day, however,
she received a number of points; not because she had
done something recently, but because one of her older
articles had received a good review. So she came to
an experimenter’s office and asked if she could rate her
own articles down to get her old position back. But then,
she was told, she would get points for the reviews. So
there was nothing that she could do to get back to 0
points (unless making the reviewer who rated her article
give her a bad review instead). She did not like that.
Unique positions — even if not directly associated with
a positive merit — have a certain attraction to users.
Improvement Through a review comment, Martin
was adverted to the template that is recommended for
creating user profiles. He had not used the template be-
fore, so he asked his colleagues about the profile and
had them help him to change his profile page. Feedback
from the reviews was helpful to him and for improving
the article’s quality.
Manipulation To quickly gain a considerable amount
of points and become Hero of the Week, Stan hacked the
Moknowpedia by writing a script that rated all articles
“good”. Although he immediately received lots of points,
he still did not win the title because the articles’ authors
received more points than him. The incident shows that
— given enough incentive — attacks against the system
become probable. Administrators deleted all reviews in
the database that were created through the attack. The
group negotiated that no one would attempt such an
attack anymore.
Teasing From his office, Rico saw Sonny at the end of
the hallway, he laughed and jokingly exclaimed: “Hey
Sonny, I rated your last meeting minutes ‘poor’!” Yet a
few minutes later Rico changed the review to a better and
more appropriate rating. The users used Moknowpedia
to tease each other, leading to a form of viral advertising.
7.6.3.4 Future design recommendations
In the second interview, there were three additional state-
ments about the rewarding mechanisms. All three re-
warding mechanisms were not perceived as very effec-
tive at motivating users. On the average, they all were
rejected weakly. The ranking list was perceived as most
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effective rewarding mechanism (2.9 points), followed by
the Hero of the Week (2.7 points), and finally the level
hierarchy (2.6 points).
The questionnaire invited users to provide further re-
marks of what had or would have motivated them, what
they had liked or disliked, and if it changed their behav-
ior. The major design recommendations are presented
below:
A few users said that they would not feel motivated
by the rewards in any way. Instead, they responded it
would have required much larger rewards, or coercion.
They had a distrust against the reviewing system, and
considered reviewing articles as distracting and a waste
of time that they could rather spend on writing articles.
Some users bore concern that the extensions could be
manipulated and be attacked systematically to harm tar-
geted people.
Positive remarks were that the design was pleasant,
and the integration fitted well into the existing Moknow-
pedia. It was simple to access, and easy to use and under-
stand. The review comments were regarded as very use-
ful because they motivated and helped with improving
articles. Users felt that the reviews made them read and
tend to more articles. Reviews also gave them a feeling
of trust. But also the anonymity of writing reviews was
appreciated. Several users valued that they could see
their own activity, or compare it to the others’ activity.
Some users noted a positive fun factor in the rewarding
mechanisms, which they regarded as entertaining.
One user testified that the rewards had motivated him
to start contributing to Moknowpedia. Others browsed
more vigilantly to be able to give reviews, or wrote
articles more carefully. A major contributor, however,
said that he had reduced his contributions to give others
a chance. A couple of users felt appealed by the rewards
and answered that it had changed their behavior, but
noted that the motivation was not sustainable, and could
not withstand other pressing tasks. The lack of time
was given as the major reason for not contributing to
articles as well as not reviewing. A few users said that
they would not care for the rewards and, in fact, were
using the wiki because they were convinced by it, but
they also said that the rewards made them think more
about the wiki.
Wishes for future improvements were to harden Mo-
knowpedia against manipulation, to provide a user with
hints how to earn his next points, a way to immediately
respond to reviews, and to have computer-generated
initial quality assessments. The value of rewards should
be increased (e.g. an additional day off), and getting a
certain amount of reputation points per week should be
compulsory. Even punishment like paying money into a
thank-you box was proposed. Another wish was to have
user groups so that teams could compete against each
other.
7.6.4 Discussion and threats to validity
The users originally expressed the wish to have more
time to make their contributions and reviews, or even
wanted to be called upon to do it by their managers.
CollabReview takes a different approach. It assumes that
if users have enough motivation to contribute, then they
themselves will find the time to do so. Although purely
intrinsic motivation would be preferable, CollabReview
has some extrinsically motivating effects that lead to the
desired effects.
The evaluation shows that CollabReview increased
the volume of contents in Moknowpedia. Users feel
that the number of articles increased. An increase in
content size was measurable, too. The same holds true
for quality, where users think that interestingness and
understandability increased. Additionally, reviews pro-
vide confidence in article content, further adding to their
quality. The Moknowpedia wiki became more attractive
for users through this.
The CollabReview extension also drew more users to
Moknowpedia. Except for a very few users that disap-
proved the review concept outright (one of them was a
quite active contributor of articles), there was no user
that did not at least contribute some reviews. At least
one user admitted to have started contributing because
of the rewarding system. Although it was not possible
to achieve active contribution by everyone without ex-
ceptions, CollabReview was successful at drawing addi-
tional users to Moknowpedia.
The additional cost of operation through CollabRe-
view is negligible. All that was needed was a little more
computing power, and a small reward for the Hero of the
Week. By its design, CollabReview does not prescribe
users what to do. No one is forced to comply and there
is no threat or punishment involved. Similarly, there was
no record of events that would suggest the existence of
undesirable phenomena like rat races, or bullying. In-
stead, the reputation system was perceived as fun.
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All effects are closely related to the subjective value
of reputation for the individual. The more reputation is
worth, the more efforts users will invest to attain a high
reputation (see Section 3.5.2.2). For example, relying on
coercion or higher rewards will lead to greater positive
effects but at the cost of risking destructive effects like
rat races.
Socio-technical systems are highly complex due to
the involved human beings that tend to be unpredictable.
Changing only a minor factor in the environment or
the people themselves, could lead to very different re-
sults. For example, if the work groups were not built
on friendly cooperation and intrinsic motivation, if the
environment were more competitive, or if the majority
were not computer scientists, then results might have
been different. Also, when the test started, the Moknow-
pedia was about two years old. Usage behavior had
had its time to establish and stabilize before the exper-
iment. Several attempts to improve contribution had
failed. That it worked this time is probably due to Col-
labReview. Yet it cannot be fully precluded that the
change in behavior observed during the test, is not due
to some other effect.
7.6.5 Summary
After installing CollabReview in Moknowpedia, its use
was evaluated for several months with two work groups.
The goal of the evaluation was to gather first experiences
with such a system. The focus was on qualitative feed-
back from observations in the field and interviews with
users. Hard usage numbers were collected, too.
All in all, the evaluation results were promising. Not
only have the users accessed the wiki more often, but
they have also read more articles, and made more contri-
butions. The quality and quantity of the software process
artifacts in Moknowpedia increased: the number of new
articles increased by 40% to 60%, their average size in-
creased by 20%, and the content was perceived as about
half a point better on a 5-point Likert scale after the field
experiment (Requirement-1: “Improve internal software
quality”). Most users accepted the CollabReview ex-
tensions and enjoyed using them; however, no user was
forced to use or care for them (Requirement-6: “Involve
contributors without dependence”). Some users even
made their first contributions because of CollabReview
(Requirement-2: “Appeal to individuals’ motivation”).
The trial allayed initial fears that the system might be
misused as a tool for bullying, or be confronted with to-
tal rejection (Requirement-4: “No hazard to the team”).
Instead, the experiment showed that with a little effort
invested in integrating the CollabReview prototype into
the Moknowpedia, and offering a small exchange value
for reputation, considerable improvements contributions
could be obtained (Requirement-8: “Few overhead for
users”).
Besides showing an overall success of the CollabRe-
view concept, the evaluation informs the design of simi-
lar future systems. The anecdotal stories provide a vivid
picture of the social processes that occurred during the
test. These are complemented by hints for improvement
gathered through the final interviews.
7.7 AgileLab Field Experiment
The AgileLab was the first field experiment dealing with
improving source code quality in a software project.
While the experiment failed to achieve the desired out-
come, valuable lessons with regard to aspects critical
for success were learned. This description is based on
(Prause et al., 2012). Note that all presented names are
pseudonyms as explained in Section 7.1.3.
7.7.1 Purpose
The purpose of the field experiment was to try CollabRe-
view for improving the quality of source code, and to
validate the same requirements as in the Moknowpedia
field experiment, i.e. primarily Requirement-1: “Im-
prove internal software quality”, Requirement-2: “Ap-
peal to individuals’ motivation”, Requirement-4: “No
hazard to the team”, Requirement-6: “Involve contrib-
utors without dependence”, and Requirement-8: “Few
overhead for users”. However, the experiment failed.
A verifiable effect, either positive or negative, was not
found.
Instead, the experiment was adapted to deliver infor-
mation about the reasons for failing. It teaches valuable
lessons about the socio-technical interplay and effects
of CollabReview. This information informs the future
design of experiments and similar systems.
7.7.2 Method
An opportunity for studying CollabReview in a software
development project opened up with the AgileLab. The
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study started as a field experiment but later turned into a
postmortem analysis of the experiment to better under-
stand what had happened.
7.7.2.1 The field experiment part of the study
During the lab, CollabReview computed quality and
quantity karma scores of developers. The quantity karma
scores served for data gathering purposes only, and were
not disclosed to participants of the experiment. Quality
karma scores served for data gathering as well, but would
additionally be published to developers to influence their
behavior.
The arbitrary re-combination of developers into pro-
gramming pairs and their small number made it infea-
sible to split them into a control and an experimental
group running in parallel. Instead, the experiment fol-
lowed a within-group design and was split into a control
and an experimental phase. First, comparison data was
collected during the earlier phase without the developers
knowing. In the second phase, after about half of the
project duration, the intervention started. The experi-
mental phase lasted for 8 working days and served to
measure the effect of CollabReview.
CollabReview and the experimental intervention
based on it The day when the intervention started was
“Day 0”. It was signified by an introductory email, which
informed all developers that they were taking part in an
experiment. It explained that personal scores depended
on Javadoc in their source code, and that measurements
were not totally accurate but reflected trends.
CollabReview then sent all developers a daily email
in the late afternoon. This email contained a ranking list
of all developers (including their individual scores), and
repeated a short explanation of how developers could
improve their quality ratings by writing Javadoc. In
addition to the published ranking list, a 30EUR Amazon
voucher was announced as a prize for the developer who
would have the highest karma score at the end of the
lab. A short information on the top scores was given in
the standup meeting8 at the end of each day to improve
visibility.
There were two partly conflicting goals set for the
project: the primary goal was to deliver software with
8Standup meetings are used in agile development to discuss current
issues and to coordinate work between team members.
certain functionality to a hard deadline, while the sec-
ondary goal (supported through CollabReview) was to
obtain high quality source code. These two goals are
conflicting to some degree in the short term as neglect-
ing quality can temporarily speed up development (see
Section 2.2.2.2). In particular, a developer’s contribu-
tion quality and quantity were negatively correlated at
intervention start (r = −0.70) and end (r = −0.43),
respectively, i.e. more quality means less quantity and
vice versa.
Although the lab was graded, students were instructed
that neither their quality karma scores nor their quantity
karma scores as determined by CollabReview would
affect their lab grades. Consequently, even if improving
quality would cost developers their time, this would
not affect their grade in neither a good nor a bad way.
Developers were free to invest (almost) any amount of
time into writing Javadoc comments. And they were
expected to document the public API well anyways. The
only trade off between implementing and documenting
was that of having less time for other implementation
activities when documenting.
7.7.2.2 Postmortem interviews after completion of
the experiment
When it became foreseeable that the intervention would
not have the intended effects, a structured interview was
designed. It would be done with the students after the
completion of the experiment. The interview was based
on a questionnaire, and aimed at learning for the fu-
ture design of similar interventions. The questionnaire
contained Likert items for quantitatively capturing the
importance of certain factors, and additional free text
questions to qualitatively investigate deeper into what
happened. The questionnaire asked about eight human
“feelings” about CollabReview to learn whether the in-
tervention was
• present — How present were the reputation scores
in your consciousness?
• fair — How fair were reputation scores suited to
your work?
• important — How important were the reputation
scores for you?
• understandable — How well did you understand
the way reputation scores were computed?
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• likable — How much did you like that reputation
scores were computed at all?
• interesting — How interesting was it for you that
there were reputation scores?
• fitting — How well do you think reputation scores
fitted into the lab situation?
• acceptable — How acceptable are reputation scores
for you?
7.7.2.3 Notes on the conduction of the experiment
During the daily standup meetings, shortly after the
CollabReview intervention had begun, the students ex-
pressed some confusion about how their karma scores
were computed. During the working hours, the teaching
staff observed further murmur on the scores. Still the
students did not ask many explicit questions about the
scores, or how they were computed.
A bug in the rank computation algorithm led to wrong
karma scores being published via email. Some users had
actually a different rank than the one published in the
daily email. Luckily, however, this mishap did not affect
the winner of the prize, who was Millhouse in both cases.
In fact, the mishap later turned out to be fortunate when
interpreting the results.
7.7.3 Data
The collected data consists of the history of quantity
karma scores, quality karma scores, and results of the
questionnaire.
7.7.3.1 History of quantity karma scores
Figure 7.13 shows how the amount of source code (mea-
sured in hecto non-empty lines of source code (HSLOC))
contributed by individual developers evolved over time.
The figure starts at day -11, which was the first day of
the project. More developers appear during the early
days of the project when making their first commit to
the code base. In general, the figure does not contain any
surprising results: As more and more code is developed,
the developers’ contributions increase.
The figure does not count days on weekends. There-
fore, Day 0, which marks the start of the intervention, is
after a little more than two weeks into the project. The
project ended at day 7, one and a half weeks after the
intervention started. The dashed line shows the average
quantity karma score of the developers, which is analo-
gous to the total amount of source code in the code base.
There is a sudden increase to a high peak and then a
rapid decrease to a normal level for Sanjay. This phe-
nomenon results from copying a huge amount of code
into the code base, which is later removed or edited by
other developers.
7.7.3.2 History of quality karma scores
Figure 7.14 is more important with regard to the study. It
shows how the developers’ individual karma scores for
quality evolved over time. Especially in the beginning,
these scores jumped up and down. The reason is that
initially the developers had contributed only few source
code, while quality karma scores were computed from
the average quality. When the amount of source code
authored by a developer increases, each line will have
less influence on the average.
The dashed line shows the average quality karma
score of all developers with scores weighted by their de-
velopers’ quantity, i.e. a developer’s score has a higher
weight when that developer has contributed more code.
The average score is therefore equivalent to the code
base’s overall quality. A larger code base also leads to
a stabilizing average quality karma score. The simple
reason is here, too, that with more source code going
into the average, a single change will have less effect.
7.7.3.3 Quantitative questionnaire results
Likert-scaled responses are presented in Table 7.5 (very
low = 1, ..., very high = 5). The overall reception of
the intervention reveals potential for improvement but
also shows that it is not rejected outright: Fitting (2.44),
fairness (2.33) and especially understandability (2.11)
are the most problematic areas, while likability (2.67)
and presence (2.89) were less problematic.
7.7.4 Results and Discussion
Figure 7.14 shows that the intervention (starting at day 0)
had only a small influence on code quality. The intended
effect of increasing the code quality is not supported
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Quantity in HSLOC 14
-11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 day 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Kent Krusty Lenny Ned Bart
Sanjay Seymour Mel Rainier Millhouse
Figure 7.13: Amount of source code contributed by the developers (quantity karma scores)
Quality rating 9
-11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 day 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Kent Krusty Lenny Ned Bart
Sanjay Seymour Mel Rainier Millhouse
Figure 7.14: Average quality of source code written by each developer (quality karma scores)
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Bart - - 0 0 - - 0 - - - - 0 2.0
Kent - - + - - 0 0 - 2.5
Krusty + - + - - + 0 0 3.0
Lenny + 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 2.9
Mel + + - 0 0 0 - + 3.1
Millhouse 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 2.9
Ned (no feedback received)
Reinier - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.3
Sanjay 0 - - 0 - - + - 0 - - 2.3
Seymour 0 - - - - + 0 0 + 0 2.8
Average 2.89 2.33 2.56 2.11 2.67 2.56 2.44 2.56 2.5
rs(mail) 0.53 -0.05 -0.23 0.36 0.58 0.27 0.41 0.13 .35
rs(Q
end
l ) 0.28 0.04 -0.01 0.28 0.49 0.18 0.38 -0.10 .25
rs(Q
start
l ) 0.20 -0.01 -0.04 0.20 0.52 0.06 0.28 -0.15 .08
rs(Q
end
t ) -0.50 -0.42 0.44 -0.67 -0.03 -0.39 -0.11 -0.41 -.53
rs(Q
start
t ) -0.40 -0.14 0.41 -0.13 -0.37 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -.18
Table 7.5: Likert-scaled opinions about the intervention and correlation with score ranks in AgileLab
by the data. In fact, there is actually a small decrease
in quality because day 0 coincided with a quality peak.
The conclusion is that the intervention did not have an
adverse effect, too. It just did not show any significant
effect. One could argue that quality scores might be con-
founded by an end-of-project deadline. It may be that
developers would normally have sacrificed quality in fa-
vor of functionality to complete all their tasks before the
software is delivered. Our intervention could then have
prevented that from happening. But this interpretation
remains speculative.
7.7.4.1 Relations between opinions and quality
karma scores
Unless stated otherwise, all correlation coefficients rs
denote Spearman rank correlations. Most correlations
are not significant, which is probably due to the small
sample size. That does not necessarily mean that de-
tected correlations do not exist but the chances that the
do not are non-negligible.
The average personal opinions correlate weakly with
quality karma scores at the end of the evaluation period
(rs(Qendl ) = .25) while only a trivial/no correlation was
found with scores at the start. It indicates that the inter-
vention probably had had some effect. The relationship
with ranks published through email (rs(mail) = .35) is
a bit stronger. This increased strength might be attributed
to the effect that profiteering leads to a better reception,
but also to the effect that a better overall reception of
karma leads to more investing in quality.
There is a strong relationship between published ranks
and the perceived presence of karma scores (rs(mail) =
.53). One explanation could be that those who feel that
karma has a high presence are more interested in achiev-
ing high karma scores and ranks themselves, and there-
fore write higher quality code. But the following reason-
ing suggests that it is the other way around (that being
higher in the ranks leads to a stronger perceived pres-
ence of karma.) The correct ranks Qendl at the end of
the trial should show a similarly strong or even stronger
correlation rs(Qendl ) = 0.28 ≯ 0.53, if presence leads
to investing in quality, irregardless of the actually pub-
lished scores. Yet the data does not support this. Instead,
future designs should take into account that having a low
quality rank leads to low perceived presence of karma.
Cognitive dissonance theory can explain this observa-
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tion9 (Festinger, 1957). It can also explain why the re-
lationship between quality karma score ranks, and the
opinion that karma scores fit into the XP environment,
is stronger for published ranks than for the correct ones.
The perception of fairness seems unrelated to actual
ranks from quality karma scores as only very weak cor-
relations were found (|rs(mail)| ≤ 0.05). Neither high
nor low ranked developers consider karma scores more
or less fair. Similarly, there is only a minor relationship
between acceptability of karma scores and a developer’s
rank (rs(mail) = .13). One might think that acceptance
is tied to profiteering and a good rank, but there was no
evidence for this.
There is a weak negative correlation between per-
ceived importance and the karma rank rs(mail) =
−0.23: those who rank high do not consider ranking
very important but those who rank low give higher
importance to ranking. This could result in a threat to
overall team motivation as the positive effect on winners
is weak, while the negative effect on losers is strong.
Those who understood well how karma scores were
computed had a slightly better chance to achieve higher
ranks (rs(mail) = .36). This finding is consistent with
the expectation that understanding is necessary for im-
proving performance.
Developers who achieve high karma ranks have a sub-
stantial tendency to like the computation of karma scores
(rs(mail) = .58). It may be that profiteers plainly enjoy
receiving the benefit of reputation; as described above,
no such evidence was found. Analogously, it may be
that developers who care for source code quality — and
who therefore have high karma scores — welcome any
tool that supports source code quality. This reasoning
could explain why there is a moderate relationship be-
tween finding karma scores interesting and attaining
good scores (rs(mail) = .27).
The factors that are most strongly correlating with
high karma ranks are the liking of having karma scores
computed, the presence of reputation, and the fitting of
reputation into the XP environment. The only negatively
correlated factor is the perceived importance of reputa-
tion.
9Humans want to always maintain a positive self-image. If they
make observations, which are not congruent with positive self-image,
then such observations are ignored.
7.7.4.2 Relations between opinions and quantity
karma scores
For work quantity, most correlations are the inverse
of the correlations for quality, and in many cases they
are stronger. For example, there seems to be a ma-
jor negative relationship between quantity karma score
and average opinion rs(Qendt ) = −0.53. A simple
explanation for this inversion is the medium negative
relationship between a developer’s quality and quan-
tity karma scores. More than that, mass contributors
have a fairness problem: they tend to think that scores
are unfair (rs(Qendt ) = −0.42), have problems under-
standing how scores are computed (rs(Qendt ) = −.67),
and do not feel that reputation is present (rs(Qendt ) =
−0.50), acceptable (rs(Qendt ) = −0.41) or interesting
(rs(Qendt ) = −0.39). But karma scores often mattered
to them (rs(Qendt ) = 0.44).
Major contributors have a stronger influence on total
code quality because they contribute more code. It is
therefore of high importance to also reach them with the
intervention. But acceptance of the intervention among
them is especially low. They might feel treated unfair
because they give the software a lot of functionality, but
which seems not valued enough. For a minor contributor
(like Millhouse) it is much easier to achieve very high or
very low quality karma scores because they only need to
fix or spoil few source code.
7.7.4.3 Qualitative feedback from the question-
naires
Some developers perceived the presence of karma scores
as high due to their competitive effect, and due to the
daily emails sent out to developers. However, some
developers noted that this single email created ups and
downs in presence. It could even happen that — because
mails were sent in the evening — developers had for-
gotten about it until the next day. Another developer ig-
nored the emails altogether because he did not consider
his work (on the external API) relevant for documenta-
tion.
Fairness was one of the more problematic aspects of
the intervention. One developer stated that his score
changed when he added a comment, and so he thought
it was fair. Others, however, criticized that the algo-
rithm was strange and that they did not know how they
could achieve good ranks. They said that by contribut-
ing to source code which was high quality due to oth-
ers’ contributions, one could also earn quality karma
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points. This could create the impression of arbitrariness.
Additionally, fairness was negatively affected by pair-
programming because someone else might commit on
one’s account, and although two people are responsible
for the code, only one is credited for it. The reality in
the lab was not reflected very well, including the lab
ideology that instead “the naming should be expressive”,
which would make a description unnecessary.
Regarding importance, one problem was that karma
scores showed up late in the lab. Of course, the reason
for this delay was the research methodology but it made
the karma scores come in as a surprise. Again one de-
veloper mentioned that for his kind of work, Javadoc
was not important. So he considered the karma scores as
pointless and unimportant. Also karma scores were per-
ceived as being in conflict with “too much other stuff”,
and especially the priority “to implement a running ap-
plication.” One developer noticed this conflict could be
“just a lame excuse of not adding comments.” Among
the aspects that made karma scores important were “im-
provement of my work” and again the competition with
other developers.
Understanding karma scores was rated as the most
severe problem in the trial, and at the same time had a
relatively high influence on the ranking. Only one devel-
oper thought that “the explanation was clear”, but even
he only expressed the hope that it was correct. Although
developers “knew the idea of comments”, it was the
karma score that caused problems with understanding.
More detailed information on the algorithm was missing
and “the process of calculating the score was not clear”
to some. One developer just “did not care about it” and
so did not try to understand it.
Developers liked karma scores comparably well, al-
though there was some concern that it was not relevant.
Some ones felt “bad to be second not first”, “did not care
about it”, were “not following the score that keenly”,
or just had a diffuse dislike for it. Still the idea itself
was not seen as a problem and liked “as a motivation for
writing good documented code”.
The perceived importance of karma scores was nega-
tively impacted by feelings of meaninglessness and pri-
ority conflicts. But the competition made karma scores
highly interesting.
The reputation concept was considered as fitting
poorly into the evaluation environment. Although it
was not precluded that it still “might fit”, “applying it
to our lab was not beneficial because of our lab nature.”
A major problem was pair-programming because of
group effects of pair work and the loss of contributor
information in commits. But also the teaching of feature
driven development was perceived as being in conflict
with karma scores.
One developer mentioned that he noticed low accep-
tance among his peers which led to few commenting,
and another said that he does not like the tendency in
modern life to measure everything. However, others
were “in agreement with what my score is [... and] how
it was computed”, or found that it is a “nice idea as long
as it is only for us, not grades/payment/other assessment
of work [are] done”.
7.7.4.4 Threats to validity
The field experiment included only a few developers,
which makes correlation results hardly statistically sig-
nificant. Statistical significance (5% threshold) for N=9
is reached at r ≈ 0.6. For an r ≤ 0.4, statistical sig-
nificance starts at about N ≥ 18 subjects. While some
results are almost significant, most of them need to be
treated with care. Still, many results reveal a moderate
strength. If the team size had been bigger, then most
results would have been statistically significant. But
ten developers is the normal team size of an agile soft-
ware project or sub-project, greater numbers of subjects
would hardly have been possible.
While it is true to some degree that the environment
of the field experiment presented here was artificial, it
is not set up for the experiment specifically but, as part
of teaching activities, tried to resemble a natural setting
as closely as possible. For example, while the subject
pool featured students, it was graduate students with
development experience working in the domain of their
education (Harrison and List, 2004). It is natural that
experimental realism comes at the cost of experimental
control. At the same time, this adds to the realism of
field studies (see Section 7.1.1.2).
Therefore some sub-optimal environmental influences
were out of control for the experiment. For instance, the
experiment might have been to short. Perhaps more time
would have been needed for CollabReview to unfold its
full effect. Yet the length of the project could not be
influenced. Another factor was that developers did pair-
programming, which blurs the responsibility computed
by CollabReview.
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7.7.4.5 Lessons learned regarding the development
environment
CollabReview is not very well suited for pair program-
ming because there is only one committer recorded in
the revision control system while code is written by two
developers. The social dynamics that are in effect be-
tween the changing pairs of developers, and which are
intransparent to the reputation system, should not be
underestimated. Also, the metrics were computed only
for a part of the whole code base, which was assigned
to the project. The analyzed code did not include Pro-
log and some Java parts. For example, as Ned mostly
contributed to prolog parts, it seems that he did only
very little, which is wrong. It blurs contribution and
responsibility mappings and possibly leads to incorrect
or skewed karma scores. In turn, this reduces the under-
standing and perceptions of fairness in the team.
Extreme programming favors expressive naming of
identifiers over comments. Much in line with this phi-
losophy, project management had ambivalent opinions
regarding comments and Javadoc during the field exper-
iment. Some students perceived Javadoc as senseless.
Management must clarify that there is no goal conflict,
and that indeed naming and comments are important (cf.
Raskin, 2005). Full support for the employed measure-
ments is necessary.
7.7.4.6 Lessons learned regarding the effectiveness
of the reputation system
Classical management theory states that what one mea-
sures is what one gets (see Section 3.5.3.3). A metric
might not measure the right things, leading to undesired
behavior, but one should get what one measures (Hauser
and Katz, 1998). Consequently, there should have been
a lot of (potentially senseless) Javadoc comments. How-
ever, it did not happen here. The question is why?
Money seemed adequate for such a short, one-time
project. Possibly winning the one prize was too risky
or too much out of control for the individual (Hauser
and Katz, 1998). Perhaps there should be more or better
prizes. For some developers, competition is an important
motivator. For instance, Krusty mentioned competition
as important factor and enjoyed it. Something with a
high presence is needed. And in general, a better overall
reception with regard to the different feelings leads to
more investment in scores. Instead of a daily email,
results could be integrated in the developer’s IDE to
achieve higher and continuous presence.
The reputation idea was mostly accepted. But sub-
jects expressed that acceptance depends on how scores
are used and that they should retain their light character.
Especially developers who already care for quality, wel-
come reputation. However, there was no indication that
it is profiteering which leads to a better reception.
Major contributors have a strong influence on overall
quality. But acceptance of the intervention among them
is especially low. They might feel treated unfair because
they give the software a lot of functionality, and might
feel that this contribution is not valued enough. It must
be explained to major contributors that the purpose of the
intervention is not assessing their performance. Instead,
the goal is to improve the quality of the project, and
here they have an even higher responsibility than minor
contributors (cf. Section 3.5.3.2).
Low ranks result in higher perceived importance of
karma scores. This is a danger for team motivation.
Even more so, as while being second is good, it “feels
bad to be second not first”. Additionally, low ranks lead
to low perceived presence, so especially poor-scoring
developers need more presence of reputation and must
understand that scores measure something that is im-
portant to them. Contrariwise, major contributors have
the worst feelings about quality scores. But it is them
who are very important because they influence software
process artifacts the most.
Understanding has one of the highest correlations with
the email rank. This is congruent with literature (cf.
Hauser and Katz, 1998). Perhaps developers would just
have needed more time to get acquainted to CollabRe-
view. But also in the short time, the understanding of
reputation could have been improved by providing more
up-front training, and more immediate and elaborate
feedback on developer actions. An alternative is to sim-
plify the algorithm for measuring quality to make it eas-
ier to understand.
Reputation gaming can still work when the experimen-
tal setup is amended in such a way that the relationship
between investing in quality and a desirable reward is
firmer as, e.g. in the VIE theory by Vroom (1964), i.e.
• developers need a better understanding of how to
affect their score,
• responsibility assignments are less fuzzy by avoid-
ing pair programming and scores are more under
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control of the individual (i.e. “Expectancy”: effort
in code⇒ better score)
• a high score leads to a prize with a higher probabil-
ity, e.g. by not only rewarding the first place (i.e.
“Instrumentality”: better score⇒ prize), and
• the prize is worthwhile to achieve (i.e. “Valence”,
the prize).
7.7.5 Summary
This field experiment brought CollabReview into an ag-
ile software project to improve the internal quality of
source code. The objective was to increase the ratio of
source code entities that are documented with Javadoc.
The karma scores were not meant as a performance mea-
sure of a developer’s productivity but as a compensation
for the “endured pain” of doing what developers do not
like to do: to write documentation.
After an initial phase where comparison data was col-
lected, developers started receiving a daily digest of their
karma scores, and a prize was announced for the winner.
While the intervention probably had had some effect,
no measurable quality improvement occurred. Various
reasons for this were discussed. But the experiment does
not evidence that a reputation system is unsuitable for
improving code quality. Instead, it shows that integrat-
ing a reputation system into a project environment is
difficult, and must be done right.
The major contribution of this study is therefore the
lessons learned:
• Measurements must be implemented carefully to
measure the right things, and to not endanger team
spirit.
• A low rank leads to low perceived presence but high
importance, i.e. weak positive but strong negative
effects. Already the second place leads to a bad
perception.
• Furthermore, developers who care for quality wel-
come a tool like CollabReview that supports them.
Yet there is no indication that it is the profiteering
that leads to a better overall reception.
• But a better overall reception of CollabReview
leads to more investing in quality. Of all factors,
understanding seems to be the most essential factor
for performance improvement.
• Especially mass contributors had bad feelings about
karma scores but they mattered to them the most,
creating feelings of unfairness.
• However, there was few general rejection and ac-
ceptance mostly depends on how karma scores are
used.
7.8 TornBond Design Experimen-
tation
The AgileLab field experiment had shown that in princi-
ple the CollabReview concept works but the experiment
failed. The intended effect did not occur. Further experi-
mentation with the prototype was deemed necessary to
improve its concept and design.
Therefore, the CollabReview prototype was brought
into a software development environment. Among the
modifications it trialed was tracking how technical debt
in source code evolved. Technical debt karma scores ap-
praise the approximate cost in Euro that it would cost to
fix the problems the developer brought into the project.
7.8.1 Purpose
After the failed AgileLab field experiment, the purpose
of the TornBond experimentation was to
• collect lessons learned, and
• evolve the concept and design
and thereby pave the road for further field experiments
with an improved prototype. The primary focus of the
experimentation was on the requirements Requirement-
2: “Appeal to individuals’ motivation” and Requirement-
6: “Involve contributors without dependence”.
Requirements like Requirement-1: “Improve internal
software quality” were secondary, so the purpose was
not to collect quantitative data for validation. Only some
data and results obtained in the TornBond experimen-
tation are presented here as most of them are technical
details of lesser scientific interest.
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7.8.2 Method
The design experimentation consisted of several infor-
mal iterations, in which the CollabReview prototype
was modified, put into the development environment,
and then observations and discussions of its effects on
the developers were collected. The pursued results are
lessons learned for designing and better integrating the
CollabReview prototype in a development environment.
While karma scores were tracked, they were not meant
to be evaluated quantitatively.
7.8.3 Data
The technical debt karma scores collected are presented
in Figure 7.15. The black line represents the quantity
of source code committed by the tracked developers (in
500 LOC). Lines in other colors are the technical debt
of the developers. The data shows that the reports gen-
erated by CollabReview do not seem to have influenced
development very much. But as said above, inducing a
change was not the primary goal of this experimentation.
7.8.4 Results
Most of the information obtained through the experimen-
tation resulted in lessons learned. However, some results
also raised new issues, out of which several have been
addressed in the further research.
7.8.4.1 Lessons learned
The results obtained through the experimentation served
to enhance the CollabReview concept, and supported
adaptation of the prototype to social contexts of develop-
ment environments. They led to several lessons learned
that are presented here.
Intervention needs an initial introduction The de-
velopers did not get an initial introduction when the Col-
labReview prototype was installed. Instead, the proto-
type just started sending them reports after their com-
mits. So the developers complained that they would have
liked to be better informed about the changes. When
CollabReview is introduced in a development environ-
ment, developers should be addressed in an official note.
It should at least explain what the reasons of the inter-
vention are, and what is going to happen.
Rewarding system is important CollabReview did
not have any of the other rewarding mechanisms of Mo-
knowpedia, however, the social environment was very
similar. All developers even were members of Moknow-
pedia. The hope was that peer-pressure due the self-
interest of developers would arise. This did not happen.
Instead, published scores were not perceived as some-
thing worthwhile. Karma scores alone do not work, even
if the team is well-established, and knows karma scores
from a different project. Additionally, a human being
representing management should be involved in the re-
warding system to confirm that improvement of quality
is actually desired.
Possibly, a social game addressing more of the intrin-
sic motivation of developers could compensate the ab-
sence of external exchange value, and relieve CollabRe-
view from the necessity of management representatives.
Amount of information pushed to the developers
should be tuned right The developers in AgileLab
reported a low presence of daily emails. To increase
the presence, emails were first sent immediately after
every commit. This caused a lot of emails being sent to
developers. One developer complained that he was just
about to configure his email reader to filter them out. At
a later meeting, the developer made an on-the-fly survey
among his colleagues who else installed a filter. Another
developer proposed that the emails be sent only once per
week.
To reduce the amount of emails but still preserve some
presence, the prototype waited several minutes after a
commit for a new commit. If there was no further com-
mit, it updated its karma scores and emailed a ranking
list with technical debt information to developers.
Negative karma scores should be avoided Negative
scores tend to demotivate. Initially, the CollabReview
prototype published quality karma scores in the range
of [−10,+10] only. However, the scores were all neg-
ative in order to leave much room for improvement.
One developer called the prototype frustrating because
there were only negative points. Another one noted
they seemed haphazard, and sarcastically proposed that
“points be squared”. Scores should be mostly positive,
and honor attempts to improve them early. Later proto-
types used a modified quality assessment method that
was more likely to produce positive values.
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Figure 7.15: Evolution history of technical debt in TornBond
Technical debt The concept of technical debt was in-
vented to make abstract quality problems more tangi-
ble for developers and managers (Brown et al., 2010).
Karma scores tracking the developers’ personal techni-
cal debt were introduced for this reason. Technical debt
avoids publishing negative numbers (x < 0) and is more
concrete than quality ratings. Developers would start
with no technical debt, and just need to take care to not
spoil their score by keeping all source code they touch
in good shape.
However, technical debt karma scores did not work
out as intended. They did not add to the developers’ un-
derstanding. Motivating effects failed to appear because
technical debt does not contain an indication of progress
as developers already start with the best score and have
to struggle to keep it. Technical debt karma scores were
subject to jokes. One developer said that while he tried
not to be last in the list, he initially set a goal for himself
to reach 7000EUR of debt but as he reached it quite
quickly, he had to set a new goal for himself.
Technical debt scores also retained the negative con-
notation that they were punishing developers who were
contributing a lot. The amassing of several estimated
thousands of Euros in technical debt did not increase
alertness.
Neglecting of quantity is not considered fair A long
discussion arose with a developer who argued that those
who contribute a lot would be in bad luck because they
would automatically be accumulating a lot of technical
debt. While it is not true that developers automatically
accumulate a lot of technical debt because they would
not do so if they kept their source code clean, it is true
that they have a higher risk of accumulating more tech-
nical debt than someone who does less. Specifically
in the TornBond environment, where not all developers
contribute a similar amount of efforts in development,
there is potential for unfairness. TornBond is only one of
several projects competing for the developers’ attention.
Neglecting contribution quantity might indeed be inter-
preted as a bit unfair by developers here. Still, quality is
the higher goal above quantity for CollabReview. If and
how quantity is to be included in the karma scores has
therefore to be considered carefully.
7.8.4.2 Raised issues
One developer asked the question if some quality as-
sessment tool like Sonar (see Section 3.3.5.3) would not
be better suited. While Sonar is a mature product com-
pared to a prototype, the difference is that Sonar does
not compute karma scores. It only provides overviews of
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a code base. The question if personal karma scores make
a difference is picked up again in a later experiment (see
Section 7.11).
Another developer proposed that CollabReview could
“forget” about scores over time so that developers’ karma
scores are not dragged down by poor quality of old soft-
ware process artifacts. Especially when developers with
project backgrounds of different extensiveness collabo-
rate, developers with a long history might be advantaged
or disadvantaged. However, if time cures old sins, then
developers would have less motivation to not do it in
the first place. Therefore this issue is considered as con-
tradicting the CollabReview concept, and is not further
treated here.
Some resistance appeared in the development team
because of the kind of work that was being carried out.
Most of the work was refactoring, and more precisely
re-organizing old source code in new places by copying
it between files. The developers argued that in this stage
of development, readability was of no concern. Instead,
only the quality of newly developed source code should
be regarded. Apart from some technical difficulties to
decide if source code is written anew or moved, the Col-
labReview prototype was configured to use its author-
ship algorithm with copy detection. Through this, re-
sponsibility mostly stays with the original developer, and
not the one who is merely copying the source code. The
concern is therefore considered as taken into account
sufficiently.
7.8.5 Summary
In summary, the following lessons about CollabReview
were learned:
• developers should receive detailed information on
CollabReview upfront,
• the rewarding system and the exchange value for
karma scores are vital,
• the amount of information pushed to developers
has to be tuned carefully,
• negative or negatively-connotated karma scores
should be avoided,
• technical debt is a negative karma score and does
not fulfill its promise of tangibility,
• neglecting contribution quantity is considered un-
fair if contribution is — to some degree — volun-
tary, and
• copy detection should be used to still attribute re-
sponsibility for moved source code to the original
developer.
The lessons influenced the design of further CollabRe-
view prototypes and how they were deployed in the later
field experiments.
7.9 ReputationForge Field Experi-
ments
The ReputationForge field experiments were conducted
by Agaraj (2012). He tested the CollabReview concept
in Moknowpedia and Vyrygh, but with focus on the re-
warding system. Refer to this text for a detailed descrip-
tion.
The previous AgileLab experiment had shown that the
exchange value offered for karma scores is essential to
the CollabReview concept. However, offering expensive
tangible rewards is not always desirable (e.g. motivation
crowding, see Section 3.5.4.1) or possible in all work
environments (e.g. public service administrative restric-
tions). ReputationForge therefore meant to explore other
motivation possibilities. Instead of simple rewarding and
reputation mechanisms described earlier in this work,
ReputationForge was a web-based application that added
a complex social media game. The game builds on tasks
to address a set of internal motivators. It is an extension
to the CollabReview prototype.
7.9.1 Purpose
The purpose of the field experiments was threefold:
• Try CollabReview in a new environment (dis-
tributed consortium project Vyrygh) to increase
confidence in the earlier field experiment in Mo-
knowpedia (Requirement-3: “Flexible applicabil-
ity”).
• Build a rewarding system based on CollabRe-
view’s karma scores that better addresses internal
motivation instead of relying on external rewards
(Requirement-2: “Appeal to individuals’ moti-
vation”, Requirement-6: “Involve contributors
without dependence”).
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• Better understand how the use of karma scores in-
creases the exchange value of computed scores.
7.9.2 Method
As the primary environment for testing the CollabRe-
view concept, the wiki of project Vyrygh was chosen.
The project is signified by a large number of potential
contributors from distributed partners in a consortium
project funded by the EU. The ReputationForge was
integrated into the project’s GForge development infras-
tructure. In Moknowpedia, ReputationForge augmented
the existing rewarding schemes from CollabReview.
Both environments have a number of users large
enough to support running a control and an experimental
group in parallel. The control group would use the
tools as they were before and not see any difference,
while ReputationForge would only be available to the
experimental group who were instructed to not talk
about with members of the control group.
The distribution of users into the two groups was a
major concern in preparation of the experiment. The
groups should be as similar as possible. However, demo-
graphic differences like education, organizational tenure,
culture, gender or social position were not taken into
consideration.
For Vyrygh there were 38 participants from nine
difference project consortium members. Work in the
project was split into several workpackages. The follow-
ing goals were chosen to make the two groups compara-
ble: All workpackages should be represented equally in
both groups. The employees of each member should be
split in equal parts onto both groups. The accumulated
activity levels (as defined through contributions and the
number of logins) of employees should be similar in
both groups.
Distribution of the 26 participants from Moknowpe-
dia followed similar guidelines. Here the criteria were:
Both groups should receive the same number of student
employees. Members of the two work groups should be
equally present in both groups. And the average ranks of
original contribution scores computed by CollabReview
should be similar. A particular challenge here was that a
high number of participants who had used Reputation-
Forge were needed for a later usability study (not pre-
sented here). Some participants in the ReputationForge
experiment with Moknowpedia were also participants
in the experiment with Vyrygh. So a constraint was
that participants who were in the Vyrygh experimental
group should be in the Moknowpedia control group, and
vice versa. Doing so, increased the total number of sub-
jects who had worked with CollabReview and could give
feedback on it. Also, the evaluation period happened to
coincide with the start of Christmas holidays for several
people, which had to be considered in the distribution of
participants. But in the end, two somehow comparable
groups were obtained here, too.
The evaluation period in Vyrygh was five weeks (from
2011-11-16 until 2011-12-21). Due to organizational is-
sues, the Moknowpedia period was considerably shorter
and ran for about two weeks (from 2011-12-12 until
2011-12-21). At the beginning of the evaluation period,
the experimenter gave participants information on the
experiment, how to access and use ReputationForge, and
instructed them as to why they were in the experimental
group and that they should not talk to members of the
control group about the experiment.
The experimenter prepared eight tasks in Reputation-
Forge that could be selected and completed by the par-
ticipants. They included tasks like to rate two articles,
to increase one’s quality rank by two levels, or to gain
two quantity points each day for the next four days.
Most data would be collected during the conduction
of the experiment. This concerned the number of logins
and karma scores for quantity, quality, the number of
reviews as determined by the sum of their timelinesses,
and the number of articles to which the participant con-
tributed at least 30% (C30 karma score). Furthermore,
the experimenter prepared a questionnaire that was sent
to all experimental group participants after the end of
the experiment. The questionnaire mainly aimed at the
usability evaluation but also gave hints with regard to
the results of the experiment.
7.9.3 Data
The data collected during the evaluation consisted of the
number of logins; the number of started, completed and
failed tasks; and the participants’ karma scores.
7.9.3.1 Data for Vyrygh
Nineteen participants were in the experimental group
for Vyrygh. Eight out of them used ReputationForge
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by logging into the system once on a regular basis, and
another five logged in from time to time. The most
active participants completed thirteen tasks in total, and
started another four tasks, while the rest did not start and
complete any tasks. The first and probably easiest task
“Rate two articles” was completed six times, followed by
“Make two contributions of at least 30%” completed by
two participants. Other tasks were each completed once.
The average participant completed 8.5% of the available
tasks.
Figure 7.16a depicts the contributions by participants
in control and experimental groups. The average devel-
oper in the experimental group increased his quantity
karma score by 4.05 as compared to 1.22 in the con-
trol group, his C30 karma score by 0.63 as compared
to 0.056, his quality karma score by 2.67 as compared
to 1.01, and logged in 4.84 times instead of only 2.17
times in the control group. Review data could not be
compared because the control group did not have the
possibility to submit reviews.
7.9.3.2 Data for Moknowpedia
The experimental group for Moknowpedia consisted of
11 participants; out of them, six used ReputationForge
regularly. They completed nine tasks. The other partici-
pants never logged in, in the same way mentioning a lack
of time. The average participant completed 10.25% of
the available tasks. In total, the group completed “Rate
two articles” six times, “Make two contributions of at
least 30%” twice, and “Rate everyday one article for two
days consecutively” once. There were a few attempts to
complete other tasks but they were either failed or ran
over the end of the evaluation period.
Figure 7.16b depicts the contributions by participants
in control and experimental groups. The average devel-
oper in the experimental group increased his quantity
karma score by 0.55 as compared to 0.52 in the control
group, his C30 karma score by 0.62 as compared to 0.5,
his quality karma score by 0.18 as compared to 0.07,
and rated 1.15 articles instead of only 0.29 articles in the
control group. However, the only statistically significant
difference is that for reviewed articles. This is congruent
with the finding that mostly the “Rate two articles” task
was completed. Login data could not be compared due
to a lack of data in the experimental group.
7.9.4 Results
In Vyrygh, ReputationForge clearly made a difference.
All results are better for the experimental group. Ex-
cept for the number of logins they are are all statistically
significant based on two-sample t-tests. In Moknowpe-
dia, ReputationForge resulted only in a small advantage
for the experimental group over the original CollabRe-
view used in the control group. Two-sample t-tests only
showed statistical significance for the number of submit-
ted reviews.
Possible reasons why the positive effect did not clearly
show in the Moknowpedia experiment are that
• the evaluation time was too short and a bit unfavor-
able due to Christmas time,
• the Moknowpedia was already quite well-
established among its users, so that there was
few room for improvement, and
• ReputationForge had to compete with the original
CollabReview.
Two participants of Vyrygh stated that Reputation-
Forge is probably more suitable for more active wikis.
However, contribution in Moknowpedia initially also
only grew slowly after the introduction of CollabReview.
CollabReview is made exactly for this kind of situations.
The subjects who did not work on a single task men-
tioned a lack of time as the major reason. But lack of
time means nothing else than a priority conflict. It has
therefore to be concluded that the rewarding system was
just not effective enough with them.
The true benefit of ReputationForge over simpler re-
warding mechanisms used in CollabReview could not
be shown with high confidence. It is probable that the
time for doing the experiment was unlucky.
The field experiment with Vyrygh shows that Col-
labReview and ReputationForge together clearly have
the power to change user behavior for the good. How-
ever, EU projects seem to be a very difficult environment
because by far not all users could be reached. More re-
search may be necessary.
7.9.5 Summary
The exchange value offered for high karma scores is
important for the CollabReview concept. But as offering
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Figure 7.16: Comparison of contributions in Vyrygh and Moknowpedia
expensive rewards is not always possible, other means
of increasing the perceived exchange value were to be
explored by ReputationForge. ReputationForge is an
extension to the CollabReview prototype that adds a
complex social game building on several motivational
theories.
ReputationForge was
• tested in two field experiments with between-group
designs. It could
• further improve contribution in Moknowpedia, and
• it had a considerable impact on the wiki of Vyrygh.
However, its
• added benefit as rewarding system is not that clear.
• There seem to be improvements over the simple
rewarding mechanisms in CollabReview but they
are hardly statistically significant, which may be
due to the unfavorable conditions in the test period.
• But both field experiments support the value of
CollabReview.
In addition to this, the experiments show that EU
projects are a difficult environment. Many participants
did not even log on to ReputationForge a single time. A
longer evaluation period might have helped. In general,
it is difficult to involve all participants. What is needed
are techniques for getting late adopters involved and
to create rewarding systems that are attractive to all.
Such a system has to involve project and consortium
management.
7.10 MicroEditCastigator Field
Experiment
The MicroEditCastigator is an arbiter that
punishes many small changes that are committed in
short succession. This arbiter is the opposite of the
gamification applied by Singer and Schneider (2012b):
Whenever there are three changes by the same author
to the a software process artifact with the same name
in a row, and less than five minutes passed between
each two subsequent commit, then the changes are
called micro edits. When a micro edit is detected, the
MicroEditCastigator is triggered. It will then
issue a poor rating for the artifact. The rationale is that
in a wiki, new revisions should not be created as try-outs
or previews because they pollute revision history logs.
The global history gets crowded with many irrelevant
changes of a single artifact, while the local history
is cluttered with unnecessary entries. Furthermore,
such preview edits typically do not have a revision
log message. Of course, it is more difficult to write
an appropriate commit log message for an unclean
commit, so that micro edits pose a bigger problem to the
contributor to write sensible messages. Instead of doing
micro edits, the wiki’s preview function should be used.
A similar problem had formerly occurred with com-
mits to Karakos’s Subversion repository (see Section
2.3.4): The idea of Subversion is that commits should
be atomic, i.e. every commit should be one logical
change. It should include as few changes as possible
but as many as necessary to have a single, logical and
complete change to the code base. Additionally, com-
mits can be annotated with log messages to further ex-
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plain the changes. A well-cultivated change history is
considered as important key component for awareness
and maintenance, although it has the additional burden
of summarizing the change in a concise message (e.g.
Hruschka and Starke, 2011; Buse and Weimer, 2010a).
But due to difficulties handling their IDEs, developers
did not follow this best-practice (see Section 2.3.4.5).
When the same problem emerged in the well-
established Moknowpedia with its integrated CollabRe-
view, an opportunity for another experiment was born.
Here, too, contributors were reminded several times to
care for evolution documentation but to no avail.
7.10.1 Purpose
The purpose of this field experiment was to disapprove
an undesirable behavior with a penalty to karma scores,
and see how developers reacted. The question was if
CollabReview could change a behavior that repeated
human intervention could not.
7.10.2 Method
The MicroEditCastigator was added as an ar-
biter to the Moknowpedia installation of CollabReview.
Whenever there was a series of micro edits detected by
it, it would automatically submit a review with a poor
rating and an according comment. The reviews were
submitted non-anonymously by the arbiter, and were
therefore not rejectable. The only way to get rid of a bad
review was therefore that it lost timeliness in the course
of further changes.
There was no announcement or other information
when the MicroEditCastigator was installed. It
just started penalizing micro edits with bad reviews
whenever they occurred. The participants did not know
that they were taking part in an experiment.
For evaluation, the number of micro edits in time
frames of one month was measured. A micro edit was
at least three edits in a row with less than 300 seconds
between two edits. If there were multiple subsequent
micro edits, they were counted as one. That is, five edits
in a row were still counted as one micro edit. However,
as the MicroEditCastigator could not know in
advance how many more edits would come, it would
submit or update reviews for each edit in the row from
the third on.
7.10.3 Data
Figure 7.17 reproduces the history of micro edits in Mo-
knowpedia. The table (Figure 7.17a) prints the measured
numbers, and how they relate to each other. Months
before the intervention are put above the symmetrically
corresponding month after the intervention started. The
values are plotted in chronological order in Figure 7.17b.
Before the intervention, the dashed line (total number
of new software process artifacts per month) is at about
the same as the continuous line (micro edits); during the
intervention, however, it remains above it. The number
of micro edits per month has decreased in total and in
comparison to the number of new artifacts.
7.10.4 Results and discussion
The first micro edit occurred a few days after the
MicroEditCastigator was installed. It sent its
first negative review, which promptly created the first
complaint by a user. The arguments put forward against
it were that frequent saving would be better than losing
data, and that it would do injustice to the arduous work
in the article itself. A few days later, another user
expressed astonishment that the way how he edits an
article should affect the quality of its content. Over
the course of the next months, similar disagreement
could be heard from time to time but the presence of the
MicroEditCastigator was condoned. Note that
the question if saving lots of small changes actually is
bad or not is not answered here. (However, I personally
hold the view that the log is valuable documentation.)
The experiment just wants to test how users react to an
arbitrary rule, and what the influence on their behavior
is.
One user started to rate articles with the best grade
possible to compensate for a poor score whenever that
article had received a micro edit penalty. Another user
who was responsible for many micro edits, did not do
that. But he never submitted any review. He did not
seem to care for his karma score anyways, which is
plausible since he joined the work group rather lately
and, as a student, was not that much integrated into the
Moknowpedia reputation game.
Both of the stories above support that it is the karma
scores that make users refrain from undesired behavior.
And this is also what the data shows: there is a 21%
decrease in micro edits at only a 9% decrease in total
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Month (control) -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Micro edits 8 5 7 14 6 8 13 13 8
New artifacts per month 246 106 127 284 298 180 325 245 204
Percent micro edits 3.25 4.72 5.51 4.93 2.01 4.44 4.00 5.31 3.92
Average percent mean=4.44, median=4.23
Month (experiment) +9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1
Micro edits 1 1 5 5 3 1 8 7 34
New artifacts per month 48 108 165 170 102 84 323 280 563
Percent micro edits 2.08 0.93 3.03 2.94 2.94 1.19 2.48 2.50 6.04
Average percent mean=2.68, median=2.5
(a) History of micro edits
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(b) Graphical history of micro edits
Figure 7.17: Number of micro edits detected each month before/after start of intervention (July 19th 2011)
new artifacts. If the ninth month before and after the start
of the intervention are left out, there is a 13% decrease in
micro edits at a 2% increase in new artifacts. The mean
percentage of micro edits in the total number of new
artifacts is 4.44% before the intervention as compared
to 2.68% during it, which is a decrease of ≈ 40%.
A user once explained how he edited an article: He
made a change, saved it, recognized that he had to make
another change, also made that one, saved, and recog-
nized once more that there was still something to change.
He now had to make a decision to either make the change
immediately and risk to get the penalty, or to make the
change later. He decided to make the change imme-
diately, still hoping to avoid the penalty (to no avail).
However, the example shows that users of CollabRe-
view consciously decide to break the enforced rule, i.e.
they think about it before and weigh up the alternatives
against each other.
In one incident, the MicroEditCastigator was
disabled for some days due to technical reasons after the
end of the evaluation. When it was later reactivated, it
submitted all the reviews that it had deferred before. Sev-
eral users reacted to this event with comments like call-
ing it “out of control”, mentioning there might be some-
thing broken, or by declaring ironically that it would
really have been a pity if it had missed one violation.
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Making the arbiter’s reviews rejectable might give
users an opportunity to express their resistance in a dif-
ferent way than countering with good ratings. But most
users tend to rate the articles they contributed to rather
good anyways.
7.10.4.1 Threats to validity
This field experiment only covers a single case. It may
not be transferable to other cases. Yet the described
cognitive processes in users indicate that results may
transfer to other cases as well.
The total numbers from the control and experimental
phase are probably not easily comparable due to the
potential changes in work practice that can occur in the
11/2 years of the studied time period. There was some
fluctuation in personnel, primarily in student personnel,
and it could be that new users have different editing
styles. However, the main actors remained the same.
The experiment provides an indication that CollabRe-
view works, but due to problems in its internal and ex-
ternal validity it cannot be called a “proof”.
7.10.5 Summary
The CollabReview prototype in Moknowpedia was
extended with the MicroEditCastigator arbiter
which penalizes the creating of many new revisions of
an artifact in a short time frame. Such behavior may or
may not be desirable: micro edits clutter the revision
history of the article and the revision repository, thereby
making it difficult for others to grasp what changes were
applied and what is happening. Of course, micro edits
also do not receive a change message as well, as they
do not contain a “logical” change. Micro edits therefore
decrease the quality of the revision history log. On the
other hand, micro edits save the user from potential loss
of data if he did not save his work for too long.
Trading off the two behaviors (frequent vs. wise com-
mitting) against each other is not the purpose of this
discussion. The point is that although users
• did not agree with the MicroEditCastigator
and
• showed some recalcitrant and countering behavior,
they
• still adapted to the new rule promoted by CollabRe-
view.
• Undesired behavior was reduced by ≈ 40%.
CollabReview led to a less cluttered revision history and
improved quality.
7.11 ScrumLab Field Experiment
The ScrumLab field experiment introduced the Col-
labReview prototype into two software projects follow-
ing the Scrum development methodology.
7.11.1 Purpose
Several problems had been identified in the AgileLab
experiment. Most importantly, the CollabReview proto-
type did not have the expected effect on development.
With the ScrumLab, a new environment for a field exper-
iment was found.
The purpose of this experiment was to show that Col-
labReview can work with source code just as well as in
wiki environments. Additionally, the experiment should
provide data supporting the fulfillment of all remaining
requirements.
7.11.2 Method
The ScrumLab started April 26th (Day 1) and went until
June 29th (Day 47, only counting work days). Two
independent software projects following the agile Scrum
methodology were to be executed during this time by
post-graduate students in two teams.
The teams consisted of nine and eight students, re-
spectively. At the beginning, students were distributed
onto both teams based on a questionnaire that they had to
fill out before the lab. The questionnaire asked them to
assess their Java coding skills, other coding skills, knowl-
edge of Scrum, experience with software processes, and
with collaboration tools like Subversion on a scale from
1 (very low) to 10 (very high). For every student a com-
bined skill score was computed in which the Java coding
skill weighted thrice as much as the other skills. The stu-
dents were then distributed onto the two teams based on
the rank of their combined skill, i.e. the highest ranking
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student was put into team A, the next two on team B,
then two on team A, and so on. In the end, the average
combined skill ranks in both teams were equal, and the
average combined skill score differed by less than five
percent. On these scales, the students considered them-
selves as rather experienced in programming in general
(6.5) and with Java (5.5), and were knowledgeable of the
software development process (5.9). They had a little
less experience with collaboration tools (4.6), but had
very few experience with Scrum (1.5).
The size and organization of the ScrumLab allowed
to design an experiment with within-group and between-
group designs. That means that one team (Team A)
started the project while receiving the CollabReview
intervention. During this time, the performance of
Team A could be compared to the performance of Team
B (between-group experiment). After about half the
project, the intervention ended for Team A and began
for Team B. At the end of the project, the performance
of Team B can be compared to its prior performance
(within-group experiment).
The time for the end of the intervention for Team A
and start for Team B was fixed to be at the half of the
project, i.e. after about 22 days. A problem was that
development could not start immediately in the first few
days. Instead, it took about two weeks until development
had finally started. While the intervention had been
announced to Team A on the first day, the first quality
report was sent to Team A only at the time when the
development was really ongoing (Day 10, May 10th).
The intervention ended for Team A on May 25th (Day
21), and started for Team B on May 29th (Day 23).
Each intervention started with an instructional email
to the respective team’s Scrum Master, who was respon-
sible for circulating it within his team. It contained a
first quality report consisting of all developers’ current
quality scores as ranks on a leader board, and details
on responsibilities and detected violations as hints for
improving the scores (see Figure 6.11).
The following rewarding system was announced to the
students: If everybody shown in the ranks has a quality
score of at least 9, then all in the team will receive a
bonus on their lab grade by half a grade. If not, then
only the two developers with the highest quality score
will get the bonus. If a developers’ personal score is 0
or below, then his lab grade will be half a grade worse.
None of the subjects had a score of 0 or less at the start
of the interventions.
The teams were informed that intermediate reports
sent to the team were not important for the grade. Only
the final score at the end of the respective intervention
period was relevant. That meant that both teams should
have enough time to carefully approach a better score.
And that is what was explicitly recommended to Team
B: to carefully improve style and fix problems over time,
and not to recklessly fix them immediately, or hope to
fix them in the last few days of the lab.
The teams also received the following hints:
• If they liked, then they could install the Checkstyle
toolkit by themselves to check their source code
before checking it in. There is also a plug-in to
Checkstyle from within Eclipse.
• Eclipse with default format settings or most other
IDEs as well, are capable of automatically fixing
the style of source code, which should easily let
a developer get rid of most violations found by
Checkstyle very quickly.
• While every developer had his own karma score,
they could help each other by fixing someone else’s
code. They could win individually or as a team.
7.11.2.1 Interviews after completion of the experi-
ment
At the end of each team’s intervention, a questionnaire
similar to the one from the AgileLab was given to the
team members to gain a better understanding of how
CollabReview was perceived. In addition to the original
questions (see Section 7.7.2.2), which were resubmitted
for comparison, the new items were:
• influence — How much influence did the contest
have on the way how you developed code?
And: Why did the contest have little/much influ-
ence on your way of developing code?
• additional effort — How big was the additional
effort that the contest caused you?
And: Why did the contest cause you little/much
additional effort?
• quality improvement — How much more under-
standable has your code become due to the contest?
And: Why has your code become much/not much
more understandable?
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• difference — Would it have made a difference for
you to only see an overall score of the team instead
of individual scores?
And: Why did it make a difference/no difference
for you to only see an overall score?
• concern — How much did it concern you that others
could see your score?
And: Why did it concern you much/not much?
7.11.3 Data
The collected data consists of the subjects’ karma scores
over the duration of the experiment, responses to the
questionnaire given to subjects at the end of their in-
tervention period, and other observations made during
the weekly Scrum review meetings between customers,
product owners and the rest of the team.
7.11.3.1 Collected karma scores
Figure 7.18 plots the evolution of quantity karma scores
in Team A. The black line is the average quantity karma
score in the team. More and more colored lines appear
as subjects became responsible for software process ar-
tifacts by committing first source code and changes to
the repository. The quantity karma scores are measured
in HSLOC. The figure shows that scores continuously
increased. An interesting observation is that on Day 19
Clark and Bruce suddenly changed positions because
Clark lost many points while Bruce gained many more.
The reason is that the team of Clark and especially Bruce
helped him to fix his code (see also Section 7.11.3.2).
Figure 7.19 visualizes the same data for Team B. The
peak plateaus found in the second half of the project are
due to renaming efforts to make the source code con-
forming to the Checkstyle coding styles. In the renaming
process, directories with source code were first copied
before the old source code was deleted. So for some
time, duplicate code existed, which is responsible for the
steep increments.
Figure 7.20 shows the development of quality karma
scores in Team A. The black line is the average quality
score in the other team. So, while the average quality
in the other team slowly stabilized at a lower average
in the first half of the project, the members of Team A
started to improve their scores during the intervention.
Especially on the last few days there was a sudden in-
crease to the maximum possible score for all members
of the team. In the very beginning, Wally had a quality
karma score below 0 but fixed this before the interven-
tion started. Still, most quality scores were rather low
initially. Individual quality scores started to fall as soon
as the intervention was over. Clark, in particular, rapidly
spoiled his good score, while others did not lose points
that quickly. Clark was a major contributor during this
period. Although Bruce contributed even more, his score
remained rather constant.
Figure 7.21 displays the history of quality karma
scores in Team B in much the same way. It can be seen
that while the average score of Team A rose to 10 during
the first intervention, the scores of subjects in Team B
slowly worsened until the intervention in Team B started.
Team B used the full time available to them to work
towards the necessary minimum scores. While not every
subject in Team B was able to attain the perfect score of
10, they all reached the necessary 9 points for their team
bonus.
At the start of the intervention, Team A had ≈ 0.65
violations per SLOC, while Team B had ≈ 0.75. Until
the end of the intervention, Team A increased its quality
to 0 violations per SLOC, while Team B had almost
0. Both teams increased their quality from almost one
violation per line, to almost zero, and therefore both
teams almost reached the best possible result.
7.11.3.2 Observations
On the last two days before the lab ended, Team A much
increased on their quality karma scores by fixing all of
the problems found by Checkstyle. However, a problem
was that they broke their software in this process. So
when they wanted to show their finished software to their
customers, not everything worked as they had expected
it. Some functionality which had originally been there,
was lost. For this reason, Team B was explicitly advised
that they should carefully and steadily work towards
their goal when their intervention started.
During one of the first review meetings after the first
scores had been published to Team A, Clark said that
he had not slept well the last night. He saw no chance
of reaching the nine points necessary for the bonus. He
was very frustrated and felt offended by the coding rules
because he had worked so much and would now get
punished. But his team members could calm him down,
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Figure 7.18: Quantity scores of Team A compared to average of Team B
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Figure 7.19: Quantity scores of Team B compared to average of Team A
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Figure 7.20: Quality scores of Team A compared to average of Team B
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Figure 7.21: Quality scores of Team B compared to average of Team A
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since still a few weeks were left until the deadline. Dur-
ing the next weeks, he did not improve his score very
much. Instead, his team helped him fix his source code
the day before the deadline. In the sprint retrospective
on Day 21 (end Team A) he argued that Checkstyle was
driving him mad. It had been taking him too much time
to clean up the source code. He continued that it was
only for his team members who had eventually saved
him. Also, Victor explained to him how to configure
automatic code styling in Eclipse, so he did not have
to do it all manually. Still it was a pain to him. Yet
in the final lab meeting on Day 46, Clark followed up
on his original statements. He had noticed that since
CollabReview was no longer there, source code quality
had started to decrease again. There he had learned to
appreciate the value of clean source code.
In the final meeting, Pamela expressed that she “did
not care about code styling. Someone else just did it for
me [her].” So in both teams there were developers who
did not themselves care for source code quality but had
others do it for them. This division of labor was in line
with the idea of CollabReview. The original developer
could probably best fix the problems in most cases. But
it may be a viable way in situations where one developer
is overburdened with implementation tasks, while others
are idle. Or others could not finish implementation of
functionality as fast as the first developer, so they divide
the labor. The additional work of writing documentation
is negotiated efficiently between developers (see Section
3.5.3.3).
7.11.3.3 Questionnaire feedback
Table 7.6 summarizes the opinions about the CollabRe-
view intervention in the ScrumLab. Team B rated the
intervention better than Team A. Generally, the opinions
are much more positive compared to the AgileLab ex-
periment.
Presence The most-often named reason for a high
presence of karma scores is that the developers’ final
grade was influenced by the score, and that they consid-
ered it part of their education. But developers also said
that they care for the quality of their source code, and
found it “really helpful”. Another developer mentioned
that it was present because he “wanted to have a high
score.”
Prominently members of Team A, but also few ones
from Team B “did not do anything at first” and “focused
on the programming instead”. They started caring about
“coding style at the end of project” and “in the last two
days before the deadline”. A developer from Team B
noted that they “tried to pay attention to it neutrally”.
Fairness The developers had two problems with the
fairness of karma scores. The first problem was about
the computation of scores. A subject explained that the
developer with the most source code always had collec-
tive errors, and thus less karma points than a developer
with less contributions. Vice versa, the less the contri-
bution, the higher the probability to get a better score.
One even found it demotivating: “as I saw that after all
my work I may not get the bonus, and somehow the
more you contribute and see less contributors advance,
[the] less motivation you have to work more.” Another
one added that she once corrected a file from a second
developer, who then changed something to the worse, so
then they both got less points.
One developer said he was “very satisfied with the
score but [... he was not so sure about ...] the standard
of judging the code quality.” So, the second problem
concerned Checkstyle’s ability to judge quality: Another
developer explained that in his “opinion, clean code
is code that is easy to use by human beings: easy to
extend, to read, to reuse.” But Checkstyle “didn’t catch
some violations that are important, such as poorly named
methods, while it was too whiny about others that are not
obvious to the human eye at all.” So often points were
lost “to minor issues, like trailing spaces in the Javadoc.”
The developers in one team were using a framework,
which in its own coding guidelines states that certain
properties of classes should be public instead of provid-
ing accessors. This is different from the standard coding
styles. For comparability of the standards in both experi-
mental groups, no adaptations of coding styles to project
peculiarities was possible. One developer criticized this
as unfair. Apart from that, the “criteria for grading the
code were [regarded as] pretty straightforward”.
Overall, fairness was much improved compared to the
AgileLab, and developers found it “accurate”. Two de-
velopers added that “Sometimes it was fair. Sometimes
it seems not, but totally that was fair” “most of the time”.
One developer remembers “for example, last time [...] I
only got 4.2, this time I feel much better with my task,
then I got 10.0”. Others found the “scores really helpful
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Arthur 0 - - + + + - - - - - - - + - - + + - -
Bruce + - 0 + 0 0 - 0 - + + - - + - -
Clark + + - - + - - - - - - 0 + 0 + + + - -
Dick + + + + - - 0 0 0 + + 0 0 + +
Matt 0 + + + + - - 0 - + + + + + + + + 0 0
Peter + 0 - + 0 0 + - - + - + + - -
Steven 0 0 + + 0 - - 0 - - 0 0 -
Victor 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + + + 0
Wally + 0 + 0 0 + 0 0 0 + 0 + -
Harvey + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - -
Johann + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0
Lex + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + 0
Max + 0 + + 0 + + + + + - + + + 0
Norman 0 0 + + + 0 0 + 0 + + + + - -
Oswald + + + + + + + - - + + 0
Pamela 0 0 - + 0 + + + - + + + +
Selina + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + - -
Average A 3.67 3.11 4.00 3.11 2.67 2.67 3.00 3.33 3.00 3.56 3.11 4.11 2.00
Average B 4.13 4.14 3.88 4.13 4.00 4.00 4.13 4.50 3.50 3.29 4.25 4.14 2.38
Average 3.88 3.56 3.94 3.59 3.29 3.29 3.53 3.88 3.24 3.44 3.65 4.13 2.18
AgileLab 2.89 2.33 2.56 2.11 2.67 2.56 2.44 2.56
Table 7.6: Likert-scaled opinions about the intervention in ScrumLab
and it feels like we achieved something during this lab.”.
They also liked that they could use a Checkstyle plug-in
for Eclipse, so that they had few check errors, which
helped them to get a good score.
Importance One subject noted little importance be-
cause he was focusing on the functionality of the pro-
gram. But the majority of subjects found the intervention
highly important. Very important was for them that they
could improve their own and their team’s final grade
when taking care of the scores. For one developer it was
important because “On the one hand, I don’t care about
the grade of the lab at all, but on the other, I didn’t want
to finish a place lower than the top 2.” Another also
found that “it helped me to improve my code quality”.
Other developers felt it was important so they could re-
flect on their work, and keep the documentation of their
code in mind.
Understanding Two developers felt that they had
“Not any idea about it.” Some others at least had a
feeling of what they should take care of next time, that
there is a coding standard provided for Java, and that
there is the Checkstyle tool. It was also possible to
install an additional plug-in, and then just follow its style
recommendations. One developer had understanding
difficulties because “he thought somehow the score
would be a compromise between no. line [sic! number
of lines] of codes and errors in code”.
The majority, however, felt that they had a good under-
standing because it had been detailed to them in an email.
While a few “still didn’t quite get how the individual
team member’s scores were formed”, the quality report
“helped to understand it”, and detailed how scores were
“calculated on the basis of the number of violations per
lines of code”. Some developers noted that it took them
some time but at last they understood. For understand-
ing, “it helped to closely look at several reports” which
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“showed the mistakes and how [to] improve the style”,
and to actually “do correct styles”.
Liking The most frequent problems keeping develop-
ers from liking CollabReview were when they did not
understand how scores were computed, or that it could
create a competition in the team, while “it should not
effect the relations between the people who are working
in the team.” One developer did not like it because he
would not have gained many points if his team had not
helped him, and he thereby caused his team some trou-
bles. Another one neutrally said that he thinks it would
make sense from an educational point of view.
But most comments were positive. Developers liked
that it kept them alert about coding styles and the quality
of their source code, for its fairness, about how errors are
measured, and that they could successfully increase their
scores. They liked about it that it caused an increase in
the readability of source code, and that it encouraged the
other group members to take care of quality.
Interesting Developers found CollabReview interest-
ing because of its motivating effect, and especially that
someone with a “low score could have attempted to go
for the team bonus.” It gave them “confidence and in-
spiration for working hard to achieve [a] certain score”,
because developers found it interesting how better scores
helped their team in the final grade; especially when they
recognized that their score could effect the whole group.
They also found it interesting that the individual scores
made them pay more attention to their source code qual-
ity. Another advantage was to know who to ask if one
had a question when correcting his own style.
One developer stated that if he thought that it could
evaluate his work right, he would find it very interesting.
But in his opinion, it could not. Others objected: They
said it could judge source code quality, and had made
them improve their code because it notified them of its
disadvantages.
Fitting Some developers reported that CollabReview
and the karma scores were not fitting the lab well. For
example, they put much pressure onto one team: “I think
they caused a lot of distress to some people, especially
given the fact that they already were under pressure. I
realize that this contest grades only one aspect of our per-
formance and how much we contribute is irrelevant. But
it is discouraging if you spend sleepless nights coding
for the lab to get penalized for something ridiculous as
trailing whitespaces.” A recurring topic was that quan-
titative contributions were not honored enough: “The
guys [that] make the majority of contributions got the
lowest score.”
One developer said that the lab as group work should
also be counted as group work. But if there is someone
working really hard, then there should be something
special for him.
Other developers recognized that if everyone has good
quality source code, then it is easier for others to under-
stand. The karma scores gave a motivation to the whole
team for making well-formed source code. So it made
them have well documented source code for others to
understand more easily. Developers also liked that it
showed the team members who cared about source code
and followed code styles. It somehow re-focused devel-
opment away from pure focus on functionality towards
a combined functionality-and-quality focus.
While one developer noted that CollabReview was
relatively accurate, Clark mentioned that his score was
not quite exactly his score “in essence” because others
had helped him to achieve it. Others noted that it fit-
ted because it could increase their lab grade, because it
helped them to learn how to write code according to a
coding style, and they just took it as “part of the learning
experience” to which they had to react.
Acceptability Almost none of the subjects had an ac-
ceptance problem with CollabReview. They also ex-
pressed this in their statements and saw no problem with
it except for its discrimination against mass contributors,
and its potential for causing competition in the team. In-
stead, they praised its motivating effect and being able to
see progress in one’s own score. Some developers stated
that acceptance did not matter if it only assisted the team
in scoring well; and that it did. They saw no reason
to reject it “since its fair” and “reflects the truth”, and
its “quality of measurement”. Developers were satisfied
with their scores, and one of them specifically pointed
out that it was fair that other developers also got the
maximum score after she corrected their style.
Influence Developers who felt little influenced by Col-
labReview said that they were always trying “to do clean
code in a first instance.” Another one further explained:
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“I haven’t really changed anything in the way I develop
my code. I am relatively confident that I write clean
code, and the errors I tend to make cannot be caught by
Checkstyle: field and method naming, usage of design
patterns and object-oriented paradigms. I need to take
care of that, but it will take time and Checkstyle will not
be involved in the process.”
Those who felt influenced named as reasons that they
wanted to “write right code”, just had “to care about
code style”, needed the bonus to improve their grade,
or found it really helpful for their future job. They had
changed their behavior to now “develop code directly
with style.” And it kept them “from developing in a un-
organized manner.” One developer also admitted to have
actively influenced the others: “I wanted everybody to
have a high score.” Other developers, however, said that
they still stuck to their old behavior of first developing
functionality, and to then take care of code style later.
While in Team A the influence was that the last days
in the evaluation period had to be dedicated to fixing cod-
ing styles, developers declared that it did not influence
development of functionality very much but it helped
them a lot to write good quality source code. One devel-
oper described that there was no feeling of a contest but
that they had a “really nice collaboration in the team”.
Additional effort Developers who integrated their
style checking into their programming practice by doing
it simultaneously reported little additional effort. They
noted that using styling plug-ins for their IDE took the
most load off of them. The rest was a normal task that
they had to dedicate time to.
But developers who first developed and then later
styled their source code, reported high efforts through
CollabReview and Checkstyle. Developers reported to
have “spent a whole day fixing Checkstyle warnings”,
and helping “others in improving their code quality” be-
cause they were already done with their own tasks. They
also referred to their breaking of the software shortly
before the demonstration. Especially, Checkstyle was
identified as the major culprit because of its finickiness,
which made some review their “code several times be-
fore committing it in svn.” However, it was not all finick-
iness. One developer admitted that fixing Checkstyle
warnings was a “little bit tricky if you don’t understand
the code.”
Quality improvement Most of the controversy if
source code quality had improved revolved around
Checkstyle. The accusations were that it “does not
address major understanding violations”, and that their
“code was more or less clear” anyways so Checkstyle’s
warnings “didn’t add more clearness.” It would check
things “which are unimportant from the developer point
of view [... but were still] decreasing the score.” And
one developer added: “I had one of the highest scores
without doing a thing to improve my style and I only
lost points to issues that I considered unimportant.” In
Team A, some of the default coding rules were against
the guidelines of a development framework that they
decided to use. This conflict has certainly influenced the
perception of quality improvements in that team.
Others, however, found that the quality still improved
because of Checkstyle and karma scores. It made de-
velopers refocus from only developing functionality to
creating quality source code. They were now ”writing
the comments with the methods.“ Consistent style made
code more easy to read, while comments made it better
documented and added to its understandability. Only the
quality report was seen as a little abstract but was still
working well.
Individual scores make a difference Most agree-
ment was reached among developers in the point that
individual scores made a difference from an overall
score for the team. Initially, karma scores were per-
ceived as trying to separate collaboration on tasks but
then the teams found out that they could also work
together. Developers used the scores to ”pick out the
guy whose score effected the team“. There ”it’s better
individual, to know who to blame :-) like svn does it.“
It helped developers to see who had and who had no
problems. In the case of an overall score, it would have
been much more difficult to locate problems.
For a few developers it only mattered to see their own
karma score. But scores were also used by developers to
improve on their source code by looking at the source
code of someone with a higher score. It inspired them
to work hard to get a good score. One developer stated
that ”he wouldn’t have cared at all for the contest. The
thing that kept me motivated was that I was going to be
excluded from the bonus if I didn’t do something. As
I said, I don’t care for the lab grade, but these scores
aroused some unexplainable competitive spirit in me.“
Another one agreed that seeing the other ones’ scores
somehow created a little bit of a challenge.
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Concerns about published scores While two sub-
jects answered that they were concerned about the
publishing of their scores, the only reasons given were
that it could create a competition, and to make others
feel bad for their karma score. But it was explicitly
not regarded as a privacy issue: Almost all developers
answered something along the lines of ”We don’t have
nothing to hide“, ”we are [a] group and others should
know about my feedback“, or ”I feel natural to let my
teammate to know my level, I think knowing each other
within a team is important.“ Of course, publishing the
scores ”was important to see the scores of everyone
if we were to go for the team bonus“ and so that they
could see that someone who was correcting code styles
was doing it well. One developer stated that it would
be a different matter if karma scores were published to
both teams.
7.11.3.4 General
Peter had a general reservation against the CollabReview
intervention: ”for me the clearness of the code it’s very
important, but not the scores. I think a project needs to
not admit code that is not clear, but have a competition
in the team about the scores... I’m not [sic!] agree.“
Oswald mentioned that ”it would be nice to have the
script to compute score [sic!] so we could compute them
any time“, instead of being dependent on waiting for an
updated report being sent to them.
7.11.4 Results
This section infers and discusses results regarding the
effects and reception of CollabReview from the data.
A general remark on both teams is that the instructors
of the lab graded Team A to be about one mark weaker
than Team B. For their assessment, they did not rely on
and did not have access to the scores computed by Col-
labReview (except for the information that both teams
had reached the team bonus goals). Instead, it was their
impression that Team A was a bit less organized, had
problems getting development started and just imple-
mented less functionality. In fact, this last point is also
what the quantity karma scores support.
7.11.4.1 Short-term effects and lasting influence
The evolution history of the quality karma scores clearly
shows that the CollabReview intervention has the in-
tended effect on both development teams. While Team
A worked rather deadline oriented and fixed most issues
shortly before the deadline, Team B steadily worked its
way towards the goal. Team A went for the maximum
score possible, while Team B rather set out to just reach
the necessary threshold of 9 points.
The post-intervention results for Team A at first fur-
ther support that it actually was the CollabReview proto-
type, which was responsible for the increase in scores.
Taking the CollabReview-intervention away lets source
code quality slowly decay. But secondly, the rate of
decay reveals that there are some limited lasting effects,
e.g. resulting from learning. It is not that karma scores
abruptly fall down to their original level but that al-
though source code quantity increases to a multiple of
the amount at the end of the intervention, quality karma
scores only fall by about 15%. So there seem to be some
limited lasting effects, which are possibly due to learn-
ing effects in the team. This is also congruent with the
developers’ statements: Some said that they had learned
things like immediately writing comments, or keeping
an eye on their style. Others claimed to not have changed
their style.
7.11.4.2 Reception of CollabReview
The presence of karma scores was much higher in this
experiment than in the AgileLab, although emails with
the report were not sent daily but occasionally only. In
addition to the emails there was no additional presence
mechanism. Instead, teams and their scrum masters took
full responsibility for making scores present. While all
developers started caring rather late for the quality karma
scores with respect to the goal, Team B started earlier
and could therefore avoid overhasty actions.
Also the perceived fairness of CollabReview improved
considerably since the AgileLab. This is probably due
to the better explanation of how scores are computed,
and a larger and more detailed quality report, which
also included information like major contributors of a
software process artifact. Still there were some problems
relating to the computing of scores without considering
contribution quantity, and Checkstyle’s rules. In general,
developers could better reconstruct what was happening,
though.
In this experiment, the intervention was found highly
important by most developers, leading to an average
score of almost 4, which is an increase of more than one
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mark compared to the AgileLab. High importance is
primarily rooted in the grade bonus, but some also found
it important because of reflection and learning processes.
Understanding is still one of the weaker points but
it became much better, and subjects found that they
understood it sufficiently well. Exact computation of
scores is still a bit unclear to them but all eventually
knew what to take care of to get a better score.
There was no improvement in the liking of CollabRe-
view for Team A since the AgileLab, but Team B liked it
very much. No one in the team did not like it. The iden-
tified problems were that it caused some competition
inside of the team, that it still was a somehow unknown
and unpredictable thing due to problems understanding
it, and that developers could feel indebted to their team
colleagues when they fixed their problems for them to
increase their score.
Few improvements were made with respect to interest-
ingness. Being already on a rather high level in the Ag-
ileLab, it did not increase not as much as other aspects.
Developers find it interesting for its motivational effects
resulting from the social group-context, and various mo-
tivational aspects for the individual. CollabReview also
adds a source of information for developers so they can
better understand the team, and what is happening.
CollabReview fitted much better into the Scrum en-
vironment than into a pair programming scenario. It
helped the team to attain the grade bonus through better
source code, so it is mostly seen as a fitting support.
Developers also felt that they were learning something
from it, which suited the teaching perspective.
Acceptance has much improved compared to the Ag-
ileLab. There were no severe acceptance problems. The
only issues raised were the potential for competition
and discrimination against mass contributors. Instead,
CollabReview’s motivating effects were praised and per-
ceived as being fair.
The majority of developers did not consciously feel
neither a strong positive nor negative influence through
CollabReview. While objectively the effect on quality
is evidenced in the karma scores of all developers, sev-
eral developers emphasized that the intervention did not
have a lasting effect on them. The main reason for the
nonappearance seems very much to be that developers
did not agree with Checkstyle’s rules.
Many developers reported defensible additional effort
through CollabReview, especially when using style tools
or when doing styling in parallel to coding. Only in
case Checkstyle’s warnings were ignored for too long,
problems occurred later on. Hasty last minute actions
could break the project and lead to developers spending
whole days fixing style problems.
Primarily in Team A, the opinions whether or not
quality had improved were controversial. In contrast to
this, members of Team B consistently reported improved
or much improved source code quality. The developers
uttered concerns about the suitability of Checkstyle, but
still found that it led to more readable source code by
promoting descriptive comments and consistent style.
Far reaching agreement existed among developers that
individual scores made a difference as compared to an
overall score for the entire team. The differences from
overall scores were that they awoke an unexplainable
competitive spirit to achieve better scores and quality,
could be used for picking out developers who damaged
the team score, and could also be used for learning from
others.
All developers had no privacy concerns regarding the
publishing of scores within their team.
7.11.4.3 Rat race
Some form of a rat race may have occurred in Team A.
When fixing all style problems right before the deadline,
the team even broke its previously functional demon-
strator. Of course, this was a very bad situation right
in front of the customers. Also, the team members per-
fected their karma scores. Only scores of nine would
have been necessary for achieving the team bonus but
they fixed each and every single Checkstyle warning in
their code base. These findings could indicate that there
was reckless perfectionism occurring.
But it may also be just hastiness. The team had few
time left for fixing all problems. They could not go
through several iterations of first fixing previously iden-
tified problems and waiting for the next quality report
being sent to them. They had to do it in one or two itera-
tions. So they just fixed everything they could. This may
be the reason why one developer recommended to give
developers direct access to the computation of scores.
In addition to this, developers did not report an over-
emphasis on quality goals. Team A was probably just
a bit inept dealing with the scores. Team B carefully
but steadily worked its way over the threshold for the
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team bonus; and not every team member did have the
maximum score. The conclusion is therefore that a rat
race did not occur.
Also pommeling of non-performers did not seem to
have occurred. Quite to the contrary, developers started
helping each other in reaching the necessary scores, ei-
ther by providing help with the right tools, or by fixing
each others’ source code.
7.11.4.4 Effort versus quality improvement
Both teams together estimated that there was some addi-
tional effort caused by CollabReview (3.44). However,
both teams also found there was a bigger increase in
quality (3.65). The plus in additional effort is less than
the plus in quality improvement. This hints at that the
CollabReview intervention brought more benefits than
costs.
In Team B the difference between additional effort
(3.29) compared to quality improvement (4.25) is even
more eminent. Feedback from the developers indicates
that they had a relaxed and planned approach to dealing
with the quality report: the additional effort was low
because they fixed potential style problems right away,
while they were programming; they saw the intervention
as a normal task that they had to dedicate time to, and
they used styling tools to immediately fix most problems
without having to do anything manually.
For Team A, the intervention rather does not seem to
have been beneficial from an economic point of view.
Team A estimated a higher effort at a lower quality gain
through CollabReview. But it has to be considered that
Team A caused itself some problems by trying to fix
all problems right before the deadline. The feedback
from Team A also points in the direction that they had
a different approach: they used less tools, and started
to fix their problems rather late. Developers in Team A
spent whole days fixing Checkstyle warnings, manually
fixed source code, and reviewed it several times before
checking it in.
Feedback from Team A regarding the quality improve-
ment furthermore indicates that they had greater doubts
in the benefits of Checkstyle: They said that the Check-
style warnings they received were not adding to clear-
ness, and that it instead was failing to address major un-
derstanding violations. They were using a development
framework, which had some style recommendations that
differed from the standard coding styles. Also, the in-
structors of the ScrumLab had the impression that Team
A was less organized, and that some major contributors
rather were more like coding cowboys. Interestingly,
Clark approached me weeks after the end of their inter-
vention to tell me that he now actually would appreciate
the improvements in quality. It is probable that due to
the late fixing of their internal quality problems, Team A
did not have the time to reap the rewards of their efforts
before filling out the questionnaire. A later interview
might therefore have given more favorable results for
CollabReview.
7.11.5 Summary
Two field experiments were run in software development
projects. The CollabReview prototype was brought into
both environments. Both teams could either win a team
reward as a whole team, or, if they failed for this goal,
two individuals per team could win the reward. The
intervention was perceived rather well. CollabReview
scored better than neutral on all interviewed dimensions
(e.g. Requirement-9: “Easily understandable”).
In both teams, CollabReview could considerably in-
crease the quality of source code as measured by Check-
style. The field experiment was a success. It showed
the effect that CollabReview can have on the internal
quality of a software project, if it is employed correctly.
The quality goals set were reached or even surpassed
by both teams. The number of rule violations decreased
from a little less than one per SLOC to almost zero
(Requirement-1: “Improve internal software quality”).
Everybody was somehow engaged in their team’s quest
for quality (Requirement-6: “Involve contributors with-
out dependence”).
Limited lasting influence, possibly due to learning
effects, could be seen beyond the end of intervention in
Team A. As opposed to strict commit rules, e.g. scripts
which prevent source code that fails Checkstyle tests
from being checked in, CollabReview grants developers
flexibility to postpone fixing of problems, or to distribute
implementation and style fixing tasks (Requirement-2:
“Appeal to individuals’ motivation”).
While there was some indication that a rat race might
have occurred in Team A, evidence was not found. The
interviewed subjects made no respective remarks, too
(Requirement-4: “No hazard to the team”).
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In Team B the gain in quality through the intervention
was estimated considerably higher than the additional
effort associated with CollabReview. Team A reported
slightly more effort than gain from the intervention but
this may be due to the fact that they hastily fixed their
problems rather late leading to slips of the pen. This
could have prevented them from enjoying the benefits be-
fore answering the questionnaire (Requirement-8: “Few
overhead for users”). Furthermore, one of the develop-
ment frameworks they decided to use had conflicting
coding style recommendations as discussed in Section
7.11.4.4.
Some developers found that CollabReview further
increased the pressure on them, which was already high
through the Scrum-based development. Now they had to
additionally take care of source code quality. While this
may be true, exactly this personal responsibility is the
purpose of CollabReview. It is supposed to give a voice
to quality which may otherwise be forgotten.
7.12 Overview of Studies
The validation concerned 9 requirements that were ad-
dressed in ten individual studies. Table 7.7 summarizes
the key facts of the conducted studies and aligns them
with the validation of requirements.
The studies that are presented first are more concerned
with the technical validation of the CollabReview proto-
type. Later studies focus on the integration of CollabRe-
view concept and prototype into actual development and
business environments. While it is not an explicitly de-
scribed topic of the experiments, technical viability was
always a matter in the early studies.
Responsibility established through authorship for text
in software process artifacts is a key ingredient to karma
scores in CollabReview. In order to obtain karma scores,
authorship has to be determined. A technical key com-
ponent is therefore the algorithm for authorship compu-
tation. First validations of the authorship algorithm pre-
sented in “Evaluation of Authorship Algorithm” (Sec-
tion 7.2) investigated if the algorithm generated sound
results. It had to be tested with regards to its ability to
find suitable predecessors of artifacts, and if it could
handle moving (and copying) of text between artifacts.
In a laboratory analysis with the source code of Karakos
and FreeCol, it returned a different author for about 30%
of lines of text. That means that its results are not totally
off, in the worst case 30% worse than svn blame, in
the best case 30% better. It is probably some value in be-
tween but with a tendency to the better case because the
validation showed that the algorithm determines better
predecessors than Subversion, and can roughly handle
moving, copying and reformatting.
“Consistency of Karma Scores” (Section 7.3) aimed
at reducing the uncertainty left behind in the previous
study. If developers have rather consistent coding styles,
it should be possible to predict the internal quality of soft-
ware process artifacts from correctly computed karma
scores. The laboratory analysis compared karma scores
computed with several algorithms applied to several
projects. The results were consistent with a substantial
correlation for CollabReview’s algorithm; similar results
could be obtained with some of the other algorithms,
too, but choice of the algorithm for the CollabReview
prototype should also consider tampering resistance.
Under the assumption that willingness to invest in in-
ternal quality is a rather constant trait of developers, not
only should fellow developers have a rather good feeling
for a developer’s contributions but it should also reflect
in other documentation media like Subversion commit
logs, or the documentation wiki. This issue was investi-
gated in “Validity of Computed Karma Scores” (Section
7.4) . The results found that karma scores well reflected
the developers’ reputation among their peers, and their
willingness to contribute to other documentation media.
Experiments to validate the more human and social
aspects of CollabReview were initiated by a summary of
the expert reviews that were conducted several times in
“Analytical Concept Evaluation” (Section 7.5) . Expert
opinions offer the opportunity to virtually validate Col-
labReview cheaply and in environments where normally
access would not have been possible. CollabReview
tended to lead to heated discussions, but was generally
received positive. Issues identified by experts actually
eventuated, which could argue for the transferability of
the experts’ assessments. CollabReview may not be
equally suitable for all environments.
The first field experiment with real users was the “Mo-
knowpedia Field Experiment” (Section 7.6) , where the
prototype was integrated into a work group’s knowledge
management wiki. The experiment was set up as within-
group design, and succeeded in increasing contribution
quality as well as quantity (by up to as much as ≈ 60%).
Other important results were insights into the social pro-
cesses through interviews and observations, and the non-
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Study (and
section)
Purpose
(and requirements)
Method Study en-
virnmnts.
Results & notes
Evaluation of
Authorship Al-
gorithm (7.2)
Preliminary validation
of algorithm correct-
ness (3, 5, 7)
Source code analysis:
predecessor goodness,
svn blame comparison
Karakos,
FreeCol
30% different authorship,
good predecessor search,
copy/move robustness
Consistency of
Karma Scores
(7.3)
Algorithm validation
by prediction of quality
through karma scores
(7)
Analysis: predict
artifact quality from
karma
Karakos,
TornBond,
AgileLab,
FreeCol,
Log4j
karma consistent, algorithm
valid, choice of algorithm
matters, predictive capabil-
ity substantial
Validity of
Computed
Karma Scores
(7.4)
Show that karma
scores reflect social
reputation and are
hence valid (7)
Compare computed
karma to (1) reputation
interview (2) proxies
(svn log, wiki)
TornBond,
Moknow-
pedia,
AgileLab
Computed karma scores are
valid; similar to social rep-
utation and reflect willing-
ness to document
Analytical
Concept Eval-
uation (7.5)
Risk mitigation and
design improvements
(implicit, all social)
Analytical evaluation
of concepts by experts
Expert
workshops
Controversial reception,
early identification of ac-
tual issues, transferability,
varying suitability
Moknowpedia
Field Experi-
ment (7.6)
Test prototype with
real users of a wiki (1,
2, 4, 8, 6)
Field experiment; ob-
servation, data gather-
ing, interviews
Moknow-
pedia
Promising results, contribu-
tion improvements, no bad
effects, anecdotes
AgileLab
Field Experi-
ment (7.7)
Test prototype in field
with programmers (1,
2, 4, 8, 6)
Field experiment;
within group, data
gathering, interviews
AgileLab Failed (no effect), insights
into socio-technical inter-
play
TornBond
Design Ex-
perimentation
(7.8)
Evolve prototype and
design after failed test
(1, 2, 6)
Experimentation with
prototype in field;
observation to collect
lessons learned
TornBond Brief users, karma value vi-
tal, avoid negative karma,
tune information, neglect-
ing quantity unfair
Reputation-
Forge Field
Experiments
(7.9)
Test social rewarding
game and in EU
project (1, 2, 3, 6)
Field experiment; be-
tween groups, data
gathering, interviews
Vyrygh,
Moknow-
pedia
Significant improvements,
but additional benefit of
ReputationForge game is
limited
MicroEdit-
Castigator
Field Experi-
ment (7.10)
Show concept validity
by suppressing undesir-
able behavior (1, 3, 2,
6)
Field experiment;
within group, observa-
tion, data gathering
Moknow-
pedia
Undesired behavior re-
duced by 40%, some users
show recalcitrant behavior
ScrumLab
Field Experi-
ment (7.11)
Validate that concept
works with source
code (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9)
Field experiment;
between and within
groups, data gathering,
interviews; individual
& group rewards
ScrumLab Quality goals fully reached,
much improved reception
of concept, no deniers, neg-
ligible adverse effects
Requirements: 1=Improve internal software quality, 2=Appeal to individuals’ motivation, 3=Flexible applicability,
4=No hazard to the team, 5=Robustness and resistance against attacks, 7=Validity of computations, 9=Easily
understandable, 8=Few overhead for users, 6=Involve contributors without dependence
Table 7.7: Overview of conducted studies
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appearance of fatal negative effects. Further experiments
to repeat the success could follow.
In the “AgileLab Field Experiment” (Section 7.7) the
previous success should be replicated in a programming
environment with source code. However, the experiment
failed because there was no measurable effect on the
developers. Interviews conducted with the developers
at the end of the evaluation period correlated with their
karma scores and provided deep insights into the effects
of CollabReview; e.g. low ranks tend to displace the per-
ception of presence but increase importance, CollabRe-
view is welcomed by quality-oriented developers but not
because of profiteering, understanding how scores are
computed is important for working towards high scores.
It seems that CollabReview is not compatible with pair
programming, which obfuscates responsibility.
The “TornBond Design Experimentation” (Section
7.8) served the purpose to optimize the prototype after
the previous failed experiment. There was no formal
study methodology but rather iterative improvements
of the prototype’s design followed by observations of
how it affected developer behavior. The experimentation
taught several lessons, for instance that users should
receive a detailed briefing upfront, that the exchange
value for karma scores is vital, that negatively connoted
karma scores like technical debt should be avoided, that
informational load should be tuned to the users needs,
and that neglecting quantity in the karma scores can be
perceived as unfair.
As a result of the AgileLab experiment, more empha-
sis was put on the exchange value offered for karma
scores. The ReputationForge prototype implemented a
complex social game that was to substitute potentially
expensive tangible rewards. The “Reputation- Forge
Field Experiments” (Section 7.9) trialed the prototype
with a between-groups experimental design in Moknow-
pedia and the wiki of Vyrygh. A considerable and sta-
tistically significant positive effect was measured for
Vyrygh. There was an increase compared to simpler
game elements originally used in Moknowpedia, how-
ever, not all improvements were significant.
The “MicroEditCastigator Field Experiment” (Sec-
tion 7.10) served the purpose to trial CollabReview in
breaking a bad habit regarding the checking in of article
revisions in Moknowpedia. Too frequent committing
of revisions adversely affects the history documentation
of an article and the wiki as a whole. Suppressing it
can therefore increase internal quality. Using within-
group design, the study showed undesirable behavior
could be reduced by as much as 40% over the course of
several months. However, some users showed enduring
recalcitrant behavior objecting against and countering
MicroEditCastigator’s ratings.
The “ScrumLab Field Experiment” (Section 7.11)
was set up as a second attempt to trial the improved Col-
labReview in a programming environment. It featured a
combined within- and between-groups experimental de-
sign. The rewards had a high exchange value for karma
scores, and combined group and individual rewards to
amplify exchange value. The results were very positive.
Not only were the quality goals fully reached but also
was the reception of the prototype much better. Adverse
effects were almost non-existent. There were no deniers,
but groups engaged in division of labor to alleviate some
members from unloved activities.
7.13 Validation of Requirements
and Concept Evaluation
This section reiterates the requirements that were defined
for the CollabReview concept and prototype. It discusses
for each requirement if or to what extent it is met based
on results of the studies presented in this chapter.
Table 7.8 repeats the requirements’ titles and their fit
criteria. The last column contains an estimate whether
the requirement is met as discussed below.
7.13.1 Validation of Requirement-1 “Im-
prove internal software quality”
Fulfillment of Requirement-1 is determined by the crite-
rion “There is an increase in the quantity and quality of
documentation created by the development team”.
The suitability of the CollabReview concept for the
purpose of improving the internal quality in software
projects has been presented to several experts of software
engineering. The majority deemed it suitable for this
purpose (see Section 7.5).
In addition to this, validation of the requirement has
been addressed in several field experiments. In the Mo-
knowpedia field experiment, the number of new arti-
cles increased by 40% to 60%, their average sized in-
creased by about 20%, and the content was perceived
as about half a point better on a 5-point Likert scale af-
ter the field experiment (Section 7.6). ReputationForge
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# Requirement titles Requirement criterion Fulfilled
1 Improve internal software qual-
ity
There is an increase in the quantity and quality of docu-
mentation created by the development team ++
2 Appeal to individuals’ motiva-
tion
Developers show more of the desired behavior although
they are not forced to comply, i.e. they still have a choice ++
3 Flexible applicability The prototype is flexible with regard to the determination
of responsibility, the assessment of quality of artifacts
and the assessment method, the kind of artifacts and their
revision repository, size of the project, distribution of
development, and the rewarding mechanism
++
4 No hazard to the team There are no or only weak manifestations of hazards to
the team +
5 Robustness and resistance
against attacks
The prototype and its reputation system should be robust
and resistant against attacks +
6 Involve contributors without
dependence
The prototype does not require broad user support from
the start, and individual contributors cannot shun its effect ++
7 Validity of computations Responsibility and quality information, and the resulting
karma scores are valid ++
8 Few overhead for users Only low direct overhead is caused to users
++
9 Easily understandable Users understand the prototype and how to improve the
quality of artifacts +
Table 7.8: Summary of requirements’ satisfaction criteria
caused significant increases in quantity, quality and cre-
ation of articles in the wiki of Vyrygh, and further im-
provements in Moknowpedia (see Section 7.9). The
MicroEditCastigator field experiment reduced
the amount of undesired behavior by ≈ 40%, and con-
sequently increased repository quality. Finally, in the
ScrumLab field experiment the set quality goals were
reached or even surpassed by both software development
teams. The number of violations decreased from a little
less than one per SLOC to almost zero. The reduction
of violations also means that more inline documentation
was written (see Section 7.11).
However, the CollabReview prototype did not work in
all development environments. In the AgileLab experi-
ment, it did not cause a change; similarly, it did not have
much influence in the TornBond experimentation. Both
studies improved the understanding of the circumstances
that make employment of the CollabReview concept suc-
cessful.
It also has to be noted that not all readers might agree
to the automatic assessments of quality that were used
in some experiments, i.e. Checkstyle and the number
of micro edits. Justification for both measures has been
given, still quality is a much more complex concept
and in some cases a subjective matter, too. Perfectly
modeling and measuring quality is not the purpose of
this research. For discussions of quality refer back to
Section 3.2.
The requirement is considered as fully met.
7.13.2 Validation of Requirement-2 “Ap-
peal to individuals’ motivation”
Requirement-2 is met under the following condition:
“Developers show more of the desired behavior although
they are not forced to comply, i.e. they still have a
choice”.
By design, the CollabReview concept does not in-
terfere with the development processes. The prototype
reads evolution information from the revision repository,
gives users additional ways for interaction, and provides
them with further information like karma scores. What
the CollabReview prototype does has only informative
character. It does not, for example, force users to fix all
source code style before committing, or reject submit-
ting of software process artifacts without an appropriate
revision log message. Furthermore, contributors are free
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to amass any amount of bad karma points they wish
to. Contributors are not forced to comply with the rules
supported through the CollabReview prototype.
Still contributors in several field experiments (see Sec-
tions 7.6, 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11) showed more of the desired
and less of the undesired behaviors. The CollabReview
prototype has addressed and altered the contributors’
motivation, resulting in an increase in internal quality.
The requirement is therefore fully met.
7.13.3 Validation of Requirement-3 “Flex-
ible applicability”
The criterion for Requirement-3 is: “The prototype is
flexible with regard to the determination of responsibility,
the assessment of quality of artifacts and the assessment
method, the kind of artifacts and their revision repository,
size of the project, distribution of development, and the
rewarding mechanism”. In all of the named dimensions
the CollabReview concept and prototype are highly flex-
ible. That should make it adaptable to many different
programming environments.
7.13.3.1 Flexibility of responsibility
The CollabReview prototype implements several respon-
sibility metrics, including its own authorship algorithm.
Other responsibility metrics are contributors who made
changes to a software process artifact recently, or im-
ported Java packages as described in Section 7.3. Further
responsibility metrics not directly based on contribution
were discussed in Section 5.2.3. It describes, for exam-
ple, social indirect responsibility that results from the
social context of the development environment.
7.13.3.2 Assessment of artifact quality
The quality assessment method used in the CollabRe-
view prototype can be adapted in various ways to the
needs of software projects. Assessments are made in the
form of reviews with ratings. Multiple ratings from re-
views are integrated into the quality rating of a software
process artifact. By default, reviews are only weighted
by their timeliness but other integration algorithms are
possible. Reviews can be submitted by users, through
web services, or automatically through software tools
like Checkstyle. While few automatic assessments are
currently implemented in the prototype, its interfaces
allow for easy extension with other software metrics or
tool kits.
7.13.3.3 Supported kinds of artifacts
CollabReview is designed for collaboratively created
software process artifacts that have a text representa-
tion. In its current form, it is not bound to a particu-
lar programming language but it relies on string edit-
ing algorithms at the granularity of lines to determine
key-measures like timeliness and responsibility. This
gives the CollabReview prototype the ability to support
mainstream programming languages like Java or C#, or
wiki markups like that from MediaWiki. It can access
revision repositories of Subversion, GForge wiki, and
MediaWiki. Other kinds of software process artifacts
can be supported by switching to appropriate editing
algorithms, and providing importers for the respective
revision repository.
7.13.3.4 Size of project
The CollabReview concept should work with any size
of project. However, larger projects have higher hard-
ware and implementation requirements. The prototype is
therefore only required to work with small- to medium-
size projects. This has been validated in Section 7.2.
7.13.3.5 Distribution of development
CollabReview prototypes do not require co-location or
distribution. In fact, most communication like reviews
should occur anonymously through the prototype any-
ways, so co-location is not necessary. However, co-
location may be beneficial for some reputation-based
rewarding systems. Prototypes have been successfully
trialed with co-located and distributed teams. For exam-
ple, ScrumLab (bi-weekly meetings) and Vyrygh in the
ReputationForge experiment were distributed projects
(Sections 7.11 and 7.9). As opposed to this, contributors
in Moknowpedia and AgileLab were co-located (Sec-
tions 7.6 and 7.7).
7.13.3.6 Rewarding mechanism
The CollabReview concept builds on karma scores for
quality, quantity or others. Several rewarding mecha-
nisms have been implemented in the CollabReview pro-
totypes used in the field experiments. They range from
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simple leader boards to the complex ReputationForge
social game.
7.13.3.7 Limitations
CollabReview seems to be not applicable to pair pro-
gramming environments because in its current form, re-
sponsibility information of both pair partners is difficult
to obtain. More research is necessary. All projects that
CollabReview prototypes were tested with were less-
planned, agile projects.
7.13.3.8 Summary
Both the CollabReview concept and prototype are very
flexible with regard to many aspects like responsibility,
quality, the kind of software process artifacts, size of
the project, distribution of development, or the reward-
ing mechanism. It does not seem suitable for pair pro-
gramming due to problems in acquiring responsibility
information though. Except for this exception, the re-
quirement is fully met.
7.13.4 Validation of Requirement-4 “No
hazard to the team”
The following criterion has been defined for Requirement-
4: “There are no or only weak manifestations of hazards
to the team”.
Through its anonymous reviews, the CollabReview
concept protects reviewers from having to fear the con-
sequences of bad reviews. And indeed, all field exper-
iments were free of manifestations of hazards for the
team through the employment of the CollabReview pro-
totype. The interviewed users of e.g. Moknowpedia
(Section 7.6) or ScrumLab (Section 7.11) actually stated
that they liked the intervention.
However, some studies revealed that under certain cir-
cumstances users might have problems with CollabRe-
view. Expert reviews pointed to the inherent danger-
ousness of a concept based on social dynamics early in
the research process. In Moknowpedia, users jokingly
gave each others’ articles bad ratings, enjoyed being
last in the ranking table, or were discouraged by the
progress of major contributors (Section 7.6). One inter-
viewee rejected to take part in a study because he was
concerned about scores being computed (Section 7.4).
Programming experiments of AgileLab, TornBond, and
ScrumLab revealed that developers who contributed a
lot, felt treated unfair because quantity was not honored
enough (Sections 7.7, 7.8, and 7.11 respectively). In
ScrumLab, one team might have suffered from some
form of rat race, when they broke their software while
trying to reach top scores.
Over all, in none of the experiments did CollabReview
endanger the software project through its presence. But
it has to be noted that the risk is there. The requirement
is fulfilled.
7.13.5 Validation of Requirement-5 “Ro-
bustness and resistance against
attacks”
Robustness as demanded by Requirement-5 is given
by: “The prototype and its reputation system should be
robust and resistant against attacks”. The CollabReview
concept is not easy to attack in principle. It takes two
kinds of input: responsibility and quality ratings.
In the prototypes, responsibility is defined through
authorship. The authorship algorithm has been designed
to be robust and resistant. It detects copying of code,
and it detects if software process artifacts are created
or removed only temporarily. Also reformatting is de-
tected. This makes it difficult for contributors to forge
responsibility information.
The quality input is less robust and resistant, and there-
fore more susceptible to attacks. Every user has only a
limited influence on the quality ratings of software pro-
cess artifacts. Unwarranted reviews can be rejected, and
software metrics can add objectiveness. Theoretically,
the further analysis of reviewing behaviors, for instance
rating biases of own articles or having one’s reviews
rejected repeatedly, to detect malevolent behavior is pos-
sible. Also, the automatic assessment of quality can be
attacked by figuring out how it works.
The analytical concept evaluation with experts re-
vealed that they saw the risk that users could attack
the reputation system (Section 7.5). However, attacks
against the CollabReview prototype were seldom and
not severe in the experiments. In Moknowpedia a user
attacked the system by automatically generating reviews
(Section 7.6). The MicroEditCastigator was
attacked by counter-reviews with very good ratings
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(Section 7.10). And one team in ScrumLab attacked
the Checkstyle quality assessment by providing empty
Javadoc comments for some entities (Section 7.11).
It has to be expected that with an increasing exchange
value for karma scores, the number and severity of at-
tacks will increase. In the experiments, this has not been
an issue though. CollabReview therefore complies to the
requirement.
7.13.6 Validation of Requirement-6 “In-
volve contributors without depen-
dence”
The fulfillment criterion of Requirement-6 is: “The pro-
totype does not require broad user support from the start,
and individual contributors cannot shun its effect”.
It is not necessary that all contributors actively use the
CollabReview prototype from the start. There is nothing
they need to install, and even if they do not consciously
interact with CollabReview, they still interact with the
revision repository. This enables the CollabReview pro-
totype to compute karma scores anyways. So users are
automatically part of the game and the rewarding system,
even if not them but only others actively participate.
In some environments, the CollabReview prototype
is dependent on more assistance from the users, for in-
stance in Moknowpedia. They are needed to provide
reviews of software process artifacts. Moknowpedia
therefore motivated reviewers by offering bonus points
(Section 7.6). This helps as a bootstrapping mechanism
to get user involvement started.
Still the CollabReview concept is vulnerable to broad
rejection. This is specifically a problem when the re-
warding system builds only on social reputation mecha-
nisms. A critical mass has to be supporting it: If there
is no social group to give an exchange value to karma
scores, then the CollabReview concept does not work.
This has been the problem in AgileLab (Section 7.7) and
TornBond (Section 7.8). Yet insufficient exchange value
is less of a bootstrapping problem but more of a gen-
eral one: without an exchange value for karma scores,
CollabReview does not work.
CollabReview concept and prototypes are vulnerable
to weak exchange values in the rewarding system. But
they fully meet the requirement of being involving for
all contributors.
7.13.7 Validation of Requirement-7 “Va-
lidity of computations”
Requirement-7 is satisfied if “Responsibility and quality
information, and the resulting karma scores are valid”.
First, authorship information obtained through Col-
labReview’s authorship algorithm was analyzed. It was
found that its results are about 30% different from the
classical Subversion blame command. This difference
was attributed to its abilities of detecting copies, and
an improved determination of software process artifact
predecessors (Section 7.2).
Second, consistency of the computed responsibility
information was validated by using karma scores as pre-
dictors of software process artifact quality. Moderate to
substantial significant correlations were found between
assessed and predicted quality ratings. Furthermore, the
results are comparable in precision to other prediction
methods like using the reputation of Java packages to
predict quality (Section 7.3).
Third, the contributors’ karma scores were compared
to their social reputation for contributing to the project,
their disposition to write commit log messages, and their
wiki karma scores. Significant positive correlations were
found here, too. The weaker correlation between quality
karma scores and the social reputation in TornBond orig-
inates from a low acceptance of Checkstyle as a quality
enhancement tool (Section 7.4).
Fourth, developers in ScrumLab felt that scores were
understandable and fair (Section 7.11). This also indi-
cates that they are valid because otherwise interviewees
would not agree to them. Developers only had problems
with Checkstyle as a quality measure. Agreement in
AgileLab was not so high because in pair programming
the CollabReview prototype had problems making the
right responsibility attributions (Section 7.7).
While karma scores can certainly be improved in their
precision, they have to be considered as valid. The
requirement is fully met.
7.13.8 Validation of Requirement-8 “Few
overhead for users”
The decision if Requirement-8 is fulfilled is based on
the following criterion: “Only low direct overhead is
caused to users”. It has to be noted that the CollabRe-
view prototype causes additional effort by making the
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individual developer do things that he normally would
not do. This is not overhead. Overhead is only what
is associated directly with the use of the CollabReview
prototype. The overhead that CollabReview causes is
analyzed analytically and empirically.
CollabReview is designed to cause only low overhead
for its users. The rationale is that if the CollabReview
prototype costs users their time, they will not use it.
Therefore it is accessible through the web to minimize
installation efforts on the contributor side. Review forms
can be integrated into the contributors’ development
environment as widgets into the wiki GUI, or as plug-
ins into the IDE, so access to them is quick and easy.
Applying automatic quality assessments further reduces
the need for feedback from users.
There was only low overhead found empirically
through the users’ reports. Contributors in the Scrum-
Lab reported that the CollabReview prototype created
much additional effort (Section 7.11). But this effort
was described as mostly consisting of efforts to satisfy
all the Checkstyle rules, which is effort spent in quality,
not on overheads. Apart from that, contributors found
that there was a greater gain in quality than in efforts
spent. The users in Moknowpedia had to provide
the reviews themselves as there was no automatic
assessment mechanism. But they, too, considered the
additional effort worth the cost (Section 7.6).
CollabReview causes only very little overhead to the
contributors. It therefore fully complies to the require-
ment.
7.13.9 Validation of Requirement-9 “Eas-
ily understandable”
The criterion determining fulfillment of Requirement-9
is: “Users understand the prototype and how to improve
the quality of artifacts”.
While understanding of the prototype was not perfect
in all experiments, users usually had a basic understand-
ing of how karma scores were computed and what they
needed to do in order to improve their scores. In order
to gain confidence in how scores were computed, they
needed to experiment with them a bit.
Participants of the AgileLab experiment probably had
the least understanding. Some ones pointed out that they
probably understood how karma scores were computed,
others did not. The problems might have been that they
got too few feedback, not really tried to improve their
score, and were doing pair programming which made
karma score computations unreliable (Section 7.7). As
opposed to them, Moknowpedia users, although not ex-
plicitly asked about it, knew that they could influence
each others’ scores by rating their articles (Section 7.6).
The members of the development teams in ScrumLab
said that they had a rather good feeling for how scores
were computed. However, the exact way how karma
scores are computed was not explained to them, so they
did not know how it was done. But they knew what to
do in order to improve their scores (Section 7.11).
While understanding of the inner workings of Col-
labReview was not very good in the experiments, the
users usually knew rather well how to influence their
karma scores to the better. The requirement is satisfied.
7.13.10 Summary of requirements valida-
tion
A set of nine requirements were distilled during the de-
sign of this research. Next, the CollabReview concept
and prototype were crafted to fulfill these requirements.
This section iterated through all requirements to deter-
mine if the requirement can be considered as satisfied
summarizing the results from the conducted studies. The
result is that all requirements have been met or fully met
(also refer back to Table 7.8).
7.14 Evaluation of CollabReview
The research thesis is that gamification through com-
puter tools that compute reputation scores, and an ac-
cording rewarding system, can motivate developers to
take more care for software process artifacts themselves,
resulting in better internal documentation and quality of
the whole software product. It was then elaborated into
a set of requirements. Several studies were conducted
with the CollabReview concept and prototype to confirm
the fulfillment of requirements (see Section 7.13).
The results obtained in the field experiments are
promising: In a co-located team, the number of software
process artifacts with general documentation could
be substantially increased. Also the quality of docu-
mentation increased in the users’ perception. Similar
improvements were also recorded in distributed develop-
ment teams. Using a complex social game as rewarding
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system, further improvements seem probable (results
not statistically significant). Undesirable behavior was
massively cut in an experiment. High quality standards
were set for two independent software development
teams, and both teams achieved their goals. CollabRe-
view provides very valuable support to make developers
contribute to the software project’s documentation, and
therefore to its internal quality.
However, the critical point is the rewarding system
that provides the exchange value for karma scores. As
economic theory predicts, the success of the employ-
ment of a CollabReview prototype depends on the ex-
change value that is offered to contributors for their
karma scores. Only if karma scores have a subjective
value, then will contributors work towards better scores.
The exchange value can be tangible like money but it
does not guarantee an effect as evidenced in one of the
field experiments. Factors like including understandabil-
ity of how karma scores are computed, or the design
of the rewarding system are crucial. In the end, quality
management remains a management task and requires
commitment by management. Here motivation theories
like Vroom’s VIE model become more important. Also,
group rewards can amplify peer-pressure and mutual
control in the team that strives to achieve a goal together.
The CollabReview prototype has proved to be highly
flexible and configurable. It has been applied to differ-
ent kinds of documentation, integrating feedback from
humans and static analysis, using different responsibil-
ity or software process artifact importance weights, and
various rewarding systems. Still many of its adjusting
screws have not been taken full advantage of. CollabRe-
view has further potential.
Weak and strong contributors to quality perceive Col-
labReview differently. Weak contributors feel treated
unfair because the mass of their contributions is not hon-
ored; and they easily eliminate every thought about the
presence of a CollabReview prototype. Awareness has
to be created. Strong contributors, instead, welcome
CollabReview. However, they do not welcome it as prof-
iteers but as a tool that helps them corral team members
who would otherwise harm the internal quality of the
software. They make good confederates for it.
Negative karma scores and karma scores with a neg-
ative connotation can lead to frustration and rejection.
While technical debt may be well-suited to explain the
problems of poor quality to managers, it does not seem
so to the team. Instead, positive scores that show indi-
viduals and teams their achievements should be used.
Users usually enjoyed the game created by the Col-
labReview prototype. The rewarding system was never
presented as a threat but as an opportunity. While there
were a few incidents which might be precursors of haz-
ardous effects, a threat to the development team was
not evidenced in the field experiments. Instead, Col-
labReview presents itself as involving, causing first-time
contributions by persons who had not contributed to doc-
umentation before. It is cost-effective, causing more
benefits in documentation than costs through additional
effort for contributors.
The CollabReview prototype defines responsibility
through authorship. Its AUTH algorithm has been shown
to make much different attributions in authorship than
common approaches. Additionally, it adds basic robust-
ness against attacks based on authorship information.
The quality karma scores (including the authorship infor-
mation they are computed from) are consistent. There
are significant moderate to substantial correlations be-
tween quality predictions for software process artifacts
made with the help of karma scores. That means that
karma scores are not arbitrary but measure something
meaningful. However, quality predictions made with
karma scores are not perfect. The AUTH algorithm com-
pares well to other algorithms for authorship computa-
tion regarding its precision. But as the differences to
other algorithms are rather small, the choice of what
algorithm is used by a CollabReview prototype should
be influenced by other criteria like robustness. Here the
AUTH algorithm’s nearest neighbor search and clone
detection make it a good choice. Yet resistance of the
CollabReview prototype against attacks was not really
challenged in the field experiments. Malevolent behavior
can be easily addressed through organizational regula-
tion. There was only one incident where a user attacked
the system through automated submission of reviews.
CollabReview had the power to involve contributors
in the creation of documentation. Even if it does not in-
volve each and every single contributor, several contrib-
utors admitted that they made their first contributions or
only contributed because of CollabReview. Experiments
like ScrumLab showed that even if a few developers do
not join the game, quality standards can still be achieved
and that some peer-pressure arises.
Under the assumption that willingness to write docu-
mentation is a character trait, computed quality karma
scores were compared to social reputation and manifesta-
tions of documenting behavior as proxies. Contributors’
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karma scores proved soundness as predictors of software
process artifact quality, further supporting their validity.
According to the users’ statements, CollabReview
meant only low overhead to them. The most effort that
it caused was due to source code styling and documenta-
tion. These investments are as desired and no overhead;
they can be expected to pay off in the long run. And even
in the short term, the gains in quality were considered
more valuable than the efforts, as long as developers
immediately took care for their karma scores.
Understanding often comes from playing with karma
scores. Once contributors start to try to optimize their
karma scores, they quickly get a feeling for what they
need to do. However, not understanding the scores can
keep contributors from trying to improve their scores.
Help in form of initial briefings and informative feedback
on how actions affect scores are needed.
On a general note, experts’ opinions about the CollabRe-
view concept are controversial. A vast majority thinks
that the concept can work, and said that it is worthwhile
a try. It might be more suitable for open source devel-
opment. But industry management also showed some
interest in the concept. Several of the issues pointed out
by the experts were later confirmed in the field experi-
ments. In expert groups, often heated discussion arose
between proponents and opponents of the concept.
Validation of the requirements has shown that Col-
labReview improves internal quality, appeals to the in-
dividuals’ motivation, is flexible, does not pose a se-
vere hazard to team spirit, has robust and manipulation-
resistant calculations, draws individuals into the game,
is cost-effective due to low overheads, and is understand-
able. The research thesis is therefore accepted.
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Conclusion
Everyone knows that debugging is twice as hard as writing a program
in the first place. So if you’re as clever as you can be when you write
it, how will you ever debug it?
— Brian Kernighan
AFTER a retrospective on the work that has beenexecuted in this research, this concluding chapterpresents an outlook into possibilities for future
work.
8.1 Retrospective
The retrospective consists of an overview of conducted
research, a summary of main contributions that it makes
to the state of the art, and a set of personal lessons
learned from conducting the research.
8.1.1 Summary
Software is a knowledge-intensive product that comes
into being through an evolutionary process in which the
problem space is explored, alternatives are experimented
with, and decision are made. All of this builds a fragile
knowledge construct; every software is a science in its
own right. Building the software requires developers
who either already have the necessary knowledge, or
are enabled to learn what they need to know. However,
getting that knowledge into the developers’ heads is
expensive.
Developers cannot always have every bit knowledge
that they need about the software in their head. Learning
will be inevitable. Developers learn and relearn the re-
quired knowledge in many ways, including supervision
by other knowledgeable developers, experimentation, or
acquiring it from documentation; where documentation
is not limited to but includes source code and other soft-
ware process artifacts. Documentation is by no means
everything that developers can or do use to get the re-
quired knowledge, but it is an important ingredient for
making a software project a good learning environment.
Documentation is a long-term investment in the health
of a project. It keeps development on tracks, alleviates
distance problems, reduces communication complexity,
is one of the few things of the whole knowledge cre-
ated in a project that can be transferred to customers in
contracted development, and only documentation allows
later engineers to make a product out of a prototype.
Next, it was argued that documentation has few value
for the individual developer himself who has to write it.
It costs him his precious time but the reward is reaped
by his fellow developers and others. The effects are
ubiquitous in software development: If not guarded well,
source code is like a common property that everybody
just uses to press functionality in but that gets polluted
with unusable and missing documentation. This internal
un-quality is technical debt. The software project’s most
valuable outcome, the source code, is at stake of being
incomprehensible, and therefore of becoming unmain-
tainable, to age quickly, and to be lost finally.
Agile development methodologies have become im-
portant in today’s software development. They allow
to create value fast, and to flexibly adapt to changing
environments with emerging requirements as in research
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software projects. However, agility comes at the cost
of weakened code ownership and responsibility rela-
tionships. Moreover, agile development is renowned
for its ambivalent position towards documentation, and
its complicated relationship towards classical processes
which are central in traditional software quality manage-
ment. Agile development is often misunderstood for not
needing documentation, as a harbor for cowboy coders,
where it is difficult to control what is done. Other means
of motivating developers to write documentation are re-
quired.
This situation is addressed by the CollabReview con-
cept and prototype. CollabReview wants to offer devel-
opers an incentive to contribute more to documentation
by establishing a sense of individual responsibility in
collaboratively written software process artifacts like
source code. Responsibility for artifacts is established
by contributing to them. The result are personal karma
scores for developers that express how well they have
contributed to internal quality.
The karma scores serve in the gamification of inter-
nal quality, for instance, in leader boards, recognition
awards, or tangible rewards. While the gamification
itself and its rewards are not the central focus of this
research, several field experiments had to rely on such
games to offer an exchange value for karma points to
developers. The success of CollabReview critically de-
pends on the perceived exchange value. But if the ex-
change value is chosen right, then considerable changes
in developer behavior towards more caring for internal
quality can be achieved.
8.1.2 Contributions
This research has applied basic economic theory to ad-
vances in mining software repositories, motivation and
the emerging field of gamification to software quality
management. Its major contributions are therefore
• extending current scientific view of the software
crisis by attributing it in part to the well-known
economic effects of free riding and the sociological
phenomenon of the tragedy of commons, i.e. to the
rational individual economic thinking of develop-
ers,
• a novel and evaluated approach to improving the
internal quality of software by motivating develop-
ers to contribute to various kinds of documentation
with a game, thus
– not requiring strict process regulations but
being light-weight instead,
– functioning in agile projects with weak code
ownership,
– where few hierarchical power is available, and
– while granting developers the autonomy of
decision of when to go into technical debt,
• computing the responsibility of developers for soft-
ware process artifacts based on their contributions
and possibly other relationships,
• an algorithm based on string manipulations and
nearest neighbor searches to compute the author-
ship of developers that
– delivers better results than typical line-based
algorithms,
– has an increased robustness against reformat-
ting, moving and copying of source code, and
– thus has a higher tampering resistance,
• a telling critique of potential problems and lessons
learned when implementing a reputation in a devel-
opment environment,
• a communication channel that allows developers
and software metrics to store opinions and assess-
ments, to integrate them, and to feed them back
as quality information to the authors of software
process artifacts without unnecessarily risking per-
sonal conflicts,
• a new view on incentives and rewards to apply them
not to directly improve performance of individuals
but to strengthen communication and sustainability
within a team, and thereby improving team perfor-
mance,
• providing several empirical studies on the effect of
rewards on voluntary contributions, and
• the CollabReview prototype that is available for
reuse in further research.
The presented concept is certainly not a silver bullet
for the software crisis. Yet it can give developers a cost-
effective nudge towards making long-term investments
in the internal quality of software they produce.
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8.1.3 Lessons learned
Not only has conducting this research have had an effect
on the state of the art but it also affected myself. Besides
all the things that I have learned and experienced through
the years, I want to point out a few lessons that I deem
important to note:
Technical debt seems to be a bad vehicle for trans-
porting information about the condition of a software to
developers. While it was invented as something concrete
and graspable to make problems visible (Brown et al.,
2010), I found that developers had some problems un-
derstanding it. An experienced software engineer from a
collaborating company once even called it “ridiculous”.
Perhaps technical debt is for communicating with man-
agers, not with technical people. In times of the Euro
crisis nobody wants to be indebted, and so technical
debt has a strong negative connotation. Anyhow, techni-
cal debt was therefore not used as a karma score in the
later field experiments, and negative scores should be
avoided.
The experiments showed that a certain level of under-
standing is a very important factor for making developers
change their behavior in the desired way. Understand-
ing among developers was worst in the AgileLab. They
were only told that in order to achieve high scores, it was
enough to make sure that there was Javadoc in the source
code they contributed. Scores were too diffuse and ap-
peared a bit random. While there was murmur among
developers about scores, they did not ask questions to
investigate details or experiment with the scores. The
Moknowpedia, in contrast, had a long article dedicated
to explaining how scores were computed, and how they
effected rewards. Contributors barely read the article and
so there still were open questions; especially the article
weighting including size and view counts was confusing.
However, understanding was well enough to induce a
change in behavior. Understanding was perhaps best in
the ScrumLab, which featured detailed quality reports
that added further data on the intermediate computations.
But still understanding was not perfect. When creating
karma scores, it should be kept in mind that complexity
complicates understanding.
The CollabReview concept was invented to reduce the
need for management control in projects and still attain
internal quality. More than before I think that quality
management is a management task. If management is
not deeply committed to quality, then also CollabReview
will have a hard time to change something. The reason
is that it then misses exchange value to offer in exchange
for high karma scores: there will be no tangible rewards
without management money to pay for them, there will
be no intangible rewards that matter to the developers,
and there will rarely be peer pressure because cultural
norms regarding quality will not develop without man-
agement committing to them. CollabReview is a concept
and a tool that successfully supports management in its
quest for quality; but it will not work alone.
CollabReview was not intended to measure perfor-
mance. It never was because measuring performance
may happen to be problematic, and leave some people
demotivated and asking why they performed badly (e.g.
Humphrey, 1997; Deming, 1994). So I was surprised
to find that leaving out quantity — which is the proto-
typical performance measure — in karma scores cre-
ated feelings of unfairness. The technical debt scores
in TornBond counted only the amount of violations; not
the amount of produced (good) source code. Scores in
AgileLab and ScrumLab only measured quality without
any indication of quantity. In all three projects this was
considered as unfair by major contributors. Additionally,
social reputation seemed to be better reflected in quantity
than in quality scores. Major contributors could have
invested a little bit of their time in fixing coding style
problems and they would have been fine. Instead, they
felt that they were penalized for doing more work than
others.
Most of all, I learned that the topic of computing
karma scores is highly controversial on an emotional
level. On workshops, the concept tended to create heated
discussions, one colleague rejected to fill out any ques-
tionnaires, and even work on one of the master theses
could almost not have started because of a professor
rejecting the idea. There was almost no discussion au-
dience where there was not at least one strong opposer.
I would guess about ten percent of the people have a
problem with it. However, it were mostly concept re-
viewers who were skeptical about the concept, and less
participants of field experiments. The concept may seem
more threatening then its actual implementations were.
It is probably essential to keep the light-weight and fun
character of a sportive game-like competition when us-
ing CollabReview.
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8.2 Future work
Future work can be split into two parts: open questions
that have remained unanswered in this research due to
time constraints, and opportunities for further research.
8.2.1 Open questions
Several questions were left open in this research. Regard-
ing the prototype, users wished for hardening it against
manipulations, for personalized assistance on how to
earn the next points, or for the possibility to form teams
that could compete against each other.
The CollabReview prototype relies on a variety of
metrics to compute its scores. For example, the respon-
sibility metric relies on authorship but therefore misses
out to acknowledge deleting as a contribution. But clean-
ing up is a valuable contribution, too. While the author-
ship algorithm was good enough for the experiments
presented here, there is still room for improving its preci-
sion and its resistance against attacks. Its clone detection
technique could be enhanced with more advanced meth-
ods that rely on fuzzy matching, or exploit source code
semantics, so that superficially modified source code
retains its original author.
What has been termed indirect responsibility can be
worthwhile further research. There are many more static
analysis tools and software metrics available that could
add to the quality assessments used for source code.
Analogously, natural language metrics could enhance
quality assessments of wiki articles. Test coverage is
another information that could be incorporated into in-
ternal quality assessments. While reviews written by
humans were used in the wikis, and were foreseen for
source code in the original concept, they have not been
tested with source code. Finally, there are other karma
scores (e.g. the number of software process artifacts
rated that no one else has rated) that could be tried, and
more karma scores could be integrated into the so-called
robust karma scores.
Experiments with robust karma scores could deal with
feelings of unfairness regarding karma scores that do
not involve quantity. The problem with open-ended
quantity scores and closed-range quality scores is that
open-ended score components tend to outweigh closed-
range components. So the focus of a combined robust
karma score would shift from quality to quantity. But if
quantity is “scaled” down to a closed-range, can it still
tackle the developers’ feelings of unfairness?
CollabReview was not applied to issue trackers al-
though bug databases are important in managing project
knowledge. It should be possible to adapt the prototype
to issue trackers without much effort. So it could be used
with tracker-based requirements management. But this
has not been tried. Still more types of software process
artifacts might also be addressed.
Also, the AgileLab field experiment was the only trial
in an environment with pair programming. While part of
the failure was attributed to the diffusion of authorship
information due to pair programming, the failure may
also have other reasons. Especially if appropriate ways
of determining responsibility in programming pairs are
available, then CollabReview could also fit into such
environments.
Reputation plays an important role in open source
software development. Many projects reward their top
contributors with more development rights, e.g. earning
commit rights, and give them more control of what is
developed. A reputation system could fit naturally into
such an environment, making the process more transpar-
ent.
The rewarding system and the exchange value it pro-
vides for karma scores are essential to CollabReview.
In the field experiments, it used different rewarding
schemes as a means of delivering exchange value for
karma scores. But they were only means to an end. Fur-
ther research can focus on building better or the “perfect”
rewarding system. With respect to this, users even ex-
pressed a wish for punishment like paying money into
a thank-you box, or making earning a certain number
of karma points per week compulsory. More valuable
rewards like an additional day off were proposed, too.
Another possibility is further research into social games
to deliver more exchange value.
The prototype and the concept have many more ad-
justing screws to offer that are worthwhile further experi-
mentation and can lead to optimizations and adjustments.
Additionally, more and larger studies with CollabReview
in different environments are important to confirm its
effectiveness. With the results of more studies, its effec-
tiveness and efficiency could be determined more pre-
cisely. More studies can also provide stronger support
for aspects like the validity of karma scores.
8.2.2 Further research opportunities
CollabReview extracts information about developers’
karma scores from the revision history of software pro-
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cess artifacts that was not available in that form before.
There is more research potential in the obtained scores.
As the analysis of the data from the AgileLab field ex-
periment has shown, scores can be put into relation with
other information about or provided by developers. And
such information can also be given to the developers
themselves. For example, showing developers their re-
viewing bias could help them learn more about their
quality expectations as compared to other reviewers.
Some experiments required that the assumption holds
true that willingness to document is a character trait
of developers. So it was implicitly shown that there is
something like such a trait; perhaps this trait not only
results from experience but also related to traits like
altruism. Further research in personality psychology
could investigate into this direction.
It is not the intended purpose of CollabReview to
measure developer performance. Performance measure-
ment can easily become a threat to motivation. While
that would be an area of interest for management, lit-
erature arguments against doing it (e.g. Deming, 1994;
Humphrey, 1997; Spolsky, 2004). An instance of Col-
labReview should keep part of its fun character and never
be perceived as a threat. Therefore is unclear whether
CollabReview has the potential to replace more costly
concepts, especially formal reviews: For instance, Col-
labReview may not be suitable for security relevant soft-
ware, because coverage of sensitive code with reviews
is not guaranteed. Hence desirable deterring effects (cf.
Tanenbaum, 2001) are not very present. Further research
could investigate into this issue. Moreover, security is
only one quality characteristic. CollabReview might in
general be applicable to external quality characteristics
as well if ways are found to relate software failures to
the respective components inside the software source
code, for example through evaluating bug tracker and
revision repository commit log information.
CollabReview could be used to keep developers near
perfect workload: CollabReview constantly urges them
to increase their quality karma scores, while manage-
ment constantly throws new implementation tasks at de-
velopers. Whenever the developers’ karma scores go
above a certain threshold, managers can use this as a rec-
ommendation system to increase implementation work-
load.
Outside the software development domain, CollabRe-
view can have its place in knowledge management. This
research started with the characterization of software de-
velopment as knowledge work. And CollabReview was
already tested as a tool for increasing contributions to a
knowledge management wiki. While this was within the
software development context, CollabReview is proba-
bly applicable to other knowledge databases that rely on
voluntary contributions as well. It could, for example,
amplify contributions to collaborative efforts of collect-
ing software patterns in a database (see Reiners et al.,
2012).
If it was possible to bring other real-world processes
into a text representation, then potentially also such pro-
cesses could be supported. For instance, if the conduc-
tion of work meetings with delays, people arriving late,
interruptions, supportive work like minute keeping, and
task assignments, could be automatically converted into
text representations, then CollabReview could support
discipline, and lead to more productive meetings.
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API Application Programming Interface
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Inter-
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CASE Computer-aided Software Engineering
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CPU Central Processing Unit
CSCW Computer-supported Cooperative Work
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CVS Concurrent Versions System
DvC Durable vs. Consumable
EC European Commission (the executive of the Euro-
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FLOSS Free/Libre Open Source Software
FP5 Fifth Framework Programme for Research and
Technological Development
FP6 the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and
Technological Development
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Giga Byte
GUI Graphical User Interface
GvL Guaranteed vs. Luck
HotW Hero of the week award
HSLOC hecto non-empty lines of source code
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IDE Integrated Development Environment
IP Integrated Project
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
IvC Intermittent vs. Continuous
IvG Individual vs. Group
J2EE Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition
JSP Java Server Pages
KLOC thousand lines of code
LAN Local Area Network
LARI Large Anonymous Research Institute
LOC lines of code
NFS Network File System
OSGi Open Services Gateway initiative
P-CMM People Capability Maturity Model
PvC Public vs. Closed
PvD Proclaimed vs. Discoverable
PvR Punishment vs. Reward
RAM Random Access Memory
SCAM IEEE International Working Conference on
Source Code Analysis and Manipulation
SCM Software Configuration Management
SLOC Source Lines of Code
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
SPI Software Process Improvement
SPICE Software Process Improvement and Capability
Determination
SQuaRE Systems and software Quality Requirements
and Evaluation
SvT Show-off vs. Take-away
TQM Total Quality Management
TvO Targeted vs. Open-ended
UML Unified Modeling Language
USB Universal Serial Bus
VIE Valence-Expectancy-Instrumentality
VvR Virtual vs. Real
WebDAV Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning
Word Microsoft Word
WSDL Web Services Description Language
WWW World Wide Web
XML Extensible Markup Language
XP Extreme Programming
] the rejected review function
a software project artifact
aε empty artifact aε
A set of all software project artifacts a
b function for adding bonus point for other achieve-
ments
∆ a string edit distance function
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δa′ a an edit script that transforms a′ into a
ids developer specialization index
k a function that gives the karma score of an agent u
p a function that gives an artifact’s optimal predecessor
q a function that computes an artifact’s quality score
from the available review ratings
q′ a function that computes an artifact’s quality score
from its contributors’ karma scores
r responsibility of agent u for artifact a
s function that gives the rating score that an agent has
assigned to an artifact or one of its ancestors (recur-
sive)
t a timeliness function for reviews
u agent
U set of all agents u
w an importance function that assigns weights [0..1] to
artifacts
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